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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Relevance of the Research Subject
Comprised of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, GUAM
borders the European Union on one side, Russia on the other, and,
the Middle East on its Southern periphery. Initiated as a mecha-
nism of policy coordination during the disintegration process of the
1990s, GUAM today is a regional organisation with an advanced
structure.1 Amidst domestic turbulence within the GUAM member
states, the repercussions of the global financial crisis and Russian
intervention in Georgia and Ukraine the organisation continues to
exist. Today, GUAM is unique in post-Soviet space, because Russia—
the traditional initiator and promoter of interstate cooperation in
post-Soviet space—is no part of it, and because GUAM’s agenda
promotes the integration of its members into European and Trans-
Atlantic structures. These features indicate that the grouping may
follow other variables than have previous regional integration projects.
Regional groupings are no new phenomenon. Today, all countries
are part of a regional structure (De Lombaerde & van Langenhove
1 From 1999 to 2005 Uzbekistan was a member of the group. Thus, oﬃcial
documents and other sources of that period use the abbreviation GUUAM
(see also ch. 3).
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Figure 1.1: The GUAM member states Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine (Source: author’s design).
2007). The number of regional groupings has increased in the last
decades (cf. Choi & Caporaso 2002; Fawcett & Hurrell 1995b; Glania
& Matthes 2005); particularly interstate trade agreements have prolif-
erated (Baccini & Dür 2012; Mansfield & Milner 1999), representing
shallow integration (Börzel 2012b; Burfisher et al. 2004), while re-
gional organisations did not increase in an equally strong way and
deepened only to a limited extent (Börzel 2012b).
Regionalism Studies (RS) is characterised as ‘fragmented’ (De
Lombaerde & Söderbaum 2013: xvii, De Lombaerde et al. 2010: 731),
embracing various ‘schisms’ (Shaw et al. 2011: 4). It comprises a
diverse set of theoretical and analytical approaches, key concepts and
research issues (Goltermann et al. 2012; Väyrynen 2003). RS borrow
to a large extent from the central theories of International Relations
(IR), including the branch of European integration theories. Conclu-
sions from IR theory on the emergence of international institutions
have been reiterated for regional projects, proposing global challenges
(De Lombaerde & van Langenhove 2007)—or de-nationalised prob-
lems (Zürn 2005)—as systemic explanations, and power and welfare
increase as actor-related explanations. Interstate institutions are
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regarded as a cornerstone of cooperation (Axelrod & Keohane 1993;
Milner 1992) that help to form stable expectations of the other’s
behaviour, and therefore reduce distrust between states (Fawcett &
Hurrell 1995a; Keohane 1993; Martin & Simmons 1998). In this con-
text, regional integration is assumed to have positive eﬀects not only
for peace, but also on economic prosperity and democratisation (the
Kantian triangle), which have been of particular interest to the newly
independent states along the Eastern European periphery (Mansfield
& Pevehouse 2006; Pevehouse 2005; Oneal et al. 2003). Studying
regional projects has also been related to core issues of IR, such as
the nature of the international system, agency and how the world is
organised.
Another relevant contribution to RS comes from classical eco-
nomics. While International Political Economy (IPE) focuses on
the ‘marketisation from below’ of regional projects (Söderbaum 2013;
Spindler 2002; Väyrynen 2003) and the relation between regionalism
and globalism (Newman et al. 2006b; Sbragia & Söderbaum 2010),
development studies oﬀers insight into regional projects between de-
veloping states and into their impact on raising the development level
(Baccini 2012; Heydon & Woolcock 2012; Jurcic et al. 2013).
Patterns of regional integration diﬀer from case to case (Hettne
& Söderbaum 2002). Comparative regionalism suggests diﬀerences
for integration projects that involve developing countries (Acharya
& Johnston 2007a; Shaw et al. 2011; Sbragia & Söderbaum 2010);
yet, post-Soviet states (PSS) do not fit into classic definitions of
developing states and reflect a rather heterogenous group, suggest-
ing a diﬀerent form of regionalism. Regional integration projects in
post-Soviet space have been a domain for local scholars who have
argued primarily with ‘the power variable’ and Russian hegemony
(Molchanov & Yevdokimov 2005). Scholars disagree as to whether
the communist legacy has explanatory power for alleged divergent
patterns of regionalism (Gros & Suhrke 2000; Molchanov 2009; Lib-
man & Vinokurov 2010). A high number of projects combined with
limited activity are two characteristics of post-Soviet regionalism (cf.
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Aslund et al. 1999; Libman 2007; Molchanov 2009). Considering the
criticism of ‘façade-making’ (Trojesen 2007) and the so-called higher
eﬃciency of global integration schemes (cf. Choi & Caporaso 2002), it
is imperative to ask what added value GUAM has to oﬀer. Moreover,
the fact that Russia has neither been the initiator nor the promoter
of GUAM adds to the relevance of the case. Yet, with PSS following
a diﬀerent logic concerning democratisation and market reform than
transition states in Eastern and South Eastern Europe (Kuzio 2007;
McFaul 2002; Mickiewicz 2005), and without the ostensible transfor-
mative power of EU and NATO membership (Börzel 2011) in the near
future, the capacity of GUAM to contribute to closing the welfare
and democracy gap is doubtful. Moreover, the continuing conflict in
Ukraine underscores the significance of sovereignty.
From a European vantage point, GUAM may serve as an instru-
ment for stability along the EU’s Eastern periphery (cf. Emerson
2008; European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’
2003); promoting economic development and democratic governance
among its members, GUAM might contribute to the concept of a
‘ring of friends’ around the European Union. Other structures like
the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
or the Black Sea Synergy are of limited success while the Eastern
Partnership remains an accumulation of strategy papers and bilateral
action plans that is jeopardised by the continuing European debate
of ‘widening-versus-deepening’ (cf. Manoli 2012). In addition to the
stability perspective, the economic dimension adds to the importance
of the four GUAM countries and their joint economic agenda, since
the four states are relevant for international trade from Europe to
Asia and vice versa—particularly with regard to energy resources.
However, the EU’s East is Russia’s West, where security and economic
concerns of both actors coincide, leaving the EU with the dilemma of
how to approach GUAM without steering into strong discord with
Russia.2
2 Apart from sporadic actions, the EU does not hold established relations with
GUAM. Instead, the EU follows a single country approach. According to a
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1.2 Research Questions
This study seeks to make both an empirical and a methodological
contribution by testing two diﬀerent concepts as an explanation for the
emergence and the present state of GUAM as a regional integration
project in post-Soviet space. In scrutinising the emergence of GUAM,
I suggest that GUAM members do have common interests and follow
a double-strategy: facilitating development on the one hand, and
strengthening their sovereignty, on the other. Both aspects are tightly
interwoven and can be regarded as a consequence of disintegration from
the Soviet Union (SU).3 The inception of GUAM as well as the current
state of GUAM are designed as explanandum. The first assumption
that GUAM functions as a development strategy repeats common
ground in RS and is based on liberal institutionalism’s conviction
that states aim at welfare maximisation (1). GUAM states can be
understood to aim at shifting their comparatively low welfare level to
the level of Western European states. Thus, development—conceived
in a broad sense as the process of increasing the welfare level—is
employed as the independent variable. The second assumption refers
to the current state of GUAM, arguing that their development strategy
is bound to fail, since the composition of the participants is ill-
conceived (2). This assumption refers to three diﬀerent independent
variables: mutual trust, state capacity and demand. These variables
have to be examined in the context of the Soviet disintegration
process. The third assumption—GUAM as a sovereignty strategy—
underscores the significance of sovereignty for GUAM, which has been
regarded only marginally in RS but is decisive for PSS (3). In this
setting, sovereignty is employed as the independent variable. The
fourth assumption argues that GUAM’s sovereignty strategy is also
decision in June 2007, GUAM for the first time received funding from the
ENP budget 2007-2010 (915 mill. Euro in total), which had to be distributed
to projects of the GUAM member states, with the EU deciding how much
every state had to receive (Memo on Eastern Partnership, MEMO/09/217,
05.05.2009).
3 Other explanations for the inception and present state of GUAM, e. g. identity
construction, are disregarded due to the limited scope of this dissertation.
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deficient, because its format is inadequate for addressing practiced
sovereignty (4). Sovereignty and power are employed as independent
variables to prove this assumption. I propose that GUAM should not
be understood as a security organisation, but as an instrument to
strengthen the sovereignty of its individual member states. GUAM
contradicts traditional concepts of security organisations, since it
is less about containing conflict amongst participants, but rather
about maintaining sovereignty towards a non-member without military
elements. Summing up, I argue that GUAM as a development and
as a sovereignty strategy is not designed to fit the capacities and
demands of its members and, thus, is destined to fail.
1.3 Methodological Approach
In this dissertation GUAM is scrutinised within the regionalism re-
search programme, focusing on states which formalise their intergov-
ernmental cooperation in various issue areas with regional institutional
entities, adding relative durability to their relations (cf. Fawcett 2008;
Goltermann et al. 2012; Russett et al. 2006).4 As a product of
post-bipolarity GUAM could be associated with new regionalism
(Söderbaum & De Lombaerde 2013; Molchanov 2009), displaying
also a multidimensional character by embracing economic, political,
social and cultural aspects (Hettne 2000). Moreover, as a project
of smaller states without the participation of the advanced industri-
alised Western countries, the GUAM case follows the demands for a
turn in RS towards such case studies (Shaw et al. 2011; Sbragia &
Söderbaum 2010). However, GUAM is still state-centric, typical for
old regionalism.
This study is embedded in the grand schools of IR theory. I
combine diﬀerent ‘isms’ (cf. Keohane 2008: 1), forming a complex
whole.5 Diﬀerent theories are not perceived as mutually exclusive or
4 Regionalism as a phenomenon below the national level (micro-regionalism) is
disregarded in this context.
5 The issue continues in the debate about ‘the end of IR theory’. Dunne et al.
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competing to explain a phenomenon, but ‘tend to focus on diﬀerent or
related aspects of the broader regional phenomenon’ (De Lombaerde
et al. 2010b: 27). New theories complement old ones which remain
in our repertoire (Meyers 1990). While the economic dimension of
GUAM is primarily examined in a liberal institutionalist setting
in combination with International Political Economy, realism and
integration theories are employed for the sovereignty dimension of
GUAM.
States still constitute the main actors in IR and are assumed
to act goal-orientedly and rationally. Whether power calculation
or welfare maximising—states do calculate the costs and gains of
cooperation and inactivity (Lipson 1993; Keohane 1993), considering
future outcomes of their behaviour. PSS—like other states—exhibit
‘assertive sovereignty’ and should not be reduced to ‘pushover pawns’ of
the two former superpowers (Pourchot 2008; Silaev 2006). Within the
empiric-analytical research programme, I follow a deductive approach
that bridges traditional levels of analysis (cf. Viotti & Kauppi 1993)
to explain a regional phenomenon. Since a unit-analysis cannot ignore
the context of the international system (cf. Keohane 1984), this
analysis embraces structure-related as well as actor-related variables. I
will detail the theoretical setting at the beginning of the two analytical
chapters.
This dissertation is based on heuristic analysis of various docu-
ments. I cite secondary sources on the region and GUAM member
states, primary sources from governments, media and international
organisations, such as the legal documents of GUAM or the mem-
ber states (including government publications like strategies or press
releases), newspaper articles and interviews with oﬃcials, diﬀerent
indices and special reports are examined as well.6 The latter comprise
governance as well as economic indicators, the Bertelsmann Transfor-
(2013: 416f) propose ‘integrative pluralism’ which diﬀers from eclecticism by
intersecting and forming a complex whole. By contrast, David A. Lake (2013)
suggests concentrating on mid-level theories, which will also be considered in
this dissertation.
6 Bibliography or citation in Cyrillic letters has been transliterated into Latin
letters according to the norm BGN/PCGN.
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mation Index (BTI), the Transition Report from the EBRD, Nations
in Transit from Freedom House, the Global Competitiveness Report
(GCR) from the World Economic Forum, various data sets from the
WTO, IMF, Worldbank, etc. It has to be noted that international
economic statistics involve primarily data provided by national gov-
ernments. Even analysts from the post-Soviet states acknowledge
deficits of their indices—their diverging calculation methods, deliber-
ate manipulation or simply non-availability of data—which complicate
the comparability among GUAM states (Libman 2007; Libman &
Vinokurov 2010; Vinokurov et al. 2009;).7
Lastly, the reader should be aware that recent political develop-
ments in the GUAM states—notably Ukraine—could only be followed
until the beginning of 2014.
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation begins with a look at the state of the art, which
serves as an introduction to post-Soviet regionalism (ch.2). It also
highlights the characteristics and predispositions of PSS, forming an
important backdrop for the subsequent analysis. The following chap-
ter (ch. 3) introduces the research subject, which may be unknown
to some readers. It recounts GUAM’s institutional development and
objectives as formulated in its oﬃcial documents. The short perfor-
mance review in this section is the starting point for the subsequent
analysis of the state of GUAM within the framework of development
and sovereignty. At this early stage of research, I eschew the term
failure to characterise the performance of GUAM, because using it
might overlook accomplishments between the lines which may have
arisen as an epiphenomenon.
Next, I embark on the two major sections of analysis: The chapter
7 E. g. the export from Ukraine to Russia is estimated diﬀerently in Russian
and Ukrainian national statistics (Libman & Vinokurov 2010: 8). Ambiguous
owner structures in the private sector, shadow economy, inconsistencies (in
methodologies and along years even within one state) add to the diﬃcult
statistical situation (Libman 2007: 402; 407).
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on GUAM’s economic dimension (ch. 4) examines the explanatory
power of the development concept for the genesis of GUAM and
surveys conditional variables such as mutual trust, state capacity and
demand calculations in the foreign trade sector, to explain the current
state of GUAM. The last chapter examines the emergence of GUAM
as a sovereignty strategy (ch. 5). It also reveals how the objective of
strengthening sovereignty leads to inconsistencies in the development
of GUAM itself. Chapter four and five each begin with theoretical
considerations and then turn to explanations for the origination of
GUAM and continue by expounding the current state. Lastly, I
sum up the major conclusions (ch. 6) and illustrate how they can
contribute to our understanding of GUAM and how they might aﬀect
our knowledge of post-Soviet regionalism and regionalism studies in
general.

Chapter 2
GUAM and post-Soviet
Regionalism
2.1 Conceptualising the Research Subject
The first part of this chapter conceptualises the research subject. I will
illustrate that GUAM can be regarded as a regional integration project
and, thus, as a subject of regionalism studies. Subsequently, I will
explain how I employ the term of PSS. GUAM members are and their
characteristics will assist in understanding the peculiarities of post-
Soviet regionalism in general and GUAM in particular. Thus, we can
determine how GUAM fits into previous conclusions on regionalism.
The second part of this chapter reviews current research on post-Soviet
regionalism and also reflects on what scholars already do know about
GUAM. Thus, I present a starting point for my argument and explain
how this study assists in closing voids in current research on GUAM.
2.1.1 GUAM and Regional Integration
Referring to a basic definition of integration as a process1 between at
least two states who deepen their mutual cooperation in such a manner
1 There is a continuing debate on integration describing either a precondition, a
process or a result (Bieling & Lerch 2006a; Meyers 2008b: 506).
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that they form joint rules and procedures which take eﬀect in joint
institutions (Haas 1958), GUAM can be regarded as an integration
project. GUAM is, thus, more than interstate cooperation, although
such cooperation can be a starting point of an integration process
(Goltermann et al. 2012: 4).2 As a subcategory of cooperation
between states integration shares central characteristics which have
been brought forward by Robert Axelrod & Robert Keohane (1986;
1993) and Helen Milner (1992). Accordingly, integration can be
discerned as goal-oriented behaviour of states, who take measures
to elevate their mutual dependence in aspiration of mutual benefits
(cf. also Cohen Orantes 1981; Haas & Schmitter 1981). Submitting
to a joint set of rules and procedures allows states to form stable
expectations about each other’s behaviour (cf. Krasner 1982).
A major criterion for distinguishing integration from cooperation
is the forming of institutions. The quality of competences that are
granted by nation-states to an institution alludes to the level of inte-
gration. Such competences can refer to a collective decision-making
process (Lindberg 1971: 48) or even to juridical competences (cf.
Haas 1958: 16). Integration means opening up national processes to
the influence of the partner (cf. Hoﬀmann 2007: 100) and therefor
is commonly related to a loss of national sovereignty (Kühnhardt
2008; Kösler & Zimmek 2008a). Such institutions represent a new
governance level that forms and executes decisions and, thus, obtains
actor quality (cf. De Lombaerde & van Langenhove 2007: 1; Galtung
1981: 132; Mattli 1999). The new governance level can be grasped as
‘a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over
the preexisting national states’ (Haas 1958: 16). Notwithstanding, a
transfer of competences or authority (cf. Lindberg 1971: 48) from the
national level to the new established entity may come along only at the
end of an integration process (Mattli 1999: 41; Zimmerling 1991: 42).
The creation of such a new regional or international actor could also
serve as a significant criterion to distinguish integration (understood
2 Such a wide definition would embrace regional organisations as well as pref-
erential trade agreements. Regionalism as an interdisciplinary research field
tries to embrace political as well as economic regional phenomena.
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as a result) from regional cooperation—although regional cooperation
can be regarded as a starting point of integration (understood as
a process). Furthermore, integration entails a dynamic character.
More and more issues can be addressed by shared regulations and
the number or scope of physical supporting structures can increase as
well as decrease.
Starting with policy coordination around the CFE-treaty negotia-
tions at the beginning of the 1990s, GUAM’s Washington Declaration
(1999) already reflects the creation of a shared code of conduct. The
Yalta Charter (2001) initiated the transformation from a regime to
a full-fledged regional organisation and can be recognised as a first
level of integration, where territorial entities give a mandate to a com-
mon body to govern the areas of collaboration (cf. Slocum-Bradley
2008: 241). Understanding integration as a process allows us to term
GUAM as an integration project, even though the implementation of
accorded integration goals is lagging behind and existing institutions
like GUAM’s Secretariat maintain weak authority over the partici-
pating states. I opt for a wider definition of integration which also
embraces joint institutions with a weak mandate. Shallow forms of
regional integration are still prevalent (cf. Börzel 2012b: 256). This
allows us to focus on how and why states initiate integration projects
as well as on obstacles for implementing integration projects. GUAM
embraces economic and political objectives as well as cultural and
scientific objectives. Whereas Nye (1968: 858) distinguishes types
of integration, this dissertation considers GUAM to be a ‘multidi-
mensional’ as well as a ‘complex’ integration process as suggested by
adherents to the New Regionalism (NR) school (cf. De Lombaerde et
al. 2008: 149).
As a regional integration project GUAM states form common
policies and create common institutions that are situated above the
national level but below the systemic level (cf. Buzan & Weaver
2003: 28, De Lombaerde & van Langenhove 2007: 1). They form
a delimitable sub-system of the international system (Hettne 2000:
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xviii; Kern 2002: 18), also dubbed as supra-national or macro-regional
level (cf. De Lombaerde & van Langenhove 2007: 1; Hettne 2007:
1021). Regional integration corresponds to the term of regionalism
in a narrower sense (Hurrell 1995: 39; Söderbaum 2008: 1; Telo
2001c: 90), yet, without elaborating on a particular institutional form
(Fawcett & Hurrell 1995b: 3). In a broad sense, regionalism can be
grasped as the sum of all inter-state relations in a geographical region
(Rinke 2008: 445).3 The territorial parameter is often applied as
a minimal definition for regional integration projects, describing a
number of states linked together by a geographical relationship—or
‘alleged geographical proximity’ (Slocum-Bradley 2008: 242; cf. also
Goltermann et al. 2012: 4). Taking into account maritime borders,
GUAM indeed forms a territorially related space. GUAM has also
been discerned as a sub-regional integration project, either of the
post-Soviet space or the Black Sea region (Libman 2007; Robinson
2004; Tsantoulis 2009). Considering Björn Hettne’s core-periphery
dichotomy (2007: 1022), GUAM can also be interpreted as a pe-
ripheral regional integration project, presuming it to be ‘politically
more turbulent and economically more stagnant’ (Hettne 2000: xx)
but also ‘fragile and ineﬀective’ (ib.). Of course, such categories
are objects of change, since regions are dynamic (cf. Gebhard 2007:
34). Regarding the degree of regionalisation, GUAM’s regionness
(Hettne & Söderbaum 2002) and consequently its actorness (Hettne
2005: 270) is rather low. In addition to the territorial parameter,
a regional project implies some degree of mutual interdependence
3 Regionalism can also be grasped as a strategy to organise world order in a
multipolar way, as well as a project of forming regions (Fawcett 2005: 24;
Farrell 2005: 8f). Hettne & Söderbaum (2002: 34) see this diﬀerence as
regionalism and regionalisation, with the latter relating to the process of
implementing regionalism (Gebhard 2007: 38; Fawcett 2005: 25; Hettne &
Söderbaum 2002: 34), discerning a process of social transformation ‘whereby
the regional level is becoming a relevant space for many aspects of human
behaviour and activities’ (de Lombaerde & van Langenhove 2007: 1). It should
not be confused with the usage by economists who delineate regionalisation
as bottom-up integration that arises rather spontaneously from increased
social and economic interactions of market actors (Breslin et al. 2002: 14; cf.
Goltermann et al. 2012: 4).
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between participating states (Fawcett 2008: 17; Goltermann et al.
2012: 4; Hettne & Söderbaum 2002: 38; Veitl 1981: 25). Although
GUAM members share a post-Soviet identity (Molchanov 2002) and
Georgia and Azerbaijan may be associated with a South-Caucasian
identity (Eyvazov 2007), GUAM should not be considered as a region
that is based on or has formed a distinct regional identity.4 I will
discuss the issue of interdependence and traces of a common identity
among GUAM member states in more detail in ch.4.
GUAM as a regional or sub-regional integration project can also
be termed restricted regional integration. GUAM is restricted in two
ways. Firstly, GUAM is limited by the preponderance of national
authority. Even rejecting Etzioni’s idea of a political community as
the final outcome of integration (1962: 44ﬀ), a process definition
demands that some form of regional entity with a certain degree of
authority is being formed. However, GUAM’s present institutional
set-up focuses more on coordinating national policies than on adjusting
preferences. Participants are not (yet) prepared to shift competences
to the regional level. I will return to that point in ch. 3.3.1 and 5.3.3.
Secondly, GUAM’s integration can be regarded as restricted by the
dualism of GUAM integration and Euro-Atlantic integration. Over
the long haul, GUAM members strive for stronger integration into the
European Union and NATO. Full membership is not the immediate
objective, but may be the aim of a longer process. Hence, GUAM
is conceived as a stepping stone towards another existing—macro-
regional—integration project, which would eventually make GUAM
obsolete eventually. This is a peculiarity of GUAM.
4 It is undisputed that region building may be employed as a way of identity
construction, similar to the construction of national identity (Solioz & Stubbs
2009: 4; cf. Ciuta 2008: 140; cf. Slocum-Bradley 2008: 241), making a region
a cognitive product (Schmitt-Egner 2002: 181). However, identity formation is
not the object of this dissertation. Social constructivism perceives regions as
‘socially constructed, spatial ideas, which follow concepts of community and
society’ (Goltermann et al. 20012: 4).
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Integration as a research subject has gained importance among IR
scholars with the phenomenon of European integration (cf. Schieder
2012: 83; cf. Goltermann et al. 2012: 6), which to this day re-
mains unique in its scope and format. With the EU as their pet
project, regionalism scholars embrace European integration theories
as well as theories from Political Economy forming the two major
schools of theory within RS (cf. Börzel 2012b: 258f; Goltermann
et al. 2012: 5; Väyrynen 2003: 25). Integration theories have
been strongly influenced by the great debates of IR theory (Schieder
2012: 83). The two main schools of thought of European integration
theories—intergovernmentalism5 and neofunctionalism (supranation-
slism)6—still characterise the research field (Goltermann et al. 2012:
5; Schieder 2012: 83; Schimmelpfennig 2012: 394). Adherents of
liberal institutionalism contributed to what has been termed liberal
intergovernmentalism (Moravszik 1998), emphasising the role of in-
ternational institutions for facilitating trust between states and for
compliance of participants with joint rules, but also the role of relative
power in the international system (Schieder 2012: 84). State interests
are also influenced by interests of societal actors (ib.). In contrast,
adherents to a realist intergovernmentalism highlight the influence of
geopolitics on the formation of state interests (ib.).
Neofunctionalism also believes in the transformative power of
international institutions (Schieder 2012: 85). Rational neofunc-
tionalism borrows from intergovernmentalism the cost calculus, but
underscores that interstate negotiations are a result of and not a
cause for integration (Schieder 2012: 87). Schimmelpfennig (2012:
411) highlights the sequencing in employing both analytical schools:
5 Intergovernmentalism explains the integration as the result of a bargaining
process between governments, thus, determining states as the relevant actors
(Schieder 2012: 83; Goltermann et al. 2012: 5; Schimmelpfennig 2012: 410f).
Their decisions follow a cost-calculus and are also influenced by exogenous
factors such as increasing interdependence or economic shocks (Schieder 2012:
87).
6 Neofunctionalism discerns elites and transnational organisations as relevant
actors (Goltermann et al. 2012: 5). But integration also stems from endogenous
preferences, spill-over eﬀects and path dependency (Schimmelpfennig 2012:
410f).
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While intergovernmentalism may explain the emergence of European
integration, neofunctionalism is better suited to explain the present
state of the European project.
Social constructivism as another theoretical branch has been either
regarded as an independent school of thought that emphasises the
process of identity formation for the European integration project
(Schimmelpfennig 2012: 411) or as a sub-category of neofunctionalism
(social-constructivist supranationalism) (Schieder 2012: 87).7 Soci-
ologists underscore the role of the people and how they aﬀect and
are aﬀected by the European integration process.8 Other scholars
underscore the utility of a federalist approach in understanding Eu-
ropean integration.9 The Political Economy approach as the second
major theoretical school in RS will be addressed separately in ch. 4.1.1.
Today, the European Union is by far not the only regional project.
Although the number of deep integration projects remains scarce
(Börzel 2012b: 256), forms of regional integration have skyrocketed
in the last decades (cf. Baccini & Dür 2012: 57). Regional projects
of developing countries are emerging (Jurcic et al. 2013: 1; Sbragia
& Söderbaum 2010: 563; Shaw et al. 2011: 10), but also other
formal and informal regional projects by non-state-actors, so called
micro-regionalism (Börzel 2012b: 256; Shaw et al. 2011: 4; Väyrynen
7 Further integration would depend on the identification with European ideas
within the member states and on how much Europeanisation corresponds to
the existing political ideas within the member states (Schieder 2012: 86).
8 See Eigmüller, Monika (2010): Integration trotz Desintegration. Entwick-
lungstendenzen der EU. In Soeﬀner, Hans-Georg (ed.): Transnationale Verge-
sellschaftungen: Verhandlungen des 35. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft
für Soziologie Frankfurt/M, Bd. 1 u. 2. See also the impact of interest groups
for policy making and the role of civil society and the question of legiti-
macy: Knodt, Michele and Corcaci, Andreas (2012): Europäische Integration.
Anleitung zur theoriegeleiteten Analyse. Konstanz.
9 See Benson, David & Jordan, Andrew (2011): Exploring the Tool-Kit of Euro-
pean Integration Theory: What Role for Cooperative Federalism? Journal of
European Integration V.33, pp. 1-17. Further approaches to scrutinise Euro-
pean integration come from multi-level governance or from Neo-Gramscian and
Critical analysis, see Knodt, Michele and Corcaci, Andreas (2012): Europäische
Integration. Anleitung zur theoriegeleiteten Analyse. Konstanz.
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2003: 44). Such integration attempts by non-state actors have been
primarily observed in the economic area, and dubbed as ‘marketization
from below’ or as ‘regionalisation’ (Spindler 2002: 25; Väyrynen 2003:
44). At the same time, existing regional projects experience deepening
(Börzel 2012b: 256; Burfisher et al. 2004: 4). Moreover, exogenous
factors like uneven globalisation or the proliferation of (weak) states
created a new environment for regional projects (Shaw et al. 2011: 5).
As a consequence, the focus of RS shifted from integration projects
between Western states towards a growing number of multifaceted
regional groupings initiated by non-Western states and non-state
actors (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 13; Börzel 2012b: 256; Fawcett
& Hurrell 1995b: 2), including also interactions between regional
groupings (inter-regionalism) and other actors of the international
system and their eﬀect on world order (cf. Hettne 2005; cf. Hettne &
Söderbaum 2002; cf. Fawcett & Hurrell 1995b; Shaw et al. 2011: 4;
Väyrynen 2003: 44). This turn towards new research issues has been
frequently termed ‘New Regionalism’ (cf. Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond
2010: 993).
However, a review of recent studies revealed that analyses with
a state and Eurocentric perspective continue (Shaw et al. 2011: 4;
Söderbaum 2013: 9); as a result, scholars advise their academic peers
to make greater eﬀorts to integrate those changes into analysis, em-
brace comparative regionalism and pay more attention to the social
construction of regions as well as the nexus between market, state and
non-state actors (Söderbaum 2013: 9; cf. Warleigh-Lack & Rosamond
2010: 993; cf. Shaw et al. 2011: 4). Nonetheless, there is neither a
methodological nor a theoretically clear concept of NR (De Lombaerde
et al. 2010a: 731; cf. Lovering 1998). Perceptions of phases of RS
vary and it remains unclear what exactly diﬀers, thus, giving rise to a
‘fragmented’ research area (Söderbaum & De Lombaerde 2010: xvii;
Väyrynen 2003: 25).10 The essence may be grasped with the advice
10 Some scholars link NR to the end of bipolarity and the decline of American
hegemony (Söderbaum & De Lombaerde 2013: xvii; Hettne 2007: 1021; cf.
also Hettne & Söderbaum 2002 and Hettne 2005: 270), making NR a new
concept to analyse IR since regional institutions are the new actors among
states (Joﬀé 2001: xiv), while others date the ‘new turn’ to the 2010s or the
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not to remain focused on a state-centric and EU-oriented research
field. As such, GUAM is both sticking to the old state-led regionalism,
while simultaneously opening up to new forms of regionalism beyond
Europe.11
Asking why states form regional groupings, the genesis, growth and
institutional design of regional integration projects have been leading
research interest (Goltermann et al. 2012: 3).12 The power variable
and economic factors (interdependence and externalities) have been
the two major explanatory variables (Börzel 2012b: 259). Scientists
later turned to the conditions for success of regional integration
(Farrell 2005). The impact of domestic factors gained importance
(Goltermann et al. 2012: 3). The reciprocal eﬀect of regionalism on
its members is another research direction (ib.), driven primarily by the
Europeanisation concept.13 Scholars perceive major diﬀerences for
projects between small states (Börzel 2012b: 259) or projects between
developing states (Jurcic et al. 2013; Shaw et al. 2011; Söderbaum &
Sbragia 2010; Väyrynen 2003).
work of Acharya & Johnston 2007a (Shaw et al. 2011: 5). NR has also been
associated with an economic turn in analysis of regional groupings, the growing
importance of the global market (Baccini & Dür 2012: 57; Robson 1993: 330;
Gebhard 2007: 42; cf. Mansfield & Milner 1997b: 2; Väyrynen 2003: 44).
Some scholars regard the emergence of regional projects between non-state
actors as major feature of NR (Spindler 2002: 2; Börzel 2012b: 256). For
Burfisher et al. (2004: i) NR is associated with new methods of analysis.
11 Tanja A. Börzel (2012b: 262) demands more studies on the repercussions of
integration on member states, whereas Sbragia & Söderbaum (2010: 563) and
Jurcic et al. (2013: 1) pledge for a focus on other cases of regionalism. Also,
other actors should be included and, thus, attention should turn towards the
nexus between market, state and non-state actors (Söderbaum 2013: 9).
12 See Acharya & Johnston (2007b) for questions of legitimacy of institutions
and their design, or De Lombaerde & Schulz (2009), Fawcett (2005), Acharya
& Johnston (2007c) for the role of sovereignty and the influence of external
factors on regional processes.
13 Europeanisation focuses on the consequences European politics have on national
states. Diﬀusion can be grasped as a sub-category of Europeanisation (Schieder
2012: 88f). See also Börzel (2011) or Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas (2012):
From Europeanization to Diﬀusion Special Issue of West European Politics V:
35: 1.
20 CHAPTER 2. GUAM AND POST-SOVIET REGIONALISM
Concluding, GUAM will be employed in this dissertation as a
restricted regional integration project. Regional integration shall be
understood as cooperative behaviour (a), between at least two states
(b), on more than one issue (multidimensional) (c), that produces a
new institutional structure above the national level and below the
systemic level (d), to which participants gradually shift competences
that traditionally belonged at the national level (e). Integration is
restricted in the sense that it does not aim at the creation of a new
governance level above the nation-state with considerable authority.
Instead, it envisages a low level of institutionalistion with the emphasis
on issue-oriented interstate cooperation (harmonising policies).
2.1.2 Characteristics of post-Soviet States
This section addresses the challenges PSS14 face and and how they
diﬀer from other post-communist states, suggesting diverging assump-
tions on their behaviour in regional integration projects.
The dissolution of the USSR posed various problems: the demar-
cation of new borders, the establishment of clear citizenship, the
division of the Soviet army and its armaments while maintaining
security among all former republics. Furthermore, the financial dif-
ficulty of budget and debt division, the establishment of separate
14 In absence of an adequate term, in this dissertation PSS comprise all former SU
republics except for the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (cf.
Robinson 2004), which are commonly not included in studies on post-Soviet
space. Due to their diﬀerent economic, political and historic development in the
20th century as well as their diﬀerent status within the SU, they are perceived
as in between states, fitting neither in the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) category nor with the other post-communist states in Eastern Europe (cf.
Kaczinski 2004). Russia is a diﬃcult subject due to its dominant role within
the SU and its past as a Tsarist Empire. Where appropriate, I indicate that an
assumption does not hold true for Russia. Dmitri Trenin (2011) and Alexander
Nikitin (2008) object correctly that the common Soviet past is less determining
today, but fail to provide an alternative term. Since the withdrawal of Georgia
and due to the ambiguous legal structure of the CIS, the term CIS states
would also be ill-conceived. The term Eurasian states (Molchanov 2009; Way
& Levitsky 2007) reiterates the controversial issue of the Baltic and Russia
and the general question of who is European and who is Asian.
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functioning market economies and monetary systems for all former re-
publics (safeguarding resource and energy supply), the establishment
of functioning independent infrastructure or telecommunication, and
then also the issue of inherited ecological problems. Finally, the whole
process of state and nation building for all the new independent states,
some of which had no prior experience—neither with independence
nor with democracy nor even with being a nation. All these challenges
were to be managed with the same communist elite and bureaucracy
and the inherited political and economic institutions of the Soviet
past (Ergun 2011: 51ﬀ). The dissolution of the USSR happened so
fast without time nor previous patterns to prepare for it (cf. Aslund
et al. 1999: 1; cf. Astrov & Havlik 2007: 128ﬀ; Odom & Dujarric
1997: 8). Those challenges oﬀer both prerequisites and obstacles
for regional integration attempts as I will demonstrate in the course
of my study. Particularly the sudden exposure to the international
system of post-bipolarity as new independent states and their lack of
capacities (financial and institutional) will prove to be relevant for
the subsequent analysis of GUAM.
PSS are assumed to develop along a diﬀerent path than other post-
communist states in Europe.15 Taras Kuzio’s (2007: 25) quadruple
transition concept emphasises the demands of institution building on
the one hand, and nation building and identity construction on the
other, since PSS—with the exception of Russia and the Baltic—did not
previously exist as independent states. Moreover, whereas transition
in Central and Southeast European states has been motivated and
pressured by the European Union as well as the United States, the
Western leverage (Way & Levitsky 2007: 48) was absent in the case of
the former Soviet republics. Today countries from post-Soviet space
are recognised to be managing political and economical transition less
successfully (Holmes 2004: 235; Mickiewicz 2005: 197). Thus, scholars
15 Post-communist states diﬀer in their trajectories from previous transition
countries in Latin America and Africa by the simultaneity of change (Oﬀe
1991), characterising it as a ‘threefold transition process’ (Szczerbiak 2004:
1223; cf. Holmes 2004: 232).
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tend to avoid the concept of ‘transition’ for PSS, since those states
may indeed neither head towards democratisation nor capitalism, but
towards pre-Soviet standards where ‘feudal institutions structured
the societies’ (Stefes & Wooden 2009: 5).16 Even though PSS are
not homogenous, they are regarded as a distinct sub-category of
post-communist states in this dissertation.17
The low level of democratisation as well as of market reform ex-
emplify the post-communist divide (Way & Levitsky 2007: 48; cf.
Mickiewicz 2005: 197). In contrast to the previous third wave of
democratisation, communist states converted into democracies and
dictatorships (McFaul 2002: 213; cf. Croissant & Merkel 2000; cf.
Diamond & Morlino 2005; Stefes & Wooden 2009: 6). The former
Soviet states (save the Baltic) have shifted towards authoritarian-
ism, usually combined with a low level of domestic and transnational
trust. They ‘often lack political legitimacy, and have little capacity to
pursue domestic change or international association’ (Robinson 2004:
191). PSS keep being hybrid regimes at best (Freedom House 2014).
Moreover, instead of a civil society scholars observe atomised society
with lacking interest in self-organisation, combined with a strengthen-
ing of paternalistic traditions (cf. Grinberg 2003: 340).18 Domestic
agents of change are hard to discern. NGOs in PSS function rather as
research institutions than as representatives of their members, since
membership is low (Ergun 2011: 55). Moreover, they are kept alive by
16 Understanding democratic transition with Linz & Stepan (1996: 3) the process
is finished for PSS, although the final objective of a democratic state on market
economic terms similar to Western European democracies has not been reached.
All four GUAM states continue to struggle with the outcomes of transition.
Only Azerbaijan could be regarded as a consolidated state.
17 Diﬀerentiation among PSS can be made along endemic factors, like a weak
tradition of statehood, in relation to their linkage with European organisations,
or in their reaction to Russia’s role in the neighbourhood (Bremmer & Bailes
1998: 139). They can also be categorised by their adherence to transformation
or consolidation (Holmes 2004: 235).
18 Molchanov & Molchanova (2010: 6) speak of a ‘relative immaturity of civil
societies’ and poor social capital (cf. also Ergun 2011: 54). For civil society
in PSS cf. Howard, M.M. (2003): The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-
Communist Europe. Cambridge.
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foreign support in the first place (ib.), making them easy targets for
restrictive measures by their governments. Yet, the colour revolutions
have indicated a turn towards more bottom-up initiatives (Stefes &
Wooden 2009: 9).19
Azerbaijan is a typical autocratic regime (cf. Linz & Stepan
1996; Freedom House 2014) while the other three states can be charac-
terised as hybrid regimes at best which more or less successfully mimic
Western democracies (Kuzio 2009; Musayev 2010; Munteanu 2005;
Freedom House 2014).20 Although Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
have been leading the ranking of political democratisation in the
CIS-area for a long time, in international comparison they are only in
the middle field (BTI Regional Report 2012: 2). The so–called ‘colour
revolutions’ have lost their steam and have partly even reversed direc-
tion (table 2.1 below lists countries and level of democratic progress).
Autocratic elements are consolidating (Donner 2010: 2; BTI 2010
brochure: 15; BTI regional report 2012: 2). Azerbaijan, in contrast,
maintains the lower ranks both among CIS-states and internationally
(ib.).
1999/2000 2005 2010 2013 2014
Azerbaijan 5.58 5.86 6.39 6.64 6.68
Georgia 4.17 4.96 4.93 4.82 4.68
Moldova 4.25 5.07 5.14 4.79 4.86
Ukraine 4.63 4.50 4.39 4.86 4.93
Table 2.1: Freedom House Democracy Score 1999/2000 – 2014, from 1 to 7 with
1 as the highest level of democratic progress (Source: Freedom House).
19 At least for the hydrocarbon exporting countries like Azerbaijan this hope
may be ahead of time, since such states strengthen patron-client relations by
smart distribution of revenues among agents (Wooden & Stefes 2009b: 253;
Franke et al. 2009: 133).
20 There is a wide discussion about the term of hybrid regimes (and other adjective
democracies), for example Köhler & Warkotsch (2010), Linz & Stepan (1996),
Croissant & Merkel (2004), Diamond & Morlino (2005).
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From the economic vantage point, almost all post-communist
states aimed at the completion of a free market economy (Mickiewicz
2005: 197). Being PSS, GUAM members had to transform their
planned economy into a market economy, and at the same time to
disintegrate from an economic union state into independent national
economies. Economic transformation demands appropriate legislation
providing the space and the boundaries for economic activity, as well
as the necessary regulatory institutions. This ‘economic constitution’
and its corresponding institutions are still in the making in Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Several PSS can be characterised as rentier states, e. g. GUAM
member Azerbaijan (Franke 2009: 19; cf. Kakharov 2007: 111). They
are not yet fully developed market economies—and may remain on
that level for years to come (EBRD Transition Report 2010: 4)—or
even turn into ‘failed economies’ (Popescu & Wilson 2009: 17). Since
the mid 2000s economic reform has stagnated in all four GUAM states
(EBRD Transition Report 2013: 4). They have been deeply aﬀected
by the 2008 financial crisis, and have not yet returned to pre-crisis
economic growth (EBRD Transition Report 2013: 11).
All four GUAM economies are ‘at about the same stage of eco-
nomic liberalization’ (Muzaﬀarli 2008: 33). A coherent understanding
of market principles appears still to be missing. Ronald Chilcote
(2004: 629) and Ruslan Grinberg (2003: 340) nowadays perceive
a mixture of capitalism and central planning similar to developing
states. A strong command-and-control style in economic regulation
is still evident.21 Comparing the economic systems of all GUAM
participants, the Global Competitiveness Report has for many years
characterised GUAM members as ‘countries in transition from a factor
driven economy to an eﬃciency driven economy’, except for Moldova
which remains a ‘factor driven economy’ (GCR 2010-11: 88; 162; 240;
21 Molchanov & Molchanova (2010: 7) perceive a dichotomy between individual
businesses on market economy terms and governmental enterprises which are
still centrally planned from above as in the communist past. In addition,
among PSS the political and economic elite are overlapping, implying that
political decision-makers follow their individual instead of the national economic
interest.
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334).22 However, Georgia and Ukraine could improve their status and
are categorised as eﬃciency driven economies in the last GCR study
(GCR 12-13: 182; 356). According to the EBRD Transition Report
(2013: 4), the improvement of economic institutions can be delineated
as the major challenge for all four states in order to push economic
growth and advance the transition process. Table 2.2 shows how the
four GUAM states coped with political and economic transition as
estimated by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
However, the term developing state, which is frequently applied by
regionalism scholars, has its limits. The concept is strongly oriented
on economic variables (Halperin 2007: 220; Chilcote 2004: 628), pri-
marily considering indicators of economic performance like growth
rates or per capita GNI. While performance indicators place post-
communist states close to developing economies, structural indicators
show their likeness to industrialised states, e. g. by their higher
developed health and education sector or their higher degree of indus-
trialisation and infrastructure development (Nohlen 1997: 17; Gros &
Suhrcke 2000: 18; Grigoriev & Salikhov 2007: 10). Economists have
hesitated to categorize post-communist states. In the first years after
1991, they were put in an in between category.23 Today, Azerbaijan
is characterised as an ‘upper middle income’ state and the other
three GUAM members as ‘lower middle income’ states according to
the Worldbank system (Worldbank Doing Business Report 2012).24
Nevertheless, from a purely economic perspective they have more in
common with developing rather than with advanced industrialised
economies.
22 The GCR determines three development stages of economies, based on twelve
socio-economic categories. The lowest level is a factor driven economy, followed
by an eﬃciency driven economy and finally an innovation driven economy.
23 The OECD formed the special category of ‘more advanced developing and
Eastern European countries’.
24 The OECD returned to the Worldbank categorizing system in 2005. Lower
middle income states show a GNI per capita between 1006 and 3975 USD.
Upper middle income states show a GNI per capita between 3976 and 12,275
USD. For alternative dimensions of a development concept cf. Nohlen &
Schultze (2010) and Halperin (2007).
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Summing up, as PSS the four GUAM members faced a greater
scope of challenges than other post-Communist European countries
since they had to cope with disintegration from the SU, that is to say,
forming individual states and economies from scratch. In general, PSS
have turned into states with authoritarian governance and various
economy types. Those characteristics can be assumed to aﬀect their
expectations and management of regional integration.
2.2 Concepts and Voids in Current Research
The following two chapters draw on present assumptions on regional
integration projects in post-Soviet space25 and display the state of
the art on GUAM research. A closer look at general research on post-
Soviet integration projects is indispensable, since thorough analyses
of the GUAM case are rare. This allows us to form a starting point
for the subsequent analysis.
2.2.1 Post-Soviet Regionalism
Studies on integration projects in post-Soviet space are underrepre-
sented in regionalism studies (RS). Ikboljon Qoraboyev (2010: 206)
remarks that scholars of RS and scholars of post-Soviet studies have
conducted research in relative ignorance of each other. In this small
research area native scholars dominate with the CIS as the focal point
of analysis (Malfliet et al. 2007; Klimin 2009). Mikhail Molchanov
(2009) issued one of the rare comprehensive works on integration in
the region, and the detailed analysis from Aslund et al. (1999) remains
fundamental to understanding the emergence of regional cooperation
among PSS. Therefore, scrutinising the GUAM case adds to studies
25 Nine cooperation projects dominate post-Soviet space: The Customs Union, the
CIS, the Single Economic Space (also translated as ‘Common Economic Space’),
the Eurasian Economic Community, the Union State project between Russia
and Belarus, GUAM ODED and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation
(CSTO). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Community
of Democratic Choice (CDC) are hybrid constructs of PSS and their European-
Asian neighbours.
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of post-Soviet regionalism and contributes to general conclusions on
regional integration.
Although the majority of scholars consent that regional integration
eﬀorts in post-Soviet space share many characteristics with previous
regional projects initiated by developing states, they shy away from
equating those integration projects with each other (cf. Safaeva 2007:
129; Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 1;6).26 Regionalism between
PSS is still state-led, representing ‘old’ regionalism (Börzel 2012b:
256). Mikhail Molchanov’s concept of Eurasian Regionalism attempts
to integrate the knowledge on post-Soviet regional integration projects
into the larger research field of RS and advance the formulation of
general conclusions. He highlights that regional integration projects in
post-Soviet space transcend economic development, ‘invoking numer-
ous political, cultural, ecological, and traditional and nontraditional
security motifs’ (Molchanov 2009: 328; cf. also Skripka 2011: 18).
Mikhail Molchanov (2009: 328) argues that Eurasian regionalism
cannot be termed as either ‘old’ or ‘new’, either ‘core’ or ‘peripheral’
regionalism. It rather is an ‘eclectic combination’ of opposites. He
also rejects the view of regional integration projects in post-Soviet
space being just Russian ‘neo-imperialism’ (2009: 329). Especially for
the GUAM case this would not apply. In contrast, Evgeny Vinokurov
& Alexander Libman (2010; 2012) focus on economic integration in
post-Soviet space and refer to concepts of Political Economy in RS.
They coined the term Eurasian Integration that should be understood
as regionalisation processes that can be found on the Europe-Asia con-
tinent, which are characterised by overlapping and competing projects
like the European Economic Union and the Eurasian Economic Union;
such processes should not be confused with intergovernmental projects.
26 Major characteristics of projects among developing states are a hesitation to
pool sovereignty, a state-led approach (Pevehouse 2005), a focus on economic
integration (Dangerfield 2000; Ethier 1998, Glania & Matthes 2005; Beretta
2008) and a low level of implementation (Kösler & Zimmek 2008a; Mattli
1999).
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In contrast to Molchanov’s Eurasian Regionalism concept or Vi-
nokurov & Libman’s Eurasian Integration, this dissertation employs
the term of post-Soviet regionalism (PSR) which encompasses regional
groupings formed exclusively by post-Soviet states. This narrower
term avoids the thorny definition of what is Eurasian. Hence, integra-
tion projects which transcend post-Soviet space, e. g. the Shanghai
Cooperation, the BSEC and the Organisation of the Baltic Sea States,
are omitted. This allows to form assumptions about the uniqueness of
the post-Soviet space. Moreover, PSR centres on intergovernmental
integration.
Scholars primarily draw on the emergence of PSR. Although
they frequently demand a combined approach for studying PSR (cf.
Molchanov 2009; cf. Molchanov & Molchanova 2010; cf. Malfliet et
al. 2007), scholars hold on to the realism perspective, focusing on
security issues and the power variable.27 Almost all projects have
been initiated by the most powerful country in the region: Russia.
CACO and GUAM have been the only exceptions. Arguing with
the concept of power distribution, Russia as well as Kazakhstan and
Ukraine are assumed to strive for buttressing its regional power status
(Molchanov & Yevdokimov 2005: 194; Molchanov 2009: 328). For
Alexander Libman (2007: 411) Russia is powerful enough to still
be perceived as a threat in the region, while simultaneously being
too weak to actually change politics in its neighbouring post-Soviet
states.28 This assertion has to be reassessed after the annexation of
the Crimea in 2014. Notwithstanding, existing approaches of power
and interdependence could not explain why some PSS avoided regional
27 Some studies also address the issue of identity construction to explain the
emergence of PSR (Mayer 2007; Kulick & Yakobashvili 2008; Molchanov
& Molchanova 2010; Nygren 2008) or examine the influence of European
integration on PSR (Libman 2007; Molchanov & Molchanova 2010).
28 Scholars are divided whether to consider Russia as a benevolent or a malign
hegemon. Theorists like Kathleen Hancock (2009) and Malfliet et al. (2007)
consider Russia to be capable of providing the necessary, easily measurable
short-term benefits for other participants to assure regional integration, whereas
Stina Torjesen (2007) points out that Russia would not be able to finance such
projects (cf. Molchanov & Molchanova 2010).
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integration with Russia (Börzel 2012b: 259). The prevalent perception
of PSS as pawns of Russian (or American) foreign policy should make
way for a greater consideration of the individual policy agendas of
all PSS when studying cooperation and discord in post-Soviet space
(Pourchot 2008; Silaev 2006: 90f; cf. Libman 2007: 403).
Molchanov (2009: 345) also oﬀers a systemic explanation for the
emergence of PSR: The end of bipolarity would have endorsed the wish
for alliance formation to address new economic and security challenges.
Linking a realist approach with liberal concepts, Molchanov refers
to Walter Mattli, explaining Eurasian Regionalism as a ‘defensive
reaction to globalization’, referring to the lack of competitiveness of
post-Soviet economies and their sudden exposure to global economic
eﬀects (cf. also Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 2). The GUAM case
will not oﬀer such easy conclusions, since all members also pursued
integration into international or macro-regional political-economic
institutions.
Despite their disputed eﬃcacy, integration policies continue (Lib-
man 2007: 402), showing overlapping memberships (Skripka 2011: 17)
and a simultaneity of integration and disintegration (Libman 2007:
401).29 PSR has been widely assessed as a failure (Molchanov &
Molchanova 2010: 1; Hancock 2009: 127), which in turn oﬀers an
explanation for the high number of such projects. Whereas Mikhail
Molchanov & Vera Molchanova (2010: 7) could at least acknowledge
certain success in the field of security, Alexander Libman (2007: 403)
rejects the existence of any real security cooperation. Asymmetric
Russian power has been frequently discerned as explanatory variable.
Russian preponderance in almost all post-Soviet integration projects
would meet suspicion and dismay among other participants and would
29 Whereas Katharina Hoﬀmann (2007) speaks of a diﬀusion of post-Soviet
regionalism, Mikhail Molchanov (2009) recognises polycentricity. Similar to
the European concept of ‘concentric circles’, PSS would assemble in various
‘coalitions of the willing’ in order to implement at least a minimum. The
Russian government seems to consolidate the diﬀerent ‘coalitions’ (Zagorski
2011: 2). However, GUAM is at this moment no part of this consolidation
tendency.
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explain the reluctance to actually implement accorded agreements
(Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 5). The size and power of Russia
would make eﬀective punishment for its own defective behaviour dif-
ficult (Robinson 2004: 180). Bilateral agreements are favoured over
multilateral solutions.30 This argument should be reassessed for the
GUAM case. The sovereignty variable, which had not been addressed
in detail, promises more plausible results (cf. Coppieters 1998: 200;
Robinson 2004: 180).
From an economic standpoint, post-Soviet regionalism is also
widely perceived as failed integration (Libman 2007). Jahangir Ka-
kharov (2007: 111) suggests that beneficial trade eﬀects are unlikely
due to the low level of trade complementarity among former Soviet
republics (excluding Russia). Molchanov & Molchanova (2010: 6f)
argue with insuﬃcient reinforcement from market actors, whereas
Libman (2007: 422) assumes that institutional weakness may oﬀer a
plausible explanation for the current state of post-Soviet regionalism.
All in all, there are few empirical economic analyses; also, liberal
theories like neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism have been
applied only to a small extent (Libman 2007: 402).
Stina Torjesen’s study on CACO (2007) is one of the rare ap-
proaches to explain the failure of PSR with the idiosyncrasy of PSS.
She links state weakness with political culture to explain the failure
of cooperation in post-Soviet space. PSS would display a ‘pseudo-
democracy’, a kind of ‘façade-making’ inherited from Soviet time when
there was already a gap between ideological claims and actual prac-
tices (Torjesen 2007: 68f; 320). In addition, interest collision between
political leaders and other political actors, especially in bureaucracy,
would lead to a lack in state authority, seen for example in high cor-
ruption and rent seeking (Torjesen 2007: 67). Nevertheless, Torjesen
admits that regional cooperation among former Soviet states displays
30 Bilateralism has been raised as another explanation for the failure of PSR
(Pearson 2010; cf. Nygren 2008). Bilateralism is believed to be more eﬀec-
tive due to its greater flexibility and because it is well-known among PSS
bureaucracies (Willerton & Beznosov 2007).
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at least shared norms and ‘agreed procedures of state conduct’ (2007:
130), where previously only Soviet-imposed structures existed. These
structures ‘might also be used to defuse crises and should at least
unconsciously strengthen taboos against the use of force’ (Bremmer &
Bailes 1998: 133). GUAM should be clearly decoupled from regional
projects that are believed to promote democracy.31 Such regional
projects would demand adequate role models among participants,
something GUAM members cannot provide.
In contrast to the majority of studies that focus on security issues
only, this dissertation may shed new light on PSR and advance
general conclusions in regionalism studies (RS) by embracing both
the development aspect of GUAM and the sovereignty dimension.
Furthermore, the GUAM case adds a new actor perspective to the
continuing Russian focus in PSR.
2.2.2 GUAM
The last part of this chapter reflects current research on GUAM and
shows voids for further scrutiny. Only a number of studies have
addressed GUAM as a research subject, with the more comprehen-
sive works being ten years or older. So far the GUAM case has not
been integrated into the regionalism research programme. Despite a
dearth of monographs,32 there are relevant incollections in editions
on broader topics, for example Jürgen Schmidt (2003; 2000) or Jen-
nifer Moroney & Sergei Konoplyov (2002). However, they cover only
the first years of GUAM before its transformation into a regional
31 Scholars studied how preferential trade agreements can be utilized to induce
policy change among new participants, i.e. democratisation or market liber-
alisation in exchange for (regional) market access (Mansfield & Milner 1999:
606). Mansfield & Milner also suggest that states may use trade agreements
to assist in achieving objectives that are met with national resistance. This is
rather unlikely for GUAM countries.
32 Even the promising title of L.M. Grigoriev & M.P. Salikhov’s (2007) book
‘GUAM Ten years later’ (Original title: GUAM – Pyatnadtsat’ let spustya.
Sdvigi v ekonomike Azerbaydzhana, Grusii, Moldavii i Ukrainii, 1991-2006)
shows to be a pure statistical foreign trade analysis without any linkage to the
policies of the organisation.
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organisation in 2007 (also Kuzio 2000). GUAM has been included in
studies on strategic security dilemmas in the Caucasus and Central
Asia (Allison 2003; 2004) and on individual member states (Fischer
2008; Alieva 2011). The most extensive examination of GUAM has
been presented by a special issue of the journal Central Asia and
the Caucasus (2008): GUAM: From a Tactical Alliance to Strategic
Partnership. Unfortunately, the collection of various articles embraces
no in-depth analyses either.
The major debate among scholars is about the emergence of
GUAM. Particularly Russian scientists doubt the existence of com-
mon interests among GUAM members (Klimin 2009: 273; Grozin
2008: 217; Skakov 2008: 145). Alexander Skakov (2008: 145) at
least recognises the free trade union as a common interest of all four
participants. In contrast, other scholars do discern common interests
(Norling & Nilsson 2008: 204; Muzaﬀarli 2008: 33f). Moroney &
Konoplyov (2002: 186) identify the deepening of economic and politi-
cal cooperation as a joint objective of the four states, for example with
the establishment of a Caspian-European oil transportation corridor
(cf. N.N 2006: 1). The development of a general Trans-Caucasian
transportation corridor would be a major objective for the inception
of GUAM (Pinzar 2008: 128), but also a joint position towards Rus-
sian policy in post-Soviet space would constitute a common interest
(ib.). Some scholars (Dhaka 2008: 188, Kuzio 2000: 85; Norling &
Nilsson 2008: 205) discern integration ambitions into European and
trans-Atlantic structures as a further motive to form GUAM. Sergey
Tolstov (2008: 38) even suggests that the present exclusion from the
European integration process may have resulted in creating GUAM
as a substitute for absent membership.
Various scholars underscore the security impact (cf. Eyvazov 2008;
Norling & Nilsson 2008: 204; Schmidt 2003: 379). Silaev (2006: 64)
emphasises the challenge of separatism in almost all member states
as a joint concern (cf. Pinzar 2008: 128), while others view Russia
as the security risk in the region (Japaridze 2007: 2; Aslund et al.
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1999: 167). For many theorists (cf. Papava 2008b: 50) Russia is
considered to have had the strongest impact on the decision to form an
alternative integration model. Safeguarding independence (Schmidt
2003: 379; Moroney & Konoplyov 2002: 180f) and balancing Russian
power (Tsantoulis 2009: 247; cf. also Oles Donij in N.N. 2006: 1) have
been brought forward as principal motivations to form GUAM, but
have been scarcely substantiated with existing theoretical concepts.
Sergey Tolstov (2008: 38) understands security to be the major issue
of GUAM’s agenda, because GUAM members regard security as a
prerequisite for GUAM’s main goal: economic development. It is
perceived as an icebreaker for many other reforms (cf. Munteanu
2005: 250). The dominant role of Russia within the CIS and the
corresponding ineﬀectiveness of this cooperation format have also
been identified as a motivation for the inception of GUAM (Grozin
2008: 211; Tolstov 2008: 45, Klimin 2009: 273).33
Little attention has been paid to sustain assumptions on GUAM
with existing theories of RS. Although the majority of scholars en-
dorses multicausal explanations for the emergence of GUAM (Kuzio
2000: 85; Parakhonskiy 2008; Moroney & Konoplyov 2002; Tolstov
2008), most of them favour either an economic or a security per-
spective. This economic–security–divide is in line with assumptions
on other regional projects in post-Soviet space. Yet, as adherents of
a multifaceted approach suggest, there may be a close relationship
between economic and security issues. As Felix Ciuta (2008: 124)
recognised for the wider Black Sea region, cooperating states would
‘see economic cooperation as a source to security, and operate broadly
on the basis of a paradigm of security that is linked to democracy,
respect for human rights, and good governance’. It can be assumed
that the economic–security–nexus will be of relevance for GUAM.
The assumptions on shared interests of the four states are jux-
taposed with the perception of GUAM as an object of Russian or
33 For analysis of CIS cf. Klimin 2009; Schwabecher 2005; Aslund et al. 1999;
Coppieters et al. 1998.
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American foreign policy. Rustem Zhanguzhin (2008: 66) claims the
American proposal of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to be the rea-
son for the inception of GUAM, degrading GUAM to an artifact of
American foreign policy. Mikhail Pogrebinskiy suggests that the US
would use GUAM as a counterweight to balance its relations with
Russia (N.N. 2007: 1). Russian academics in particular criticise the
American approach as a continuation of cold war thinking, intended to
weaken Russia, without considering the danger of international terror-
ism (Manekin 2005: 3).34 GUAM has also repeatedly been assessed
as a ‘pinball’ between Russia and the United States (Getmanchuk
2007: 2; also Eyvazov 2008: 285). All of these hypotheses exhibit an
understanding of the four participants as mere pawns on the great
geopolitical chessboard–which calls for a diﬀerent perspective.
The development of GUAM has been widely overlooked by re-
searchers. Even the leadership concept has been employed only for
initiating integration projects. Due to its size, Ukraine is commonly
distinguished as the dominating force within GUAM (Tolipov 2008:
136, Kuzio 2000: 88; Schmidt 2003: 363; Malek 2002: 27)—at least
until the end of Yushchenko’s government (Parakhonskiy 2008: 109).
But also, Azerbaijan has been brought forward as a leader within
GUAM (Schmidt 2000: 127; Getmanchuk 2007: 1); and also a tandem
model with both of them as the drivers of integration (Polukhov 2008:
126).
Most scholars refer to the lack of implemented decisions when
claiming GUAM to be a failure (Eyvazov 2008: 282; Tolstov 2008: 40;
Grozin 2008: 217; Klimin 2009: 275). Yet, adherents of GUAM point
to the institutional achievements, e. g. the observer status at the UN
General assembly or the parliamentary assembly and the business
council (Grigoryan 2011: 213). Nicklas Norling & Niklas Nilsson
(2008: 204) underscore that GUAM ‘was symbolically important in
constituting a cooperative eﬀort among states of the region which
34 Paul Goble (2008: 157) observes that there are scholars who perceive such a
move as the American intention to ‘demontage [...] the post-Soviet world’ and
‘pluralize post-Soviet structures’.
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was not imposed by any foreign or regional power, but was based on
their common interests’. Georgeta Pourchot (2008: 110) and Sergey
Tolstov (2008: 34; cf. also Japaridze 2008: 77) point to the useful
consultative multilateral mechanism, based on equality and respect
for each other’s sovereignty.
Critical assessments of GUAM are linked to three analysis levels,
but are not sustained with in-depth analyses of an empirical or the-
oretical profile. The first focus is on GUAM’s institutional design,
pointing out institutional shortcomings, such as the demand for more
accountability and transparency (Rakhmatulina 2008: 223; Japaridze
2008: 97) or the lack of a consistent strategy (Kovalova 2007: 189;
Kravchenko 2009: 1; cf. Skakov 2008: 147). The second group argues
from the national level that is the participants, e. g. unstable politi-
cal dynamics (Kovalova 2007: 189; cf. Norling & Nilsson 2008: 207;
cf. Fischer 2008: 145) or low economic potential (Fesenko 2007: 1;
Rakhmatulina 2008: 224). Last, exogenous factors on the systemic
level have been brought forward, for example Russian opposition
to GUAM (Kovalova 2007: 189; Kravchenko 2009: 2) or decreased
American support (Kravchenko 2009: 2).
In summary, the dearth of in-depth analysis of GUAM and the
void of theoretical substantiation oﬀer a good starting point to more
thoroughly examine the explanatory power of existing theories on
regional integration and advance our understanding of GUAM as a
non-Russian integration project in post-Soviet space.
2.3 Conclusion
PSS have been more aﬀected than other post-communist states by the
challenges of transition, because they were also disintegrating from a
‘union state’–a collective economic, political and social system. The
quadruple transition process of PSS suggests, on the one hand, a great
degree of mutual interdependence, facilitating regional cooperation
among GUAM states. On the other hand, the limited economic, polit-
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ical and ideational capacities can be assumed to generate constraints
on regional integration. Economically, the four states have more in
common with developing states than with advanced industrialised
economies, whereas from a democracy perspective, the four countries
are hybrid regimes at best with deficient political and economic insti-
tutions. Those characteristics form an important backdrop and will
guide the subsequent analysis.
Previous research on integration projects between post-Soviet
states has focused on security issues and scarcely advanced knowledge
on other cases than the CIS. General assumptions to classify PSR, and
GUAM in particular, either as a new category of regional integration
or just one more case of integration between developing states are
missing. Instead, analysis should employ a generic actor perspective,
rejecting the view of GUAM members as mere pawns on the great
chess board of world politics.
Among the small number of studies on GUAM, there is a particular
shortage of in-depth analyses (empirical and theoretical) and research
on the grouping after its transformation into a regional organisation.
Research has focused on the emergence of GUAM, viewed within
either the realist tradition which characterises GUAM as a security
organisation against a Russian threat or, from an institutional vantage
point, assessing GUAM as just another failed integration project.
Moreover, GUAM has also been perceived as a product of American
foreign policy, rejecting the existence of common interests among
GUAM members and not considering actual demand for integration.
A minority of authors suggests a nexus between economic and security
related objectives, but fails to specify the linkage. This oﬀers an
interesting starting point for a greater in-depth analysis. Moreover,
the security reference should be reconsidered, examining Russia’s role
towards the four states. Such an examination should embrace the
issue of sovereignty that has scarcely been examined as an explanatory
variable and which can be assumed to be of particular relevance for
newly formed states.
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Existing approaches have failed to shed light on the longevity of
GUAM. Any new analysis should entail a multidimensional approach,
testing various assumptions from RS and advance the larger goal of
contributing to PSR.
Chapter 3
GUAM – Facts and Figures
This chapter addresses the evolution of GUAM from a diplomatic
initiative to the Organization for Democracy and Economic Develop-
ment – GUAM (ch. 3.1). It recalls major objectives of the grouping
according to its documents (ch. 3.2). The following chapter oﬀers
major facts on GUAM’s institutional design and financing (ch. 3.3).
Both aspects will be of relevance when it is about the state of GUAM.
Subsequently, a short overview of GUAM’s performance in the area
of economics and sovereignty is presented (ch. 3.4) which forms the
basis for proving the four principle assumptions of this dissertation.
The chapter closes with a conclusion (ch. 3.5).
3.1 The Evolution of GUAM
This dissertation argues that GUAM is oriented along two major
lines: development and sovereignty. This twofold approach is already
reflected in the first years of GUAM’s evolution. The evolution of
GUAM can be delineated in three phases: the founding years (1997-
2005), the dynamic years (2006-2008) and the shadow years (since
2008). As early as in 1993, Ukrainian President Kravchuk proposed
to form a tripartite union between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine,
which should focus on transporting Azerbaijani oil to the other two
states and further on to Europe (Klimin 2009: 274). The so-called
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‘Group of three’ can be regarded as the starting point for GUAM
(Schmidt 2000: 123).
Four-party coordination between GUAM countries began in a
piecemeal manner in 1995 on a diplomatic level within UNO, OSCE
and the Council of Europe, but without any institutional framework
(Tolstov 2008: 35). In 1996, dialogue intensified in the negotiation
round for the Treaty of Conventional Arms in Europe (Schmidt 2003:
361; Japaridze 2008: 75). On initiative of Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minis-
ter of Foreign Aﬀairs, Araz Azimov, the diplomatic staﬀ of the four
countries entered into informal discourse, exchanging and harmonising
views, especially with respect to the deployment of Russian forces
on their territory (Socor 2007a: 1; Japaridze 2007: 2).1 Western
diplomats coined the term ‘GUAM’ for this coordinated diplomatic
approach of the four countries (Schmidt 2000: 124).
In 1997, the four countries published their first joint statement,
the Strasbourg Communiqué, at the sidelines of a meeting of the
Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Their declaration approved further
quadrilateral consultations, yet, without any certain format or the
mentioning of GUAM’. The four states agreed to consult on issues
of ‘mutual interest including bilateral and regional cooperation, Eu-
ropean and regional security, political and economic contacts’ (Joint
Communique of the Meeting of the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine, 10.10.1997). The establishment of a Eurasian,
‘Trans-Caucasus transportation corridor’, cooperation with ‘European
and Trans-Atlantic structures’ and the eﬀort to ‘combating aggressive
nationalism, separatism, and international terrorism’ constitute key
issues for cooperation and illustrate the nexus between economic ob-
jectives and stability. Even if the first document remains ambiguous
on the clear direction of quadrilateral cooperation, until today the
leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova adhere to their
1 See Annexes of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to the Final Document of the
First Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel
Strength, 31.05.1995, www.osce.org.
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statement that they do not intend to form a military alliance against
Russia. GUAM members always stressed that their cooperation was
not against Russia (Parakhonskiy 2008: 111), although, it can be said,
it was to exclude Russia. Nevertheless, the principles of cooperation
emphasised in the Strasbourg declaration unfold a strong reference to
Russia, demanding ‘respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, invio-
lability of state frontiers, [and] mutual respect’ (Joint Communique
of the Meeting of the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine, 10.10.1997).
For a short period (1999-2005), Uzbekistan has also been a member
of GUAM. Its membership has been rather symbolic and can be un-
derstood as a move to provoke Russia.2 In fact, from 2000 till its final
exit in 2005 Uzbekistan did not participate in any GUUAM-activities
although it formally remained a member of GUAM’s free trade agree-
ment of 2002.3 After Uzbekistan harmonised its relations with Russia
and amid a growing engagement of GUAM NATO, Uzbekistan ceased
working with GUAM. The membership of Uzbekistan is neglected in
this work and the old abbreviation of ‘GUUAM’ eschewed, because
Uzbekistan’s association was without any consequence for GUAM.
The subsequent Yalta Charter—the first legal agreement between
the four countries—is equally short. It refers to other international
documents and their principles: UN-Charter, Helsinki Final Act, Paris
Charter for a New Europe, reflecting where GUAM and its members
position themselves. The Charter specifies the structure of GUAM
with its four main hierarchic councils for the first time.
The attack on New York’s World Trade Center in 2001 put the fight
2 It declared its membership at a NATO-summit in Washington. At the same
time, it suspended its membership in the Tashkent Pact of 1992 (Tolstov 2008:
36).
3 Jason Strakes, Mikhail Molchanov & David Galbreath argue that Uzbekistan
suspended its membership in 2001 and already left in 2004. In: Denemark,
Robert A. (2010) (ed.): The International Studies Encyclopedia. Chichester.
V. X, pp. 6629-6650.
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1995-1996 Consultations between the diplomatic corps of Azerbaijan,
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia within UNO, OSCE and the
Council of Europe.
1996 Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan sign agreement on a Euro-
Asian transport corridor.
1997 First oﬃcial appearance of GUAM. The four states adopt a
joint communiqué on the creation of a consultative forum at the
Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg.
1999 Uzbekistan joins GUAM.
2001 First summit and first oﬃcial agreement – the Yalta Charter.
2002 Agreement on forming a free trade area was signed (entry into
force 2003).
2003 GUAM gains observer status in UN General Assembly.
2004 GUAM decides to create a Parliamentary assembly.
2004 First meeting of GUAM Economic Forum and GUAM Business
Council in Kyiv.
2005 Uzbekistan leaves GUAM.
2006 A new Charter is signed at the Kyiv Summit including the
decision to turn GUAM into an international organisation.
2006 Defense Ministers of GUAM (without Moldova) meet in Tbilisi
to outline the contours of a joint peacekeeping unit.
2007 At the Energy’-Summit in Krakow the plan of a joint Balto-Black
Sea-Caspian energy transit space is formulated.
2007 Inception of Sectoral Cooperation Development Plan which
focuses on practical action in the field of economy and transport.
2007 First Secretary General of GUAM is elected and a Permanent
International Secretariat is formalised.
2007 First informal meeting in Madrid with EU partners (Forum:
Group of GUAM friends in EU)
2008 Last Summit takes place in Batumi.
2008 Statement of Representatives of the Foreign Ministries of the
four member states and GUAM Secretary General on Georgian-
Russian war: Conflicts should be solved according to interna-
tional law and within existing territorial borders.
2013 Statement of Secretary General Chechelashvili on Ukraine: Con-
flicts should be solved according to international law and within
existing territorial borders.
2014 The GUAM Council of National Coordinators emphasises the
territorial integrity of all GUAM members and states that a
referendum on autonomy such as in Eastern Ukraine or on
Crimea have to be in line with the Constitution of the respective
state.
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against terrorism to the top of GUAM’s agenda. The Agreement on
Cooperation Among the Governments of GUUAM Participating States
in the Field of Combat against Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other
Dangerous Types of Crimes (2002) added a new theme to GUAM’s
work and formed a greater interest of the United States for the group-
ing (Goble 2008: 157, documents of GUAM US, e. g. statement
of 2005 Chisinau summit). In 2003 GUAM received observer status
at the UN general assembly.4 The US supported various GUAM
activities that advanced the American larger goal of increasing global
security. Those activities were coupled with economic initiatives.
In 2002 the four states signed an agreement to create a free trade
area that entered into force in 2003. In 2004 an economic forum, a
business council as well as a parliamentary assembly were established
to strengthen economic cooperation.
The reviewed Charter of 2006 marks the transformation into a
‘full-fledged’ regional organisation and its relaunch as Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM (ODED-GUAM).
The Charter followed the Chisinau Summit Declaration (2005), but
is often referred to as Kyiv Charter, because it was signed at the
Kyiv Summit in 2006.5 The Yalta Charter did not cease to be valid,
neither is the Kyiv Charter a substitute for the former, but if GUAM
today speaks of its charter, it usually refers to the 2006 document. As
the Yalta Charter before, the document recalls ‘norms and principles
of international law for maintaining peace, security, the development
of good neighbourly and friendly relations among states’ and makes
references to the same international legal documents. The Kyiv Char-
ter is a constitutive document detailing all entities and functions of
GUAM.
4 Cf. resolution A/RES/58/85 (09.12.2003). After signing the Kyiv Charter,
GUAM registered at the United Nations as a regional organisation.
5 Georgia and Azerbaijan ratified the charter in 2006. In Ukraine and Moldova,
the ratification process is due in the respective parliaments (http://bit.ly/
1UCyi7l; last: 22.04.2014). However, the charter is temporarily valid until its
final ratification (Kyiv Charter, 2006, art. 19).
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The Baku Declaration (2007) marks the 10th anniversary of the
organisation and summarises its results. It celebrates the success of
an increased cooperation and remarks that GUAM is now an ‘interna-
tional regional organisation’ (www.guam.org.ua). The year 2007 was
characterised by new initiatives. Energy was the focal point of a meet-
ing in Krakov (Poland), proposing a joint energy transit space from
the Caspian to the Baltic Sea. Economic integration has been spurred
with the Sectoral Cooperation Development Plan and the Agreement
on International Multimodal Transportation of Goods which specifies
transport and economic projects for cooperation. Notwithstanding,
with the free trade agreement being still in limbo, the emphasis is
clearly more on coordination than on true integration. 2007 was
also the year when the GUAM secretariat under its representative
Valeri Chechelashvili started working and first informal meetings with
EU-partners were initiated.
Under Georgian chairmanship in 2008, GUAM presidents met for
the last time and approved the Batumi Declaration that represents the
latest oﬃcial document signed by the Presidents of GUAM. Despite the
usual concern over the protracted conflicts, economic issues dominated
the debate. Just a few weeks later the Georgian-Russian war put
an end to high level meetings. Since then regular meetings of the
foreign ministers represent the highest level of interstate contact.
Activity retreated to the level of working groups. Cooperation took a
functional turn, focusing on building networks of technical experts,
exchanging expertise and harmonising procedures and standards. The
emphasis is put on low politics such as combating cross-border crime,
trade and transport facilitation or tourism and youth exchanges.6
Another area of increased activity is cooperation with other regional
and international organisations: to exchange expertise of regional
cooperation but also to establish GUAM as a regional actor.
6 Since 2006, cooperation takes place in various working groups and sub-working
groups: WG on Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime and Drug Traﬃcking;
WG on Emergencies; WG on Culture and Tourism; WG on Economy and
Trade; WG on Energy; WG on Transport; WG on Law Statistics; Steering
Committee on the Trade and Transport Facilitation Project.
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3.2 Objectives
This chapter expands on the objectives of GUAM as described in
oﬃcial documents of the grouping. Economic development and sover-
eignty are of particular relevance and substantiate the focus of this
dissertation. I will also elaborate on two more objectives expressed
in GUAM documents: integration in trans-Atlantic and European
structures as well as democratisation.
‘. . . promoting social and economic development; strength-
ening and expanding trade and economic relations; de-
velopment and eﬀective use in the interest of GUAM
states of the transport and communication arteries with
its corresponding infrastructure located in their territo-
ries; strengthening of the regional security; developing
relations in science and culture and in the humanitarian
sphere; interacting in international organizations; com-
bating international terrorism, organized crime and drug
traﬃcking’ 7
This is how GUAM summarises the purpose of its organisation. The
ample approach to cooperation is a pertinent feature of GUAM and
other regional integration projects in post-Soviet space. The catch-all
character enables the participants to utilize the grouping for any
possible issue. Despite all broadness, GUAM documents reflect an
emphasis on both economic and sovereignty issues. Even though one
theme may sometimes dominate the agenda, both issues have always
been present.
Economic development is one of two focal points in GUAM docu-
ments. The member states are convinced that cooperation would help
their national economies become strong and independent competitors
in world economy (cf. 1997, 2005). Transport, trade and energy are
dominant themes of economic collaboration. The establishment of
a transport corridor has already been prominently mentioned in the
7 http://www.guam.org/about, previous website, 07.07.2009.
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Strasbourg Communiqué (1997) and reiterated in all following doc-
uments (Chisinau, Baku and Batumi Declaration). This corridor is
supposed to link the European market with Central Asia and facilitate
the transport of commodities, namely hydrocarbons. Energy supply
has always been an issue both of economic and security policies and
explains why GUAM has been conceived as either an economic or
security organisation. In 2001 Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoli
Zlenko dubbed GUAM in 2001 a grouping dedicated to economic
issues in the first place, particularly ensuring transport of energy
sources.8
In a special Statement on Development of the GUAM Transporta-
tion Corridor from 2008, GUAM encourages its members to present
explicit proposals for transportation projects. While the statement
focuses on modernising existing transport routes, the Agreement on
International Multimodal Transportation of Goods (2007) strives to
increase eﬃciency by ‘ensuring traﬃc safety, harmonising require-
ments and legal rules as well as creating equal conditions for the
competition’ (art. 3, sentence 1). The document also invites other
states to participate without an obligatory membership in GUAM.
The formation of a functioning transportation corridor is tightly linked
to hydrocarbons. GUAM members perceive themselves as part of a
global energy security project (cf. Baku Declaration, 2007). They
strive to become a reliable supplier and transit partner for hydrocar-
bons from the Caspian and Central Asian region to Europe as well
as from Russia (in case of Ukraine). This would provide them with
a considerable income. In addition, they seek to diversify their own
energy supply and loosen their pronounced dependence on Russian
hydrocarbons and electricity:
‘7. [the head of states] notify the unacceptability of
economic pressure and monopolization of the energy mar-
ket, and highlight the necessity to mobilise strengths with
8 Interview with Yulia Mostovaya in Zerkalo Nedeli, Nr. 3, 19.–26.01.2001,
http://zn.ua .
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the aim of safeguarding of energy security by the way of
diversifying transport routes for energy sources from the
Central Asian and Caspic region to the European market.
8. support the maximum use of GUAM’s international
transit potential, especially for safeguarding a stable supply
of energy sources.’ (Kyiv Declaration, 2006)
More than any declaration before, the GUAM Sectoral Cooperation
Development Strategy (2007) identifies fields of economic cooperation.
Trade, transport, energy and information technologies are discerned
as major areas of interest. Nevertheless, the strategy fails to propose
definite steps. The Sectoral Cooperation and Development Strategy
urges the implementation of the free trade zone that has already been
agreed to in 2002. This would entail:
‘. . . elimination of customs duties, quantitative limita-
tions in State-to-State trade; elimination of other obstacles
to free flow of goods and services; setting up and developing
an eﬃcient system of mutual settlements and payments
in the field of trade and other transactions.’ (Sectoral
Cooperation and Development Strategy, 2007, part I, ch.1)
The agreement also underscores the harmonisation of legislation in
foreign trade according to EU-legislation. Customs and customs pol-
icy play an important role in that respect. Another ambition is the
free movement of services, capital and labour (similar to the four
freedoms of the European common market).
Taking a closer look at political objectives, the main reference
objects are the domestic conflicts within the member states, primarily
the secessionist movements in Georgia, Azerbaidjan and Moldova. The
tonality of the documents has become stronger and more restrictive
in the last few years (cf. Batumi Declaration, 2008). From ‘deep
concern’ (Washington Declaration, 1999) in the first documents and
intense discussion on conflict settlement (Kyiv Communiqué, 2006)
to active diplomacy within OSCE and UN. The Joint Declaration of
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the Heads of State of the Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development – GUAM on the Issue of Conflict Settlement (2006)
demands international assistance in solving the secessionist conflicts
within the member states and rebuilding the eﬀected zones. GUAM
members make clear that a conflict resolution will only be possible, if
sovereignty, territorial integrity and internationally recognised borders
are respected. That means a domestic solution within the present
borders, including
‘. . . return of displaced persons to the places of their
permanent residence, restoration of transport communi-
cations and ensuring the peaceful co-existence and coop-
eration between the communities in these territories as
having no alternative and being just and lasting’ (Baku
Declaration, 2007)
The four states pledge for international observers under UN or OSCE
auspices and demand a demilitarisation of the conflict zones (Joint
Declaration on Conflict Settlement, 2006). European and trans-
Atlantic institutions are being recognised as vital partners for the
peace process in the region and as substantial security providers.
In their declaration GUAM – Uniting Europe’s East, signed at
the Batumi summit in July 2008, GUAM members again identify
the resolution of the protracted conflicts and the aﬃrmation of their
territorial integrity as principle objectives. They pledge to increase
activity within the existing multilateral fora for conflict resolution, but
they do not refer to GUAM as a new platform for those negotiations.
Although Russia was never explicitly mentioned in relation with
domestic conflicts in the first years, it is obvious that sovereignty
violations such as ‘external interference’ and ‘military occupation of
territory’ refer to Moscow. Only when it comes to deployments, the
four states explicitly demand the withdrawal of Russian troops and
putting an end to Russian interference.9
9 Comment of the Representative of Georgia on discussing the resolution draft
(Records of the General Assembly GA/11109).
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GUAM documents denote a nexus between promoting economic
development and strengthening sovereignty. Energy is one example:
The development of the trans-Caucasian transport corridor shall re-
duce dependence on Russia and, thus, increase the national sovereignty
of GUAM members. In addition, the settlement of protracted conflicts
is an important objective of GUAM and assessed as a precondition
for a prosperous economic and democratic development:
‘It was emphasized that these threats [international ter-
rorism, aggressive separatism and extremism, and trans-
national organized crime], as well as unresolved conflicts
and illegal presence of foreign troops and armaments in
GUAM States are recognized as main obstacles on the
way to full-scale democratic transformations and economic
development in the region.’ (GUAM Summit Declaration,
Kyiv, 2006)
GUAM entails a clear Western orientation (Strasbourg Commu-
nique, 1997; Chisinau Declaration, 2005; Batumi Declaration, 2008).
Integration in European and Trans-Atlantic structures has been men-
tioned throughout all GUAM documents, but without speaking of
‘membership’. GUAM documents do not allude to the depth of in-
tegration. The Batumi Declaration (2008) pointedly recognises the
individuality for each member on that path:
‘9. [The Council of Heads of State] Expresses support
for deepening European integration of the GUAM Member
States and developing closer relations with the EU with
due account of individual particularities and aspirations
of each GUAM Member State, taking into consideration
the new concept of EU relations with Eastern neighbors –
‘Eastern Partnership’. (Batumi Declaration, 2008, pt. 9)
The reference to European and Trans-Atlantic structures should be
understood as a commitment, particularly in the first years of GUAM.
GUAM countries see their future tightly interwoven with Europe and
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its ideological, economic and political conception. It can be grasped
as a commitment to the principles of democratic governance, market
economy and the respect of human rights.10
NATO-membership is never mentioned explicitly. Instead, NATO
is consistently referred to as an important partner for security on a bi-
lateral basis, e. g. within the framework of the Partnership for Peace
Programme (Kyiv Summit Communiqué, 2006; Baku Declaration,
2007).11 Yet, the Baku Declaration (2007) aims at intensifying coop-
eration with NATO. This shall be realised by reports and briefings of
GUAM members to NATO about GUAM developments (McDermott
& Morozov 2008: 243). Eﬀorts are aimed primarily on establishing
transparency and best practice support for GUAM. EU and NATO
are regarded as security providers for GUAM states, as guardians of
their sovereignty, ‘the process of integration into Trans-Atlantic and
European structures could to a considerable extent reduce [...] threats
and risks [of regional and European security]’ (Joint Communique of
the Meeting of the President of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine, 10.10.1997). This may come across naturally, as Western
states and institutions could be perceived as the ‘adversaries’ of Rus-
sia, who seems to represent the predominant hazard to the security of
the four states. With its specific intention to integrate into a diﬀerent
(macro)regional structure in the medium term perspective—making
GUAM an interim solution—GUAM diﬀers from other regional inte-
gration projects.
Let us turn to the last prominent objective on GUAM’s agenda.
In 2006, GUAM was restructured and redefined as Organization for
Economic Development and Democracy – GUAM. Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldova stressed their endeavor to adhere to demo-
10 The dedication to the Western model could also be understood as an attempt
to link their identity to a European instead of a Russian or Eurasian value
system.
11 GUAM asked for a 19+5 format in 2000, but received a negative answer
from NATO (Moroney & Konoplyov 2002: 189). NATO prefers continuing
cooperation along the established bilateral structures (Moroney & Konoplyov
2002: 189).
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cratic development and its accompanying values like rule of law and
respect of human rights (Yalta Charter, 2001)12, but despite the
prominent place in the organisation’s full title, no initiatives have
been formulated to promote democracy. In fact, the tonality of oﬃ-
cial documents implies that GUAM members perceive themselves as
democracies, which would only demand some minor improvements
and consolidation (Kyiv Summit Communique, 2006; Batumi Declara-
tion, 2008, pt. 1). The Kyiv summit declaration unfolds that GUAM
states relate their low performance in democratisation and economic
development to secessionist conflicts, transnational crime and interna-
tional terrorism. Thus, responsibility for deficits in domestic reforms
is shifted from the national government to exogenous factors. GUAM
regularly sends an observer mission to parliamentary and presidential
elections within the member states. In their reports they refrain from
open criticism and declare ‘the elections to have been free and fair’
(Presidential elections in Azerbaijan on 9th October 2013) or at least
found ‘no critical remarks that could fundamentally impact on the
voting result’ (Parliamentary elections in Ukraine on 28th October
2012). Democracy remains an indistinct object in GUAM’s docu-
ments, which would be achieved, by the by, when GUAM countries
have gained complete sovereignty (Kyiv Summit Communique, 2006).
Although democratisation has been presented as an objective since
2006, the grouping failed to provide any road map or actions to achieve
this objective. The democratisation rationale on the GUAM agenda
can be regarded as a product of its time when democratisation move-
ments in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) took over and national
reform governments utilised GUAM to strengthen their domestic
regime change. Yet, Azerbaijan has always remained untouched by
democratisation ambitions. Moreover, democratisation in Moldova in
2009 has been propelled by domestic opposition and not by GUAM
policies. Whereas in Ukraine and Georgia the first democratisation
12 Regional organisations can be studied as advocates for good governance (Börzel
et al. 2013). This usually refers to developed-developing constellations of
integration members. The absence of an established democracy among GUAM
members that could function as a role model allows to discard that dimension
for GUAM.
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wave has been quickly revoked. Therefore, this dissertation neglects
a closer examination of the democracy idea as well as cooperation
in culture and science. Sub-chapter 3.4 will take a closer look at
GUAM’s performance on the key areas development and sovereignty.
3.3 Institutional Design and Financing
The Yalta Charter (2001) is the first document specifying institutions
of GUAM, but it is the Kyiv Charter (2006) that elaborates on the
structure and functions of diﬀerent institutional bodies of the reformed
ODED – GUAM. Additional regulations on each institution, e. g. the
Rules of Procedure of the Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development – GUAM (2006) or Provisions on Personnel, describe
tasks and competences. The first part of this chapter will address
the structure of GUAM, giving information on tasks, procedures and
responsibilities. The second part turns to the financing of GUAM.13
3.3.1 Institutional Design
The main structure of GUAM is characterised by councils on diﬀerent
government levels: the Council of Head of States, the Council of
Foreign Ministers, the Council of National Coordinators and the
Council of Permanent Representatives (figure 3.1). Decisions within
all four bodies are based on consensus (Kyiv Charter, 2006, ch. 3, art.
12).
In 2007, the GUAM secretariat started working. It evolved from
the GUAM Information Oﬃce, which had been opened in Kyiv in
2002. The creation of the secretariat marks GUAM’s ambition to
transform into a ‘full fledged’ international organisation as agreed
in the Kyiv Summit Decision (2006). The secretariat is headed by
a secretary general, who represents GUAM and is determined by a
rotating principle (Regulation of ODED-GUAM, art. 8; Provision
on personnel, art. 6). The tenure of the secretary general is four
13 For diﬀerent approaches to study institutional design see Goltermann et al.
2012: 6f, Acharya & Johnston 2007b.
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Figure 3.1: Main bodies of GUAM in hierarchical order (Source: author’s
design).
years (Provision on the Personnel of GUAM secretariat, art. 6).
Nevertheless, the first secretary general, Georgian diplomat Valeri
Chechelashvili, served two tenures. This can be interpreted as a lack
of interest in GUAM among the member states.
The key mandate of the secretariat is to provide organisational and
technical support to GUAM activities (Provision on the Secretariat of
ODED-GUAM, art. 2). Another important task is the dissemination
of reports and decisions for internal and external use (Kyiv Charter,
2006, art. 8; Provision on the Secretariat of ODED-GUAM, art. 2).
The secretary general also prepares the budget (Financial Provisions,
art. 3).14
14 To assist the secretary general with his duties, three programme coordinators
(international staﬀ) are delegated by GUAM member states in rotating princi-
ple for three to four years (Provisions on the Secretariat, art. 3). In addition,
administrative-technical staﬀ can be employed by the secretary general on a
contractual basis (Provisions of the Secretariat, art. 3). The secretary general
may apply for additional staﬀ if justified (Provisions on personnel, art. 8
54 CHAPTER 3. GUAM – FACTS AND FIGURES
Yet, the secretariat’s authority is limited to supporting and pro-
ducing suggestions to the various GUAM councils. It is the annual
meeting (summit) of head of states that represents the highest body
of GUAM. According to the Yalta and Kyiv Charters, the Council of
Head of States forms joint positions on international issues of mutual
interest, decides on the institutional structure of GUAM and takes
major decisions and gives directions to political and economic cooper-
ation (ib.). It is the final authority of GUAM to approve decisions and
to determine general directions of GUAM’s policy. Starting in 2001,
summits usually took place once a year, except for 2004 (Kyiv Charter,
2006, art. 4 (2)). However, the last summit was organised in Batumi
(Georgia) in 2008—just a month before the Russian-Georgian tensions
resulted in a military conflict. The council of head of states adheres
strictly to the principle of equality. The rotating chairmanship lasts
from one summit to the next, usually one year (Kyiv Charter, 2006, art.
4 (2)).15 Decisions are made unanimously. Summits primarily fulfil a
representative task. Yet, national leaders of the member states have
to consent on new directions or issue areas to allow GUAM to advance.
The foreign ministers meeting is the executive body of GUAM,
coordinating cooperation between the summits (Regulations on the
Council of the Foreign Minister of GUAM Member States, Yalta,
2002, Nr. 7). Representatives from USA and OSCE have already
participated as observers in open sessions of the council (Protocol
of the meeting in Chisinau, 2005). Principle tasks are the adoption
of the budget, the preparation of summits with regard to agenda,
contents and supervision of the summit proposals (chapter 2, art.5,
Kyiv Charter). The council coordinates and controls the execution
of tasks by minor bodies. Again, decisions are made by consensus.16
It is the council and not the secretariat that can establish working
groups or other assisting entities (Regulations on the Council of the
15 The Republic of Moldova holds the chairmanship for 2014.
16 Only decisions concerning procedures are handled with simple majority (Regu-
lations on the Council of the Foreign Minister of GUAM Member States, 2002,
Nr.16).
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Foreign Minister of GUAM Member States, 2002, Nr. 15). The
working groups are the most active part of GUAM, even if their work
concentrates on reporting national progress and discussing initiatives.
The documents do not elaborate on sanctioning mechanisms. Nei-
ther the secretariat nor the Council of Foreign Ministers have means
to pressure for implementation of decisions. Cooperation remains
completely voluntary. Members are even able to opt out of single
projects. It is unclear what happens if deadlines for reports or pro-
posals as well as for implementation of projects are not met. It could
not be ascertained whether time frames for certain projects do exist.
It can be assumed that this is one reason among other for the low
implementation level.
It is important to note that the initiative for proposals does not
come from the secretariat, but from within the national governments
of GUAM member states, i. e. their foreign ministries, which are
represented by the Council of National Coordinators (CNC) on the
one side and the Council of Foreign Ministers on the other. While
the foreign ministers introduce proposals on behalf of the government
(national leader), the CNC can also propose on behalf of the results
of a study or the working groups’ outcome. The CNC consists of one
representative delegated from the foreign ministry of each GUAM
member (art. 6). Except for procedural questions decisions within
the CNC are also taken unanimously, (Regulations on the Council
of National Representatives of the GUAM Member States, Nr. 20).
GUAM does not curtail the sovereignty of its members in any way. It
can be suggested that consensus in decision making allows GUAM to
develop only according to the speed of the slowest partner. The CNC
decides on all issues that do not lie exclusively in the competence
of the head of states or the foreign ministers. Therefore it can be
described as the real working body of GUAM (Regulations on the
Council of National Representatives of the GUAM Member States,
Nr. 5)17.
17 The document was probably put in force in 2005. No clear date given.
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GUAM has extended its institutional structure in a step-by-step
approach. In 2004 parliamentary cooperation was initiated (Para-
khonskiy 2008: 110).18 The business council was supposed to target
business opportunities among members and also attract third coun-
tries to GUAM markets, with the transport and energy sector as the
foci of its agenda, reflecting the importance given to economic develop-
ment. GUAM’s institutional structure resembles other international
institutions, e. g. the EU and particularly the Black Sea Economic
Council. However, it follows a clear state-led-approach, creating insti-
tutional bodies first and assigning them tasks second. Today GUAM
comprises plenty of small bodies and sub-committees addressing a
broad scope of issues. GUAM’s distinct intergovernmental structure
avoids the transfer of significant power to a supranational body, pre-
serving the national authority of each participant. For an organisation
that only recently started GUAM’s structure can be described as
unnecessarily complex for its actual workload. It is quite the opposite
of the form follows function principle. However, in contrast to other
regional integration projects in post-Soviet space, namely the CIS,
GUAM is equipped with few full-time personnel. The majority of
personnel is delegated by the respective national ministries.
3.3.2 Financing
GUAM disposes of its own budget as approved by the Council of
Ministers (Financial Provisions of GUAM, art. 3 ). Compared to
the budget of other regional organisations the amount is rather small.
The budget of 2007, for example, was marked with 252,862.54 USD
(Protocol Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2006; Decision on the Approval
on the Secretariat’s budget for 2007, point 1). GUAM adheres to the
strict principle of equal burden-sharing (in absolute figures), neglecting
the actual capabilities of each participant. Every year the member
18 According to its documents, the Parliamentary Assembly is interested in
establishing relations with other parliamentary assemblies, for example from
EU, OSCE, NATO or Council of Europe. It is aimed at creating networks,
exchange experience and enhance good governance.
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states decide on the amount of the membership fee and, hence, how
much power they want to transfer to GUAM.
The limited financial power of GUAM is reflected in various
ambitions to reduce costs. For example, employees of the secretariat,
which are announced by quota, are paid by their home country
(Regulations of Secretariat). Expenses for organising summit meetings
have to be paid by the country who holds the current chairmanship.
The delegations participating in the summit must pay for their travel
and maintenance costs (Rules of Procedure, art. 8). The same rule
applies for sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Governments
try to coincide ministers’ meetings or ambassadors’ meetings with
international gatherings, for example when the UN General assembly
opens its sessions, in order to reduce costs and save time. GUAM
developed a system of keeping a considerable part of expenses ‘in
house’, reducing the necessity of spending valuta or ‘real’ money
abroad. Member states are either unwilling or unable to spend much
money on the secretariat.
The documents do not provide any information on how individual
GUAM projects are financed. It can be assumed that each project
has to be financed nationally. Member states appear to be very
cautious. They try to allocate as little money as possible for joint
usage to the intergovernmental institution, which may be related to
a certain distrust to joint bureaucratic (and often corrupt) institutions.
In contrast to the BSEC or the Eurasian Economic Community,
GUAM does not dispose of its own investment bank or other loan
giving institutions which could contribute financially to regional devel-
opment projects. Therefore, GUAM is trying to attract funding from
other institutions and states, e. g. EU or USA. Despite the ambition
to promote regional integration projects, the European Union seems
to shy away from open cooperation with GUAM. The EU oﬀers finan-
cial support to GUAM participants only on a bilateral basis within
the Eastern Partnership.19
19 For example, the EU gives financial support to prepare the transport corridor
of Caspian oil to the European market. Beginning 2007, Ukraine received 494
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In contrast, the US financed GUAM directly for several years.20 At
the beginning the US-interest was primarily driven by energy security
(Getmanchuk 2006: 1). The US supported the construction of energy
transport routes for Caspian hydrocarbons, bypassing Russia. GUAM
was envisaged to play a role in securing those energy transports and
in tapping new hydrocarbon resources (Goble 2008: 157). Yet, in the
first years after GUAM’s foundation, assigned American money has
never been transferred due to a lack of eligible projects (Socor 2007a:
1f, Schmidt 2003: 370).21 After 9/11, American support continuously
addressed GUAM as a pillar in the war against global terrorism (Goble
2008: 158; Statement of 2005 Chisinau Summit). A GUAM oﬃce for
fighting terrorism was outlined to be opened in Baku (Getmanchuk
2007: 1). The US-GUAM framework agreement of 2002 identifies two
main areas of American support: first, the Virtual Law Enforcement
Center (VLEC) and second, the Trade and Transport Facilitation
project (TTF) (US Dep. of State 2007: 12).22 The choice of selected
projects unfolds that the US perceived GUAM both as an economic
and a security project. In 2007 USAid also supported the opening of
the GUAM secretariat in Kyiv and paid trainings for oﬃcials within
the VLEC and TTF (US Dep. of State 2008: 2). The US state
department stopped funding GUAM within the USAid programme
in 2009.23 The US continue to finance individual GUAM projects
million, Moldova 209 million, Georgia 120 million and Azerbaijan 92 million
Euros (Memo on Eastern Partnership, MEMO/09/217, 05.05.2009).
20 The United States government oﬀers financial support to former Soviet states
‘encouraging interstate cooperation and strengthening democratic practices to
make permanent their transition to market-based democracies (US Department
of State 2007: 1). Most funding is spent in bilateral projects (US Department
of State 2008: 1).
21 In 2001, US-Congress decided to fund GUAM projects with about 45 million
USD. The funds were supposed to finance the structure of GUAM and economic
projects (Socor 2007a: 1f, Japaridze 2008: 83). According to Schmidt, GUAM
plus Armenia were to receive US-Congress funds also for defence and security
projects (Defence and Security Assistance Act 2000, cp. Schmidt 2003: 370).
22 In 2006, the US government financed the VLEC and TTF with 590.000 USD
(US Department of State 2007: 12 (linked table)).
23 The Georgian-Russian war very likely caused a return to the bilateral approach
of American assistance. Furthermore, the financial and economic crisis resulted
3.4. PERFORMANCE REVIEW 59
such as workshops for exchanging expertise.24 They will also support
the extension of the VLEC technically and financially (GUAM US
Joint Statement, 26.10.13, guam-organization.org). American funding
makes it diﬃcult to asses who is the driver for such network projects.
It can be assumed that without American funding GUAM would not
have advanced that fast in those issue areas.
3.4 Performance Review
This chapter gives a general overview on GUAM’s performance. Not
even ten years have past since GUAM became a full-fledged regional
organisation, allowing only preliminary conclusions on its perfor-
mance.25 The review concentrates on the main issue areas of GUAM:
economics and security cooperation. Advances towards European
and trans-Atlantic integration are neglected, because the EU as well
as NATO prefer a bilateral track of convergence (Astrov & Havlik
2008: 137; cf. Moroney & Konoplyov 2002: 189). Regarding the ad-
vancement of integration into European and trans-Atlantic structures
GUAM functions as a commitment and exchange network rather than
an enforcement mechanism.
3.4.1 Economic Cooperation
Economic projects centre on three themes: tariﬀ reduction, transport
infrastructure and energy delivery. There are mixed results among
in a general cutdown of American aid.
24 For example the ‘Workshop on Anti Money Laundering’ in Chisinau, 1-
3.10.2013 has been co-financed by the UN Oﬃce in Drugs and Crime and the
US (http://www.guam-organization.org).
25 The author of this dissertation is aware of the danger of applying a eurocentric
view. For developing states, especially where sovereignty is a rather new
phenomenon, the EU model may not be appropriate (Acharya & Johnston
2007c: 245, cf. Coleman & Underhill 1998b: 11). Also, there are general
methodological diﬃculties of defining and measuring failure and success of
integration projects (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 14; Kösler & Zimmek 2008b:
6; De Lombaerde & van Langenhove 2006: 17).
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those three vectors.26 GUAM pursues a twofold trade strategy, stimu-
lating intra-regional trade on the one hand and transregional trade on
the other. The main problem is the discrepancy between promising
ideas and tangible results. The first initiative for tariﬀ reduction
agreed on a free trade area. Yet, its national implementation is still in
limbo (http://www.guam-organization.org). With the Economic
Forum and the GUAM Business Council two institutions have been
established that are supposed to single out joint cooperation projects
and attract foreign investment. Other proposals followed, for exam-
ple the Sectoral Cooperation Development Plan, accorded in 2007
(Japaridze 2008: 89) or the Protocol on the Country of Origin of
Goods Regulation, added in 2006.27 In 2003, the four states signed
the Agreement on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation in Customs
Matters. Ukraine suggested a joint customs service (Ivshenko 2006b:
1), which should be supported by an electronic customs control sys-
tem (Ragimova 2011: 1). The system is not yet implemented. The
Coordination Committee of the Chambers of Commerce is a another
promising initiative. Moreover, at the meeting of the CNC in 2010
it was decided on taking further steps to complete the free mobility
of workers, capital and services.28 One of these further steps is the
cooperation agreement in the banking sector (N. N. 2009: 2). In 2010
the Central Eurasian Banking Federation was formed among GUAM
states, also including other states from Central Asia, Central Europe
and Central Caucasus.29 To sum up, there are various ideas and
initiatives to facilitate trade. However, implementation into national
legislation proceeds very slowly or is lacking completely (cf. Japaridze
2008: 82). As the chapter on GUAM’s institutional design shows the
26 Economic integration progress appears easy to measure only on first sight. Yet,
in reality numbers can diﬀer immensely. Distinct accounting systems on the
one side and inaccurate figures on the other make economic analysis outside
OECD diﬃcult. Various scholars from PSS hinted to the problems of data
availability and data validity (Lippert 2007: 402; Libman & Vinokurov 2010:
8; Torjesen 2007).
27 Cf. http://bit.ly/1UCyi7l; 22.04.2014.
28 Cf. http://bit.ly/1PPwKIX; 22.04.2014.
29 Cf. http://bit.ly/1PPwOZj; 22.04.2014.
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GUAM secretariat has no means to press for national implementation
of proposals or sanction defective behaviour. At least dialogue contin-
ues, working groups proceed with initiatives and urge implementation
(cf. Ragimova 2011: 1), but projects seem to lack suﬃcient financing.
Statistics show high transaction costs at the beginning of GUAM
cooperation (cf. Babetskii et al. 2003: 1; cf. Robson 1993: 334). Ta-
ble 3.1 illustrates export and import costs for the year 2002 (Founding
year of GUAM free trade area), 2006 (year of new GUAM Charter)
and 2012 (latest figures) among GUAM participants. A lot of tariﬀ
and non-tariﬀ trade barriers are still in place, e. g. fees, long customs
procedures, poor payment systems and diﬃculties in financing (cf.
UNECE 2006: 8; Aslund et al. 1999: 56; Hallaert et al. 2011: 61).
Georgia sticks out as the best performer whereas Azerbaijan has even
increased its trade barriers (EBRD Transition Report 2010: 71). Re-
gional or WTO-trade agreements seem to have aﬀected tariﬀ barriers
among the four only to a certain extent, using non-tarrif barriers as
a backdoor to return to protectionism (cf. Hallaert et al. 2011:61).
Georgia was the first member to reform its customs code and, thus,
ease customs procedure. In Ukraine, the new customs code came
into force in June 2012 and it remains to be seen how it is enforced
(EBRD Transition Report 2012: 157).
Suﬃce it to say that the present economic cooperation among
GUAM countries is below its potential. Only Georgia realises about
20% of its total exports within the GUAM area (cf. ch. 4.3.3 on de-
mand). The free movement of goods has not been completed yet. The
four states mostly trade with non-GUAM members, e. g. with Russia
or the EU (cf. chapter 4.3.3 on demand). Scrutinising microeconomic
ties between GUAM states supports the predominance of bilateral
relations (Grinberg 2005: 14).
High transaction costs are closely related to unsolved transport
problems, which have been pertinent during the first years of inde-
pendence of the GUAM members. Therefore, the development of the
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transport corridor has been a crucial vector of GUAM’s economic
programme from the start. Infrastructure had to be modernised,
including communication networks and power grids. One measure to
enhance transport within the GUAM territory is the Agreement on
International Multimodal Transportation of Goods (2007). In addi-
tion, at the Baku conference ‘GUAM Transit’ in 2008 the member
states agreed to modernise and extend existing routes through the
South Caucasus, for example the railroad project Baku (AZ)-Tbilisi
(GE)-Ahalkalaki (GE)-Kars (TUR) and Baku (AZ)-Tbilisi (GE)-Poti
(GE).30 Other projects like the Poti/Batumi (GE)-Kerch (UA) ferry
service or the modernisation of the railway route between Basarabi-
aska (MO) and Berezino (UA) shall be embarked on (cf. Tolstov 2008:
42). However, key transport interconnections between the four states
are still missing or in bad shape. Neither time frames nor comments
on financing could be found.31 Yet, the pessimistic assessment of
the Eurasian Development Bank about the competitiveness of the
Transcaucasian corridor from Europe to Asia in comparison to the
Europe-Asian-Transport-Corridor through Russia can be regarded
as premature, since it does not take the intra-regional perspective
into account.32 In 2013, GUAM presented a detailed concept for the
development of the GUAM transport corridor. The improvement of
transport is also a question of suﬃcient funding. As was indicated
above, financing is one of the great handicaps of the GUAM project.
Some transport projects have been addressed and co-financed by the
TRACECA-project.33 Executing those projects is mainly a national
30 The latter route shall be extended to Aktau (TUK) and Almati (KA) specifically
for container transport (cf. Statement by the Heads of State of the Organization
for Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM on development of the
GUAM transportation corridor, 2008).
31 The railway route Baku-Tbilisi-Kars is financed by SOFAZ, the Azerbaijani
state oil fund (Bayramov 2010: 7).
32 The Eurasian Development Bank argues that the high number of necessary
transshipments (Baku-Turkmenbashi; Varna/Odessa-Poti/Batumi) makes the
Trans-Caucasian corridor highly capital intensive (Vinokurov et al. 2009: 2).
33 The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia programme (TRACECA) origi-
nates in the 1990s. Five Central Asian republics and three Caucasian republics
together with the EU agreed to develop a transport corridor from Europe across
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issue. GUAM is limited to a coordination structure which only priori-
tises projects of regional concern.
Energy is the third vector of GUAM’s economic strategy. One of
the principal objectives of GUAM was to develop alternative transit
routes and to gain access to Caspian hydrocarbon resources and, thus,
decrease energy dependence on Russia (Polukhov 2008: 125; Piroshkov
& Parakhonskiy 1999: 4; Molchanov 2009: 329). Improving extraction
and transit of hydrocarbons as well as electricity supply are not only
crucial for developing GUAM economies, but also decisive for gaining
independence from a dominant supplier: Russia (Kyiv Declaration on
Principles of Global Energy Security, Energy Summit in Kyiv in 2008).
Azerbaijan is presently the only alternative supplier for hydrocarbons
within the GUAM area (cf. Papava 2008b: 51). Although Azerbaijan
has satisfied Georgia’s gas demand almost entirely since 2007 (Vinhas
de Souza 2008: 76), the greatest share of Azerbaijan’s energy exports
is directed to the European market.
At various summits and gatherings pipeline projects, transport
routes and energy sources have been discussed (figure 3.2 and 3.3).
Various pipeline projects via the Caucasus have been completed.34
An extension of the Caucasus pipelines to Ukraine or Moldova is
still theory (cf. Mamedov 2006: 1; Withmore 2007: 2; Simonyan
& Gamova 2007: 1), mainly because these initiatives compete with
alternative routes via Turkey and other Russian projects across the
the Black Sea via the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea to Central Asia (European
Commission 2007: 11). In 1996 Ukraine and Moldova joined TRACECA and
were followed by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey in 2002. The programme is
financed by the EU and others (Kulick & Yakobashvili 2008: 26). Their ideas
have partly already been implemented, e. g. the BTC and the South Caucasus
pipeline (Piehl 2007: 2).
34 The first oil pipeline (Baku-Supsa) was built in 1999 (Astrov & Havlik 2008:
165). The Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) opened in 2006 (Astrov
& Havlik 2008: 165). Oil from Azerbaijan to Georgian ports at the Black
Sea has also been transported by rail (Kulick & Yakobashvili 2008: 25). The
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (also named South Caucasus pipeline), was
commissioned in 2007 (Mangott & Westphal 2008: 162).
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Black Sea (Tolstov 2008: 42; Patronyk & Zhovkva 2010: 35).35 In
2013 Azerbaijan finally decided to refrain from Nabucco in favour of
the TAP-route to Italy (Hosp 2013; Meister 2014).36
Although Rakhmatulina (2008: 223) hails energy cooperation
as a successful field of GUAM cooperation, GUAM can hardly be
accounted for the creation of the Caucasus pipelines, because most
projects have been realised outside the GUAM framework, either
nationally, bilaterally (Azerbaijan-Georgia, Ukraine-Moldova) or in
cooperation with non-GUAM members. For example, neither the suc-
cessful implementation of the railway project Kars-Tbilisi-Baku nor
the BTC pipeline can be called GUAM projects despite GUAM docu-
ments identifying those interconnections as key projects (cf. Preyger
2008: 66). Moreover, electricity is still a national issue (or a bilateral
one with Russia as partner). At least, some small-sized cross-border
power grids have been realised, e.g between Georgia and Turkey
or Georgia and Armenia (Chomakhidze 2011: 3). Nonetheless, bi-
lateral energy trade flows dominate between GUAM members or
include non-members like Turkey and Russia (Soghomonyan 2007:
9). Real quadrolateral projects do not exist and respective demand
35 One example is the GUEU. Another example is the Danube Energy Bridge,
which was proposed by the Ukrainian government in 2005. It is a transporta-
tion corridor for oil and gas, crossing Azerbaijan, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Russia. It is supposed to improve
energy security for Europe and GUAM countries (Preyger 2008: 64). Further-
more, the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline project was pushed by the consortium
‘Samartia’, with its members Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Poland and Lithua-
nia, founded in 2007 (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 166; Tolstov 2008: 41). The
pipeline already exists and reverse its transport direction (Tomberg 2007: 43).
The pipeline is planned to be extended to Plozk (Poland) and be connected to
the existing Plozk-Gdansk pipeline (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 166; Tolstov 2008:
41). However, Azerbaijani oil is not even filling the existing two pipelines via
Georgia to full capacity (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 165; Tomberg 2007: 39). ).
In order to also fill the Odessa-Brody pipeline additional Kazach oil would be
needed (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 166; Tomberg 2007: 44).
36 In summer 2011 Azerbaijan’s state oil company, SOCAR, started the selection
process for a new gas pipeline project. Four scenarios have been short listed
(Eurasian Monitor 2011, V.8 Nr. 202).
66 CHAPTER 3. GUAM – FACTS AND FIGURES
Figure 3.2: Major gas pipelines in the GUAM area (Source: author’s design).
from bottom-up is diﬃcult to detect. Nevertheless, GUAM oﬀered a
discussion platform for those projects, but there is no suﬃcient proof
to determine how final decisions on pipeline projects have been taken
and by whom.
Looking at investment flows in the GUAM area, capital flows
between GUAM members and GUAM outsiders dominate, e. g.
Turkish investment in Georgia, Russian and Kazakh investment in
all four countries (cf. Grinberg 2005: 6). Mutual investment which
could be interpreted as a bottom-up indicator for integration has not
increased within the GUAM framework. Among PSS there are hardly
any other investors than Russia and Kazakhstan. Although Alexander
Libman (2007: 409) conceives integration tendencies between PSS
from bottom-up, his numbers show mainly Russian investment and
Russian business activity (ib.; cf. also Munteanu 2005: 108). His data
analysis indicates an integration of PSS into the Russian economic
system instead of growing interdependence and the formation of new
macro-regional entities above the state level. Considering labour
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Figure 3.3: Major oil pipelines in the GUAM area (Source: author’s design).
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flows, labour migration is typical for the South Caucasian states
Moldova and—to less extent—Ukraine. Labour migrants are primarily
employed in the construction sector, but also in retail and markets,
doing mainly unskilled work. Russia and Kazakhstan are the top
destinations for migrant worker due to higher wages, higher economic
growth and cultural or personal bonds.
3.4.2 Political Cooperation
Political cooperation within GUAM has been frequently described as
security cooperation and, thus, GUAM is characterised as a security
organisation; I will dwell on the diﬀerentiation in ch. 5.2.1. Issues
of political cooperation have been the withdrawal of Russian troops
from GUAM territories (a), and the ending of Russian interference in
national issues, which is closely linked to the resolution of domestic
conflicts within the GUAM states (b). In addition, there have been a
number of domestic security initiatives (c). There are no military ad-
vances to realise political cooperation.37 GUAM practices an approach
of policy coordination to achieve the withdrawal of Russian troops
and to put an end to Russian interference. National Coordinators
meet regularly to discuss concerted diplomatic approaches.38
The first point addresses the withdrawal of Russian troops (a)
which were partly remainders of Soviet military bases and are partly
deployments under a CIS-peacekeeping mandate (cf. Molchanov &
Yevdokimov 2005: 194). The four states have been dissatisfied with
the solution within the CIS-framework. They began to coordinate
their positions at the consultations over the Treaty of Conventional
Weapons and Arms in Europe in 1995/1996, which was one of the first
occasions for cooperation within the GUAM format (Tolstov 2008:
35; Japaridze 2008: 75; Schmidt 2003: 361). In spite of this, the
37 Military cooperation existed only bilaterally between GUAM members, as
between Georgia and Azerbaijan and was primarily concerned with disaster
relief.
38 For example, in September 2009 the National Coordinators met to discuss
joint approaches in the UN, OSCE and other international organisations
(http://bit.ly/1PPwKIX; 22.04.2014).
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formal resolution of the troop question in Ukraine and Azerbaijan
has been achieved on a bilateral basis, and in the case of Azerbaijan
already in 1993. This again exemplifies that political issues were not
the only basis for the inception of GUAM. Both countries signed
agreements on the presence of Russian soldiers on certain rented bases
(Dubovyk 2010: 2; Nygren 2008: 111); while in Azerbaijan Russian
troops oﬃcially had withdrawn until 1993 (Human Rights Watch
1994: 176), Ukraine held long negotiations over the presence of the
Russian Black Sea fleet on the Crimea (cf. Spillman et al. 1999: 330;
Felgenhauer 1999: 3f). Georgia and Moldova made advances at the
OSCE meetings and bilateral negotiations, but experienced drawbacks
due to secessionist conflicts in both countries (Klimin 2009: 274; cf.
Gorincioi & Tcaci 2005: 238f; Devdariani 2005: 190ﬀ) (for more
details cf. ch. 5.3.2). Although the joint position of GUAM states
helped to keep the issue high on the international agenda and raised
international awareness, it did not speed up the actual withdrawal.
One measurement to disengage from those Russian troops, which
resided under a peacekeeping mandate, was to replace them with
non-Russian peacekeepers. Russia peacekeepers are blamed for be-
ing biased; they were to be replaced with peacekeeping mandates
from the UN or the OSCE. GUAM even discussed the idea of a joint
peacekeeping battalion. In the Chisinau Declaration (2005) the par-
ticipants express their firm determination to make a joint contribution
to sustaining peace and stability, aﬃrm their intention to establish
military and political cooperation, including peacekeeping operations’.
However, no document specifies how such a cooperation should be
modeled or implemented.39 Scholars remain divided, whether GUAM
rejected the idea of using its peacekeepers on their territory (Socor
2007b: 2) or approved of it (Tolstov 2008: 44). GUAM clearly stated
that their particular peacekeeping force would—as others—act only
under the auspices of international institutions like the OSCE, NATO
or the UN, making its deployment on GUAM territory even more
39 The idea of a joint force first appeared on the agenda in connection with the
eﬀort to protect the pipeline system in 1999 (Tolstov 2008: 37; Kuzio 2000: 87;
Getmanchuk 2006: 1). This initiative changed later to a peacekeeping unit.
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unlikely as this would require Russia’s consent for the annulment of
the present CIS-mandate (Fesenko 2007: 1f, Tolstov 2008: 44). A
joint peacekeeping unit should also be considered as a part of GUAM’s
ambition to comply with the obligations of established sovereign states
and international organisations.
The planned joint peacekeeping battalion is still not in action and
probably never will be, because it lacks consensus among the member
states (cf. Japaridze 2008: 89; Tolstov 2008: 44).40
Closely associated with the withdrawal of Russian troops is the
resolution of domestic conflicts (b); Russia is regarded as the primal
reason for their resilience. GUAM does not propose military actions
to stop Russian interference in the conflict zones, but aims at ac-
tivating existing international fora, such as the Minsk Group, and
at raising international awareness for Russian sovereignty violations.
Raising international awareness has been approached primarily by
the introduction of joint resolutions in the UN-General Assembly.
Since 2006 a resolution draft concerning the displaced persons and
refugees in Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been presented annually
to the General Assembly, where it has been habitually approved by
a slight majority and accompanied by Russian criticism.41 In its
resolutions the general assembly accepts the right of refugees on the
Georgian territory to return to their homes and the protection of
40 The idea first came up in 1999 at the GUAM defence ministers’ meeting (Tolstov
2008: 37). In the same year, the first joint military exercise—without Moldova—
took place in Georgia (Tolstov 2008: 37). Only in 2006, under Ukrainian
chairmanship, GUAM defence ministers (except for Moldova) made another
eﬀort (Zakareishvili 2008: 307). One year later a preliminary agreement was
reached to create a joint GUAM peacekeeping battalion, which was proposed
to replace ‘the Russian military contingents that operate under the U.N. or
CIS mandate or in compliance with regional agreements in the conflict zone’
(Tolstov 2008: 44). Moldova rejected this idea completely and referred to its
neutral status (Japaridze 2008: 89; pf. Socor 2007b: 2). The Baku Summit
(2007) postponed the project indefinitely (Socor 2007b: 2; Zakareishvili 2008:
308).
41 As an example resolution A/62/L.45 from May 2008 (62th session of the
UN-General Assembly) or resolution A/65/L.74 from 2010 (65th session).
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their property. It also urges to intensify eﬀorts of the Geneva Group,
which regularly meets to solve the disagreement resulting from the
Georgian-Russian war in 2008. In 2007, the four states introduced
a joint draft on Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their
implications for international peace, security and development, which
underpins the dangers of the conflicts and urges for international
assistance in conflict resolution (UN resolution A/62/L.45). The
document has been reintroduced every following session, but has been
continuously postponed. The same happened to drafts demanding
the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Nagorno Karabakh (62th
session of UN-general assembly). With Azerbaijan taking over a seat
in the UN Security Council (2012-13) the topic remained high on the
agenda. Although the UN General Assembly supports the resolution
on the refugee question, it is no indicator for the success of GUAM’s
coordinated diplomacy; those resolutions have not contributed to
conflict resolution. Moreover, GUAM itself is no adequate forum for
negotiations, because it does not include all involved parties.
The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and Russian interference in
Ukraine in 2014 reflect that the sovereignty of the four states did not
improve considerably. As a non-military organisation GUAM could
not prevent intervention and could do nothing more than condemn
Russia’s violation of international law.
Practical results have been achieved mainly in the area of domestic
security (c). The Virtual Law Enforcement Center and the GUAM
Interstate Information Management System have been launched to
help fight against organised crime. Joint projects focus on establishing
networks for data exchange that will help to pursue and prevent
transnational crime, such as traﬃcking in narcotics, weapons, human
beings, but also money laundering and tax evasion (Agreement on
Cooperation among the Governments of GUUAM Participating States
in the Field of Combat Against Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other
Dangerous Types of Crimes, 2004). They have been pushed and funded
by the US government since its worldwide fight against terrorism
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(Chechelashvili 2008: 13; US Dep. of State 2007: 12).42 Fighting
transnational crime is conceived as a contribution to international
security and stability. American technical and financial support
indicates that success in implementation is closely linked to the
contribution of financial means and expertise. Since 2006, various joint
operations between the four states took place, which are envisioned
as strengthening cooperation in the areas of customs control, border
control and law enforcement.
To sum up, there has been limited progress in political cooperation.
However, on a positive note, collaboration between the law enforce-
ment bodies of the four member states has improved. Yet, the issue of
secessionist conflicts as a source of unconsolidated sovereignty remains
unsolved—despite maintaining successfully international awareness
for the conflicts, no progress in conflict resolution has been achieved.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter expanded on the evolution of GUAM, its structure and
objectives and closed with a short performance review.
GUAM has been described as a regional project, which evolved
from a diplomatic initiative around the CFE Treaty negotiations
in the 1990s. Although the demand for the withdrawal of Russian
troops was one of GUAM’s major concerns, consultations have been
flanked by economic interests right from the beginning. Only four
42 After 2001 the security term has been amplified, including also terrorist
insurgents and organised crime. The fight against international terrorism and
organised crime gained momentum for three reasons: One is the increasing
US-interest in that issue, and second, that the GUAM states have strived
to comply with EU-demands for a safer neighbourhood. Last, there is an
actual demand within the member states for ramping up in the fight on terror.
For instance, Azerbaijan has to deal with growing Islamist extremism and
influence from countries like Iran or Afghanistan. During the second Russian-
Chechen war Georgia was accused by Russia of giving shelter to Chechen
terrorists. Moldova and Ukraine have an increasing problem with organised
crime, particularly human and drug traﬃcking. In addition, the Southern
Caucasus is a popular transit route for drugs from the Far East to Western
Europe.
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years after its first appearance, GUAM produced a charter, which
was the beginning of a fast institutionalisation process (1997-2005).
Starting with the opening of its Secretariat in 2007, GUAM can be
termed a regional organisation, characterising its phase of intense
activity (2006-2008). The Georgian-Russian war in 2008 put an end to
high-level meetings of participants and GUAM’s shadow years began.
The downsizing of cooperation was also due to changed national power
realities. Nevertheless, consultations continue.
Although GUAM’s institutional design today is very sophisticated
with various councils and working groups, the emphasis is still on
policy coordination instead of policy harmonisation. The Secretariat
functions as an information hub, which coordinates but can neither
enforce action nor sanction inactivity. The structure, the voting
principle of unanimity and also the equal division of costs reflect
the high attention GUAM members pay to the principle of equality.
Whereas the strict interpretation of sovereignty is unequaled among
post-Soviet integration projects, the avoidance of sovereignty pooling
is a pertinent feature among PSS and developing states in general.
Moreover, GUAM disposes of limited financial means and had to be
supported with American funding for several years.
GUAM embraces a broad scope of issues, with an emphasis on
economic development and sovereignty. Trade facilitation and the
diversification of energy distributors are the major ideas to spur
development; the grouping also aims at undertaking cross-border
infrastructure projects and modernise their communication networks.
Strengthening sovereignty shall be attained by solving domestic con-
flicts and consolidating territorial integrity. Economic and political
objectives are intertwined, and conflict resolution is regarded as the
principal obstacle for economic prosperity. The EU and NATO are
understood as the guardians for the security of the four states.
Looking at GUAM’s record, tangible results are scarce. Despite
valuable project proposals for facilitating trade, implementation lags
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behind. Moreover, advances in energy security and transport mod-
ernisation have been achieved only in Azerbaijan and Georgia and
outside the GUAM framework. Concerning sovereignty, GUAM’s
joint diplomatic approach in international organisations like the UN
did maintain international awareness, but failed to mobilise additional
support. The exchange of Russian peacekeepers and the resolution
of domestic separatist conflicts remain in limbo. To sum up, GUAM
is still limited to policy coordination. When cooperation measures
demand greater eﬀorts—financially and administratively—deadlock
dominates.
Chapter 4
The Development Strategy
Since its beginning GUAM cooperation has vacillated between an
economic and a sovereignty emphasis. This chapter focuses on the
economic dimension of cooperation within the GUAM framework,
scrutinising two of the four leading assumptions of this dissertation.
The first assumption argues that GUAM was conceptualised as
a development strategy: GUAM members are assumed to employ
economic integration to enhance economic growth and by doing this
raise their national welfare level. The welfare increase is supposed to
close the development gap between GUAM members and Western
industrialised states. This assumption conceives of the emergence of
GUAM as the explanandum and development as explanans. To this
purpose, I will show why development is of particular importance to
GUAM member states. Referring to theories of RS, I will then demon-
strate the development argument by utilising GUAM documents and
activities.
The second assumption argues that GUAM as a development
strategy is bound to fail. There is an abundance of both favourable
and restrictive conditions to explain the advance or stalemate of
regional integration projects. This dissertation will concentrate on
three core variables: mutual trust, state capacity and demand for
regional integration. The chapter will show that thwarting factors
dominate over conducive factors. GUAM participants can be regarded
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as ill-prepared for the chosen economic integration format, because
they lack the necessary state capacity. Moreover, the composition of
participants can be regarded as ill-advised, since it does not allow
for compensation of individual deficiencies among participants. It
also does not consider the aspect of suﬃcient demand for integration
among participants. GUAM’s current state is conceived as explanan-
dum; that is, there is no single isolated explanans causing one certain
eﬀect, and there is a synthesis of diﬀering variables at work that can
moderate or even exacerbate the impact of each other. The overall
plethora of factors in RS make a clear-cut diﬀerentiation between
causal and intervening variables diﬃcult.
This chapter can be divided into four main sub-chapters. The
first part (4.1) exhibits how GUAM can be regarded as an example of
economic integration. It also conceptualises welfare and development.
The second sub-chapter (4.2) buttresses the development strategy of
GUAM along three major explanations for development: modernisa-
tion, disintegration and transformation. It refers to documents and
activities to substantiate GUAM as a development strategy and, thus,
proves the first assumption. In the following sub-chapter (4.3), I
analyse GUAM along three conditional variables, which shed light on
the current state of GUAM. Thereby I present substantial ground for
my second assumption that GUAM’s development strategy is bound
to fail. I close with a summary of my conclusions (4.4).
4.1 The Setting
Regional groupings have been studied by economists as well as politi-
cal scientists. Their methods and conclusions have been incorporated
in the extensive research field of RS. In this section economic consid-
erations form an important backdrop for analysis. Firstly (4.1.1), I
delineate how economists conceive regional integration and explicate
that GUAM can be examined as an example of economic integration,
allowing us to employ economic assumptions on regional integration.
It will also be shown that economic and political integration are inter-
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related and should not be regarded as isolated processes. Applying
an interdisciplinary approach, both perspectives are included in this
analysis. In the second step (4.1.2), I draw on the motivation of states
to pursue economic integration, linking welfare and development to
economic integration.
4.1.1 Economic Integration
Although GUAM has already been conceptualised as a regional inte-
gration project in chapter 2.1.1, I come back to the term ‘integration’
to take into account the economic perspective. This chapter illustrates
that GUAM can also be studied as an example of regional integration
from the vantage point of economic sciences. The first part draws on
how economists interpret economic integration, then, the concept of
integration will be employed for the GUAM case. Lastly, it will be
briefly delineated how International Political Economy (IPE) has em-
braced regionalism as a research area. Regional integration, economic
integration, regionalism and preferential trade agreements (PTA) are
used synonymously.
Economists define regional integration as a phenomenon of eco-
nomic cooperation between two or more states based on formal agree-
ments. In most cases those agreements define mutual preferential
trade conditions, which have been the principal drivers for increased
economic flows between states in a region (Glania & Matthes 2005:
4; Mansfield & Milner 1999: 591). Free trade endeavours such as
GUAM’s Free Trade Agreement, can be regarded as the nucleus of
economic integration, and integration may spread to other economic
issues throughout the process. In that context, regional refers to
a limited number of partners in a geographically specified area in
contrast to a global form of economic integration, for example within
the WTO-framework. The first stages of dismantling interstate trade
barriers may occur in a unilateral approach (cf. Underhill 1997).
The advanced phases of economic integration—embracing more and
more issues like joint regulations for services, capital or labour—are
understood to demand the establishment of joint institutions that
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coordinate integration activity and/or the allocation of rising costs
and benefits (Mytelka 1979: 10ﬀ; cf. Haas & Schmitter 1981: 164f; cf.
Choi & Caporaso 2002: 486; Langhammer 2003: 250).
Economists determine seven phases for integration, which often
intermingle in practice: The starting point is a) a preferential trade
zone. It is followed by b) a free trade zone, c) a customs union, d) a
common economic area, e) a common market, f) a monetary union, g)
a political union (Glania & Matthes 2005: 4f, Woll 2008: 381; Grüske
& Schneider 2003: 240). Thus, in contrast to political scientists,
economists envisage a clear final objective for integration (Grüske &
Schneider 2003: 240; Woll 2008: 381; Arentzen 1992: 1645).1 A free
trade area can be regarded as the most common model of regionalism
(Börzel 2012b: 256).2 It reflects a global trend of increasing regional
trade agreements (cf. Baccini & Dür 2012: 57; Glania & Matthes
2005: 6; Beretta 2008: 75). While regionalism can be grasped as state-
promoted integration (cf. Hurrell 1995: 44), as for example GUAM,
regionalisation is characterised as a bottom-up integration process,
arising rather tacitly among private economic actors (Goltermann et
al. 2012: 4; Vinokurov & Libman 2012: 3; Breslin et al. 2002: 14).
GUAM can be characterised as an economic integration project in
the form of a free trade agreement. Economic cooperation is reiterated
in all GUAM documents. First references were related to energy
transport (Strasbourg Declaration, 1997; Washington Declaration,
1999). The Yalta Charter (2001) vividly describes the economic
concept of GUAM:
‘1. Objectives of cooperation of the GUUAM: pro-
moting social and economic development; strengthening
and expanding trade and economic links; development and
eﬀective use in the interest of GUUAM states of the trans-
1 While pure trade eﬀects dominate at the beginning, higher integration levels
emphasise overall welfare eﬀects (cf. Grüske & Schneider 2003: 240).
2 Such regionalism could also be dubbed as negative integration (reduction
of trade barriers in contrast to positive integration by establishing a joint
economic policy) (Grinberg 2003: 343).
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port and communication arteries with its corresponding
infrastructure situated in their territories [...]
3. Directions of cooperation of the GUUAM: economy, sci-
ence, technology and environment; transport, energy and
telecommunication infrastructure; joint investment and fi-
nancial projects; humanitarian sphere, culture, education,
mass media, tourism, youth exchange; other directions of
mutual interest.’ (Yalta Charter, 2001, sentence 1 and 3)
GUAM represents a low level of economic integration. The Free Trade
Agreement (2002) has been flanked by further documents aimed at
harmonising regional trade, such as the Agreement on International
Multimodal Transportation of Goods (2007), the GUAM Sectoral Co-
operation Development Strategy (2007) or the Decision on GUAM
Sectoral Cooperation (2008). GUAM has not yet reached the level
of a customs union, even though eﬀorts to facilitate and standardise
customs procedures have been embarked upon. With all its ambi-
tious agreements GUAM could be termed a ‘Free Trade Area–PLUS’.
GUAM’s economic integration is a state-led process initiated and
manoeuvred by the participating governments of GUAM, representing
a case of regionalism. However, GUAM embraces other cooperation
areas which have not arisen as a consequence of deeper economic
integration and, thus, weaken the spill-over concept of neofunction-
alism (Colman & Underhill 1998b: 10; Gamble & Payne 1996: 252f;
Haas & Schmitter 1981: 163; Kösler & Zimmek 2008b: 6).3 Still,
3 The link between economic and political integration, especially concerning
causality, is still not suﬃciently explained (Mansfield & Milner 1997b: 11;
Mansfield & Milner 1999: 590; Mattli 1999: 31). There is no automatism
between the two. Economic and political integration habitually coincide and
can be regarded as a ‘continuum’ (Haas & Schmitter 1981: 164). Their
linkage—or at least a vision of it—can also be understood as a criterion for
integration (Mattli 1999: 190). In general, the diﬀerentiation is diﬃcult since
economic integration also demands certain accompanying political measures
to proceed (Etzioni 2001: xxxvi). On the one hand, there must be political
mechanisms to negotiate and implement economic integration steps. On the
other hand, economic integration also demands the political will to further
economic integration (Zimmerling 1991: 114; cf. Langhammer 2003: 252); in
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since economic integration is a substantial part of the GUAM project,
assumptions on economic integration can be included in this analysis.
Economic integration projects have been scrutinised primarily by
scholars from IPE, the second major branch of theory in RS. Scholars
observe a rising number of PTA between states (Mansfield & Milner
1999: 589; Baccini & Dür 2012: 57). Even states which are assumed
to have diﬃculties benefitting from economic integration such as
developing states or ‘imperfect’ trading partners, continue to pursue
regional integration (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 610; cf. Heyden &
Woolcock 2012: 535). Economic integration still is primarily shallow
integration on the level of trade preferences, with few agreements
being implemented (Börzel 2012b: 256). Political economists follow
a similar research agenda to their colleagues from political science;
the focal point is a triangle of a) the reasons for states to form PTA,
b) the eﬀects those PTA have on members, non-members and the
global economy and c) the conditions for PTA to proof eﬀective in
reference to Mattli’s (1999) demand-and-supply factors. There is still
no consensus on all three dimensions.
Looking at the motivation for states to seek economic integration,
explanations vary between the domestic and global perspectives. Gen-
erating economic growth can be conceived as the principal driving
factor. On the one hand, states are assumed to pursue regional in-
tegration when national attempts of trade or market liberalisation
fail (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 605). On the other hand, domestic
factors such as the preferences of policy-makers and interest groups
as well as the strength of domestic institutions are assumed to influ-
ence a state’s decision to integrate (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 605).
From a global perspective, regional integration can be conceived as
a reaction to externalities or economic interdependence4 or—with
reference to the power variable—as an instrument to increase a state’s
that sense, economic integration and every attempt for economic cooperation
can be grasped as a result of political decisions (Langhammer 2003: 252).
4 Baccini & Dür (2012: 57) suggest that the increase in PTA is a result of
competition for market access.
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power position in the international system (Börzel 2012b: 258f; cf.
Mattli 1999: 190).5 It has been suggested that most PTA have been
initiated for political reasons (cf. Mansfield & Milner 1999: 610).6
Studying the eﬀects of regionalism, the great debates on regionalism
versus globalism and on trade diversion versus trade creation continue
(Heydon & Woolcock 2012: 534; Ruiz Estrada 2009: 1; Hnat 2013:
1; Carrere et al. 2012: 1).7 Since PTA discriminate non-members
(Mansfield & Milner 1999: 602), scholars focus also on the eﬀects on
excluded states (Mattli 1999: 192; Laursen 2004: 18; cf. Baccini &
Dür 2012: 1).
Recent studies focus on general welfare eﬀects and on eﬀects
of policy change (transforming weaker member states in a regional
project), taking into account the nexus between regionalism and
democratisation/market liberalisation (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 606;
Baccini 2012: 455; Ladewig 2010: 7073). Various assumptions have
been brought forward to explain why some regional projects are more
eﬀective than others. Generally, developing countries are assumed
to have more diﬃculties in reaping advantages from regional inte-
gration (Krapohl & Fink 2013: 473; Heydon & Woolcock 2012: 534;
Ladewig 2010: 7073). Pokorna & Smutka (2010: 60) suggest that
trade expansion through PTAs depends on the development level of
participants and their export goods. For Ladewig (2010: 7073) it
is the developing states’ limited access to capital that would expose
5 Political allies tend to cooperate also economically (Mansfield & Milner 1999:
610). Stronger members of an agreement may employ trade agreements to
increase their power over smaller members (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 611).
In contrast, smaller states may aim at binding their stronger partner by
regional integration, although studies indicate that this results in even greater
vulnerability (Börzel 2012b: 259). Perju (2009: 1) suggests various ‘geopolitical
factors’ to explain the emergence of PTA, such as bilateral trade, sharing a
common language or cultural heritage or having been colonies under the same
coloniser.
6 For Väyrynen (2003: 25) the two logics of ‘geopolitics’ and ‘capitalism’ are
‘analytically separable but empirically intertwined’.
7 Scholars are still divided on how to assess the interrelation between regional
and global trade liberalisation processes (Brkic & Efendic 2013; Beretta 2008;
UNCTAD 2007; Gavin 2007; Mittelmann 2000).
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them more strongly to economic shocks—caused by their incorpora-
tion into international markets—and, thus, benefit them less from
integration projects. Jurcic et al (2013: 1) explain diﬀerences in
integration between industrialised and developing states with the
diverging objectives. Piatek et al. (2013) relate economic growth to
political and economic freedom, concluding that economic freedom
has a direct positive eﬀect on economic growth, while political freedom
may improve as a consequence of higher economic growth. As has
been mentioned in ch. 2.1.1, RS have been confronted with region
building below the state level as spontaneous projects initiated from
non-state actors, for example global business actors, frequently termed
as ‘regionalisation’ or ‘marketisation’ (Spindler 2002: 2). Such forms
of regionalism are increasing and gaining more attention from RS
scholars. However, GUAM as a state-led project and, thus, classical
project of trade integration as a result of agreements between various
governments, allows us to leave regionalisation processes within the
four concerned states aside.8.
4.1.2 Welfare and Development
The previous chapter explained why GUAM can be regarded as a
case of economic regional integration. Moreover, it has been shown
that political and economic integration are tightly interwoven. This
chapter illustrates, how development has been linked to economic
integration—those insights form an important backdrop for proving
the first assumption that GUAM functions as a development strategy.
For this purpose, it will be outlined how welfare and development can
be delineated as a motive for state action. Then it will be shown that
development is primarily achieved through economic growth.
There is no general rule that explains why states initiate regional
integration projects (Sampson 2003: 14), nor any proven causality.
8 ‘New’ can also be associated with methods, for example Burfisher et al. (2004:
i, 4; 37) associate a new trade theory with NR that transcends the traditional
trade theory of goods. See also The ch. 2.1.1 for NR
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The majority of cases in RS has been explained with the welfare
rationale. In reference to liberal institutionalism states can be delin-
eated as rational actors, behaving in a goal-oriented manner, weighing
the costs and gains of their behaviours (Gamble & Payne 1996: 250;
Lipson 1993). States are perceived as being always interested in
increasing their own welfare position, careless of the welfare of other
states (Keohane 1993: 274; Milner 1992: 470).
Welfare can be understood as ‘the state of doing well especially
in respect to good fortune, happiness, well-being, or prosperity’.9
This definition demonstrates that welfare comprises material as well
as immaterial elements. There is no explicit, comprehensive welfare
concept that could be applied to all states in the same manner (Geue
1997: 4467). Economic prosperity has always been a central element
of welfare, exemplified in GNP per capita; it can be termed as welfare
in the narrow sense. The Western understanding of welfare embraces
socio-political categories like health care and education services or an
intact environment, but also values like freedom or equality, which are
believed to be guaranteed best under democratic governance. While
welfare is a static category, welfare levels imply a variation in degree,
with the welfare level of industrialised economies usually as the yard-
stick.10
States may employ regional integration, on the one hand, to in-
crease their relative welfare level. On the other hand, states may be
interested in maintaining their current welfare level. While increas-
ing the welfare level can be seen as the active element of economic
integration, the ambition to maintain current welfare levels can be
understood as the re-active or defensive element, often circumscribed
as reaction to externalities (Börzel 2012b: 258). Similar to welfare,
development can be grasped in both a narrow and a broad sense.
Development in the broad sense can be equated with the process of
raising the welfare level. In the narrow sense, development has been
9 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://bit.ly/1qygiwK; 22.04.2014.
10 Scholars acknowledge methodological problems in evaluating welfare increase
(Glania & Matthes 2005: 20ﬀ.).
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delineated as economic growth, due to its easy measurability and to
its ability to expand welfare in the broad sense (cf. Glania & Matthes
2005: 16f; UNCTAD 2007: 19; Fawcett 2008: 26). While welfare and
development in the narrow sense primarily are economic concepts
(economic prosperity and economic growth), their wider concepts
both encompass socio-political factors such as health care, education,
ecology or participation (Chilcote 2004: 628; Nohlen & Schultze 2010:
206ﬀ). Industrialised economies are believed to strive for marginal
welfare increases in form of additional investment creation, increased
administrative eﬃciency, decreased transaction costs or better policy
coordination (Robson 1993: 332). Developing economies are instead
assumed to be endeavouring towards a considerable rise of their wel-
fare levels in order to close the development gap between them and the
industrialised economies (Riegel 1995: 349f). While some measures
to achieve development are a national issue, others could be accom-
plished by regional integration. Thus, most developing economies
are assumed to employ regional integration as general development
strategy to bring their national economies more in line with the West-
ern industrialised economies (Belassa & Stoutsjesdijk 1981: 285; cf.
Halperin 2007: 221).
To develop is usually understood as modernising along the mar-
ket economic model from an agrarian economy to an industrialised
economy, and to pursue political stability in the form of democracy
(Halperin 2007: 220). The measure of choice in achieving development
in the narrow sense has been to increase investments (Halperin 2007:
220). Despite vital discourse within development research, moderni-
sation theorists still dominate. They proscribe trade liberalisation
and the strengthening of the bottom-up initiative through market
liberalisation, privatisation of state assets and, last but not least,
opening economies to attain economic growth (Halperin 2007: 223).
Other approaches such as dependency theories demand to break up
old dependency relationships, even though they do not provide a
blueprint for closing the development gap (Halperin 2007: 222). Yet
to be debated is the third pillar for achieving development: technology
and the transfer of knowledge (Halperin 2007: 220).
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To sum up, increasing one’s welfare level can be seen as the long-
term objective of states when pursuing economic integration. For
the majority of developing economies, development represents the
mid-term objective in an integration process. Economic growth is
commonly regarded as the key to attain development and, thus, a
higher welfare level. Assuming that GUAM member states have more
in common with developing rather than with industrialised economies,
and that they aim at closing the development gap towards Western
states, I suggest that GUAM has been formed as part of a development
strategy.
4.1.3 Summary
In reference to GUAM documents, particularly the Free Trade Agree-
ment, this paper has already shown that GUAM should be understood
as a case of economic integration. Nevertheless, economic integration
is just one part of GUAM’s multidimensional integration process. This
chapter has also illustrated that political and economic integration
are tightly interwoven. GUAM integration has been initiated from
the respective governments. As it is a state project, both political
and economic considerations have to be included into analysis.
States aim at increasing their welfare level when they pursue
integration. Development in the narrow sense can be equated with
economic growth; it is supposed to enable development in other socio-
political areas as well. Particularly developing economies employ
economic integration as an instrument to spur development. Due to
the similarity of GUAM members’ economies to those of developing
economies and the development gap between GUAM states and their
Western European neighbours, it can be assumed that GUAM states
also employ integration as a development strategy. The next chap-
ter will provide proof for this assumption and, thus, contribute to
substantiate the first assumption of this dissertation—that GUAM is
designed as a development strategy.
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4.2 Explaining the Emergence of GUAM
In ch. 4.1.1 it has been established that GUAM can be regarded
as a case of economic integration. Chapter 4.1.2 determined that
overall welfare can be grasped as a long-term objective of integration
participants, whereas development (in the wide sense) can be under-
stood as a midterm objective particularly of developing economies.
Those conclusions suggest a development strategy for the GUAM case.
In this section I want to demonstrate my first assumption stating
that economic GUAM integration indeed is based on a development
concept. I follow a two-fold approach: Firstly, I will reveal the de-
velopment concept of GUAM member states, which employs a wider
understanding of development as is the case with other developing
economies (ch. 4.2.1). Secondly, in reference to IPE theories, I will
provide GUAM documents and activities that substantiate my as-
sumption of GUAM as a development strategy (ch. 4.2.2). I close
with a summary of my findings (ch. 4.2.3).
4.2.1 The Development Concept
This sub-chapter specifies the development concept of GUAM. It will
be reified that GUAM’s development concept surpasses the tradi-
tional meaning of modernisation (a), which has been employed by
non-Soviet developing economies.11 GUAM’s development concept
also encompasses disintegration (b) and transformation (c). All three
are related to the past of GUAM participants as Soviet states (cf. ch.
2). In the following I will elaborate on all three elements.
Let us begin with the first motive: modernisation (a). Moderni-
sation is comprised of economic growth as well as of the transfer of
technology and knowledge that is necessary to raise national produc-
11 Jurcic et al. (2013: 1) suggests that economic integration between developing
states diﬀers from integration pursued by industrialised states concerning their
objectives: The former pursue with regional integration not only industrializa-
tion and poverty reduction, but also non-economic goals like peace, political
liberalisation or food safety (ib.)
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tion to present international standards and thereby lift the general
welfare level of the four states. Before 1990 the overall welfare level of
the Socialist Soviet Republics was relatively high, although welfare in
the narrow sense, in GDP per capita, was considerably lower than in
Western states (see table 4.1). The collapse of the SU was followed by
a great decline in welfare levels—both in the narrow and the broader
senses. PSS were characterised by low national income and per capita
income levels as well as negative growth rates (see table 4.2). GUAM
states became developing economies (Sewin 2008: 282). Table 4.3
shows the steep decline of real GDP compared to the 1989 situation
for the four GUAM states. Only Azerbaijan managed to regain and
surpass its GDP level from 1989—thanks to revenues from oil sales
after the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The other
three states have not even reached two-thirds of their 1989 GDP-level,
even though 20 years have passed since disintegration started (EBRD
Transition Report 2010: 103; 117; 129; 153).
Poverty became momentous after the dissolution of the USSR.
Even the health care and education sector, which have always been a
feature distinguishing Communist states from developing countries,
suﬀered greatly, reducing the overall welfare level. GUAM members
had to grapple with securing the basic needs of their population whilst
simultaneously transforming their national economies into productive
and leading market economies, not to mention also the transforma-
tion of their political and social structures (cf. quadruble transition
concept, ch. 2.1.2).
Another reason for the steep decline of overall welfare levels were
domestic conflicts, which were unleashed at the beginning of the
1990s, and were compounded by the ensuing migration flows. For
Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia the problem of refugees raised
the level of poverty considerably (cf. Lunev 2006: 19). GUAM
member states discern those conflicts as a major reason for their
underdevelopment12:
12 Since GUAM states also agree that Russia is the primary source for the ongoing
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1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Azerbaijan 89 38 53 100 210
Georgia 88 27 34 49 61
Moldova 98 39 34 48 53
Ukraine 96 45 40 59 61
Table 4.3: Real GDP development (1989=100) (Source: EBRD Transition
Report 2010).
‘It was emphasized that these threats, as well as unre-
solved conflicts and illegal presence of foreign troops and
armaments in GUAM States are recognized as main obsta-
cles on the way to full-scale democratic transformations
and economic development in the region.’ (GUAM Kyiv
Summit Communique, 23rd May 2006)
Modernisation was essential in the energy sector; in the 1990s, it was
mandatory to ensure stable access to electricity for enterprises and
private households. With energy being indispensable for production
and welfare (cf. Hallaert et al. 2011: 20), securing energy supply
has become a key objective. Apart from ensuring energy supply for
economic production, the four states had to solve the problem of the
energy shortage for domestic consumption. After the collapse of the
SU, domestic energy production in the four states almost came to a
standstill and then, only recovered slowly. Even Azerbaijan had to
invest in its petroleum sector before it could satisfy domestic demand
with domestic production. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are energy
importers (cf. EBRD Transition Report 2010)—even though analyses
for Ukraine and Georgia suggest, that they could be self-suﬃcient
energy producers and even turn into energy exporters (Patronyk &
Zhovkva 2010; Chomakhidze 2011). Moreover, energy usage is still
characterised by high ineﬃciency due to the old production equipment
dating back to the SU that reckoned an abundance of resources. Yet,
in the wake of the dissolution of the SU, GUAM states did not dispose
conflicts, the four states shift the responsibility for their own underdevelopment
to this external actor, Russia.
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of suﬃcient financial means to purchase energy from abroad. To
address modernisation, adequate investments were needed.
Disintegration (b) has been presented as the second element of
a wider development strategy. Disintegration describes the process
of splitting from the SU to form a new independent state. This en-
tailed decoupling from a single politico-economic system, generating
national competence centres which have previously been located in
Moscow. On the one hand, the four GUAM states had to create
their own institutions from scratch, such as a foreign ministry and
a national bank. On the other hand, they had to build their own
processes and cycles, like establishing an independent tax system to
generate a state budget and form more independent production cycles.
The Soviet system had not only embraced central planning for
all economic sectors, but also ‘dependence on inter-republic fiscal
transfers for investment and consumption in the satellites; [...] de-
pendence on a mono-bank system and wide circulation of Russian
currency’ (Robson 2006: x). There were taxes which the Soviet re-
publics collected directly, taxes which were collected by the central
state (based in Moscow) and allocated to the republics and a transfer
system among the Soviet republics. In addition, most Southern Soviet
republics such as Azerbaijan and Georgia have been receivers of sub-
sidisation (Lunev 2006: 17); as a result, the new national governments
were not able to finance the state budget independently, because the
costs were too high and because their budgets lacked the necessary
revenues from their own national economies.
Additionally, the USSR was constructed as an entity with inter-
twined transport and communication systems, highly diﬀused pro-
duction chains, interdependent trade relations and an unbalanced
dependency on the Russian Socialist Republic with Moscow as the
pivot of the union. Apart from the Russian republic, ‘there was
virtually no sector with a closed cycle, starting with raw materials
and ending with finished goods for domestic production or for ex-
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port’ (Hawrylyshyn 2005: 121). All economies had to face the same
problems: sudden appearance of customs borders, the loss of formerly
guaranteed demand and supply, interrupted delivery chains, etc. (cf.
Hishow 2002: 7; UNECE 2006: 11). Particularly for small states like
the Caucasian countries or Moldova the disruption of traditional trade
relations was diﬃcult (cf. Astrov & Havlik 2008: 125). Only Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine and, to some extent, Kazakhstan, disposed of a
suﬃciently diversified and industrialised economic structure enabling
them to recover more rapidly than other PSS (Robinson 2004: 176;
cf. Muzaﬀarli 2008: 23). The less diversified an economy was, the
more it suﬀered from the collapse (Grigoriev & Salikhov 2007: 6;
cf. UNECE 2006: 11). Scholars claim that the decay of the Soviet
integrated economic complex has been decisive for the presently poor
economic situations in most PSS and distinguishes them from other
post-communist states in Europe (Grinberg 2005: 1; Astrov & Havlik
2008: 125).
The legacy of the former union state was particularly pronounced
in infrastructures. After the collapse of the SU, no PSS (except
Russia) disposed of the necessary infrastructure (transport, water,
communication, energy, etc.) to run a market economy or independent
state (Robinson 2004: 173). Apart from modernising old equipment
new independent infrastructure had to be set up. That entailed reduc-
ing dependence on the previous centre Russia, on the one hand, and
improving connections between PSS, on the other hand. I will come
back to the constraints on disintegration at the end of this chapter.
Let us turn to the third major challenge for GUAM states which
pledges for a wider development strategy: transformation (c). At the
beginning of their new statehood all four GUAM states declared their
ambition for systemic change, i. e. turning into market economies
and democratic states. Whether the four countries emulated Western
models of market economies and democratic forms of governance or
had other concepts in mind, should be debated at another place and
time. Still, they clearly intended to leave the previous planned econ-
omy and Socialist state behind. The parallelism of transformation and
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disintegration has been described as particularly challenging before in
chapter 2.1.2, distinguishing PSS from other post-communist states
in Eastern Europe. Systemic change also promised positive eﬀects
that could propel development. For example, the status as a market
economy, which has been granted to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova
by the European Union, allows access to preferential trade agreements
with leading Western economies and their markets.
These three tasks—modernisation, disintegration and transforma-
tion—should be understood as a wider development strategy that
suggests a plausible motive for GUAM states to pursue economic
integration; in order to succeed a development strategy would demand
investments (1), the transfer of technology and expertise (2), and
the management of (inter)dependencies (3). Regional integration is
generally believed to address these challenges, making it a convincing
development strategy among national approaches. I will expound on
these three constraints in more detail.
Investments are vital to embark on modernisation, disintegration
and transformation (1) (cf. Robson 2006: xii; cf. Sewin 2008: 282; cf.
Astrov & Havlik 2007: 128). Financing has been particularly diﬃcult,
firstly, because in the SU dependence on inter-republic fiscal transfers
for investment and consumption was typical (Robson 2006: x; 7).
After the collapse of the SU, PSS lacked a clear budget and debt divi-
sion (cf. Aslund et al. 1999: 1). Moreover, during the 1990s, Russia
decreased its contributions to other post-Soviet economies due to its
own crisis (Robson 2006: xi). Secondly, the collapse of the SU and the
subsequent economic crisis led to insuﬃcient tax income and, thus,
low state budgets. Thirdly, with the local banking sector still looming
(IMF World Economic Outlook 2010: 69), and distrust among market
actors, domestic investment creation was close to zero. Finally, domes-
tic conflicts in the Caucasus not only created additional expenditures,
but also contributed to an insecure investment climate and raised
transport insecurities that caused low cross-border trade and ham-
pered economic development (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 126). The new
states had to solve the double task of establishing new income sources
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on the one hand, and financing the creation of the new structures and
processes on the other. Hence, investment had to come primarily from
foreign investors or lenders; until today, the four states much depend
on FDI, and they experienced a considerable decrease of FDI inflows
after the 2008 Financial Crisis (cf. EBRD Transition Report 2010:
116; UNCTAD Investment Report 2013: 216). Economists consider
regional integration as one method to achieve this goal along with uni-
lateral or international approaches. Hence, as an economic integration
project GUAM would oﬀer the advantage of a greater regional market
and be more attractive to foreign investors (Gavin & de Lombaerde
2005: 74; Robson 1993: 332). Furthermore, regional integration is
assumed to entice mutual investments from participants and saving
costs for regional solutions instead of national approaches (UNCTAD
2007:18). Yet, investment decisions are also based on complementary
policies. Participation in a regional integration project may be less rel-
evant than the economic characteristics of the investing and the host
countries (Sapsford et al. 2002: 460). Ch. 4.3.2 will address this issue.
Creating new independent institutions and processes is also a
question of expertise (2). The new states were left with little human
capital (experienced politicians, economists, technocrats, oﬃcials,
etc.), since most processes (e. g. monetary and trade issues) had been
managed from Moscow (Hawrylyshyn 2005: 121). Moreover, they all
lacked experience with market economies and democratic governance.
In addition, market actors as well as scientists or engineers were only
marginally acquainted with the technological standards of leading
industrialised economies. Even if the old communist elite had stepped
down at the beginning of the 1990s, the young generation would
still have needed to close the knowledge gap; regional integration is
believed to pool resources as well as know-how among its participants
(cf. Halperin 2007: 221; Gavin & De Lombaerde 2005: 71f; Robson
1993: 332), and a regional integration project like GUAM is widely
assumed to contribute to sharing expertise. I will return to the limits
of shared financing and know-how for the GUAM case in ch. 3.
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2001-02 2004-05 2007-08 2010-11 2013-14
Azerbaijan n/a n/a 3.6 3.7 4.1
Georgia n/a 2.2 2.9 3.8 4.3
Moldova n/a n/a 2.5 3.2 3.6
Ukraine 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.8 4.1
Russian Federation 2.6 3.3 3.5 4.5 4.6
Germany 6.8 6.4 6.7 6.4 6.2
Table 4.4: Evaluating quality and availability of infrastructure on a rank from 1
to 7, with 7 as best grade (Source: Global Competitiveness Reports).
Turning into a sovereign state also demanded the management of
continuing or lost (inter)dependencies (3). The collapse of the SU not
only jeopardised desired interdependence—for example interrupted
Soviet trade or production flows—but continued interdependencies
and dependencies that were not wished for, like a dependency on Rus-
sia as the only energy supplier. Mutual dependencies are particularly
high amongst direct neighbours as between Azerbaijan and Georgia
or Ukraine and Moldova. Yet, most dependencies continue towards
Russia, the former centre of the union state (Robinson 2004: 178).
In that context, namely transport routes and energy are vital (cf.
UNECE 2006: 31; Pinzar 2008: 128). The inherited Soviet transport
infrastructure was a manifestation of the Soviet flow of goods: From
the Russian Soviet republic to all other Soviet republics with Moscow
as its linchpin. In contrast, connections between the other Soviet
republics or to countries outside the SU were scarce. In the 1990s,
Russia allowed other states the use of its pipelines for their energy
export only to a small extent (Aslund et al. 1999: 53). Infrastructure
deficits are still prevalent among GUAM states today (EBRD Transi-
tion Report 2010: 4, see also table 4.4).
Energy dependence is a crucial issue for the four states. Due to
the inherited Soviet transport facilities for oil, gas and electricity,
energy trade (especially for gas) is strongly monopolised and largely
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controlled by Russia (Aslund et al. 1999: 52).13 Notwithstanding,
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova all benefitted economically from low
prices or barter trades for Russian hydrocarbons and electricity; from
an economic vantage point, this dependency had its merits. Obviously,
other factors have to be added to an economic calculus: The member-
ship of Azerbaijan oﬀers an alternative energy supplier and possible
dividends from energy transit to Europe. Regional integration is
supposed to reduce dependence on a large and powerful neighbouring
market (Glania & Matthes 2005: 16f). Trade agreements discriminate
against third parties (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 602): Excluding
Russia can be regarded as an attempt to reduce dependence on the
dominant and powerful trading partner Russia.
In order to guarantee economic continuity and address the three
challenges of investments, expertise and interdependence, a cooper-
ative approach like regional integration was and still is advisable
for PSS, specifically for direct neighbours or very high degrees of
dependence. Mutual dependence plays a significant role in integra-
tion studies. Functionalism emphasises the growing complexity and
increase of technical problems that transcend national borders (Viotti
& Kauppi 1993: 241), the ‘proliferation of channels of communication’
and the growth of ‘complex cause-and-eﬀect linkages between issues’
(Haas 1980: 35f), which would result in increased mutual dependence
and, thus, the demand for integration schemes instead of unilateral
welfare strategies. Interdependence has been understood either as
an additional structural variable for explaining integration (Mitrany
1943), as a result of integration (Haas) or as a component of the
globalisation argument.14 Interdependence has also been a crucial
concept for other schools of theory: Keohane & Nye (1977: 8) conceive
interdependence as an issue that creates ‘reciprocal eﬀects among
countries or among actors in diﬀerent countries’. Nevertheless, exist-
13 The quality of oil, for example, necessitates certain refining facilities and makes
switching to other types of oil from alternative suppliers diﬃcult.
14 Globalisation should not be misunderstood as a hotchpotch for all kind of
externalities (Padoan 2001: 56). For concepts of globalisation cf. Kern 2002:
20.
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ing interdependence does not cause unavoidable cooperation (Wolf &
Zürn 1986: 215; Viotti & Kauppi 1993: 56; cf. Pollins 2008: 196).15
Regionalism is frequently explained as a reaction to various structural
factors such as interdependence. Both the origin and the solution of
such structural factors are beyond the national level and therefore
they have also been termed de-nationalised problems by political
scientists (Zürn 2005: 9) or externalities by IPE scholars (Mattli 1999:
190). Inactivity as well as national solutions would bring ineﬀective or
second best solutions and therefore adversely aﬀect the national wel-
fare levels of states (De Lombaerde & van Langenhove 2007: 1; Hettne
& Söderbaum 2002: 46).16 Although functionalism contributed to
the significance of interdependence for the emergence of regionalism,
GUAM is a state-led project contradicting the bottom-up genesis
initiated by non-state actors.
There is a number of other explanatory hypotheses for regional
integration such as regionalism as protection from negative globalisa-
tion eﬀects17, regionalism as reaction to existing regional projects18
15 Interdependence should be conceived of as an intervening variable—only when
states have no other remedy than to cooperate, could they be seen as indepen-
dent variables in a causal relationship.
16 Thus, regionalism could also be understood as an answer to a ‘crisis of gov-
ernance’ (Zürn 2005: 11) or, as economists point out, as a ‘necessity due to
economic crisis’ (Mansfield & Milner 1997b: 13f).
17 Cf. Farrell 2005: 2, Telo 2001b: 6; Mittelman 2000: 128; Nesadurai 2005: 100.
Developing economies may employ regionalism as a protective measure from
marginalisation or investment loss (Nesadurai 2005: 168; Glania & Matthes
2005: 14f; Bowles 2002: 100). Molchanov (2009a: 345) conceives of PSR as a
reaction to the sudden exposure of PSS to globalisation eﬀects. Yet, GUAM is
no isolated strategy, but accompanied by WTO and European integration, is
thus, seeking even more exposure to the global market.
18 Forming new integration projects could reduce the negative eﬀects of exclusion
of existing regional projects (Mattli 1999: 15f; Laursen 2004: 18). GUAM
could indeed be understood as a reaction to an EU membership that is beyond
reach (cf. Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 2). Yet, this seems not very
plausible for the inception of GUAM, since the four states were only marginally
participating in international trade with the EU when GUAM was initiated
and therefore may have suﬀered from exclusion only to a limited extent at
that time.
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or regionalism as result of hegemonic leadership19. They have to re-
main outside the focus of this dissertation, either due to their limited
significance or to the limited scope of this dissertation.
4.2.2 Substantiating the Development Thesis
The previous sub-chapter explained why development can be under-
stood as a plausible strategy for the four GUAM participants; it has
also been shown that they employ a wider development concept, which
goes beyond modernisation embracing disintegration and transforma-
tion as pertinent issues of PSS. Regional integration has further been
presented as an instrument to address constraints on development
such as necessary investments, transfer of expertise and technology
and management of inherited interdependencies. This chapter shall
substantiate the development assumption by presenting examples
from GUAM documents and activities; they are endorsed with previ-
ous insights from RS. I will turn to development in general, which has
been reiterated in various GUAM documents. Subsequently, I will at-
tend to modernisation, disintegration and transformation respectively,
showing how they can be traced in GUAM policies.
4.2.2.1 Overall Development
Economic issues form a cornerstone of GUAM cooperation. Develop-
ment is described as a key objective in almost all GUAM documents.
In the Preamble of the Yalta Charter the member states acknowledge
‘that regional cooperation [...] [may] improve well-being of their people’
(Yalta Charter, 2001, Preamble). The Charter also recalls ‘promoting
social and economic development’ as the first objective of GUAM
cooperation (Yalta Charter, 2001). The Free Trade Agreement (2002)
reifies the motives for the inception of GUAM:
19 A regional hegemon may initiate regional integration by oﬀering incentives
(Telo 2001a; Padoan 2001, Kühnhardt 2008: 273) or by coercion (Nye 1981:
209f; Etzioni 1962, Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 27). Yet, GUAM is no
hegemonic project.
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‘Striving to develop mutually beneficial trade and eco-
nomic cooperation based on equality and mutual benefits,
Forming the conditions for free movement of goods and
services, Promoting the growth of economic potential of
the States Parties on the basis of development of mutu-
ally beneficial cooperation ties and collaboration, Desirous
to permanently increase the living standards of the pop-
ulation of their States...’ (Free Trade Agreement, 2002,
Preamble)
Development has been laid out as the guiding principle of GUAM coop-
eration in the Chisinau Declaration, titled ‘In the name of democracy,
stability and development’. Its Preamble emphasises that regional
cooperation ‘contributes to the development of democracy, aiming to
strengthen security and stability, economic prosperity, cultural and
social development’ (Chisinau Declaration of the GUUAM Heads of
States, 2005). It details steps to reach that goal (point 8 and 9) and
ends with the statement to set up GUAM as ‘a regional organiza-
tion, which has the goal of development and democracy’ (Chisinau
Declaration of the GUUAM Heads of States, 2005, point 11).
Regional cooperation shall help to ‘promote[s] [...] economic
development, cultural and social prosperity’ (Kyiv Charter, 2006),
referring to a wide welfare concept. The Kyiv Charter delineates
development as a principle goal:
‘The main purposes of GUAM are: [...] ensuring
sustainable development, [...] development of social and
economic, transport, energy, scientific and technical, and
humanitarian potential of the Parties.’ (Kyiv Charter,
2006, ch. 1, art.1)
In a speech at the 14th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, the
Ukrainian Head of Delegation, Volodymyr Yelchenko, reaﬃrmed the
priorities of GUAM to ‘strengthening [...] economic development,[...]
and achievement of sustainable development and well-being of their
peoples’ (Statement by the Head of the Delegation of Ukraine at the
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14th meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council on behalf of GUAM,
2007). The GUAM Sectoral Cooperation and Development Strategy
(2007) provides an overview of various areas of cooperation in order
to boost development. Economy and trade, transport, energy and
informational technologies are delineated as areas of economic activity.
They are accompanied by proposals in the area of ‘legal order and
security’ and an agenda for ‘humanitarian matters’—his underscores
the wider concept of development pursued by GUAM members.
Modernisation, disintegration and transformation have been delin-
eated above as subcategories of GUAM’s development strategy, and
they can also be traced in several GUAM documents, which are duly
presented below.
4.2.2.2 Modernisation
GUAM has been described as a broader development strategy to solve
the tasks of modernisation, disintegration and transformation. Mod-
ernisation has been conceptualised to encompass economic growth as
well as transfer of technology and knowledge. Referring to concepts
of free trade, international division of labour and services and the
theory of comparative cost advantages, economies focus on immediate
quantitative trade eﬀects to accelerate economic growth (Bowles 2002;
also cf. Beretta 2008; Gamble & Payne 1996). Regional integration is
conceived, on the one hand, as an instrument to secure exports from
developing economies to industrialised states (Glania & Matthes 2005:
16ﬀ.) and, on the other hand, to increase exports to integration par-
ticipants. Integration projects are believed to be particularly suitable
for regionally traded goods, such as transport and communication,
education, research and public entities for energy and water (Belassa
& Stoutjesdijk 1981: 295f).
As has been described above, Soviet economic relations did not
consider borders of the Soviet Republics (Lunev 2006: 16). The SU
acted as a regional trading bloc, which was not immediately sub-
stituted by new trade relations among PSS and beyond (Astrov &
Havlik 2008: 130). As a consequence, trade during the 1990s de-
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creased significantly among all PSS (Grinberg 2005: 3). Forming a
post-Soviet regional market like GUAM takes into account the existing
interdependencies among PSS; consumers know the producers and
their products, whereas Western markets have never been approached
directly (except by Russia) and demanded more competitive products.
Measures of trade facilitation within the GUAM framework can be
assumed to spur intra-regional trade as well as trade relations to
industrialised states, namely to Western Europe. Propelling exports
would also be an adequate measurement to counter the trade deficit
of GUAM members (EBRD Transition Report 2010: 68).20
From the beginning, GUAM pursued steps to facilitate trade
among participants. The objective of trade expansion has been for-
mulated in GUAM’s first Charter: ‘Objectives of cooperation of the
GUUAM: [...] strengthening and expanding trade and economic links’
(Yalta Charter, 2001, art. 1). The Chisinau Declaration of the Heads
of States (2005) urges for rapid implementation of the agreed upon
measures on free trade and energy cooperation, since they are of
utmost importance for the member states (The Chisinau Declaration
of the GUUAM Heads of States, 2005, point 8 and 9).
Trade facilitation can be achieved in various ways. Minimising
transaction costs is the key approach to enhance cross-border trade
by reducing or removing tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ trade barriers. Typical
measures include eliminating quotas, fees or improving customs proce-
dures and transport infrastructures. Table 3.1 in ch. 3.4.1 compares
high transaction costs of the four member states compared to strong
exporting nations like Germany or Turkey. GUAM countries, particu-
larly the three small ones, are characterised by high transaction costs;
on the one hand, the costs depend on the distance to the relevant
European or Russian markets. On the other hand, they are aﬀected
by the changing modes of transport; for example, Georgian vine has
to be transported by road from the vine producer to a Black Sea port,
20 Analyses suggest that investment and export performance were the most
important factors for growth among PSS in the 1990s (Robson 2006: 2).
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and from there it either sets out to Ukraine, Romania or Istanbul by
ship and changes again on road or even rail until it reaches the markets
in Germany or France. Those transport routes have been underdevel-
oped in the small GUAM states. Their infrastructure originally was
constructed to transport goods to and from Moscow.21 In addition,
high transaction costs reflect expenses for necessary documentation,
certificates, customs clearances or bribes.
In 2002, the agreement to form a free trade area was signed and
entered into force in 2003. It pledges for the elimination of tariﬀ-
barriers (art. 3 and 4), the considerable reduction of non-tariﬀ barriers
(art. 3 and 5) and the harmonisation of customs procedures (art. 6).
The agreement also envisages the creation of an eﬃcient system of
mutual settlements and payments for trade and other transactions
(art. 1, s. 1). GUAM addressed the transport costs problem with
a memorandum of understanding to form a ‘steering committee for
the purpose of joint supervision over implementation of the PTTF’
(GUUAM Project on Trade and Transportation Facilitation; Mem-
orandum of Understanding GUUAM Participating States on Trade
and Transportation Facilitation, 04.07.2003). The Agreement on
International Multimodal Transportation of Goods (2007) has been
particularly designed to tackle the issue of changing transportation
methods and the related oﬃcial certification of goods. Further agree-
ments focus on trade facilitation by easing customs procedures, as
in the Kyiv Summit Communiqué (2006) or the GUAM Sectoral Co-
operation Development Strategy and cross border transport. The
Sectoral Cooperation and Development Strategy (2007) reflects a clear
European focus, stating that national legislation in foreign trade shall
be harmonised among the partners in consistency with existing EU
legislation. Emulating the European model, GUAM envisages the
free movement of services, capital and labour (Sectoral Cooperation
and Development Strategy, 2007, ch. I, part 1). In 2012, the four
member states agreed to form a working body that is supposed to
21 Infrastructure used to be a problem during the first GUAM years though
nowadays, it is less responsible for high transaction costs (Hallaert et al. 2011:
61).
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coordinate the implementation process of the free trade agreement
and propose additional measurements to improve trade cooperation.22.
The importance GUAM members attribute to trade expansion
as a key to economic growth is also reflected in their three track
approach, combining regional integration (sub-regional like GUAM
or macro-regional like EU or CIS) with global (WTO) and bilateral
integration (particularly with adjacent countries). Since their inde-
pendence, the four GUAM states have pursued application for WTO
membership23, trade negotiations with EU24 within the CIS-area25
and bilateral accords such as free trade agreements between Ukraine
and Moldova (2005), Ukraine and Georgia (1996), Ukraine and Azer-
baijan (1998) or Georgia and Azerbaijan (1996). Keeping in mind
that all four states had to build foreign trade relations from scratch
after becoming independent, the three-track approach could be seen
as activating all possible channels to boost their foreign trade and,
thus, their economic prosperity. Even WTO-rules do not apply for
all products and allow for a lot of provisos (cf. UNECE 2006: 31),
pledging for complementary agreements. GUAM documents reveal
that trade facilitation is also directed beyond the region. The Sectoral
22 Protocol on confirming the creation of a working body for the coordination
of the establishment of a free trade area, WGET DOC(12)12-3 Final version,
16.03.2013
23 Georgia entered WTO in 2000, Moldova followed in 2001 and Ukraine in 2008.
Azerbaijan started negotiations in 1997 (WTO data base).
24 All four states enjoy Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Moldova is
the GUAM participant integrated strongest into the European market with
GSP+, Autonomus Trade Preferences, a completely negotiated Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and CEFTA-membership. Georgia
is also negotiating Association Agreements with the EU, including DCFTA.
Ukraine has successfully completed negotiations for an Association Agreement
with the EU, but halted the ratification process in November 2013. Azerbaijan
lags behind due to its pending WTO-membership application (website EU
trade).
25 All GUAM members signed the CIS free trade agreement, which has not
been implemented and was terminated in 2012. The subsequent free trade
agreement took eﬀect in 2012; it does not include Azerbaijan and Georgia
(WTO database).
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Cooperation and Development Agreement (2007) delineates that mem-
ber states aim at enhancing their attractiveness for external markets,
‘integrating and building up economic potentials of Member-States
in view of strengthening competitive capacity of their economies at
external markets’ (ch. I, part 1).
Regional integration spurs trade expansion further by forming a
bigger regional market (Heydon & Woolcock 2012: 534; Hallaert et al.
2011: 7; Beretta 2008: 78; Rapacki 2008: 96; Belassa & Stoutjesdijk
1981: 286). This propels production by oﬀering economies of scale
and scope to small states (Beretta 2008: 77f; Mittelman 2000: 117).
Agreements between developing states may lead to more growth and
diversification of the production process and attract industrialised
countries to outsource their labour-intensive production. Namely for
small and vulnerable countries like Georgia or Moldova but also for
landlocked countries like Azerbaijan, a joint market is essential to pro-
pel economic growth. Ukraine clearly stands out regarding market size
and diversification.26 With a population of 46 million (GCR 2012-13:
354), Ukraine can be compared to Spain and spreads over a territory
similar to France and almost twice as large as Germany, whereas
Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia together amount only to a quarter
of Ukraine’s population (GCR 2012-13: 98; 174; 258; 354). Ukraine
serves as a pivot for integration if the smaller neighbours. Although
the added eﬀect of creating a bigger regional market may be rather
marginal for Ukraine, it would promote diversification of Ukrainian
export destinations and might promote trade beyond GUAM borders.
Important for the task of modernisation, but also for disintegra-
tion and transformation is foreign direct investment (FDI). Regional
integration is assumed to have positive eﬀects on foreign direct invest-
ment (Heydon & Woolcock 2012: 534; Glania & Matthes 2005: 14f;
UNCTAD 2007: 18; Rapacki 2008: 96). Joint economic initiatives
can boost FDI and hence facilitate development (Ismailov & Papava
26 Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova together amount to only half the gross
domestic product of Ukraine (WTO Trade Profiles).
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2008: 292). Studies on customs unions suggest positive eﬀects on FDI
(Gavin & De Lombaerde 2005: 72) and allow us to expect similar ef-
fects for integration on the lower level of a free trade area like GUAM.
Moreover, FDI entails spillover eﬀects for technological capacities and
managerial style (Berglof 2006: 19). Nonetheless, participating in re-
gional integration is no suﬃcient condition to attract FDI; investment
decisions also depend on national factors like business climate or the
legal system and may prove to be even more relevant for investment
decisions than aspirations from regional integration (cf. Kakharov
2007: 112; cf. Robson 2006: 20). This is an important point partic-
ularly for investors from outside the GUAM area. Attracting FDI
has been an implicit but pertinent issue of GUAM cooperation; all
four states need FDI to spur economic activity. The Yalta Charter
delineated ‘joint investment and financial projects’ (art. 3) as its
directions of GUAM cooperation. In its general provisions, the Free
Trade Agreement makes explicit that the major idea of the contracting
parties is to ensure:
‘Cooperation in conducting trade and economic policy
to achieve the goals of this Agreement in the fields of in-
dustry, agriculture, transport, finance, investments, social
sphere, as well as in development of fair competition etc.’
(Free Trade Agreement, 2002, art. 1)
The Sectoral Cooperation and Development Agreement (2007) also
stresses the encouragement of investment ‘which ensures sustainable
development of Member-States’ economies’ (ch. I, part 1); and the
Baku Declaration (2007) emphasises the significance of GUAM to
attract international investors (point 4).
4.2.2.3 Disintegration
Disintegration endeavours have always been present during GUAM’s
inception. GUAM can be understood as a step towards establishing
direct relations between now independent member states. The four
heads of state ‘stressed the importance of the four nations cooperation
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[...] [as the] foundation for fostering friendship and cooperation,
good-neighborly relations and full utilisation of existing economic
opportunities’ (Strasbourg Communique, 1997). The importance of
independent statehood and the management of inherited dependence
relationships can be read between the lines of GUAM documents.
GUAM documents make explicit that cooperative relations should
never violate the autonomy of each participant within its borders:
‘. . . the Parties shall develop mutually beneficial coop-
eration, guided by the principles of respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the states, inviolability of their
internationally-recognized borders and non-interference in
their internal aﬀairs and other universally recognized prin-
ciples and norms of international law.’ (Kyiv Charter,
2006, ch. 1, art. 2)
Existing dependencies should not lead to a disregard of the principles
of independent statehood. GUAM cooperation is supposed to avoid
the creation of strong dependencies between participants. Documents
indicate that building closer cooperative relations between the four
states is meant to precipitate a reduction of dependencies from Rus-
sia. For example, a new transport corridor would not only facilitate
trade expansion but would lessen dependence on the existing trans-
port corridor through Russia. Although disintegration objectives are
diﬃcult to detect in GUAM documents by the letter they become
more palpable in the distinct steps envisaged to achieve economic
development. I will also draw on the issue of interdependence in ch. 5.
In general, trade facilitation through regional integration is be-
lieved to aﬀect existing trade relations positively. Several scholars
suggest (Bowles 2002: 100; Nesadurai 2005: 168) that regional inte-
gration may strengthen economic power against dominant trading
partners. Russia was the most important trading partner for Geor-
gia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova during the 1990s (Sewin 2008:
285; Astrov & Havlik 2008: 134). Better trade conditions with Rus-
sia could assist in breaking up inherited dependency structures and,
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thus, assist in advancing disintegration from the former central power.
Regional economic integration is also understood to lead to import
substitution—either by improved national production or by regional
imports instead of global ones, thus, allowing for a proportional trade
balance (UNCTAD 2008: 18; cf. Belassa & Stoutjesdijk 1981: 285).
An integrated market may induce import substitution of Russian
goods and services for GUAM members, thus, leveling their balance
of trade. Therefore, GUAM could be understood as a mechanism
to acquire a better negotiation position for trade issues with their
major trading partner Russia, on the one hand, and strengthen-
ing their independent statehood towards their former power centre,
on the other; thus how GUAM is serving the purpose of disintegration.
Transport infrastructure also plays a crucial role for trade fa-
cilitation. Infrastructure deficits, namely transportation problems,
are a common constraint on trade expansion. Their availability is
assumed to be more important than their quality (Hallaert et al.
2011: 7). Improving the infrastructure situation is also thought to
have positive eﬀects on the domestic production of services and goods
and, thus, is a relevant factor for increasing economic prosperity in
general (Mittelman 2000: 117; UNCTAD 2007: 19). Studies indicate
that developing states also tend to employ regional integration as
a framework to realise transnational infrastructure projects which
they are not capable of approaching nationally (UNCTAD 2007: 19;
Mittelman 2000: 117). For GUAM improving the transport infras-
tructure situation serves both goals: modernisation and disintegration.
Boosting transport infrastructure has been raised as an important
issue since the beginning of GUAM cooperation. The Agreement
on Multimodal Transportation of Goods (2007) recognises ‘that in-
ternational transportation of goods is one of the means contributing
to purposeful development of trade and economic relations among
ODED–GUAM Member-States’ (Agreement on Multimodal Trans-
portation of Goods, 2007, Preamble). Particularly the formation
of a Europe-Caucasus transport corridor is envisaged to accomplish
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economic growth. In their first public communique, the four states
have already expressed their desire to cooperate in building up trans-
portation infrastructure:
‘During the meeting, the Presidents stressed the impor-
tance of the four nations cooperation in establishing a Eu-
roasian, Trans-Caucasus transportation corridor, consider-
ing joint actions taken in this direction a sound foundation
for fostering friendship and cooperation, good-neighborly
relations and full utilisation of existing economic opportu-
nities.’ (Strasbourg Declaration, 1997)
The transport corridor is a vital element of GUAM’s strategy to
raise economic prosperity. Not only the East-West transportation
corridor across the South Caucasus should be considered, but also
the North-South corridor from Russia to Iran (cf. Papava 2008a:
72). The transport corridor shall facilitate trade including energy
among and via GUAM members. This objective has been reiterated
in all key documents, including the Washington Declaration (1999),
the Yalta Charter (2001), the Kyiv Charter (2006) and the Baku
Summit Declaration (2008). The Statement by the Heads of State of
GUAM on Development of the GUAM Transportation Corridor (2008)
underscores the importance of modernising specific transport routes
of the region, particularly the connections Baku (AZ) – Poti/Batumi
(GE), Odessa (UA) – Chisinau (MO), and the railway ferry between
the ports of Kerch (UA) – Poti/Batumi (GE) (pt. 2). Even the
idea of a ‘combined Transportation Train ‘Viking’ ’ has been raised
(ib.).27 The document also urges that ‘proceeding to practical mea-
sures to stimulate international passenger traﬃc and freight services
along the route following the historic Great Silk Road’ (ib.). The
Agreement on Multimodal Transportation of Goods (2007) serves as
one step towards facilitating cross-border transport of goods between
GUAM member states. The agreement aims at increasing economic
eﬃciency of transportation of goods and standardising requirements
27 Proposals have been summarised under the umbrella of the Trade and Transport
Facilitation Project (TTFP).
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Figure 4.1: The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) in the
GUAM-area and the VIKING project (Source: author’s design).
for multimodal transportation carriers and operators (Agreement on
Multimodal Transportation of Goods, 2007, art. 3).
In 2013, the member states adopted the Concept of the GUAM
Transport Corridor, which should further improve regional transport
infrastructure. In their joint statement, representatives of the four
states confirmed ‘the backbone role of transport in the region’s eco-
nomic development’.28
28 Tbilisi Declaration of Heads of GUAM Member States’ institutions responsible
for transport development, 13.02.2013, http://guam-organization.org/en/
node/1419; 22.04.2014.
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For GUAM, transport infrastructure and energy supply are closely
interrelated; improving transport facilities for energy has been the first
imperative on the transport infrastructure agenda (cf. Chechelashvili
2008: 11). Disintegration as well as modernisation themes are preva-
lent. RS scholars suggest that economic integration assists in gaining
access and improving the availability of scarce resources (cf. Flemens
2007: 16); as such ensuring energy supply is essential for GUAM mem-
bers. In addition, propelling energy transport through their territories
would diversify their suppliers and generate new income from hydro-
carbon sales for Azerbaijan and transit fees for Georgia and Ukraine
(cf. Tolstov 2008: 41, Parakhonskiy 2008: 111; cf. EBRD Transition
Report 2010: 152; Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 2; Molchanov
2009: 329).29 Nevertheless, GUAM’s energy transport proposals are
an issue of disintegration, since energy resources have been primarily
supplied by and delivered through Russia—new transport facilities
would reduce this dependence.
Transport cooperation commenced on the basis of the TRACECA
and INOGATE programmes, financed by the European Union.30 The
Chisinau Declaration of the GUUAM Heads of States stresses
‘. . . the need for energy cooperation within GUUAM, in
particular intensifying eﬀorts to implement joint programs
and projects, on the basis of their commercial profitability,
to transport energy resources of the Caspian region to the
European energy market, using of the territories of the
29 For example, the Odessa-Brody Pipeline is supposed to participate in oil
shipments from Azerbaijan via Georgia and the Black Sea to Ukraine.
30 The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia programme (TRACECA) and
the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe programme (INOGATE)
originate in the 1990s. Five Central Asian republics and three Caucasian
republics, together with the EU, agreed to develop a transport corridor on
a West-East axis from Europe via the Black Sea through the Caucasus and
the Caspian Sea to Central Asia (European Commission 2007: 11). In 1996,
Ukraine and Moldova joined TRACECA. They were followed by Bulgaria,
Romania and Turkey in 2002.
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participating states.’ (The Chisinau Declaration of the
GUUAM Heads of States, 2005, pt. 9)
GUAM members perceive themselves as part of a global energy secu-
rity project and therefore are ready to contribute to exploiting new
hydrocarbon resources and establishing safe transport routes through
their territories (Baku Declaration, 2007, pt. 5). GUAM’s Sectoral
Cooperation Development Strategy (2007) pledges for optimising exist-
ing oil and gas transport routes and transport infrastructure and also
aims at opening new eﬃcient energy routes. The Batumi Declaration
(2008, pt. 3) underscores the significance of the Eurasian transport
corridor for energy supply.
Various pipeline projects have been propose during the Yush-
chenko’s government, like the amplification of the Baku-Supsa gas
pipeline, the Odessa-Brody(-Plock) oil pipeline or the GUEU gas
pipeline project (Simonyan & Gamova 2007; Whitmore 2007; Kozhu-
khar 2007). In 2010, Georgia began with the construction of the Black
Sea Transmission Network, which ‘should help establish a regional
energy market’ (EBRD Transition Report 2010: 117). The four states
also desire to engage in the development of renewable energy sources
as a further step towards reducing dependency on energy imports
(Baku Declaration, 2007, pt. 5). Due to the emphasis on energy issues
in the GUAM documents, some scholars like Kostya Bondarenko (N.N.
2006: 1) and Taras Kuzio (2000: 85) even think GUAM to be an
energy alliance. However, project proposals have been implemented
only to a limited extent and mainly outside the GUAM framework,
as in the cases of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) and the
South Caucasus pipeline (Piehl 2007: 2).
4.2.2.4 Transformation
GUAM’s documents centre on cooperation issues between the four
states and express the autonomy of every member state to follow its
own domestic agenda. Nevertheless, there are some examples which
point to transformation as an element of a wider development concept
for the GUAM project.
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The Yalta Charter (2001) clearly identifies a market economy as
the guiding principle for joint economic cooperation and development:
‘Being devoted to the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental
human rights and freedoms, rule of law and market economy’ (Yalta
Charter, 2001, Preamble). GUAM’s Free Trade Agreement (2002)
as well as the Sectoral Cooperation and Development Strategy (2007)
aim at strengthening the ‘competitiveness’ with respect to external
markets and other leading economies which suggest their transfor-
mation into a market economy. The same can be said about the
ambitions to integrate into European structures, which would entail
economic transformation along European standards as the master
key to such integration (cf. Sectoral Cooperation and Development
Strategy, 2007, ch. I, part 1). Nevertheless, GUAM documents do not
proscribe a certain path or final economic model; that remains the
domain of domestic politics. There are no benchmarks for measuring
or promoting progress of market reform. GUAM can be understood
as one instrument among others to provide the necessary financial
means, exchange expertise and share costs to proceed with economic
transformation.
The quotation from the Yalta Charter (2001) above reflects the
direction of political transformation: towards democracy. Democrati-
sation ambitions have been more pronounced in later documents of
GUAM. Democratisation became a key element of GUAM’s mission
when GUAM transformed into a regional organisation and has been
reiterated since in 2007. In its Preamble the Kyiv Charter (2006)
recalls that GUAM is:
‘Aimed at implementing the provisions of the Chisinau
Declaration ‘In the Name of Democracy, Stability and
Development’ of 22 April 2005, [...] Reiterating adherence
to the democratic norms and values and determination to
further proceed on the path of European integration’ (Kyiv
Charter, 2006, Preamble).
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Despite the praise for the principle of democracy, GUAM documents
do not elaborate on a distinct democratic model or on the question
of how to achieve democratic governance. Apart from convictions to
the rule of law and the protection of human rights, no decisive steps
to achieve democracy have been suggested. References to democratic
principles in GUAM documents suggest that democratic principles
are not to be achieved, but to be protected, assuming that they already
existed. The above mentioned quotation from the Preamble of the
Kyiv Charter (2006) reflects that vividly. The Batumi Declaration
(2008) also reiterates GUAM’s determination ‘to ensure respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, to assert democratic values,
the rule of law, to actively contribute to ensuring international peace,
security and stability’ (pt.1). Evaluating the democratisation process
of the four participants would surely demand more attention than
could be given in this dissertation, but are not the focus of this
analysis.
4.2.3 Summary
Chapter 4.2 centred on explaining the emergence of GUAM in order
to prove the first assumption of GUAM as a development strategy. In
a first step (4.2.1), I outlined GUAM’s development concept, claiming
that participants conceive of a broader development strategy than
developing economies, going beyond the task of modernisation. The
four GUAM states also include disintegration (from an economic
and political union) and transformation (into market economies and
democracies) into their developmental concept. Regional integration
as a state-led project is assumed to address also pending constraints
such as demand for investment, expertise and the management of
interdependencies. GUAM’s strategy is seen as a panacea for a variety
of problems, which all stem from the past as PSS. Economic integra-
tion within the GUAM framework is perceived as one strategy among
others to attain development and, thus, increase the overall welfare
level of the participants to catch up with the Western European states.
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In a second step (4.2.2), GUAM documents and GUAM actions,
as well as RS conclusions have been presented to substantiate the
assumption of GUAM as a development strategy. It has been argued
that GUAM members employ regional integration to attain economic
growth through trade expansion in the first place, exemplified by
various documents such as the Free Trade Agreement (2002) or the
Chisinau Declaration of the Heads of Statesy (2005). On the one
hand, the four states draw on a reduction of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ trade
barriers (cf. GUAM Sectoral Cooperation Development Strategy,
2007). On the other hand, they address the improvement of their
infrastructure (cf. Strasbourg Declaration, 1997, or Statement on De-
velopment of the GUAM Transportation Corridor, 2008). Attracting
foreign investments and securing energy supply are other dividends
aspired to by GUAM integration (cf. Yalta Charter, 2001, Baku
Declaration, 2007). As such, GUAM’s development rationale shares a
common denominator with other regional integration projects initi-
ated by developing economies. However, GUAM embraces a wider
development agenda due to the Soviet past of its member states.
Having clarified the motives to form GUAM as an economic inte-
gration project, the following section scrutinises significant conditional
variables to clarify why GUAM as a development strategy is bound
to fail.
4.3 Explaining the State of GUAM
The second assumption of this dissertation claims that GUAM as
a development strategy is bound to fail. Conditional variables on
regional integration form the background of the second assumption. It
has been mentioned at the beginning of chapter 4 that there is not one
isolated variable that can explain the state of GUAM. Instead a set
of variables entailing both positive as well as adverse eﬀects is at work.
Despite convincing motives for initiating a regional integration
project, integration may fail. Empirical results show that economic
integration also produces negative eﬀects amongst and within partic-
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ipating states (Beretta 2008: 76; Padoan 2001: 44ﬀ). Particularly
in developing economies trade diversion may dominate over trade
creation (cf. Glania & Matthes 2005: 52), even raising income dis-
parities within participating states of integration projects (Rapacki
2008: 97).31 Crowding out of domestic producers (Beretta 2008: 76)32
or concentration processes of market actors (oligopolistic structures)
have also been observed (Gavin & De Lombaerde 2005: 72). There
is no automatism of positive welfare eﬀects from trade liberalisation
(Zimmerling 1991: 76; cf. Glania & Matthes 2005: 20ﬀ); poverty may
remain constant among developing states (UNCTAD 2007: 19; Bach
2005: 171).
Walter Mattli (1999) remarked that demand for economic integra-
tion may not be suﬃcient. Successful integration would also need a
number of supply-factors to succeed.33 In general, scholars assume
that desired development impulses depend on the level of integration
(Zimmerling 1991: 76; cf. Glania & Matthes 2005: 20ﬀ) on the
one hand, and on the way of addressing negative eﬀects by flanking
measures of the participating governments, on the other. Relevant
factors within the member states may be the preferences of national
policymakers and interest groups, but also the strength and nature of
domestic institutions (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 589).34
31 Ruth Zimmerling (1991: 77f) hints at several case studies which reveal that
integration eﬀorts in the third world display neither trade creation nor trade
diversion eﬀects. Gavin & De Lombaerde (2005: 71) stress that trade diversion
and trade creation may occur even simultaneously, a fact most static analyses
hide (cf. also UNCTAD 2007: 18).
32 The reduction of competitors is assumed to entail negative eﬀects for consumers,
because it leads to a reduction of product variety (Gavin & De Lombaerde
2005: 72).
33 Scholars have analysed background and process conditions (Haas & Schmitter
1981: 163ﬀ), structural (Nye 1981) and also external (Zimmerling 1991: 55ﬀ)
conditions (cf. also Russett 1967; Deutsch et al. 1968).
34 This underscores that economic conditions cannot be completely separated
from political conditions (Kühnhardt 2008: 266; Mattli 1999: 190; Deutsch
et al. 1968; cf. Gavin & De Lombaerde 2005: 72; Mansfield & Millner 1999:
589).
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This dissertation suggests clustering domestic conditional variables
with regard to individual preparedness of participants and collective
preparedness of all the participants of an integration project, i. e.
their mutual suitability. For the GUAM case the focus is on three
core variables: mutual trust, state capacity and demand for trade
integration. While mutual trust and demand centre on the collective
preparedness of GUAM member states, state capacity draws on the
individual preparedness of each participant of GUAM. I argue that
unfavourable eﬀects dominate for the GUAM case, and demonstrate
that GUAM participants are individually ill-prepared to succeed in
the chosen integration format they have chosen. They are also collec-
tively ill-prepared, indicating that the composition of GUAM partners
is ill-conceived. Thus, GUAM as a development strategy is bound to
fail. The dependent variable in all sub-chapters is economic integra-
tion; mutual trust, state capacity and demand form the independent
variables.
I begin with mutual trust (ch. 4.3.1). Next, I address the state
capacity of the four participants (ch. 4.3.2.) and continue with the
conditional variable demand which will be shown for the issue of trade
integration (ch. 4.3.3).
4.3.1 Mutual Trust
This chapter addresses mutual trust. The variable refers to the collec-
tive preparedness of the four GUAM member states. Mutual trust
between integration partners is not only relevant for integration to
emerge, but also, for it to proceed. The first part draws on democratic
governance as a provider for mutual trust. The second part of this
chapter turns to common socio-cultural factors as contributors to
mutual trust.
Even though mutual trust is widely accepted as a relevant variable
for regional integration (Kühnhardt 2008: 266), it has been rarely
studied in depth, which may be related to its subjective nature.35
35 Social constructivism has been employed by scholars of European integration
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IR theorists like Axelrod & Keohane (1993: 97) already drew on the
importance of trust and credibility among cooperating partners to
form robust expectations of the others’ behaviour, making cooperation
tangible (cf. Milner 1992: 481). Trust—the firm belief in the relia-
bility, truth, ability or strength of someone (New Oxford American
Dictionary)—is relevant for the longevity of an integration project
(Tsantoulis 2009: 248; Rinke 2008: 446; Robson 1993: 332; Ladaa
2006). States do trust some partners more than others, therefore
some states cooperate better in integration projects than others.
There are two major assumptions on trust: Firstly, democracies
habitually enjoy greater credibility, since they are believed to stick
to their agreements more often than non-democratic states (Peve-
house 2005: 48f). The absence of corruption and the prevalence
of transparency, which are both more common among democratic
countries, contribute to the credibility of a partner (Kakharov 2007:
112). Secondly, trust is assumed to be easier among nations which
have something in common—this may refer to a common history
or religion (cf. Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 18; Farrell 2005: 11),
a shared language or culture or shared values and belief systems
(Russett 1967; Nye 1971: 76f; cf. Tsantoulis 2009: 248; Meyer 2001;
Higgott 1998: 42). Common values have by some scholars been re-
garded as indispensable for a successful integration project (Farrell
2005: 11; Meyer 2001: 67; Veitl 1981: 16). Yet, common values should
be understood as a corresponding understanding of specific values like
liberty, equality or tolerance, and less as a common identity (Meyer
2001: 67; cf. Farrell 2005: 12).
to examine the relevance of ideas for the ongoing integration process (Schieder
2012: 88). Several social constructivist approaches to the phenomenon of
regionalism suggest that the ‘construction of a region entails the configura-
tion of a collective identity that may eventually motivate agents to engage a
regionalist project and build regional institutions’ (Camilo Prieto 2011: 14).
Yet, this is diﬃcult to apply to the GUAM case, because various identities
are intersecting for the four GUAM states. A GUAM identity has not been
observed so far and is not likely to arise in the near future.
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A common identity, by contrast, is usually not the starting point
for an integration project and may also evolve or be created over time
as the example of the European Union shows (Farrell 2005: 12; Meyer
2001: 67).36 A study on free trade agreements concluded that states
which share a common language or a common cultural heritage, or
which have been colonies under the same coloniser are more likely
to form joint trade agreements than states which don’t have these
things in common (Perju 2009: 1).
Scholars cannot determine the exact figures for how much trust
is necessary for a successful integration, which limits this chapter to
demonstrating that there is a basic minimum of trust existing between
the GUAM participants.
Considering the first assumption on trust, the fact that GUAM
countries have never been democracies in the sense of Western Euro-
pean states suggests that the four countries have diﬃculties trusting
each other. Chapter 2.1.2 showed that the four states are hybrid
regimes at best, with Azerbaijan showing more authoritarian charac-
teristics than the other three states. All of them lack transparent and
reliable political institutions and processes. Interestingly, the most
productive phase of GUAM coincides with the parallel presidencies
of Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine and Mikhael Saakashvili in Georgia,
during which both presidents strived to push the democratisation
process in their countries. Since this was a rather short period of time,
one could conclude that there is a low level of mutual trust among
the four states due to a lack of democratic governance.
All four states share a common history as ex-members of the SU
and of the former Russian Tsarist empire (cf. Mangott 2007: 265).
The experience as former SU nations has no doubt aﬀected their values
and patterns. Soviet peculiarities have regularly been addressed as
Soviet legacy, but without methodological clarity; current assumptions
do not shed light on the question of whether Soviet legacy should be
36 For a detailed look on identity and regions cf. Chopra et al. 1999.
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treated as part of political culture or as an independent variable.37
Most politicians and oﬃcials involved in the inception, consolidation
and implementation of GUAM, were trained during the Soviet era.
They very well knowhow their bureaucracies and counterparts work
and how decisions are achieved. Soviet procedures, roles and customs
are known to them(cf. Libman & Vinokurov 2010: 7). The same can
be said about the background of entrepreneurs (cf. Grinberg 2005:
12)—a group which frequently coincides with that of the political
decision-makers (Wooden & Stefes 2009b: 249ﬀ). That surely makes
it easier to find common ground to communicate and understand each
others’ needs and constraints, assisting cooperation. Moreover, people
in PSS are connected through personal and professional networks.
To a certain extent one might speak of a ‘shadow of a regional
identity’ (Libman 2007: 405), which can facilitate regional integra-
tion. This may explain why people from PSS often find it so much
easier to work with each other than with their counterparts from
Western Europe or the United States. Such common practices can
be assumed to facilitate mutual trust. Also, all GUAM countries
share the knowledge of the Russian language, which serves as a lingua
franca in post-Soviet space. The significance of the Russian language
37 On the one hand, Soviet legacy can be conceptualised as a determining element
of today’s political culture in all the former Soviet republics. Post-Soviet
political culture then is a synthesis of new as well as Soviet patterns, roles and
images. The impact of Soviet legacy within the respective political culture
may vary among PSS and over time. On the other hand, Soviet legacy can be
conceived as synoptic explanatory category for regional integration in post-
Soviet space. Hence, post-Soviet regionalism can be understood as a distinct
category among other regional integration patterns. As a synoptic concept,
Soviet legacy should be understood as the synthesis of distinct features, the
simultaneity of which can only be discerned in post-Soviet space. Molchanov &
Molchanova (2010: 1) did so when they characterised Eurasian regionalism as
the simultaneity of various conditions, the specific combination of certain
prerequisites, making post-Soviet regionalism unique. According to Tim
Radjy (2006: 1) post-Soviet legacy comprises authoritarian rule, corruption,
military stockpiles, ‘overlapping ethnic and religious fault lines, economic
growth inequities, mineral wealth, and geo-strategic positioning’. See also
Stephen Whitefield (ed.) (2005): Political Culture and Post-Communism.
Basingstoke.
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as a common denominator is also reflected in its status as GUAM’s
oﬃcial working language.
However, there are three critical considerations regarding this
positive assessment on mutual trust. First of all, the coexistence with
other values among all four states (1), secondly, the gradual disap-
pearance of the common denominator (2), and lastly, the negative
impact of Soviet legacy (3). Considering the first point (1), each
GUAM participant (like all PSS) has maintained a decisive part of
its individual procedures, values and culture, but also religious beliefs
during their membership in the SU. Hence, there are also dividing
lines between the four participants. For example, the two Caucasian
states of Georgia and Azerbaijan have more in common than Azerbai-
jan and Moldova. In his security study on the Caucasus and Central
Asia, Roy Allison (2004: 12) observes a deep rivalry (having both
historic and contemporary roots) between the former union republics.
Such deep-rooted distrust inhibits progress in regional integration
projects in post-Soviet space (Libman 2007: 413; Robinson 2004)
and could also be the case for GUAM despite shared Soviet practices
and values.38 Thus, trust among GUAM states may be coupled with
tendencies of distrust and reduce positive eﬀects on integration.
The second point, the disappearance of the common denomina-
tor (2), underscores shared knowledge and values as a generational
feature. With each generation, the previous common ground grad-
ually decreases (Grinberg 2005: 12; Valiyev 2011: 3). The homo
sovieticus is vanishing whereas no homo post-sovieticus has appeared
so far (Grinberg 2005: 12). Dmitri Trenin (2011: 36) reminds us
that twenty years after the collapse of the SU the so-called Soviet
legacy may have lost its explanatory power. ‘This makes the future
of real multilateral cooperation rather uncertain’ (Grinberg 2005: 12).
While current political and entrepreneurial leaders have been raised
bilingually or completely in Russian, the younger generation uses
38 Kornyeyeva perceives distrust even within a society and towards political
institutions, ensuing—among other factors—from the inequality an invisible
ethnic hierarchy (Kornyeyeva 2009: 42).
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Russian as a second foreign language after English. Nonetheless, it
could take generations to change ‘the communist mindset of popu-
lations’ completely (Pourchot 2008: 6). Value congruency among
PSS coexists with varying interpretations of those ‘common’ values
(Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 6). Thus, the positive impact of
those commonalities on trust can be assumed to have been higher at
the beginning of GUAM’s existence and to lose relevance on the long
run.
Turning to the third aspect (3), it has to be asked whether an
alleged Soviet legacy may also have restrictive eﬀects on regional
integration. Soviet legacy has been employed by scholars not only as
a facilitating factor for cooperation, but also as an explanation for
reform failure within PSS and for the inertia of integration projects
(cf. Wooden & Stefes 2009b: 250). Robinson (2004: 179) convincingly
argues that the long lasting cultural and institutional bonds between
PSS are more of a burden than a blessing. They would result in a
type of regionalism that is just a ‘residual’ product of the SU and old
Soviet relations (continuity).39
Roy Allision (2004: 12f) warned of the Soviet-era instruments of
governance, which would inhibit the creation of functioning regional
organisations. That puts it very close to Stina Torjesen’s (2007) con-
cept of façade making : regionalism emulating great Soviet rhetoric
and high institutionalisation with little real output. In contrast to
elites in democracies, the Soviet elite never depended much on elec-
tions. Responsibility for political action was exercised primarily to
the person on the next level up in the hierarchy and not to the elec-
torate (cf. Kornyeyeva 2009). Personal networks were more relevant
39 In their studies on Central Asian and Caucasian states, Amanda Wooden &
Christoph Stefes (2009b: 249) determine the Soviet elite to have prevailed and
succeeded in maintaining their interests by installing favourable legislation
and institutions (cf. Stefes & Wooden 2009: 9). Sergei Lunev (2006: 23)
argues that today’s elites are based rather on patriarchal and clan systems.
Nevertheless, both scholars agree that the constant fight between old and
new elite over the division of political power and economic control also aﬀects
regional integration projects adversely.
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than institutional procedures, with the absence of independent media
and transparency aggravating this eﬀect. Soviet legacy could also be
regarded as an elite problem: It is not only about substituting the
ideology of professionals (primarily politicians), it is also about the
lack of know-how on regional integration (Munteanu 2005: 252; cf.
also ch. 4.3.2). The prevalence of the old elite with its Soviet-era
instruments of governance should be assumed to restrain the evolution
of regional integration projects (cf. Kakharov 2007: 111). Thus, posi-
tive eﬀects of shared features among GUAM participants are coupled
with negative aspects of Soviet legacy.
Trust can be examined on the level of the political and economic
elite as a whole, but also on the level of individuals. In strong presi-
dential regimes like the ones in the four GUAM states, trust between
political leaders may prove essential for the genesis of a state-led
integration project. All GUAM leaders were aware of their domestic
deficiencies, which has culminated in a tacit code of conduct, a con-
sensus on non-interference into domestic aﬀairs, avoiding any form
of pressure or criticism on each other—guaranteeing mutual regime
stability.40 This was particularly important before democratisation in
the member states gained importance. Interestingly, GUAM was even
gaining more speed during the following generation of the founding
fathers, when the presidencies of Victor Yushchenko in Ukraine and
Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia coincided. They can be regarded as
the protagonists of a turn towards assertive sovereignty, marking their
independence to follow any development path they chose. A more
detailed analysis would be needed to determine the impact of political
leadership, the individual policy agendas of political leaders or the
relationship between political leaders on the development of GUAM.41
40 The strategy of regime stability may even predominate over integration policies.
It can be suggested that regime stability may have served as a genuine individual
objective for pursuing such a regional integration project. This assumption
should be tested in a separate analysis though.
41 See for example Zimmer, Annette and Jankowitsch, Regina (2008) (eds.):
Political Leadership. Berlin.
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Diﬀerent values or cultures can also be managed otherwise (cf.
Kühnhardt 2008: 272f; cf. Higgott 1998: 42). In case of strong dis-
trust between partners, reciprocity has been proposed by IR-theorists
as a mechanism to initiate cooperation even among distrusting part-
ners (Lipson 1993: 64; Oye 1986a: 12; Axelrod & Keohane 1986: 244;
Baldwin 1993: 22f).42 Institutional design can also ensure checks and
balances to foster trust between cooperating partners, for example by
employing eﬃcient and transparent monitoring and sanction mech-
anisms (cf. Axelrod & Keohane 1993: 94; Milner 1992: 470). This
also applies to cooperation among non-democratic states which lack
credibility. GUAM’s institutional design with its strong emphasis on
unanimity and rigid financial rules ensures that member states do not
put each other in jeopardy. Yet, the lack of monitoring and sanction-
ing mechanisms in GUAM allows the delay of the implementation of
integration policies. To sum up, although a common understanding of
specific values may facilitate integration as do shared practices, they
are not indispensable for creating trust and strengthening integration.
4.3.2 State Capacity
This chapter takes a domestic perspective on regional integration,
addressing the state capacity of the four states—their individual pre-
paredness for regional integration. The argument advanced below
is that GUAM participants have weak state capacities. It will also
be shown that individual weakness adds up to a collective deficit,
suggesting that their composition is ill-conceived. Thus, the state
capacity argument would provide proof for the second assumption of
this dissertation which states that GUAM as a development strategy
is bound to fail.
In this chapter, I begin with a short review of previous approaches
to explain divergent outcomes of regional integration. In a second
step, state capacity, which participants must bring into an integration
42 Nevertheless, when actors perceive their culture to be at risk, they tend to resist
integration eﬀorts (Ladewig 2010: 7072; Fawcett 2005: 34; Slocum-Bradley
2008: 247).
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project in order to benefit from integration, is derived as the nucleus
of previous approaches. I will delineate the concept of state capacity,
again underscoring the nexus of the political and economic dimension.
In a subsequent step, the state capacity concept is applied to GUAM.
Next I draw on leadership and cohesion in order to examine whether
individual weakness can be compensated by other members of the
GUAM group. Lastly, I summarise my conclusions on state capacity,
linking it with the second assumption of chapter 4 which states that
GUAM as a development strategy is bound to fail.
4.3.2.1 Approaches
RS scholars are prone to explain diverging trajectories of regional-
ism either with the democratic-authoritarian divide (Russett 1967;
Kühnhardt 2008: 268ﬀ; Fawcett 2005a; Nye 1968: 377; Acharya
& Johnston 2007b: 7f) or with the bifurcation between developing
and industrialised economies (Pokorna & Smutka 2010: 60; Padoan
2001: 51; Glania & Matthes 2005: 52ﬀ; Nye 1981: 224). Adherents
to the democratic-authoritarian divide argue that democratic states
are better prepared to benefit from regional integration projects (cf.
Hoﬀmann 2007: 100).
Democracies are supposed to have less diﬃculties implementing
integration policies (Kösler & Zimmek 2008b: 7; Kühnhardt 2008:
265; Bach 2005: 184f). The pluralist and transparent decision-making
process as well as the reliable institutions of enforcement would en-
dorse implementation of integration decisions and the advance of
integration.43 Democracies are believed to be more able to mitigate
negative eﬀects as well as to allocate the benefits from integration
among and within participating states (Zimmerling 1991: 82). Demo-
cratic states habitually provide processes to participate and influence
decision-making, thus, channeling support or resistance to integra-
tion policies (cf. Ladaa 2006: 50; Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 7f;
Wolf 2006: 82). Moreover, democratic values are widely believed to
43 Although decision-making usually is simpler in authoritarian states than
in democracies, studies reveal that integration does not proceed faster in
authoritarian states (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 7f; Zimmerling 1991: 126).
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assist growth (cf. Hübner 2011: 4; Berglof 2006: 11). Yet, the ex-
act impact of the democracy variable remains fuzzy (Hurrell 1995: 69).
Adherents of the developing-industrialised economy divide argue
that developing economies show more implementation deficits (Glania
& Matthes 2005: 55; UNCTAD 2007: 20) and struggle harder with
addressing negative eﬀects that usually accompany regional integra-
tion (cf. Padoan 2001: 51; cf. Hurrell 1995: 70; cf. Robson 1993:
334). Developing economies are believed to have only limited financial
means to realise swift adjustments to their domestic markets (UNC-
TAD 2007: 21). It is assumed that their implementation diﬃculties
ensue from a lack of institutional structures (UNCTAD 2007: 21).
Developing economies are also understood to delay implementation
because they would fear losing influence on domestic economic poli-
cies (UNCTAD 2007: 21). I will return to this issue of sovereignty
in chapter 5. The importance of a functioning market economy to
implement integration policies to cope with negative eﬀects is believed
to rise with the integration level (cf. Kakharov 2007: 111; cf. Hurrell
1995: 70; cf. Robson 1993: 334). Participating states should at least
be engaged in market reforms, if they aspire positive eﬀects from
integration (Zimmerling 1991: 85).44
The autocracy–democracy divide as well as the developing–indus-
trialised economy bifurcation stress the implementation and enforce-
ment conundrum. The readiness of a state to embark on and succeed
with regional integration depends on the state’s inner constitution
(Hurrell 1995: 67), or more precisely on the nature and strength of its
domestic institutions (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 589). The assump-
tions of both approaches: the success of regional integration depends
on state capacity to implement and enforce integration policies.
44 Other characteristics of developing economies are related to negative eﬀects
on integration: high export dependency, low regional trade, trade of mainly
agricultural and mineral products, high transaction costs, small markets, high
disparities of incomes and market development (Robson 1993: 334).
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4.3.2.2 Conceptualising State Capacity
Capacities necessary for integration have been addressed both by
political and economic thinking (Fawcett 2005: 34). So far state
capacity has not been used as a coherent concept in RS.45 Deutsch’s
seminal Princeton study (1968) includes growing economic and admin-
istrative capabilities among participants as conditions for advancing
integration (cited in Veitl 1981: 16). Magen & Morlino (2008: 250)
conceive state capacity as the sum of rule adoption capacity and rule
implementation capacity.
In this analysis, state capacity refers to both financial and institu-
tional capacities. While financial capacity is easily explained with the
availability of suﬃcient financial means to implement and advance
regional integration, institutional capacity is comprised of various
issues. Understanding a state in the Weberian sense: an institution
that enforces regulations by a monopoly on violence, regional integra-
tion depends then on how well a state has developed its instruments
to execute the monopoly on violence. It is about capabilities a state
should exhibit in order to function as a unit (cf. Almond & Bingham
Powell 1966: 28). Almond & Bingham Powell refer to the ‘overall
performance of a political system in its environment’, including five
categories of state capabilities: extractive, regulative, distributive,
symbolic and responsive (ib.). While scholars such as Randall &
Theobald (1998: 188) prefer to distinguish between state capabilities
in accordance with Almond & Bingham Powell, on the one hand,
and institutional development, on the other, I regard institutions as
an integrative category of Almond & Bingham Powell’s capabilities
ascribed to a functioning state. Speaking about institutions refers
45 Compliance of states with international rules constitutes a separate research
field (Goltermann 2012: 162). Enforcement approaches and managerial ap-
proaches are the two dominating directions for studying compliance (ib.). The
first mainly looks on the institutional design and cost-benefit calculations
that members undertake (also sanctioning measures), the latter looks on the
managerial capacities at the national level (2012: 162f). Examining state
capacity comes closest to the managerial approach.
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not only to the structural dimension, but also to human resources,
particularly bureaucracies. For Kochanowicz (1994: 196) bureaucra-
cies are even ‘the most important ‘filter’, or mediating mechanism,
through which political ideas, programs, and projects are translated
into everyday practice’.
True, democracies and full-fledged market economies are more
prone to produce viable institutions, but being a democratic state
or a market economy is neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition
for being a functioning institution. Samuel P. Huntington (1968: 1)
observed, that eﬀective institutions can be found both in Western
and Communist countries. Strong states shall not be equated with
democratic states (Fortin-Rittberger 2014: 23). It would be more
important that a state is indeed ‘governed’. China, Singapore or the
petro states show that economic growth and, thus, development in
the narrow sense, can be created without immediate accompanying
democracy. At the same time, even among stable democracies there
is ‘a great variation in the quality of economic institutions’ (EBRD
Transition Report 2013: 18). This may also be true for regional
integration. Concentrating on state capacity for implementation and
enforcement would also allow us to decouple analysis from monolithic
either-or categories, which have been shown to be diﬃcult to apply
for GUAM countries with their amorphous economic systems and
hybrid regimes (cf. ch. 2.1.2). It is argued, then, that at a specific
time functioning institutions that produce reliable decisions and allow
economic actors to form stable expectations are more relevant than
democratic values.46
The nexus between the political and economic dimension is explicit.
Economic integration projects depend on political instruments to
implement and enforce the agreed integration steps (Zimmerling 1991:
114; cf. Berglof 2006: 10f). Moreover, a state provides not only the
political, but also the economic institutions and rules of the game
necessary for a functioning economy as well as the implementation
and enforcement of integration policies (cf. Achelashvili 2011: 44).
46 See also the ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ debate (Chandler 2007).
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Viable institutions like tax services, registration of licenses, certificates
or patents, but also law enforcement and customs services, aﬀect
business and investment climates, which are vital for modernisation
and growth (cf. EBRD Transition Report 2010: 129; EBRD Transition
Report 2013: 18). Ineﬀective political and economic institutions do
not only cause delays in implementation, they also may weaken the
reliability of decisions. Economic and political institutions shall allow
for a fair distribution of costs and gains of integration (cf. Robson
1993: 332; Zimmerling 1991: 82) and, thus, mitigate negative eﬀects.
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that domestic institutions are
only as powerful as domestic actors want them to be. In conclusion,
regional integration outcomes depend on the institutional and financial
capacities of participants to implement and enforce integration policies.
Thus, whether GUAM member states will achieve development by
GUAM integration also depends on their individual state capacities.47
4.3.2.3 State Capacity of GUAM Members
Let us now take a look at the state capacities of the four GUAM
member states. To advance my argument which states that GUAM
participants exhibit weak state capacity and, thus, are ill-prepared
for integration, I will first of all look at financial capacity (1). Second,
I will focus on institutional capacity (2).
Financial capacity (1) is a pertinent condition for regional integra-
tion to advance, because integration habitually is more than just rule
adoption. For example, reducing trade barriers by introducing unified,
computer based customs procedures, as suggested by GUAM, creates
costs that go beyond those for institutional capacity. Financial means
are not only relevant for implementing and advancing regional integra-
tion, they are also necessary for forming viable institutions. Limited
financial abilities are a frequent starting point for weak institutions.
47 There is a complex interrelation between state capacity and development.
Huntington (1968) noted that not all good things go together, i. e. economic
development does not bring eﬀective political institutions per se. At the same
time, with no state capacity there will be no development (cf. Krasner 2013).
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Chapter 4.2.1 showed why development is such a pertinent issue
for GUAM states: All four member states suﬀered a downfall of their
national welfare levels after the collapse of the USSR, and all four
states faced declining economic activity during the 1990s, which was
characterised by negative growth rates (IMF Economic Outlook 2011:
185). In 2005, all GUAM states experienced economic growth, partic-
ularly Azerbaijan (ib.). Yet, diﬀerences continue—again—particularly
between Azerbaijan and Moldova; whereas the commodity exporter
Azerbaijan realised an impressive GDP growth of 34,5% in 2006,
Moldova could never surpass its peak of 7,8% in 2007 (ib.). Amid the
international financial crisis in 2008/9, all GUAM states experienced
negative growth rates—save Azerbaijan (cf. table 4.2—above on GDP
development since 1993 and table 4.5).
The four GUAM member states had to establish means to exist as
new independent states. Lack of capital is a major defect of GUAM
states, both for market actors and governments.48 The limited re-
sources available for actual policy implementation have been largely
spent on domestic issues of state-building and economic development.
Looking at the budget of the GUAM Secretariat, figures show that
the institutional body disposes of very limited means to expand its
work (cf. ch. 3.3.2), and advances in implementing individual GUAM
projects coincide with the period of American funding for the organi-
sation. According to GUAM’s Financial Provision, implementation
is a national issue for each GUAM member.
Considering the economic integration policies of the four states, the
multi-vector approach pursued by the four members can be assumed
to further weaken their financial position. Their approach consists
of various regional and bilateral agreements that often embrace the
same partners. Although this approach could be perceived as an
advantage—reducing overall trade barriers (Langhammer 2003: 261)—
the strategy also splits the already scarce financial capacities of the
four states among several projects and may, thus, further reduce
48 PSS are highly indebted to each other with debts sometimes remaining from
the SU (Robson 2006: xi).
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GUAM’s significance and prospects.49 Hence, competing cooperation
formats would not only be an indicator of the malfunctioning of
GUAM, but do also have an adverse eﬀect on implementation of
integration policies.
In addition, states aﬀected by violent conflicts spend a lot of
money for military development and conflict management (including
care for displaced persons) instead of economic reform (cf. Astrov &
Havlik 2008: 126). As a consequence, less means remain for financing
cooperative approaches (see table 4.6). The military expenses of
Georgia and Azerbaijan are the two fastest growing among all states
in the CIS-area (Halbach 2007a: 3).
Turning to institutional capacity (2), I employ several indica-
tors to demonstrate the limits of institutional capacities among the
four GUAM countries: eﬃcient bureaucracy and human capital (2a),
corruption (2b), reliability of political decisions (2c) and judicial
framework and enforcement (2d). Considering institutional capacities,
empirical studies substantiate institutional deficits among GUAM
participants (cf. Ladaa 2006: 50), though defective institutions are a
phenomenon not only in GUAM states, but in PSS in general (Babet-
skii et al. 2003: 1). Being stuck in transformation, viable institutions
that produce reliable and predictable decisions and, thus, allow for
the implementation of integration policies are generally scarce.
Examining bureaucracy and human capital (2a), Soviet bureau-
cratic structures and know-how have remained widely in place. After
the dissolution of the USSR, the four newly formed GUAM states
disposed of very limited financial means to invest in institutional trans-
formation and modernisation. The eﬃcacy of national bureaucracies
has been surveyed in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). It
examines the impact of bureaucracies on the economic environment
49 GUAM states vacillate between Eastern and Western integration. The implicit
possibility of EU-membership can be regarded as an impediment for successful
GUAM integration. States waiting for European integration are not poised to
get deeply involved in other regional cooperation projects (Libman 2007: 412).
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and, thus, on facilitating economic growth. The GCR sheds light on
the implementation capabilities of states; results show that ineﬀective
bureaucracy still is a top listed problem in all four GUAM states, but
is more acute in Moldova and Ukraine (GCR 2012-13: 98; 174; 258;
354; Hübner 2011: 4).
Available human resources and regionalism know-how is another
aspect that is necessary for functioning institutions (Kühnhardt 2008:
265). Elites play a crucial role (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 7f).
Being newly formed states, the bureaucracies and elites of GUAM
states cannot refer to expertise in multilateral cooperation or integra-
tion, since foreign relations have been a domain of primarily Russian
oﬃcials in Soviet Moscow. Moreover, there may be a divide between
the interest of the elite and the public interests in respect to regional
integration, which might shed light on inconsistencies in integration
policies and their implementation (cf. Molchanov 2009). Expertise
on managing a national economy along market principles had also
to be created. Forming and managing a national bank with its own
currency and private banking system, a functioning foreign trade
account settlement system, an independent tax system etc.—all of
this demanded professionals who had to be trained first. A thorough
empirical study would be needed to substantiate this argument, which
is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Corruption is another indicator for non-viable institutions (2b).
It aﬀects the eﬀectiveness and credibility of political and economic
institutions and, thus, jeopardises the implementation of interna-
tional agreements. According to the Freedom House Report ‘Nations
in Transit’ Georgia is estimated to be the best performing country
among PSS (table 4.7). In contrast, Azerbaijan is a rather bad per-
former with corruption increasing slightly in the last five years. Only
Georgia seems to make progress in fighting corruption among the
four GUAM countries (Edilashvili 2011: 14; EBRD Transition Report
2010: 89). Corruption is also an economic impediment. In Azerbaijan
it is seen as a top impediment for doing business (GCR 2012-13: 98).
In Ukraine and Moldova it has also been ranked as one of the most
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pressing issues to solve to spur business activity (GCR 2012-13: 258;
354; cf. Hübner 2011: 4). However, Georgia’s low level of corruption
has not automatically created an increase in FDI; investor confidence
is also lacking due to other factors (Edilashvili 2011: 14f). Reducing
the corruption level is particularly diﬃcult for weak states, since it
demands a reform of law enforcement institutions (including finan-
cial attractiveness to work for them) and enhancing transparency of
anti-corruption agencies (Papava 2006: 6). Transparency is a pend-
ing issue for all four GUAM states, and increasing transparency is
particularly relevant for the banking sector. In Azerbaijan the state
bank dominates and there is only a small and fragmented private
banking sector (Ibadoglu 2011: 14; EBRD Transition Report 2011:
98). Due to high inflation rates combined with insuﬃcient capital,
the banking sector has not yet the potential to facilitate regional
economic integration (cf. Hübner 2011: 5). Moldova’s financial sector
is also characterised by high regulation, non-transparent ownership
structures and a limited access to capital for SME due to high interest
rates (EBRD Transition Report 2010: 129; Lupusor 2012: 461). In
2012, privatisation of the largest state-owned bank Banca Economii
started (EBRD Transition Report 2012: 129). Measures for easing
procedures of debt restructuring and loan collateral are under way
(ib.). Increasing transparency is also a prerequisite for the Ukrainian
banking sector (cf. Pleines 2008b: 6). Initiatives to improve the
regulatory framework were started in 2012 (EBRD Transition Report
2012: 157). The international financial crisis has strongly aﬀected
Ukraine due to its vulnerability to the Euro-area (EBRD Transition
Report 2012: 156). Georgia instead has to fight dollarisation in its
banking sector and to attract domestic savings for investment (EBRD
Transition Report 2010: 116). Eﬀorts to reduce inflation and comply
with Basel II and III rules are under way (EBRD Transition Report
2012: 115).
Implementation and enforcement capacities are closely related
to the reliability of political decisions (2c). Data from the GCR
indicate that policy instability is still one of the main impediments
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2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Azerbaijan 6.0 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.50 6.50 6.75
Georgia 5.0 5.50 6.0 5.50 5.0 5.0 4.50 4.50
Moldova 6.0 6.25 6.25 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.00 5.75
Ukraine 6.0 6.0 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.9 6.25
Table 4.7: Corruption index. Rating on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 as the best
score. Figures before 1999/2000 incomplete (Source: Freedom House: Nations in
Transit).
for doing business in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova (cf. GCR of last
years). Interestingly, entrepreneurs in Azerbaijan neither fear policy
nor government instability. Less then 1% of the respondents stated
such concerns (GCR 2010-11: 88; GCR 2012-13: 98), which supports
the argument that the regime type—democratic or non—may be of
less relevance for the eﬀectiveness of regional integration—at least in
integration projects on a lower level.50
The last indicator draws on judicial frameworks and enforcement
(2d). The GCR evaluates the development of political and economic
institutions as a cumulative value. Table 4.8 shows a rather pessimistic
view with Azerbaijan and Georgia as GUAM’s best performers. All
four states have institutional problems with enforcing existing leg-
islation. Even Georgia receives only satisfactory results in this area
(EBRD Transition Report 2010: 18ﬀ).
The Freedom House index in tables 4.9 to 4.12 juxtapose institu-
tional performance of the four GUAM states with the average value
of PSS. The Judicial Framework and its independence are estimated
quite low, with none of the four states reaching the average value.
50 Assessing the business climate in the four states, the most urgent issues
like unstable governments, nontransparent institutions or ongoing domestic
conflicts in three of the four GUAM countries indicate that countermeasures
are primarily a national issue rather than a collective one (cf. Robson 2006:
20; cf. Lunev 2006: 17; Astrov & Havlik 2008: 126; Hübner 2011: 4; cf. Astrov
& Havlik 2007: 130).
136 CHAPTER 4. THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
2001-02 2004-05 2007-08 2010-11 2013-14
Azerbaijan n/a n/a 3.6 3.9 4.1
Georgia n/a 3.1 3.6 3.9 4.0
Moldova n/a n/a 3.3 3.4 3.2
Ukraine 3.15 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0
Table 4.8: Development of political and economic institutions on a scale from
1 to 7, with 7 being the best value. Industrialised states score approximately 5
points (Source: Global Competitiveness Reports).
National Democratic Governance
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Azerbaijan 6.25 6.00 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.50 6.75 6.75
Georgia 4.50 5.00 5.75 5.50 5.75 6.00 5.75 5.50
Moldova 4.50 4.75 5.50 5.75 5.75 6.00 5.75 5.50
Ukraine 4.75 5.00 5.25 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.75 6.00
Average PSS 5.38 5.58 5.83 6.06 6.17 6.35 6.38 6.38
Table 4.9: National Democratic Governance on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 as
best performance (Source: Freedom House: Nations in Transit).
The categories National Governance and Judicial Framework can
be related to the implementation function, whereas the categories
Independent Media and Civil Society can be associated with the con-
trol function in those states. Although three of the four GUAM
members perform better than PSS on average, they display generally
unsatisfactory results.
Concluding, all four GUAM members exhibit weak state capacity,
making them ill-prepared candidates for economic regional integration,
particularly on higher integration levels. However, such deficits may
be compensated by other mechanisms.
4.3.2.4 Mitigating Individual Weakness
Although individual countries such as the four GUAM states may
be ill-prepared for integration projects, there are mechanisms that
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Judicial Framework
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Azerbaijan 5.50 5.25 5.50 5.75 5.75 6.25 6.50 6.50
Georgia 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00
Moldova 4.00 4.00 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.75
Ukraine 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.25 4.75 5.00 6.00 6.00
Average PSS 5.27 5.44 5.56 5.50 5.75 5.92 6.13 6.15
Table 4.10: Judicial Framework on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 as best performance
(Source: Freedom House: Nations in Transit).
Independent Media
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Azerbaijan 5.50 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75
Georgia 3.75 3.75 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.00
Moldova 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 5.50 5.75 5.50 5.50
Ukraine 5.00 5.50 5.50 3.75 3.50 3.50 4.00 4.25
Average PSS 5.35 5.63 5.83 5.83 5.92 6.00 6.00 5.98
Table 4.11: Independent Media on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 as best performance
(Source: Freedom House: Nations in Transit).
might compensate for such individual deficits. This section addresses
two concepts, cohesion and leadership, brought forward as having a
positive eﬀect on regional integration, regardless of individual deficits.
Both concepts shed light on the composition of participants.
Let us take a look at cohesion first. Cohesion draws on the homo-
geneity of the participants of a regional integration project regarding
size, political and economic systems, including beliefs and values: The
more alike cooperating states and economies are, the more they are
assumed to benefit from integration (Padoan 2001: 43; Nye 1981: 202;
Mansfield & Milner 1997b: 10; Mansfield & Milner 1999: 607).51 Yet,
there are only few suggestions on how to measure cohesion and which
51 Trade integration between partners at diﬀerent levels of development is assumed
to cause divergent long run growth rates (Beretta 2008: 80); desired income
convergence among integration participants of diﬀerent development levels is
more likely within a homogenous group of countries (cf. Rapacki 2008: 97).
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Civil Society
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Azerbaijan 4.75 4.50 4.50 5.00 5.25 5.75 6.00 6.50
Georgia 3.75 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.75 3.75 3.75
Moldova 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.25
Ukraine 4.00 3.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.50
Average PSS 4.81 4.90 4.92 4.98 5.02 5.17 5.15 5.27
Table 4.12: Civil Society on a scale from 1 to 7 with 1 as best performance
(Source: Freedom House: Nations in Transit).
degree of diﬀerence is still feasible (Mansfield & Milner 1999: 608, cf.
Nye 1981: 202). Similar belief systems or values were addressed in
ch. 4.3.1 on mutual trust. Chapter 2.1.2 as well as 4.3.2 drew on the
political and economic system of the four GUAM participants. Those
chapters showed that there is considerable homogeneity among GUAM
participants, since they are all deficient democracies (hybrid regimes
at best) as well as imperfect market economies. They all suﬀer from
institutional weaknesses and show a shared basis of common beliefs
and practices due to their past as Soviet republics and Tsarist colonies.
Nevertheless, I argue that for the GUAM case the cohesion con-
cept is reversed. Even though all participants show a considerable
degree of homogeneity in their political and economic as well as belief
systems, it aﬀects regional integration adversely. Since all GUAM
member states are deficient market economies with weak economic
and political institutions, results of regional integration are harder
to achieve and negative eﬀects more diﬃcult to manage. GUAM
members cannot mutually compensate their shared weaknesses. In
addition, none of the four states can be termed as particularly innova-
tive or technologically highly developed, making technology transfer
as a source for economic growth highly unlikely. This also applies to
transfer of integration expertise or mutual investments. Nevertheless,
other partner combinations might mitigate individual weaknesses.52
52 To avoid negative eﬀects, a UN study recommends developing economies
to either integrate with partners of an equal economic level or to opt for
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In fact, each of the four states should focus on regional integration
projects with proficient participants who could compensate for their
weaknesses. To sum up, cohesion between integration members does
not provide a positive eﬀect on regional integration per se. In fact,
cohesion of unfavourable qualities has inauspicious eﬀects on regional
integration.
This brings us directly to the leadership concept, building on the
conviction that one participant should indeed diﬀer and apply its
superiority to compensate for the deficiencies of other participants.53
A leader among participants is assumed to be indispensable, not
only as the initiator, but also as the conditional variable in order to
advance regional integration (Langhammer 2003: 262). RS scholars
argue that a regional leader fulfils three important functions: initiator
(1), promotor (2) and paymaster of integration (3) (cf. Laursen
2010: 263; Fawcett 2008: 26; cf. Mattli 1999).54 However, a regional
integration project sustained only by a regional leader will stagnate
as soon as the leader diminishes its eﬀorts (cf. Milner 1992: 480).
Leader may change their attitude towards integration out of growing
maintenance costs and/or decreasing benefits.55
asymmetric integration with developed partners (UNCTAD 2007). Yet, it
remains unclear where the optimal cost-gains relation lies. The optimal
grouping is supposed to reflect a constellation where marginal costs equal
marginal benefits (Padoan 2001: 45).
53 Empirical examples show that most integration projects were propelled by one
or a duo of states among participants (Rinke 2008: 446; Kühnhardt 2008: 272;
Mattli 1999: 190).
54 RS scholars refer to the concept of hegemony from IR theory as well as
‘the public goods approach in IPE. While IR theorists focus on increasing
power as the leading motivation for hegemons to initiate cooperation, political
economists rely on the theory of public goods, which pivots on the problem of
free-riding within the international political economy (Haggard & Simmons
1987: 502f; Kindleberger 1981). Despite their diﬀerences, both rationales
conceive of a hegemon as an initiator of cooperation (cf. also Puchala &
Hopkins 1983: 66). Only a hegemon seeking long term interests is believed to
convince others to cooperate—by force or by oﬀering incentives (Meyers 2008a:
278; Kindleberger 1981; cf. Newman 2006: 163f; cf. Pedersen 2002: 678).
55 Studies of international cooperation projects show that a dominant partici-
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The leadership concept weakens the argument of power symmetry,
which is inherent in the cohesion argument. Applying the function
as an initiator of regional integration, GUAM can be traced back to
an initiative from both Ukraine and Azerbaijan (cf. also Polukhov
2008: 126). More important for this chapter on the present state of
GUAM are the functions of a leader as financier and promoter that
would be necessary to advance integration. GUAM lacks a potential
financier among its participants, who would finance integration or
oﬀer incentives to integrate. Thus GUAM’s advancement is in jeop-
ardy. Although Ukraine is in many aspects better oﬀ than the other
three member states, it is not able and/or willing to provide suﬃcient
financial means to oﬀer incentives for advancing GUAM integration.
It could be termed a sub-regional power at best, strongly challenged
by the rise of Azerbaijan. With domestic politics in turmoil, Ukraine
has no capacities left to provide incentives for regional integration,
nor does it dispose of a domestic consensus to do so. Correspond-
ingly, Azerbaijan, who would be able to accumulate suﬃcient financial
means to support regional integration, would have to cut back on rents
from hydrocarbons for the ruling elite or for domestic modernisation
policies. As has been described above, GUAM members as well as the
GUAM organisation experience a tense financial situation and depend
on external funding to realise their joint projects (cf. ch. 3.3.2).
A leader should also provide a vision for regional integration
and motivate participants to proceed with integration. Even though
Alena Getmanchuk (2007: 1) perceives a dualism between Ukraine
and Azerbaijan for leadership within GUAM, none of the two provides
a strategy for the region and, thus, fails as a promoter within the
GUAM framework; both countries focus on their own domestic devel-
opment and foreign policy agenda. Without a strategy or initiative of
one of the participants, GUAM is reduced to a stalemate. During the
first presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (Ukraine) and the first years of
Mikhail Saakashvili’s (Georgia) incumbency, GUAM exhibited a high
pant causes inconsistent results. A regional leader could also abuse regional
cooperation structures to control the region (Fawcett 2005: 35f).
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level of activity. New initiatives were proposed and institutionalisation
propelled, e. g. with the new Kyiv Charter (2006) and subsequent
formation of ODED-GUAM (2006-2007). When Ukrainian initiatives
decreased and no other participant took over, development of GUAM
projects slowed down. This raises the issue of external promotion of
integration projects (cf. Magen & Morlino 2008a; Magen et al. 2009;
Börzel et al. 2009; Zimmerling 1991). For the case of GUAM external
promotion was undertaken by the United States between 2006 and
2008 and contributed to the formation of the Secretariat as well as
the Virtual Law Enforcement Centre (cf. ch. 3). Thanks to such
financing and best practice advice, GUAM’s activity flourished in
those years.56
In summary, the absence of a leader, who would finance and
promote GUAM integration, oﬀers a convincing argument to explain
the unsatisfactory state of GUAM. The leadership concept supports
the conclusion that the composition of GUAM participants is ill-
conceived.
4.3.3 Demand
Having shed light on trust and state capacity as independent variables
to explain the state of GUAM, this chapter continues with the topic
of demand. A frequent shortcoming of economic integration agree-
ments in post-Soviet space is that they often contradict actual trade,
investment and migration flows (Libman 2007: 403). Relatively high
intra-regional trade, a high degree of interdependence and regional
proximity suggest a demand for regional trade liberalisation (Glania
& Matthes 2005: 53; Fawcett 2005: 34; Zimmerling 1991: 76; Robson
1993: 334).57 Trade agreements are the nucleus of most regional
56 Nonetheless, external promotion (particularly unbalanced funding) aﬀects the
legitimacy of a regional organisation adversely. GUAM was frequently dubbed
a tool of American foreign policy.
57 Relatively high production diﬀerences among participants (Glania & Matthes
2005: 53; Zimmerling 1991: 76) as well as their combined market size (Mattli
1999: 190; Belassa & Stoutjesdijk 1981: 294; Robson 1993: 334) would reflect
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integration projects and they also form a corner stone of GUAM’s
economic dimension. Neo-classic trade theory suggests that trade
integration occurs between ‘countries with dissimilar comparative
advantages’ (Ladewig 2010: 7072). Yet, theorists could not convinc-
ingly explain why industrialised states which are similarly endowed
also integrate (ib.). This analysis aims at demonstrating that there
is deficient complementarity in the area of traded goods among the
four member states. Their choice of partners can be regarded as
a second-best solution. This will support the assumption that the
composition of GUAM participants is ill-conceived and aﬀects GUAM
integration adversely.
As an element of the bottom-up concept, the discourse about
demand can be traced back to functionalism theories (Mitrany 1943;
Haas 1958; also Mattli 1999; Fawcett 2005).58 Scholars assume that
without actual demand from below state-led integration is bound to
fail (Mattli 1999: 190; cf. also Gamble & Payne 1996: 252f; Glania &
Matthes 2005: 14). Yet, an ideal type of bottom-up integration as
proposed by functionalists is not the rule but the exception.
This chapter expounds that demand in the area of trade is subopti-
mal among the four member states and, hence, a deficient instrument
to spur economic growth. The following sub-chapters look at each
of the four GUAM states, drawing on a) trade structure (traded
goods, destinations/origins, trade balance), b) trade expansion as a
key to economic growth and c) the expected benefits from economic
integration within GUAM. Moreover, the subchapter provides data
demand for economic integration apart from the trade perspective.
58 Apart from indicating agency (governments vs. societal or market actors)
and the demand for integration, the bottom-up concept also highlights the
inclusion of aﬀected stakeholders. The inclusion of aﬀected stakeholders has
been assumed to have a conducive eﬀect on regional integration, because, on
the one hand, inclusion oﬀers a communication channel that helps governments
manage negative eﬀects of integration and, on the other hand, it facilitates
support for integration, making implementation easier (cf. Padoan 2001: 41).
GUAM members provide limited opportunities for inclusion of non-state actors
due to their lack of pluralism.
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on the GUAM share in foreign trade of the respective GUAM member
states. I close with a summary.
Scientific thoroughness would demand a dynamic analysis starting
with the inception of GUAM in 1997. However, due to the limited
space of this work, analysis will centre on data from the last few years.
This approach is also justified from another vantage point: There has
been little change in the trade structure in the last few years; relevant
alterations have been considered and highlighted.
4.3.3.1 Azerbaijan
The economic development of Azerbaijan is primarily driven by oil
exports (Ibadoglu 2011: 10), which turned the country into one of the
fastest growing economies worldwide between 2005 and 2007 (IMF
Economic Outlook 2010: 185). Hence, Azerbaijan’s trade structure
(a) is characterised by a strong orientation to commodity export.
The country concentrates on hydrocarbon exports with a low devel-
oped agricultural and industrial sector (cf. Robson 2006: xi; EBRD
Transition Report 2012: 98). Current exports of Azerbaijani gas are
expected to rise considerably with the opening of the gas field Shakh
Deniz II (Häfliger 2012: 28) and the upcoming transport of Turkmen
gas to Turkey (Hosp 2011: 11). In 2012 mineral fuels, lubricants and
related products constituted about 93% of its exports (UN Comtrade).
Azerbaijan primarily imports machinery, especially for transport,
and manufactured goods, but also agricultural products (UN Com-
trade). Azerbaijan is the only GUAM member with an export surplus
(UN Comtrade; WTO Trade Profiles). Table 4.13 below shows the
trade balance of all four GUAM states since 2003. The turning point
for Azerbaijan came in 2005, when the BTC-pipeline opened and
revenues from oil exports increased dramatically.
Yet, Azerbaijan’s trade surplus is not generated in the GUAM area.
Azerbaijan primarily exports to Western countries, e. g. Italy, France
and Israel (table 4.14). Ukraine is the only GUAM state ranking
among the top ten export destinations for Azerbaijani fuels, though
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2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
A
zerbaijan
-27.8
-29.8
1.3
17.6
27.3
35.5
23.0
28.0
26.5
21.8
17.0
15.3
G
eorgia
-9.6
-6.9
-11.1
-15.2
-19.8
-22.0
-10.5
-10.2
-12.8
-11.7
-5.7
-9.6
M
oldova
-6.6
-1.8
-7.6
-11.4
-15.2
-16.1
-8.2
-7.5
-11.0
-7.4
-5.0
-5.5
U
kraine
6.0
6.0
2.9
-1.5
-3.5
-6.8
-1.4
-2.2
-6.3
-8.1
-9.2
-4.0
Table
4.13:
B
alance
on
current
accounts
in
percentage
ofG
D
P,2003
–
2014
(Source:
IM
F
W
orld
E
conom
ic
O
utlook
data).
4.3. EXPLAINING THE STATE OF GUAM 145
not every year (UN Comtrade, various years). Since the huge price
hike for Russian gas in 2006, Georgia is also buying small quantities
of Azerbaijani gas. Russia also is a significant buyer of Azerbaijani
hydrocarbons (WTO Trade Profile, various years).
The greatest share of imported goods are manufactures (about
three-quarter) followed by agricultural products (about one-fifth)
(WTO Trade Profiles). Among import origins, the EU-28 rank first
(26,7%). They are equalled by imports from the CIS, among which
Russia clearly sticks out as the most significant import origin, followed
closely by non-CIS-member Turkey (WTO Trade Profiles). Only then
does Ukraine follow as first GUAM participant (ib.). Due to its
dependency on hydrocarbon exports—destined primarily on beyond
the region—and due to few other export goods, trade with GUAM
states is considerably low (table 4.15). Neighbours usually are good
trading partners (cf. Preyger 2008: 66). The lower significance of
direct neighbours for the case of Azerbaijan can be explained with its
special role as a commodity exporter and—for Armenia—with politi-
cal constraints. In addition, the small market sizes of Georgia and
Moldova makes these states generally less significant for Azerbaijan’s
trade balance.
However, Azerbaijan’s exports of hydrocarbons depend on Georgia
and Turkey (Papava et al. 2011: 164; Papava 2008a: 77). Turkey
also is an important investor. Besides the BTC oil pipeline (opened
in 2006) or the Baku (AZ)-Tbilisi (GE)-Erzurum (TK) gas pipeline
(opened in 2007), Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia pushed transport
projects like the Poti (GE)-Baku (AZ) route or the railway route
Kars (TK)-Tbilisi (GE)-Baku (AZ) (Suleiman 2008: 1f).59 All three
countries are mutually dependent and interested in good relations.
Thus, integration in the transport and trade sectors between GUAM
members Georgia and Azerbaijan indeed promises mutual benefits
(see map of oil pipelines in ch. 3.4.1).
59 The railway route Kars-Tbilisi-Baku is financed by SOFAZ, the Azeri state oil
fund (Bayramov 2010: 7).
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1
st
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Italy
Italy
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Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
Italy
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Indonesia
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France
Iran
India
Israel
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SA
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ussia
Indonesia
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Israel
Table
4.14:
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destinations
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A
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(Source:
A
zerbaijaniN
ationalStatistics).
4.3. EXPLAINING THE STATE OF GUAM 147
20
00
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
1s
t
R
us
si
a
Si
ng
a-
po
re
R
us
si
a
R
us
si
a
R
us
si
a
R
us
si
a
R
us
si
a
R
us
si
a
T
ur
ke
y
R
us
si
a
R
us
si
a
2n
d
T
ur
ke
y
R
us
si
a
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
T
ur
ke
y
T
ur
ke
y
T
ur
ke
y
T
ur
ke
y
T
ur
ke
y
R
us
si
a
T
ur
ke
y
T
ur
ke
y
3r
d
U
SA
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
G
er
m
an
y
G
er
m
an
y
G
er
m
an
y
G
er
m
an
y
G
er
m
an
y
G
er
m
an
y
G
er
m
an
y
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
4t
h
G
er
m
an
y
T
ur
ke
y
T
ur
ke
y
U
kr
ai
ne
U
kr
ai
ne
U
kr
ai
ne
U
kr
ai
ne
U
SA
U
SA
G
er
m
an
y
G
er
m
an
y
Ta
bl
e
4.
15
:
To
p
or
ig
in
s
of
A
ze
rb
ai
ja
ni
im
po
rt
s
(S
ou
rc
e:
A
ze
rb
ai
ja
ni
N
at
io
na
lS
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
.
148 CHAPTER 4. THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Looking at impediments for development (b), scholars do not
regard trade expansion as the key to curbing economic growth; instead,
Azerbaijan has to focus on diversifying its economy and increasing its
competitiveness (Ibadoglu 2011: 15; EBRD Transition Report 2012:
98). The strong export dependence on hydrocarbons characterises
the economy (cf. Hallaert et al. 2011: 57; Ibadoglu 2011: 15; EBRD
Transition Report 2013: 98). The majority of FDI in Azerbaijan is
dedicated to the oil and gas sector (Hallaert et al. 2011: 56; Hübner
2011: 4), though only a small part of the overall work force is employed
in this sector (Hallaert et al. 2011: 57).
Therefore, scholars advise improving national governance, e. g.
by better fiscal spending and investment (Hallaert et al. 2011: 8).60
Continuous revenues from mineral fuel exports have a negative impact,
maintaining patronage and clientelistic networks (Astrov & Havlik
2008: 167). Thus, Azerbaijan’s weak institutional capacity, which has
already been described in ch. 4.3.2, lacks the stimulus to adjust.61
Institutional reforms like improved tax administration procedures
have been embarked on (EBRD Transition Report 2010: 102); yet,
there still is room for reform: Customs administration should be
strengthened to fully benefit from the present railway modernisation
(EBRD Transition Report 2010: 103), but also transport infrastruc-
ture to the Black Sea needs to be improved (cf. EBRD Transition
Report 2010: 15). These examples show that Azerbaijan could also
improve trade and investment conditions with a unilateral approach.
Examining the benefits Azerbaijan may expect from GUAM inte-
gration (c), its commitment to GUAM’s economic integration frame-
work has been primarily related to energy issues. Azerbaijan’s mem-
bership is vital for other GUAM members because all of them are
energy importers. At the beginning GUAM participants anticipated
discounts for Azerbaijani gas and oil and were disappointed by a grow-
60 The conflict with Armenia has a negative impact on stability and at the same
time raises military spending and poverty (due to unsolved refugee problems).
61 Transnational energy companies like BP stick to the domestic rules of the
game to make their investments pay oﬀ and do not provide leverage for reform
(cf. Soghomonyan 2007: 8).
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ingly self-confident Baku government (Mamedov 2006: 1). Today,
only Georgia and, to some extent Ukraine benefit from Azerbaijani
hydrocarbons. Presently, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine are assess-
ing the construction of an LNG liquefaction plant along the Georgian
coast to transport Azerbaijani LNG to Ukraine (Eurasian Monitor
V.8, Nr. 179). Moreover, the Azerbaijani government has decided on
a pipeline project for gas transport from the Shakh-Deniz gas field to
Europe (Hosp 2013; Meister 2014a). Even though GUAM was not
involved in the execution of pipeline projects like the Transcaspian
pipeline, it always endorsed them and served as an important fo-
rum for Azerbaijan in the first GUAM years. Transport facilitation
projects within GUAM play a vital role for Azerbaijan’s landlocked
economy. In contrast, regional trade integration would be profitable in
regard to Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine in the first place as the three
are exporters of agricultural and/or manufactured goods). Trade
agreements with the EU-28 or Russia could be addressed in the
medium turn or within a global free trade approach. Azerbaijan
could increase economic growth considerably by unilateral measures
(addressing its institutional capacity) and, thus, avoid interference by
or submission to a regional institution. Apart from economic eﬀects,
participating in regional integration could have a positive eﬀect on
the institutional reform process—still, this would necessitate a strong
regional institution.
4.3.3.2 Georgia
Looking at Georgia’s trade structure (a), statistics reveal that Geor-
gian exports constitute a far lower share of national income than, for
example, exports in Azerbaijan. Georgia’s main economic activity
is in the service sector, particularly financial services, but also in
the agricultural and food industries (Smirnov 2007a: 137). Half of
Georgia’s workforce is employed in agriculture, whereas the majority
of large industrial enterprises is either oﬄine or operates at less than
full capacity (cf. Smirnov 2007a: 134ﬀ; cf. Edilashwili 2011: 15).
Agricultural products, including beverages and manufactured goods,
are the main export products of Georgia (UN Comtrade; WTO Trade
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Profiles; cf. Astrov & Havlik 2008: 136). Government spending and
consumption also have a significant share in GDP creation (Ibadoglu
2011: 10). The Georgian economy still depends to a significant degree
on remittances by its compatriots working abroad, particularly in Rus-
sia (Ibadoglu 2011: 10; Astrov & Havlik 2008: 128; Smirnov 2007a:
134; Zagorski 2005: 68; Göksel 2011: 31),62 and on FDI (EBRD
Transition Report 2010: 116; World Investment Report 2013: 216).
However, since 2008 FDI has been declining amid the international fi-
nancial crisis and the brief war with Russia in 2008 (World Investment
Report 2013: 216). To a large extent Georgia imports machinery
and transport, mineral fuels and mining products and manufactured
goods (WTO trade profiles; UN Comtrade, various years).
Exports go to and imports come primarily from Georgian neigh-
bours like Azerbaijan, Turkey, Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Armen-
ia—confirmation of the assumption that neighbours are good trading
partners (Georgian National Statistics, 2013). Various international
partners like the US, Germany and increasingly China also are rel-
evant (ib.). While Azerbaijan is Georgia’s major trading partner
among CIS-states (Georgian National Statistics, 2013), Turkey is
Georgia’s biggest trading partner on a global level (ib.). Turkey also
is a major investor in Georgia (cf. Sharashenidze 2011: 3; Kulick
& Yakobashvili 2008: 26; Smirnov 2007a: 142; Ibadoglu 2011: 8).
While during the 1990s CIS-countries were the major import origin for
Georgia, imports from EU-28 have increased considerably and since
2011 have even amounted to a greater share than those from CIS. In
addition, considering the EU-28 as a unitary partner, it represents the
leading export destination for Georgia (WTO Trade profiles). This
underscores Georgia’s orientation to the West. Nevertheless, Russia
still is an important trading partner for Georgia, even though politi-
cal incidents are also reflected in trade statistics (Georgian National
Statistics, 2013). Tables 4.16 and 4.17 display the leading export and
import countries.
62 For the Caucasus income from labour migration at the beginning of the 2000s
was even higher than the amount gained from export (Grinberg 2005: 3).
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Russia lost the position as Georgia’s main trading partner after
the Russian embargo on popular Georgian export products and the
closure of the land as well as air connections (Smirnov 2007a: 138;
cf. ch. 5.2.5). The embargo eventually had a positive impact on
the diversification of Georgian export destinations. With the new
government of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian products
have been granted reentry into the Russian market with only some
exceptions (Guttermann 2013). Interestingly, even during phases
of tense relations with Russia, its investments have always been
welcomed by Georgian governments making Russia one of Georgia’s
leading investors (Edilashvili 2011: 15; cf. Papava 2009: 199).
Georgia exhibits a trade deficit which reached its lowest point
in 2008 with -22% (IMF Economic Outlook 2012). Trade deficits,
typical for PSS, result from the imbalance of consumer demands
and domestic supply (Ibadoglu 2011: 16). Those deficits also reflect
high dependence on energy imports (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 129).
Table 4.13 compares the trade balance of Georgia with the trade
balances of the other three GUAM members.
Looking at impediments for economic development (b), Georgia
has taken great eﬀorts to reduce non-tariﬀ trade barriers and, thus, in-
creased cross-border trade in the last few years. The national customs
code was modified in 2006, reducing customs significantly (Smirnov
2007a: 139). Georgia also cut down transport tariﬀs and fees and
‘rooted out’ corruption among customs service to propel trade (Kulick
& Yakobashvili 2008: 27). In doing so, the Georgian government came
closest to the spirit of the GUAM free trade agreement. That being
said, Georgia’s most demanding impediments for economic develop-
ment are energy supply, political stability and institutional reform (cf.
Smirnov 2007a: 140)—first of all national concerns. Georgia disposes
of its own (but few) hydrocarbon deposits and huge possibilities for
hydropower, thermal power, sun and wind energy (cf. Chomakhidze
2007: 89f). Nevertheless, the country has to import fuels and electric-
ity (ib.). The situation seems to be improving presently. Georgia even
started exporting energy from the Batumi district to its neighbour
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Turkey and in the Northern region even to the Russian Federation (cf.
Chomakhidze 2011: 2f). Considerable assistance for improvements in
the energy sector came from the EU (Chomakhidze 2011: 3), while
Turkey has also invested in the construction of seven hydropower
stations in the Adjaria region (Phillips 2008: 11). Nevertheless, in-
frastructure deficits are still an impediment for doing business (BEEP
survey 2008-09, cited in: EBRD Transition Report 2010: 84).
With democratisation in progress, domestic politics still entail
a variable of unpredictability; particularly domestic conflicts avert
necessary foreign investments (cf. Ibadoglu 2011: 16), raise the na-
tional poverty level due to the refugee issue, and cause exaggerated
military spending (Smirnov 2007a: 140).63 Institutional reforms have
advanced considerably in the last few years. Nevertheless, the Geor-
gian government ‘should focus particularly on reinforcing the rule of
law, stimulating educational attainment and acquisition of skills by
its population and promoting further improvement of public sector
governance along the lines of the EU acquis’ (EBRD Transition Re-
port 2010: 117).
Examining the benefits (c), which Georgia can expect from integra-
tion, the small country would indeed benefit from a regional market,
but also from global integration (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 135). Yet, it
can be suggested that Georgia would have undertaken those reforms
without GUAM membership, since there are no deadlines or sanc-
tion mechanisms for GUAM’s free trade agreement. Figures indicate
that Georgia would benefit considerably from economic integration
with Azerbaijan and Turkey and to some extent with Ukraine. Geor-
gia and Azerbaijan trade agricultural products for energy resources.
Turkey and Azerbaijan are also important investors. With the EU-28
succeeding the CIS as the most important regional trade bloc for
63 Despite low revenues in state budget, military expenditures have increased
significantly in relation to GDP and to other spending—even though the US
financed a great share of military activity as part of its global fight on terrorism
(Smirnov 2007a: 140).
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Georgia, integrating with the EU would be a mid-term perspective.
Georgia would also benefit from its role as a transit hub, particularly
from Europe to Asia (Papava 2008a: 77), but also from Russia to
Armenia, and further to Iran (Papava et al. 2011: 164). In that issue
area, Georgia intensively cooperates with its neighbours Turkey and
Azerbaijan, for example, in the construction of pipelines or railway
connections (Kulick & Yakobashvili 2008: 27; Ismailov & Papava
2008: 283; Mayer 2007: 8). Transit fees are an important budget
income (about 47%), such as with the Baku-Supsa pipeline, the BTC
or the South Caucasus gas pipeline (Smirnov 2007a: 137). Sebastian
Mayer speaks of a ‘strategic partnership’ between Georgia, Turkey
and Azerbaijan (Mayer 2007: 8), and for Ismailov (2008: 13) the
integration of the entire Caucasus is inevitable, although at present
this may seem unrealistic.
4.3.3.3 Ukraine
Scrutinising the trade structure (a), the Ukrainian economy has the
advantage of being well diversified, embracing agricultural produc-
tion as well as huge facilities of chemical and steel production, with
the latter being responsible for the greatest share in GDP and ex-
ports (Pleines 2008a: 21; cf. Astrov & Havlik 2007: 137). Just as
its economy, Ukrainian exports are well diversified: Ukraine trades
with semi-finished products of iron and non-alloyed steel, machinery,
transport equipment as well as inedible agricultural products (UN
Comtrade 2012; cf. Astrov & Havlik 2008: 136).64 In fact, Russia,
Belarus, Ukraine and partly Kazakhstan are all importers and ex-
porters of each others’ machinery, construction products or spare parts,
meaning they are mutually dependent in this sector (Sewin 2008: 289).
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials account for the
greatest share of imports (UN Comtrade 2012). Other imported
goods are machinery, transport and manufactured goods (Trade Pro-
64 Ukraine possesses one of the greatest iron ore reserves in the world (Pleines
2008a: 21). In addition, Ukraine successfully sells military equipment (cf.
Astrov & Havlik 2008: 136).
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files WTO; UN Comtrade). Among GUAM countries, Ukraine is
the only member that still imports the majority of its goods from
the CIS-region, even though the share of imports from EU-28 has
increased considerably in the last few years (Ukrainian National Statis-
tics; WTO trade profiles; UN Comtrade). Russia is Ukraine’s major
trading partner. In 2012, about 29% of Ukraine’s exported goods
went to Russia, while about 35% of all imported goods came from
there (WTO Trade Profile 2012: 177). In fact, Ukraine trades more
with its neighbours than with the other three GUAM members (WTO
trade profiles)—no GUAM state is listed among Ukraine’s top ten
export/import destinations/origins, which can be explained by the
much smaller market size of the other three GUAM countries com-
pared to that of Ukraine. The group of EU-28 is another principle
export destination and import origin aside from Russia (see table 4.18
and 4.19).
Ukraine is less aﬀected by a trade imbalance than the other three
GUAM member states, as can be seen in table 4.13. Its trade balance
is only slightly negative—an unusual, but positive result for a transi-
tion state which does not rely on raw material exports.65 Until 2006,
Ukraine exhibited a positive trade balance, but reached a high deficit
in 2008. Projections expect a continuing deficit, but on a much lower
level than in Georgia or Moldova. It is still unclear how the political
changes in Ukraine in 2014 will aﬀect its trade structure.
Looking at impediments for economic growth (b), Ukraine suﬀers
from two major problems: very high energy and material consumption
(combined with low energy eﬃciency) (Gorobets 2008: 93; Astrov &
Havlik 2007: 136) on the one hand and institutional weaknesses on the
other (EBRD Transition Report 2010: 152f; EBRD Transition Report
2012: 157). Energy spending (per unit of GDP) is higher than the
global average (Patronyk & Zhovkva 2010: 36). The major reason for
this lies in the inherited Soviet economic structure and Soviet facilities,
which are resource intensive and produce high pollution (Gorobets
65 Ukraine’s trade balance with Europe and the CIS is negative, and positive
with Asia and Northern Africa (UN Comtrade 2010).
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2008: 94). Up to 50 per cent of Ukraine’s energy demand is satisfied
by gas, coming directly from or via Russia, causing a high dependence
of Ukraine on its bigger neighbour (cf. Pleines 2008a: 10). Ukraine’s
energy dependence comes along with a debt problem with Russia and
high inflation (Pleines 2008a: 6; IMF Economic Outlook 2012; cf. also
Sewin 2008: 285). Yet, it is a relative dependence, since Ukraine is the
most important transit country for Russian hydrocarbons to Europe
and will remain so even after the completion of Nord Stream, the
construction of South Stream and a developing LNG-market (Götz
2007: 159). Estimates show that Ukraine could become self-suﬃcient
in energy production and consumption.66
Institutional weaknesses have already been raised as an impedi-
ment to integration in ch. 4.3.2. The Ukrainian economy is charac-
terised by a lack of competition and a ‘shadow economy’, caused by
‘complicated and unproductive business taxation, ineﬃcient budget
expenditure and social indiﬀerence of the tax payers’ (Gorobets 2008:
100; EBRD Transition Report 2010: 152f.). Improving its business
environment is one of its major challenges (EBRD Transition Report
2012: 157). Hence, Ukraine could facilitate its economic growth by
unilateral actions aimed at improving investment and the business
climate, strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises, fighting
corruption and ameliorating the eﬀectiveness of government institu-
tions (EBRD Transition Report 2012: 157.; Pleines 2008a: 7). Trade
expansion would be interesting on a global scale, but less relevant for
GUAM partners.
This brings us to the issue of benefits from GUAM integration for
Ukraine (c). Although regional or interstate cooperation generally may
facilitate Ukraine’s economic growth (cf. Gorobets 2008: 100), GUAM
does not seem to be the appropriate framework. Trade statistics show
that the three other GUAM members do not play an important role
for Ukrainian trade, although Ukraine could easily supply the other
66 According to a policy paper from the Ukrainian International Centre for
Policy Studies (ICPS), Ukraine could even turn into an energy exporter, if it
implemented its own energy strategy (Patronyk & Zhovkva 2010: 21).
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three. Due to the small size of the three other markets, the potential
positive impact on Ukrainian exports may only be marginal. Instead
integration with Russia (due to interdependence and existing mutual
trade) or to regional trading blocs like EU-28 or CIS (due to existing
mutual trade and suﬃcient market size) promise positive eﬀects on
trade expansion. Still, growth eﬀects depend more on unilateral
measures (energy reform and improving business climate), so then
trade expansion will come as an epiphenomenon. In addition, the
GUAM model is not decisive for strengthening Ukraine’s status as
a transit hub; funding for transport facilitation has been mainly
provided by the European Union, to which the Ukrainian transit
corridor is connected.67 From an economic point of view, GUAM is
only interesting for Ukraine with regard to energy; with Azerbaijan
as GUAM participant, Ukraine may benefit from diversifying its own
energy imports and strengthen its income and position as an energy
transit hub. Again, such cooperation could be realised outside GUAM
in a bilateral (either with Azerbaijan or Turkey) or trilateral (with
Azerbaijan and Georgia) approach.
4.3.3.4 Moldova
Moldova has experienced a steep decline from the republic with the
highest GDP per capita in the entire SU to the poorest country in
Europe today (Girbu 2011: 1; Gallina 2006: 14; Hishow 2002: 17).
While Moldova was almost without debts at the beginning of the 1990s
(ib.), today foreign grants and loans form a great part of the Moldovan
budget (about 10% for January-June of 2010) (Girbu & Lozovanu
2010: 2). Presently, two thirds of Moldovan GDP are generated in
the service sector, resulting from a growing domestic consumption of
imported goods. Moldova cannot rely on raw materials export and
shows only a low developed industrial and agriculture sector (Girbu
2011: 3; Petrick 2012: 486f; Gabanyi 2004: 9).
67 Ukraine could also benefit from the transit corridor via Russia.
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Looking at Moldova’s trade structure (a), similarities to Georgia
are prevalent. Moldova is a producer of agricultural and food products
and an exporter of such products (about 40%) (Girbu 2011: 3; cf.
Astrov & Havlik 2007: 137).68 About 30 per cent of Moldovan ex-
ports are textile commodities, mostly commissioned work for Western
companies (Girbu 2011: 3). Imports are dominated by crude related
products, manufactured products and machinery and transport (UN
Comtrade 2012).
Imports primarily come from the EU-28, which reflects that
Moldova is the GUAM member best integrated into the European
area. The CIS as a group is the second largest import origin, and
Ukraine, Russia and Romania are the most relevant individual im-
port origins for Moldova (cf. table below). Interestingly, Moldova’s
neighbour, Ukraine is less relevant as an export destination than
are non-neighbours Russia or Italy (cf. table below). Keeping in
mind that Moldova has not been able to fully recover after the food-
embargo imposed by Russia in 2005/06, the continuing top ranking
of Russia is revealing (cf. Chivriga 2008: 3; Munteanu 2005: 104ﬀ).
Munteanu (2005: 77) claims that Moldova depends completely on
Russian products, particularly on oil and gas. Ukraine ranks fourth
among Moldova’s major export markets of the last few years and is
the only GUAM participant among the top ten ranking (Moldovan
National Statistics). Taking the EU-28 as a group, major trade is
done with the EU, followed by Russia, and then Ukraine to a lesser
extent (see table 4.20 and 4.21).
Moldova’s trade structure is characterised by a trade deficit, with
economists being pessimistic about a reduction of the deficit in the
next years. Table 4.13 compares the trade balance of the four GUAM
member states. High domestic consumption is, to a large extent,
68 Nevertheless, in 2007 Moldova also started to import various food products,
while the output of the agricultural sector has stagnated in the last decade
(Girbu 2011: 3). Hence, there are concerns that Moldova might turn slowly into
a net-importer of agricultural and food products (Chivriga 2008: 3), though
figures from 2010 do not substantiate that assumption (UN Comtrade 2010;
WTO Trade profile 2010).
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financed by remittances from abroad (Girbu 2011: 3; Munteanu 2005:
107f; Astrov & Havlik 2007: 136).
Considering impediments for economic development (b), Moldova
suﬀers from four major issues: the Transnistria conflict, transport
infrastructure deficits, weak institutions and limited skills availability.
With the exception of skills availability, all issues inhibit trade ex-
pansion directly. The Transnistrian conflict has increased Moldova’s
dependence on its Ukrainian neighbour. Ukraine functions as a transit
country for Moldovan imports and exports from Russia—including
energy trade—and supports the Moldovan government by acting on
behalf of the Moldovan customs service on the Moldovan-Ukrainian
border, where Transnistria is rejecting Moldovan jurisdiction (Nygren
2008: 100). Moldova’s inability to control the Transnistrian territory
makes it diﬃcult to pursue a coherent economic policy and aﬀects
stability adversely. Moreover, most industrial complexes are situated
in the secessionist region, cutting oﬀ revenues while simultaneously
leaving debts to the Moldovan state (Prohnitchi 2012: 509f). Improv-
ing transport infrastructure could help facilitate trade with and via
Moldova (BEEP survey 2008-09, cited in: EBRD Transition Report
2010: 84). At the moment, however, transaction costs still are con-
siderably high (cf. table 3.1 in ch. 3; EBRD Transition Report 2010:
128f). Reducing corruption and reforming government institutions,
particularly bureaucratic impediments, would improve the conditions
for doing business (Grau 2012: 508; EBRD Transition Report 2010:
128f).69 Limited skills availability is another considerable problem for
business activity in Moldova, which demands reforms in the educa-
tion sector (Grau 2012: 508; according to 2008-9 BEEP Survey from
EBRD Transition Report 2010: 84). Reducing the role of the state in
economic activities would contribute to a better business environment
(cf. EBRD Transition Report 2012: 129).
69 Girbu (2011: 2) points to the badly executed privatisation process as one
reason for the unsatisfactory economic situation. Privatisation of state assets
should be continued (Grau 2012: 508).
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Looking at the benefits from GUAM integration (c), Moldova
indeed could increase its economic growth by trade expansion, partic-
ularly by spurring exports. Due to its small market size, participating
in a regional free trade agreement would be an advantage. Yet, it is
important to ask whether GUAM represents the appropriate frame-
work. According to trade statistics Moldova should extend trade
integration with its direct neighbours and important trading partners
Ukraine and Romania, but also with Russia to which it is connected
by mutual trade and energy dependence. Additionally, integration
with the EU would be an advantage, further allowing access to the
European energy and transport network. Moldova already is well
integrated into EU structures and procedures on trade and investment
(Oprunenco 2010: 3).70 Moldova aspires to quick and immediate
eﬀects for its economy from the free trade agreement, which is part
of the EU Association Agreement initialed in November 2013, and
may be even more relevant than actual EU membership (Oprunenco
2010: 3).
Those eﬀects can be assumed to be of much more importance
than eﬀects from a GUAM free trade agreement. Furthermore, energy
cooperation within GUAM scarcely aﬀects Moldova, because Moldova
is restricted by the Soviet pipeline/production system and currently
has no LNG-port. Changes would require high investments, which are
unlikely to pay-oﬀ soon for a small country like Moldova. Moreover,
Moldova’s energy dependence could be reduced by improving eﬃciency
and integrating into the European energy market (EBRD Transition
Report 2012: 129). Also, GUAM’s vision of a transit corridor through
the Caucasus is marginal for Moldova. Increasing exports to promote
economic growth also is a question of domestic production, which is
generally very low in Moldova. Skills availability, improving transport
70 In contrast to all other CIS-states, Moldova was part of the Stability Pact
for Southeast Europe (Gabanyi 2004: 14) and enjoys special trade preferences
with the EU (Autonomous Trade Preferences, 2008), paying no or a very
low customs rate (Diaconu 2008: 325). Moldova also participates in CEFTA
(Grau 2012: 505); yet, Chivriga (2008: 4) concludes that Moldova does not
take advantage of its international treaties on foreign trade, since there are
deficiencies in the implementation and enforcement of agreements.
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infrastructure and institutional reform are measures which Moldova
could address unilaterally without GUAM.
4.3.3.5 Intraregional Trade
The preceding country analyses indicate that intense trade relations
exist between some GUAM members, whereas between others they
are almost non-existent. The table 4.22 summarises the most relevant
traded goods and trading partners of all the GUAM member states.
It shows that exported and imported goods among several member
states correspond—for example the emphasis on agricultural and food
related exports in Moldova and Georgia, and to some extent, Ukraine.
Also, all four states are interested in hight-tech manufactures and
transport which none of them provides. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s
hydrocarbon exports are interesting for all the other member states.
A detailed analysis of the GUAM share of total exports of each
GUAM participant is assumed to exemplify the demand for trade
integration within the GUAM framework. Applying 20% as a refer-
ence value for trade integration in a region, as suggested by Joseph
Nye (1981: 202), GUAM states show insuﬃcient regional trade. De-
spite considerable trade relations with direct neighbours, overall intra-
regional trade is low. Although intra-regional trade within the GUAM
area has increased since the inception of GUAM, it still is considerably
low.71 In 2006, when GUAM leaders formed the plan for a deeper inte-
gration process, GUAM could not be regarded as an integrated region.
Moldova and Georgia are the only members showing a two-digit share
of GUAM trade in their trade balances (table 4.23), supporting the
assumption that particularly small states would benefit from economic
integration.
Azerbaijan another small state in GUAM is a hydrocarbon ex-
porter and, thus, a special case, exporting to huge energy consumers
71 Between 2006 and 2010, intra-regional trade grew more than 82% (imports and
exports to and from GUAM participants according to their national statistics).
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Major export
goods
Major
export des-
tinations
Major import
goods
Major
import
origins
Azerbaijan
mineral fuels and
related materials;
food and live
animals; machinery
for transport
Italy (1)
France (2)
USA (3)
Israel (4)
machinery and
electrical
equipment;
transport vehicles
and aircraft; iron
and steel products;
agrarian products
like wheat, sugar or
tobacco
Russia (1)
Turkey (2)
Germany (3)
Ukraine (4)
Georgia
transport vehicles;
metals (scrap);
agricultural
products (inc.
beverages)
Turkey (1)
Azerbaijan
(2)
Armenia (3)
USA (4)
fuel and mining
products;
machinery and
transport
equipment;
agricultural
products;
manufactures
Turkey (1)
Azerbaijan
(2)
Ukraine (3)
Germany (4)
Moldova
Agricultural
products (inc.
beverages); textiles;
machinery and
electrical
equipment
Russia (1)
Romania (2)
Italy (3)
Ukraine (4)
fuel and mining
products; chemical
products;
machinery and
electrical
equipment
Ukraine (1)
Russia (2)
Romania (3)
Germany (4)
Ukraine
semi-finished
products of iron
and non-alloy steel;
agricultural
products (inc.
beverages);
machinery and
transport
equipment
Russia (1)
Turkey (2)
Italy (3)
Poland (4)
fuel and mining
products;
machinery and
transport
equipment;
chemicals;
medicaments
Russia (1)
Germany (2)
China (3)
Turkey (4)
Table 4.22: Overview of most relevant import and export goods as well as
export destinations and import origins of the four states, 2000 – 2014 (Source:
UN Comtrade Data, National Statistics).
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2002 2006 2010 2014
Azerbaijan 4.3 5.1 6.1 2.6
Georgia 12.1 15.6 22.3 24.1
Moldova 9.8 13.0 6.7 5.9
Ukraine n/a 3.3 3.2 3.4
Table 4.23: Share of exports to GUAM partners in percentage of total exports
(Source: own estimations based on data from national statistic oﬃces).
2004-06 2007-09 2010-12 2012-14
Azerbaijan 1 893 4 141 5 312 5 704
Georgia 1 209 2 183 2 838 3 559
Moldova 1 049 1 860 2 349 2 431
Ukraine 1 886 3 092 3 786 3 656
Russia 3 048 5 065 6 533 7 207
Germany 26 400 35 526 39 808 39 356
Table 4.24: Trade per capita in USD (Source: WTO data).
worldwide. Ukraine as the biggest economy within the grouping shows
the lowest regional trade share, only 2,4% in 2010. Trade intensity
also diﬀers among GUAM states, particularly between Azerbaijan
and Moldova. Generally, the four states participate only to a limited
degree in foreign trade (table 4.24).72
On the one hand, this pledges for general trade expansion, on
the other hand, it raises doubts whether trade facilitation should be
the chief focus to enhance economic growth. A detailed analysis is
required to answer this question thoroughly.
To sum up, despite intense trade relations between some GUAM
members, overall trade flows contradict the GUAM format. The
matching of the four states appears to be ill-conceived.
72 Labour flows also suggest an integration with non-GUAM members. The share
of employed persons is rather low among GUAM states (Astrov & Havlik 2008:
132) and labour migration is primarily directed towards Russia (Robson 2006:
21; Grinberg 2005: 3; cf. Zagorski 2005: 68; Göksel 2011: 31).
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4.3.4 Summary
Chapter 4.3.1 examined the existence of suﬃcient mutual trust be-
tween GUAM participants along the two criteria of democratic gov-
ernance and shared socio-cultural factors. Democracies are more
trusted to stick to their agreements than non-democracies. Since none
of the four GUAM members can be regarded as democratic states
in the sense of Western European states, trust can be assumed to
be low. Yet, appropriate institutional mechanisms of the GUAM
organisation could compensate for such deficits. Drawing on common
socio-cultural features, it can be suggested that common values and
beliefs among GUAM participants do exist—termed as Soviet legacy.
The generation in power during both the initial and consolidation
phase of GUAM was socialised in the SU. Despite regional peculiarities
among the four GUAM states, the shared beliefs and practices should
be regarded as a source for mutual trust. One should bear in mind
that those commonalities would apply to all PSS and are not idiosyn-
cratic to GUAM states. Furthermore, with each new generation the
common ground for mutual trust is disappearing gradually. Finally,
common values stemming from the Soviet past may not always be of
a positive nature concerning multilateral cooperation. Even though
Soviet legacy has very likely contributed to mutual trust and, thus,
has had a facilitating eﬀect on the emergence of regional integration,
it has inconclusive eﬀects on the advance of regional integration. More
studies are needed to separate positive and negative eﬀects of Soviet
legacy on cooperation for specific time periods.
The chapter on state capacity (4.3.2) has contributed to the
second assumption of this dissertation: that GUAM as a development
strategy is bound to fail. Previous explanations in RS have centred
on the democracy-autocracy and developing-industrialised divide—
this argument has been specified with state capacity. The state
capacity concept claims that financial and institutional abilities to
implement and enforce integration policies as well as to manage
negative eﬀects resulting from integration determines the success of
regional integration.
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Employing the state capacity variable to GUAM member states,
it has been shown that each of the four states suﬀers from deficient
state capacity. None of the four states disposes of suﬃcient financial
means to advance regional integration. In addition, all of them
show weak political and economic institutions. Institutional weakness
has been examined in regard to bureaucracy and human capital,
corruption, reliability of political decisions and the judicial framework
and enforcement. Hence, it can be concluded that each of the four
member states is ill-prepared for integration.
The chapter has also examined the collective preparedness of the
four states. Even though GUAM participants may be individually
second best candidates for integration, they still may benefit from
regional integration, depending on whom they seek as their integration
partner. Although the cohesion argument underscores the positive
eﬀect of homogeneity among participants, its meaning is reversed
for the GUAM case; cohesion in the sense of all participants being
equally ill-prepared, aﬀects integration adversely, because individual
deficiencies cannot be mitigated by other participants. Neither invest-
ments nor the transfer of necessary expertise can be expected from a
composition of deficient members only. A leader among GUAM states
that could finance and promote regional integration is absent. Thus,
individual weaknesses of the member states are not compensated
in the grouping. This supports the assumption that GUAM as a
development strategy is destined to fail.
Chapter 4.3.3, on demand, demonstrated that complementarity in
traded goods is deficient among GUAM participants. This supports
the assumption that the composition of GUAM member states is
ill-conceived and, thus, bound to fail.
Five statements can be formed on demand for regional economic
integration: Firstly, there are intense bilateral trade relations be-
tween some, but not all GUAM participants, e. g. between Georgia–
Azerbaijan, Moldova–Ukraine and, to a certain degree, Georgia–
Ukraine. Secondly, there are intense trade relations between GUAM
participants and non-members in the close by neighbourhood, which
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are in some cases even more relevant than trade relations with GUAM
members. For example, Turkey is an important trading partner and
investor for Georgia and Azerbaijan and Russia is an important trad-
ing partner for all GUAM states. While Georgia has reduced its
trade-relations with Russia, the latter is still the most important
trading partner for Ukraine and Moldova. Thirdly, all GUAM mem-
bers show intense trade relations with regions such as the EU-28
or the CIS, with the EU-28 having gained more relevance in the
last few years (cf. Muzaﬀarli 2008: 24f). The European Union is
succeeding the CIS as the most important import-region for GUAM
states. Fourthly, trade between GUAM members is considerably low
compared to their trade relations with other partners. Trade flow
calculations show that all states except Georgia73 trade less than 20%
of their total trade with GUAM partners. Fifthly, GUAM members
show similarities in their exported and imported goods. Except for
Azerbaijan, all of them export agricultural products and therefore
can be regarded as competitors. Furthermore, all of them have a
demand for high-tech products, which cannot be satisfied within their
grouping. Nevertheless, there also are goods within the grouping
with considerable demand like Azerbaijani hydrocarbons or Ukrainian
steel and coal products. It should be concluded that integration in
the current GUAM format is not supported by suﬃcient demand.
There is also good reason to believe that trade facilitation is a second
best instrument to spur economic growth for the four member states;
unilateral measures promise swifter growth eﬀects.
4.4 Conclusion
The chapter’s results have been twofold: Firstly, it has been demon-
strated that GUAM is conceptualised as a development strategy and,
secondly, the thesis that GUAM’s development strategy is bound to
fail has been substantiated.
73 Georgia can be regarded as the GUAM member with the greatest share in
GUAM trade.
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In reference to explanatory approaches from RS, GUAM has
been described as a state-led economic integration project, which is
employed by its participants as one instrument among other national
strategies to advance development—i. e., to increase their national
welfare levels.
Development in the wide sense has been delineated as the process
of raising the mutual welfare level (ch. 4.1.2). In the narrow sense
development has been equated with economic growth. Trade and
market liberalisation are still regarded as the standard procedure to
attain economic growth. GUAM’s economic integration has been
conceptualised as a development strategy that goes beyond tradi-
tional modernisation ambitions, also embracing disintegration (from
a union state/economy) and transformation (changing the economic
and political system) (ch. 4.2). This wider development strategy
distinguishes GUAM from economic integration projects of non-PSS.
Economic objectives have been a corner stone in all GUAM docu-
ments (cf. ch. 4.1.1); namely trade liberalisation and facilitating
transport have been emphasised and revealed in joint documents
such as the GUAM Charters (2001, 2006); particularly the GUAM
Free Trade Agreement (2002) reflects GUAM’s economic integration
dimension, strengthened by the GUAM Sectoral Cooperation Develop-
ment Strategy (2007) or the Decision on GUAM Sectoral Cooperation
(2008). Activities such as the Agreement on International Multimodal
Transportation of Goods (2007) or various proposals on transport
projects in the Caucasus further buttressed the economic integration.
Chapter 4.2 has also demonstrated trade expansion as GUAM’s stan-
dard procedure to attain economic growth, which is also assumed
to have positive eﬀects on foreign direct investment and energy supply.
The current state of GUAM has been scrutinised to substantiate
the second assumption which states that GUAM as a development
strategy is bound to fail, suggesting, on the one hand, that GUAM
participants are ill-prepared, and on the other hand, that their con-
figuration has been poorly planned. Mutual trust, state capacity and
demand have been determined as principal variables to support these
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arguments. Mutual trust is facilitated by similar values and beliefs
among integration partners. There are indeed common beliefs and
procedures among the four GUAM member states inherited from the
SU, which further mutual trust and, thus, facilitate regional integra-
tion. Yet, they apply for all PSS and have been gradually vanishing
since the collapse of the SU. Moreover, they are also assumed to entail
adverse eﬀects for integration, since Soviet practices are not entirely
conducive for regional integration. Hence, it can be assumed that
shared beliefs and practices from the Soviet past have had a conducive
eﬀect on mutual trust and, thus, on the emergence of GUAM, but
ambiguous eﬀects for proceeding forward with full GUAM integration.
More studies are needed to assess the precise quality of their eﬀect
on integration.
State capacity has been understood as the financial and institu-
tional abilities of states to implement, enforce and advance integration
policies (ch. 4.3.2). The four states exhibit weak institutional (eco-
nomic and political) and financial capacities to implement and enforce
integration policies, on the one hand, and to manage negative eﬀects
from integration, on the other. Each of the four GUAM members
should be regarded as unready for the chosen integration model. Em-
ploying the leadership as well as the cohesion concepts, it has been
demonstrated that individual deficits cumulate to a collective impedi-
ment. Without a leader who could provide incentives and push for
integration, the GUAM project cannot compensate for the lack of
individual state capacity. Moreover, the alleged positive impact of
cohesive structures on integration turns into a disadvantage for the
case of GUAM. In such a partnership of equally weak states and
developing economies deficits exacerbate, turning cohesion into an
impediment for economic integration. Thus, as a partnership of weak
states only, the composition of GUAM members can be regarded as
an ill-conceived one.
This chapter has also scrutinised the demand for integration in
regard to the foreign trade flows among GUAM members (ch. 4.3.3).
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In general, regional trade of goods within the GUAM zone remains rel-
atively low, despite expansion in the last few years. GUAM members
do not trade excessively. Their trade flows are primarily directed out-
side the GUAM area. Trade flows indicate that some GUAM members
are good trading partners. Intense bilateral trade relations continue,
for example between Ukraine–Moldova and Azerbaijan–Georgia, and
go along with strong trade flows beyond the GUAM area, e. g. to
Russia, Turkey or the EU-28. Exported and imported goods of the
four states correspond; to a large extent they are not traded within
the region. It can be concluded that demand for trade integration
is insuﬃcient, supporting the assumption that the composition of
GUAM participants aﬀects trade integration adversely. Moreover,
there is reason to believe that trade facilitation should not be the
number one priority in order to spur economic growth. Unilateral
measures to facilitate economic growth should be favoured, since most
constraints on economic growth are country specific.
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine initiated GUAM inte-
gration to address a wider development concept, which goes beyond
modernisation, embracing also disintegration and transformation. The
need for this wider concept stems from their common past as Soviet
republics. Yet, economic integration in the present GUAM framework
is bound to fail in its attempt to promote economic growth, since
their weak state capacities and insuﬃcient demand for trade integra-
tion makes them deficient partners. While suﬃcient demand can be
regarded as a necessary precondition to attain trade expansion at all,
state capacity determines to which extent trade facilitation can be
implemented successfully.
Although RS provide convincing arguments to explain GUAM as
a development strategy and expound on its deficits, RS could not
shed suﬃcient light on why exactly those four states initiated an
integration project when other partners might have been economically
more profitable, or why they chose such a comprehensive structure
amidst missing progress—to be sure, other theories are needed to
complement analysis; they shall be embarked upon in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
The Sovereignty Strategy
Having examined the economic dimension of GUAM in the previous
chapter, this part of the dissertation scrutinises the issue of sover-
eignty. Scholars do not agree on whether to understand GUAM as
an economic integration project or as a security-driven project. This
chapter argues that GUAM functions as a strategy to strengthen
the sovereignty of its participants and thereby, addresses the third
assumption of this dissertation: GUAM functions as a sovereignty
strategy. Thus, GUAM is less about security and more about sov-
ereignty. Sovereignty is employed as an independent variable which
explains the formation of the regional integration project GUAM.
The second part of this chapter turns to the fourth and last assump-
tion of this dissertation, arguing that the current GUAM format is
inadequate to serve the purpose of sovereignty. Again, sovereignty is
conceived of as an independent variable to explain the current state
of GUAM. The sovereignty variable is combined with power as an
additional explanatory variable contributing to the substantiation of
the fourth assumption.
The first section of this chapter (5.1) reveals the diﬃculties in
grasping the phenomenon of state sovereignty: Despite various con-
straints on sovereignty in our present world, sovereignty is still an
issue, particularly if contested. The second section (5.2) sheds light
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on the emergence of GUAM, showing why sovereignty is highly valued
among the four states and how GUAM is employed to address the
sovereignty issue, substantiating the third assumption of this disser-
tation. In a subsequent step, the third section (5.3) uses sovereignty
as a variable to explain the current state of GUAM, enlarging our
knowledge on the longevity of GUAM and the obstacles for its becom-
ing a successful regional integration project. All conclusion made in
this chapter are based on GUAM documents, GUAM activities and
historic events.
5.1 Conceptualising Sovereignty
Sovereignty is one of the core concepts in IR, specifying the ‘rules of
engagement’ between actors on the systemic level. It is, however, a
contested concept. Debate among IR theorists focuses particularly on
the question of whether the sovereign state is a vanishing phenomenon;
it is also about how sovereignty determines the international system,
whether it is a constitutive or just a regulative principle (cf. Little
2005: 770). Concepts of sovereignty are linked to major schools of IR
theory, leaving ‘little neutral ground’ (Falk 2001: 789).
The traditional, Westphalian, sovereignty concept centres around
‘a territorially bounded unit with an inside and outside’, leading to
two perspectives on sovereignty (Little 2005: 768; cf. Seidelmann
2011: 484). From a domestic perspective, sovereignty means there is
one central entity that can exercise authority within the boundaries
of a state (Biersteker 2002: 162; cf. also Krasner 1999: 4). It is
about the distribution of power within a state (James 1999: 36).
Territoriality claims the inviolability of distinct borders that circum-
scribe the zone of authority—territorial integrity (cf. Biersteker 2002:
157).1 Authority comprises decision-making competence, on the one
hand, and, executing competence of those decisions, on the other (cf.
Robertson 2002: 34). Authority is frequently described as legitimate
power (Hooghe et al. 2010a: 5), based on explicit, accepted rules,
1 For the origin of territoriality cf. Reinhard Meyers (1995).
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on legislation (Max Weber’s ‘Herrschaft kraft Legalität’), usually in
the form of a constitution (cf. Hooghe et al. 2010: 5; Robertson
2002: 34; Kegel & Amal 2008: 212f; McLean & McMillan 2009: 30).
Thus, territory and authority are central attributes of the Westphalian
sovereignty concept, defining sovereignty as the ‘unrestricted govern-
mental authority within territorial boundaries’ (Falk 2001: 790f; cf.
Biersteker 2002: 162).
From an external perspective, ‘sovereignty’ is commonly under-
stood as the absence of a higher authority above a state, the indepen-
dence from external powers. A sovereign state has to be accepted as
such by other sovereign states and be perceived as an equal member of
the ‘international society’ (Werner & de Wilde 2001: 307; Little 2005:
769). External sovereignty has been regarded as a prerequisite for
internal sovereignty. But this logic also works the other way around: If
a state is sovereign and unchallenged within its territory by other au-
thorities, it is independent from other sovereign entities (Werner & de
Wilde 2001: 299).2 Werner & de Wilde (2001: 290) have shown that
one can exist also without the other—domestic sovereignty without
external sovereignty—or vice versa. The nexus between the domestic
and external dimensions of sovereignty will be especially relevant for
the GUAM case.
Today’s concept of sovereignty refers primarily to the 19th and
20th centuries and includes attributes like self-determination (choosing
one’s developmental path and allegiances), equality of states in the
international system or the monopoly of legitimate force that have
been derived from the Westphalian concept (Little 2005: 773).3 The
Soviet definition of sovereignty from 1986 underscores particularly the
equality among all states and the right of each state to choose its own
future as well as its political system, maintaining also the right of
2 In times of transformation of territorial states into national states, the concept
of sovereignty was used to deter external claims, e. g. by the church or great
powers, on the one hand, and internal claims, e. g. by gentry or guilds, on the
other (Seidelmann 2011: 484).
3 External sovereignty is frequently substituted with ‘independence’ (cf. Gunst
1953: 57f.).
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non-interference from other states into domestic aﬀairs. The definition
reflects the circumstances of bipolarity and the clash of two diﬀerent
political-economic concepts. The attribute of ‘equality’ is highlighted
particularly by smaller states, regardless of their past (Wellershoﬀ
1999: 43). Realist scholars added the category of ‘interdependence [...]
which focuses on state control of transborder activities’ (Little 2005:
770). Interdependence has gained importance in the last decades in
the form of the attribute of economic sovereignty. Protection from
economic penetration is a typical means to secure sovereignty and, in
the cases of developing countries, to create sovereignty (Seidelmann
1998: 675). However, in times of global, highly liberalised economic
activities and interdependence, complete economic sovereignty is a
mere fiction (cf. Seidelmann 1998: 676) Nevertheless, economic
sovereignty—understood as the degree of dependence on another
actor—still plays a significant role for GUAM.
From a legal perspective, sovereignty is closely linked to the defi-
nition of a state, an entity that should have ‘a defined territory and
population under the control of its government, which has the capacity
to engage in relations with other states’ (Heller & Sofaer 2001: 26).
The legal vantage point highlights that being sovereign is not only a
right4, but entails also obligations5 that may restrict the sovereignty
of states (Heller & Sofaer 2001: 26f).
The divide between theory and practice has led to a critique of
the sovereignty concept, which assumes the sovereignty’s decreasing
relevance.6 The first constraint on state sovereignty has been de-
4 Such as the right to its territorial integrity, the right to use force in self-
defense, domestic juridical competence, eligibility to the UN and other IGOs.
A state becomes a legal person able to own and enter into contracts, diplomatic
immunity.
5 To respect the same attributes of other states and honour agreements between
states.
6 Constructivists like Thomas Biersteker point out that sovereignty is a dynamic
term, being constructed and deconstructed over time and space, ‘defined, and
redefined, by the rules, actions and practices of diﬀerent agents, including
in the case of states, by themselves’ (2002: 157). It is tremendously context
dependent.
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scribed above as the obligations a state accepts when it becomes
sovereign. On the one hand, states are never fully sovereign, because
they must exercise their powers ‘without infringing upon the rights
of other sovereign state[s]’ (Heller & Sofaer 2001: 30; cf. Seidelmann
2011: 484). On the other hand, states limit their sovereignty vol-
untarily by international law, adhering to international agreements
and conventions (Kegel & Amal 2008: 225f; Little 2005: 770; Heller
& Sofaer 2001: 30). This includes integration agreements such as
GUAM. Settling such agreements is a power only sovereign states
have. Nevertheless, states remain sovereign (Heller & Sofaer 2001:
32).
The second conflict between sovereignty in theory and practice
is of a structural nature. The growing economic interdependence in
the world economy—often associated with globalisation—has also
been mentioned above (cf. Fawcett 2005: 35; Little 2005: 768;
Seidelmann 1998: 676; Cunliﬀe 2007: 53); it is about the general
decline of national approaches amid growing interconnectedness as
well as denationalised challenges (Zürn 2005) and the increasing
relevance of global governance instead (cf. Seidelmann 2011: 489).
Yet, having a choice among instruments and partners to react to
such denationalised challenges is an expression of sovereignty. A
third constraint are violations of sovereignty by other actors of the
international system. On the one hand, sovereignty and its recognition
are not sacrosanct (Heller & Sofaer 2001: 28). Recognition criteria
for new states have changed across time and space and support the
assumption of a changing concept of sovereignty (Biersteker 2002:
163). Entities became states while lacking several attributes, whereas
others showing all attributes have been denied sovereignty/statehood.7
7 Robert Jackson (1993: 29) remarks on the contrast between the recognition and
the employment of sovereignty. Whereas negative sovereignty means freedom
from someone—a state being free without fearing interference by others within
certain geographic boundaries—positive sovereignty refers to the ability and
capacity to make and execute own decisions: freedom for something (Jackson
1993: 27ﬀ); a state is then able to use its independence. Only few states,
namely developed states, dispose of such positive sovereignty (Jackson 1993:
29). Jackson’s approach resembles the external (negative) - domestic (positive)
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There are few cases wherein real full sovereignty is obtained by an
entity (Krasner 1999: 220). Stephen Krasner claims that there are no
clear waterproof rules of the game, because rules have always been
adapted in various cases: ‘There has never been an ideal time during
which all, or even most, political entities conformed with all of the
characteristics that have been associated with sovereignty - territory,
control, recognition, and autonomy.’ (1999: 238).
On the other hand, there are violations of state sovereignty even
when states are legally recognised. Despite the emphasis on principles
like equality and non-interference, structures of power and dominance
characterise the international system and question the supremacy
of those principles (Seidelmann 2011: 487). Interventions in the
third world for the sake of democracy and humanitarian reasons—
‘cosmopolitanism’ (Little 2005: 769)—became common in the 20th
century (Krasner 1999: 224). Higher estimations of human rights led
to ‘a greater willingness to explicitly call into question the right of
states to non-intervention’ (Cunliﬀe 2007: 53). Cunliﬀe characterises
IR after 1990 as the ‘eclipse of the sovereign state’ (ib.). The principle
of justice did override the principle of sovereignty (ib.).8 Scholars
of realism object to the assumption of sovereignty losing relevance;
since Westphalia, there have always been violations of the sovereignty
principle, thus, it would be premature to claim the end of the sovereign
state (Little 2005: 770; Krasner 1999: passim 220-238).9 Interventions
have also been motivated by pure power rationale, as for example
during the cold war when the two superpowers had determined they
had any right to intervene in any zone of their interest (Little 2005:
771). Realist theorists observe that states remained sovereign only
when they were powerful enough or when their independence was
accepted as being relevant for the overall balance of power (Little
2005: 771). There seems to be a dividing line between ‘European
dimension.
8 This ended with 9/11 and was followed by ‘bringing the state back in’ (Cunliﬀe
2007: 53ﬀ), giving less reasons for interventions on humanitarian grounds.
9 Constructivists agree with realists that violations of sovereignty have been
common throughout history. But they reject realism’s conclusion that present
violations of sovereignty are exaggerated (Little 2005: 772).
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international society’ and an ‘extra-European order’ that operates on
diﬀerent principles (Little 2005: 774). According to Krasner
‘. . . the rulers of more powerful states have used their
resources to pressure or compel their weaker counterparts
to accept unwanted domestic institutional arrangements.
In some cases the targets have had no real choice; for the
would-be rulers of new states, the threat of non-recognition
has sometimes been the equivalent of ‘your money or your
life’.’ (1999: 224)
Stronger states also employ ‘economic sanctions to encourage the
rulers of target states to alter their domestic political practices’ (Kras-
ner 1999: 224). I will return to the power variable in ch. 5.2.1.
Those constraints on sovereignty make the idea of sovereignty as
a constitutive principle in international society diﬃcult to maintain.
From the resilience of the sovereignty concept in IR it could be de-
duced that sovereignty is indeed taken seriously. Nonetheless, parts of
sovereignty are ceded when it is deemed necessary, making it nothing
more than ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Krasner 1999: 220). Today, it is
widely accepted among scholars that full sovereignty is an illusion;
and constraints on sovereignty have even led several scholars to con-
clude that the sovereign state is in decline (cf. Little 2005: 769).
The ‘basket’ or ‘bundle’ approach can be understood as an attempt
to reconcile deliberate restrictions on a state’s sovereignty with the
continuing existence of sovereign statehood. This approach is partic-
ularly interesting for the nexus between sovereignty and integration
in this dissertation. In accordance with Max Weber, Krasner (1999:
220) conceives of sovereignty as a ‘bundle’ of characteristics such as
territory, recognition, autonomy and control. He refers to Fowler
& Bunck (1995) who first mentioned the term ‘bundle’ in relation
to sovereignty. Little (2005: 770) refers to the same argument as a
‘basket approach, with each state’s basket containing a distinctive set
of sovereign rights’; some of these rights may be transferred to an
international organisation, but the status would remain unchanged
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and could not be divided (ib.). Thus, as long as a state as such would
exist, it would have the possibility to take its own decisions (Werner
& de Wilde 2001: 299). As a consequence, a state’s attachment to an
integration project would be an expression of its sovereignty—it is
reversible. Sovereignty is then defined as a status of authority that
is linked successfully to a bundle of rights, powers and responsibility
(Werner & de Wilde 2001: 299). Werner & de Wilde (2001) assume
that Western states embrace such a modern understanding of sover-
eignty, whereas developing countries usually stick to the traditional
Westphalian concept. I will return to the specifics of GUAM states’
sovereignty in the next chapter.
Nevertheless, states keep existing as do claims to sovereignty.
While adherents of realism suggest that sovereignty would be less
an ‘institution’ of the international system and more a ‘cognitive
script’, telling how to behave in certain situations, constructivists
argue that such a view would reduce sovereignty to a regulative and
not a constitutive principle of the international system. Changes of
regulative rules change only the terms of the game, whereas changes
of constitutive principles would change the nature of the game (Little
2005: 771). Wouter Werner & Jaap de Wilde (2001: 285f), in contrast,
propose to understand sovereignty as a speech act and argue that
concepts like ‘sovereignty’ or ‘nation’ are more defined in the way they
are used and applied than in exact words; being context dependent,
it becomes an issue if it is contested by internal or external actors
(loc.cit.: 307). For Richard Falk (2001: 790f) the concept itself would
only be justified in cases where people still struggle for sovereignty.
In this dissertation, it is particularly relevant to grasp sovereignty
as a status of authority that is linked to a bundle of rights, powers and
obligations. While some components of the bundle can be transferred
to a regional or global institution in an integration project, states
remain sovereign. The absence of any higher authority for a specific
territory remains the core of the sovereignty concept, and is coupled
with several amendments such as self-determination and equality. Yet,
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in the contemporary world, there are various constraints on state
sovereignty that are a product of deliberate action of the sovereign
state, such as participation in the world economy or in international
agreements, but can also be the result of deliberate violations by other
actors of the international system, e. g. by states or international
institutions. It is of particular relevance to highlight that constraints
on state sovereignty—particularly violations by other actors, mark the
diﬀerence between legal sovereignty, on the one hand, and practiced
sovereignty, on the other. Legal sovereignty has been delineated above
as the international recognition of a sovereign state while practiced
sovereignty refers to the behaviour of other states and how they
employ legal sovereignty of others in their day-to-day actions. Even
though scholars still debate the relevancy of the sovereignty concept
for the international system, it undoubtedly remains that sovereignty
will always be an issue if contested.
5.2 Explaining the Emergence of GUAM
After discussing over the concept of sovereignty in the previous chap-
ter, this chapter aims at demonstrating the third major assumption of
this dissertation: GUAM functions as a a sovereignty strategy. Firstly,
previous assumptions linking sovereignty to integration and member-
ship in international organisations will be discussed (ch. 5.2.1), and
arguments are provided for why GUAM should not be mixed up
with a security motivated organisation. The following two chapters
present the two major arguments for the assumption of GUAM being
a sovereignty strategy: On the one hand, GUAM states are conceived
as young states which highly value their new independence and strive
for underscoring it by entering international organisations and form-
ing their own regional organisation. Similar to post-colonial states,
sovereignty is asserted primarily towards the former ruling power (ch.
5.2.2). On the other hand, the sovereignty of the four member states
is shown to be questioned by Russia (ch. 5.2.3). Russia’s refusal
to practice the legal sovereignty of the four states in its day-to-day
behaviours shall explain the formation of GUAM. This sub-chapter
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also oﬀers reasons why exactly those four PSS joined together to form
GUAM. Lastly, the two arguments for GUAM as a sovereignty strat-
egy are substantiated by presenting relevant references from GUAM
documents and historical examples (ch. 5.2.4).
5.2.1 From Sovereignty to Integration
This chapter gives an overview of existing assumptions that associate
sovereignty with participation in and creation of interstate institutions
in general and regional integration projects in particular. They form
a starting point for substantiating the dissertation’ claim that GUAM
functions as a sovereignty strategy. The first part of this chapter
reiterates three assumptions on sovereignty from previous research.
The second part diﬀerentiates between sovereignty and security, pre-
senting reasons why GUAM should not be deemed a security-driven
organisation.
Let us look first at previous assumptions on sovereignty. The focus
will be on young states (a), post-colonial states (b) and power (c).10
In contrast to ch. 4, where IPE concepts dominated, explanations in
this section borrow primarily from IR theory with European integra-
tion studies as its sub-discipline.11 In general, developing states use
participation in international politics and decision-making processes
and a preference for consensus ruling to express their independence
and equality as sovereign states in the international system (Acharya
& Johnston 2007c: 253). Only sovereign states can enter into interna-
10 There are also other explanatory approaches to explain regional integration,
such as identity construction: Recognizing oneself as being diﬀerent—being
not Russian or Soviet—may have been a reason to form GUAM (cf. Fischer
2008: 119). Due to the limited scope of this dissertation, this explanatory
approach cannot be considered in detail.
11 IR-theories should not be treated as mutually exclusive, since none of them
provides an adequate understanding of why sovereign states seek to participate
in regional integration to strengthen their sovereignty. It is neither a new
phenomenon, nor a contradiction that states estimate ‘soft’ issues from a liberal
institutionalism stance, while simultaneously applying a realism perspective
on ‘hard’ issues like security or sovereignty.
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tional engagements; creation of international organisations is a typical
means to secure sovereignty—and in the case of developing countries—
for creating sovereignty (Seidelmann 1998: 675). Most developing
states were newly formed states with young statehood when they
started integration projects (a). Young states are believed to employ
international agreements as a legitimising act to assert statehood
(Jupille & Joliﬀ 2010). They usually enter into a nation building
process after gaining independence. Young states are believed to esti-
mate sovereignty higher than established states. It can be noted that
especially young sovereign states—e.g. developing countries—have a
great problem giving up parts of their freshly gained sovereignty in
favour of a regional institution (Kühnhardt 2008: 272; Zimmerling
1991: 50). Hence, a project like the EU, which has accumulated
considerable sovereignty, cannot be emulated easily; Asian scholars
and policymakers stress that the European integration model would
not be appropriate for their region, as sovereignty is something quite
new there (Acharya & Johnston 2007c: 245). It is a paradox that
international agreements or membership in international organisations
are seen as curtailing a state’s sovereignty (cf. ch. 5.1), while young
states are believed to employ such agreements and memberships to
enhance their sovereignty (cf. Seidelmann 1998). Although conclu-
sions on the nexus between sovereignty and integration refer primarily
to African or Asian projects, it can be suggested that they are also
applicable for regional projects among PSS. Lacking experience with
modern statehood and new sovereignty has been suggested to thwart
regional integration among PSS (Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 7;
Aslund et al. 1999: 223f).
The second assumption on sovereignty has been derived from anal-
ysis of de-colonisation processes (b). An analysis of various free trade
agreements concludes that states which have been colonies under the
same coloniser are more likely to form joint trade agreements (Perju
2009: 1). Studies on former colonial states concluded that they usu-
ally combine international recognition with endeavours to strengthen
independence from their former colonial power (cf. Seidelmann 1998:
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675). Robert Jackson argues that the attribute of self-determination
has been particularly relevant for ex-colonial states (cf. Jackson 1993:
190). Self-determination can be assumed to be a pertinent issue for
all newly formed states that have disintegrated away from a diﬀerent
country or empire and claim their right to develop independently
from the former power centre as in the case of the dissolution of
the SU. Scholars like Ludger Kühnhardt (2008: 262) see regional
integration as ‘a defensive response to the process of de-colonization’.
States, dominated by post-colonial ideologies, strictly adhere to the
principle of non-intervention by third parties and are very suspicious
about such attempts. They are eager ‘to safeguard their new-found
independence and sovereignty’ (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 18).
Gulbaat Rtskhiladze (2007: 95) reveals that it is typical for former
colonies to seek ‘maximum distancing from the former metropolitan
country (Russia in our case) in all (particularly military and political)
spheres’ as a way to manifest the state’s sovereignty. Post-colonial
states tend to formulate a ‘more rigid and defensive attitude towards
sovereignty’ in the charters of their newly formed international organ-
isations, than does for example the UN. They emphasise categories
like equality of member states, non-intervention and respect for ter-
ritorial integrity (Clapham 1999: 101). Post-colonial states tend to
use sovereignty not only as formal recognition of their independent
statehood, but also as an instrument to assert ‘unfettered control over
their internal aﬀairs, and notably over their own domestic population’
(Clapham 1999: 103).
The third assumption on sovereignty centres on interdependence
and power as core categories of realist thought (cf. Grieco 1988:
488): As the key concept in realism, power has also been the central
concept to explain regionalism from a political science perspective
(cf. Börzel 2012b: 259); and has been often contested as many other
core principles in IR have. Power shall be understood for this work’s
purposes as a characteristic of social interaction defined by Max
Weber with the ability to force one’s will even against resistance
within the framework of social relations (Weber 1922: 28). This
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principle works also the other way around, describing the ability to
resist attempts of others to force their will on one. In the tradition
of liberal institutionalism, power shall be understood as a relative
value that is compared in relation to others (Viotti & Kauppi 1993:
44). Since power is primarily applied by threatening with economic
retaliation in case of defecting behaviour and military strength as the
‘ultima ratio’ that buttresses economic power, economic strength and
military strength are regarded as core indicators of power (Pfetsch
1989; Viotti & Kauppi 1993: 45). Power shall not be reduced to
a static concept. It is dynamic in the sense that a power is also
determined by the willingness of an actor to use it over other actors.
That means, a state’s power can by observed by its behaviour in the
international system (Viotti & Kauppi 1993: 44).
Traditional hegemonic explanations that conceive of regional inte-
gration as a project initiated by a hegemon who wishes to increase its
power status or rule without coercion, fail to explain the emergence
of GUAM. However, reversing the hegemonic stability approach, a
regional integration project is conceptualised as a reaction of smaller
states to balance a regional power (cf. Börzel 2012b: 259; Tsantoulis
2009: 247). Dependence on the former colonial power or another
hegemon in the respective region shall be reduced, while the power
of the newly formed states shall be increased, e. g. by forming a
regional organisation (cf. Tsantoulis 2009: 248).12 Thus, the role of
an initiator is shifted from the hegemon towards smaller states in the
region which aim at containing the regional hegemon in a non-violent,
cost-eﬀective and legitimate manner (Pedersen 2002: 688).13 This
can be understood as an approach to reduce the risk of sovereignty
violations by the regional hegemon. In addition, the power status of
12 Reducing dependence also includes economic dependence which might turn
into a challenge to a state’s sovereignty (Seidelmann 1998: 675). But, of course,
asymmetric interdependence is neither a required nor substantive condition
for an integration decision (Zimmerling 1991: 222).
13 Depending on the issues and circumstances, initiatives for region building
may come from various actors and be substantiated with diﬀering arguments.
Keohane (1984) claims that with eﬀective institutions in place, international
cooperation is also possible after hegemony.
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regionally integrated states would also change on a global scale: An
integration project, especially on an advanced stage, produces its own
structures and organs which allow the participating states to speak
with one voice and serve as an advocate for the region on the global
level (power sharing) (Flemens 2007: 16). A region itself is assumed
to gain more influence and negotiation power on the global level
(Glania & Matthes 2005: 14), thus, reducing again the likelihood of
sovereignty violations to its individual members. As such, establishing
a regional integration project could be understood to assure the newly
gained sovereignty status of each member state with the instrument
of power accumulation. Yet, since the four GUAM members would
not be able to accumulate suﬃcient power to challenge their former
metropolitan Russia, the validity of the reversed hegemonic approach
is in doubt. The next chapters will centre on the sovereignty variable.
In the second part of this chapter a line shall be drawn between
sovereignty and security. Although some scholars characterise GUAM
as a security-driven organisation (cf. Schmidt 2003: 379; Tolstov 2008:
38), it would be more precise to categorise GUAM as an integration
project that aims at strengthening the sovereignty of its members.
Security is a contested concept (cf. Art 2001: 757; Kolodziej 2011:
590), but can be understood simply as the absence of a threat ‘to
acquired values and the fear that those values will be attacked’ (Mawd-
sley 2007: 856). Morgenthau’s basic definition of security refers to
the maintenance of external sovereignty with features like indepen-
dence and autonomy of the state in the international system (cf. also
Torkunov 2000: 53). Today, scholars use a broader concept of security
that transcends the narrow military perspective; the variety of risks
have increased in number and type (Wellershoﬀ 1999: 22), and they
are not limited to national borders, but ‘are multiple, diﬀuse, and
unpredictable’ (Mawdsley 2007: 856; Wellershoﬀ 1999: 21). Security
today is applied commonly as a multidimensional concept (Aydin &
Ifantis 2006: 7; cf. Munteanu 2005: 15), including economic, cultural,
ecological and demographic challenges. As a consequence, security
today is much harder to achieve and is influenced by local and global
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forces (Aydin & Ifantis 2006: 7). Constructivists claim that any issue
can be securitised (Buzan 1991). There is a considerable degree of
subjectivity in the term ‘security’; it is about how someone ‘feels’,
about ‘perceptions’ of the environment and not how it actually is
(Art 2001: 757). Perceptions are objects of change and vary in degree
(Mawdsley 2007).
GUAM was conceptualised as a regional integration project in
chapter 2.1.1. Employing a narrow security concept that is based on
the protection of the state from external military attacks, GUAM
is clearly not a security-driven project in the form of an alliance.14
There is no agreement between the four GUAM members that defines
what an ‘aggression’ is or who should be considered an ‘aggressor’,
nor is there an agreement that calls for action against a potential
aggression. This has been underscored in practice with the passivity of
other GUAM members about the brief Georgian-Russian war in 2008.
Nevertheless, GUAM defines a status quo, declaring the maintenance
of each other’s territorial integrity as one of the highest principles.
GUAM is employed to raise international support and assistance
against Russia’s policies in a non-military manner (cf. Weitz 2008:
2).15
GUAM’s demand ‘to stand jointly against common risks and
threats to peace, security and stability’ (Baku Declaration, 2007) is
rather a moral assurance to its members, standing united against com-
mon threats. A wider security concept would also include challenges
to the sovereignty of a state that are of a non-military nature. Still,
14 Realists understand alliances between states primarily as a ‘cooperative security
relationship’ (Walt 2001: 23) for the purpose of protecting them from mainly
military attacks against their sovereignty. Such forms of cooperation would be
temporary until the threat ceases. Alliances aim at military cooperation (Leeds
2005: 9; Schmidt 2000: 135) and diﬀer in their level of institutionalisation
(Leeds 2005: 9).
15 The proposal of a peacekeeping unit has been frequently employed to depict
GUAM as a military organisation, but this idea had to be buried since no
consensus could be found. For more details see ch. 3.4.2.
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GUAM could be called a security organisation only under a lots of
provisos. GUAM is not part of a collective defense system like NATO,
since it is neither based on a defense agreement nor entertains a joint
military programme against external military threats (cf. ch. 3.4.2
for security-related cooperation). The four GUAM members would
be unable to mount a suﬃcient military response to a military attack
from their greatest threat, Russia. Instead, GUAM perceives NATO
itself as a security provider and each GUAM member seeks member-
ship within it (Strasbourg Declaration, 1997; Batumi Declaration,
2008). Moreover, GUAM is not a part of a collective security system
like the UN or the OSCE, both aimed at guaranteeing peace among
their member states by determining the rules for the use of violence
between them and oﬀering chances for peaceful conflict resolution.
Even though GUAM members refer to the UN Charter, the Paris
Charter and other international agreements regulating peaceful rela-
tions, the four states do not regard each other as potential threats to
each other’s security which should be managed by a joint institution
like GUAM. Neither has GUAM been used as an active forum for
solving domestic conflicts of its member states—quite the opposite,
GUAM is biased, insisting on non-interference in domestic conflicts
and on the indivisibility of their territory (cf. ch. 3.4.2 for conflict
related policy approaches).
GUAM should not be confused with a security complex in Barry
Buzan’s sense (1991: 190). The security of the four participants de-
pends less on each other than on actors outside the GUAM framework,
e. g. Russia, or within each member state.16 Bertil Nygren (2008: 9)
sees the sum of all PSS as forming one security complex, with a Eu-
ropean, Caucasian and Central Asian sub-complex. Yet, asymmetric
security dependence on outsiders does not turn the regional project
into a security complex in Buzan’s sense.
16 A security complex could be delineated in the Caucasus between Armenia,
Georgia and Azerbaijan (Freitag-Wirminghaus 2008: 54; Eyvazov 2008: 107;
Manoli 2011: 104). Also, Moldova can be assumed to form a security complex
with Ukraine and possibly with Russia or Romania.
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All three assumptions will be scrutinised for the GUAM case in the
subsequent chapters (5.2.2 -5.3.4). One has to bear in mind that it is
about the situations in which sovereignty is claimed and to whom this
claim is addressed and to which normative bases the justifications are
related (Werner & de Wilde 2001). Despite debate over the relevance
of the sovereignty concept for the international system, sovereignty is
always an issue, even if contested (ib.).
5.2.2 Young Statehood and Post-Colonialism
In reference to existing assumptions presented in the previous chapter,
this chapter argues that, on the one hand, the four GUAM states
are young states with limited experience in independent statehood
and, on the other hand, that the four GUAM states can be compared
to post-colonial states. Therefore, the following assumptions can be
employed for the GUAM case: First of all, sovereignty is of particular
importance for young states, secondly that young states are prone to
underscore their sovereignty with membership in IGOs and forming
their own interstate institutions, and thirdly that post-colonial states
underscore their sovereignty particularly in relation to their former
power centre.
In a first step, let us look at the young statehood of the four
GUAM countries. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have
evolved into new states from the collapse of the SU in 1991. Azerbai-
jan, Moldova and Ukraine used the Moscow coup in August 1991 as an
opportunity to declare their full independence from the SU. Georgia
had already gained its independence in April the same year. The four
states have been recognised by all relevant actors in the international
system. Equally important was the recognition by Russia as the legal
successor of the SU, underscoring their independent statehood outside
the territory and authority of the former power centre. The four
states had never been independent within their present borders before.
GUAM’s first joint document, the Strasbourg Communiqué (1997),
emerged after only six years of independence, when the disintegration
process of the SU had not even been completed yet. Until today, sev-
192 CHAPTER 5. THE SOVEREIGNTY STRATEGY
eral issues are still debated, for example, the demarcation of borders,
Russian military bases or the division of Soviet debts and assets.
As typical for young states, the four GUAM states experienced
diﬃculties of consolidating their domestic sovereignties in the first
years of independence. States that suﬀer from contested domestic
sovereignty are believed to compensate for the lack of domestic sover-
eignty by overemphasising external sovereignty. Disintegrating from
the SU and transformation of the governance system demanded a
consolidation of domestic sovereignty. The new independent states
were characterised by low state capacities and suﬀered from ‘power
struggles between the old elite and national-democratic or nationalist
challenges’ (Zürcher 2005: 85). The executive and legislative branches
were fighting over power and the development path (liberal reformism
vs. conservatism/communism). There have also been debates on
identity, since most PSS are a composition of various nationalities
within their borders (Gitelman 1994; Barner-Barry & Hody 1995).
All four states had diﬃculties establishing a functioning and
accepted relationship between governing institutions. The Ukrainian
parliament debated several years before they were able to agree on
a new constitution in 1996. In Azerbaijan, a new constitution was
put into action in 1995 after years of turbulence and coups. Georgia,
the first of the four countries to depart from the SU, adopted its
post-Soviet constitution in 1995 while Moldova had already agreed
on a new constitution in 1994.
Rivaling groups debated—sometimes with the use of force—about
the future governance model and the distribution of power. In Azer-
baijan, the last communist representative, Ayas Mutalibov, had to
leave oﬃce in 1992 because of pressure from the opposition. The
subsequently elected president Abulfaz Elcibey was putsched away
in 1993 (Barner-Barry & Hody 1995: 240f). Finally, his successor
Haidar Aliev could resist various attempts to oust him from power
and consolidate his position, which he later transferred to his son
Ilham Aliev (Nuriyev 2005: 1). Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s first prime
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minister and president from 1994-2004, was involved in a fierce power
struggle with the newly elected Ukrainian parliament. Moldova’s
young statehood was troubled less by spats between political rivals
than by local minorities. Fear of ‘Romanisation’ has been the driving
moment of Transnistrian and Gagausian separatism (Müller 2012: 23).
Both minorities received the right to autonomy in the new constitution
and, in its new constitution, Moldova clearly determines its indepen-
dence not only from the SU, but also from Romania (Barner-Barry &
Hody 1995: 248ﬀ). The Gagausian question was settled peacefully
in negotiations in 1994-96, amid lessons learned from loosing power
in Transnistria (Müller 2012: 24). Georgia suﬀered the most from
unconsolidated statehood. In 1991, Sviad Gamzakhurdia was elected
president of an independent Georgia (Barner-Barry & Hody 1995:
215). However, his presidency was criticised fiercely and already one
year later he was brought down after weeks of violence (loc.cit.: 241f;
Fuller 1995b: 306f). Clientelism and patronage networks ‘were among
the most eﬀective informal institutions during the Soviet period, and
they retained their function after the collapse of the SU’ (Zürcher 2005:
101). The new Georgian parliament lacked the backing of influential
networks and, thus, was destined to fail, whereas the new president
Gamsakhurdia did not succeed in managing the various networks
(Zürcher 2005: 102). As a consequence, Gamskhurdia resorted to
nationalism to maintain his position, with disastrous consequences
for the Georgian state (Zürcher 2005: 102). The subsequent president
Eduard Shevardnadze had to fight the military supporters of Gamza-
khurdia who had retreated to Western Georgia. Violent struggles
between rival political groups for power in the capital have been cou-
pled with the ethno-political conflict over South Ossetia and the war
over the breakaway of Abkhazia (Zürcher 2005: 85).17 Shevardnadze
later succeeded in forming a coalition embracing all relevant politi-
17 Without a new national army, war and violence came from paramilitary
organisations such as part-time volunteer fighters, the newly founded national
guard and the ‘Mkhedrioni’ (the knights). Whereas the national guard was
rather indirectly financed by private sponsors, the latter was a union of criminal
groups who pursued their business interests with private armies (Zürcher 2005:
104ﬀ).
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cal groups and gaining financial assistance from the West, fortifying
Georgian statehood piece by piece (Zürcher 2005: 103).
Young states are supposed to legitimise their new sovereignty with
membership in IGOs and/or form their own interstate institutions.
This supposition should be observed for the GUAM case. The four
GUAM states are not only members of post-Soviet organisations, but
also of the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the IMF, to name
just a few. Agreeing to such paramount international documents as
the UN Charter or the Paris Charter asserts the arrival of the four
new states into the international community of independent states.
Moreover, referring back to ch. 3.3.1 on the Structure of GUAM, the
sophisticated design of GUAM mimics established international gov-
ernmental organisations such as the UN or EU, reflecting their claim
to equality with established states in the international system.18 It
contains not only a council of head of governments but also of foreign
ministers, meetings between ministers of respective departments, a
parliamentary assembly, an economic council, a business council, etc.
The institutional arrangement of GUAM emanates from the principle
function following form: building institutions first, and giving them
work later. Forming their own interstate institutions such as GUAM,
can be understood as an even more vivid expression of their new
statehood.
Let us now consider the parallel post-colonialism. Independence
has been assumed to be crucial particularly for former colonies (cf.
Jackson 1993: 190). As Robert Jackson (1993: 198) remarked, former
colonies frequently expected independence to be the way to prosperity,
to welfare, because most independent states were well oﬀ. The SU is
frequently presented by scholars as colonial state with the Russian
Socialist Republic (Moscow) as its centre. Hence, the dissolution of
the SU is described as the break up of a colonial empire (Mcfaul
2002: 215; cf. Bielawski & Halbach 2004: 2), and GUAM states can
18 Whereas Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova became members of the UN in
1992, Ukraine has been a member since 1945.
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then be regarded as former colonies.19 Post-colonial states strive to
underscore their new independence particularly towards their former
power centre. Considering disintegration in post-Soviet space rather
as a de-colonisation process (McFaul 2002: 215), GUAM states could
be understood as striving for emancipation from their former colonial
power Russia. ‘All republics in Russia’s Near Abroad understand
independence as, first and foremost, independence from Russia’ (Cop-
pieters 1998: 200; cf. Spillman et al. 1999: 327). For new states
like the four GUAM members, independence had to be ceded from
Russia, statehood assured by Russia. Derivatives of sovereignty like
non-intervention, self-determination and equality among states are
of particular relevance. Pourchot (2008: 100) highlights that gaining
independence from Russia and strengthening sovereignty was for PSS
more important than, for example, the democratisation process. Their
eagerness to demonstrate their sovereignty specifically from Russia is
pronounced by the geographic closeness to the former power centre.
Territoriality is of priority importance to states that disintegrate from
a former union state as in the case of GUAM participants. Thus, it
can be assumed that the four states emphasise traditional attributes
of sovereignty such as territorial integrity and the the absence of a
higher authority above the state.
Although GUAM members, as other PSS, would benefit from
good relations with Russia, they understand independence as an
end in itself, meaning first and foremost independence from Russia
19 Whereas Aslund et al. (1999: 223) conceive of only some ‘attributes of a
traditional empire’ in the SU, Trenin employs a wider definition of Soviet
Empire, including also communist satellites like the GDR (Trenin 2011: 2).
The SU is frequently described as a ‘multi-ethnic empire unified by powerful
political, economic and cultural institutions subjugated to and centered on
Moscow’ (Scott 2007: 2), but diﬀers from the Russian Empire by its multiethnic
elite (ib.). Mikhail Molchanov (2002: 32) rejects the idea of understanding the
SU just as another form of Russian dominance over other nationalities. For
definitions of the term empire cf. O’Neill 2010: 417. In world politics, empire
is predominantly applied to the United States, see Sandschneider, Eberhard
(ed.) (2007): Empire. Baden-Baden; Laxter, James (2001): Empire. Toronto;
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio (2000): Empire. Cambridge (USA).
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(Pourchot 2008: 79; Spillman et al. 1999: 327; Alieva 2011: 197;
Rzchiladse 2007: 78). At this point, the realist perspective comes
in: Dependence on Russia shall be decreased and GUAM states can
be assumed to understand the illusion of complete independence.
They are prepared to change their dependency on Russia into a
dependency on someone else. One example is Ukraine’s resistance
to sell its pipeline network to Russia, while supporting the creation
of a consortium with Russia and Germany as major shareholders
who would invest the necessary money for renovation of the pipeline
system (Hawrylyshyn 2005: 124). Another example is Ukraine’s
vacillation between European integration (in the form of an association
agreement) and Russian integration (in the form of the Eurasian
Customs Union); being generally interested in economic integration,
it is a question of who would be the more agreeable partner.20 Georgia
accepts its dependence on Azerbaijan and Turkey, but is eager to
reduce dependence on Russia as much as possible. Further examples
will follow in the course of analysis.
GUAM members maintain an ambivalent relationship with Russia;
they waver between the desire to distance themselves, on the one hand,
and the acknowledgement of cultural closeness and shared dependen-
cies, on the other, resulting in a diﬃcult and equivocal relationship.21
At GUAM’s Kyiv meeting (2006) where the new charter had been
signed turning the grouping into a regional organisation, the heads of
state could not decide on a joint approach towards Russia; some were
highlighting the friendship with Russia, some were pointing at the
diﬃculties (Ivshenko 2006: 2).22
20 Ukrainian vacillation between both integration directions is to a large part a
question of the highest price.
21 Gerhard Mangott (2007: 262f) perceives disassociation from Russia to be
detrimental for post-Soviet states (cf. also Libman 2007: 413). It should
be less about separating the identity from ‘the other’, than about ‘inclusive
identity-building’ (ib.).
22 For Alieva (2011: 204) this inability to develop a common approach towards
Russia is one reason for the failure of GUAM itself.
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To sum up, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine can be
treated as young states lacking experience in independent statehood
and suﬀering from unconsolidated domestic sovereignty. They can
also be compared to post-colonial states that strive for distancing
themselves from their former power centre Russia. Hence, it can
be assumed that the four states value their sovereignty more than
other states and very likely use the formation of interstate institutions
to legitimise their sovereignty. Moreover, sovereignty attributes of
territorial integrity and the absence of any other authority above the
state are of particular relevance, but also their derivates, the principle
of non-interference and self-determination. They particularly reject
their status as pawns on the grand chessboard of either Russian or
American foreign policy and claim their right to follow their own
developmental path. At the same time, they are aware of restrictions
to their new sovereignty by international agreements and participation
in the world economy.
5.2.3 Russia as a Challenge to Sovereignty
After having argued that GUAM states are young states and can be
compared to post-colonial states which strive for emphasising their
newly gained sovereignty, the argument advanced below centres on the
assumption that Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine perceive
Russia as a considerable challenge to their sovereignty. The argument
refers to the assertion, mentioned in chapter 5.1, that sovereignty is
usually an issue even if a contested one. This chapter expounds on
why GUAM states perceived Russia as a challenge to their sovereignty
in order to substantiate the assumption which says that GUAM func-
tions as a sovereignty strategy; it also sheds light on the question of
why exactly those four states joined together to form GUAM.
The argument presented below is twofold: Firstly, the fact that
Russia only reluctantly let the four GUAM states disintegrate from
the SU, and secondly, that Russia did not fully practice the granted
sovereignty in its relationships to the four states. A sovereign state
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must be accepted and used by others as such in order to constitute
itself as an institutional fact (Werner & de Wilde 2001: 307).
As was shown in ch. 4, all four states are aware of constraints
on their sovereignty by international agreements or international
economic flows. International agreements are seen rather as a legit-
imisation of their sovereignty, whereas the exposure to international
economic flows aﬀects them less than Western states whose longer
histories as sovereign states and market economies has made them
more economically and legally integrated into the international polit-
ical and economic system.23 GUAM states see their sovereignty as
being more threatened by Russia than by globalisation, a possible
EU-integration or other binding international agreements (Papava
2008b: 50). Even domestic conflicts within GUAM states are per-
ceived less as an issue with their authority and responsibility than
as instruments of Russia to challenge their sovereignty. Neither are
weak domestic institutions or cronyism regarded as an equally serious
challenge to their sovereignty; it is about perceptions. Perceptions
do not have to follow facts or logic and perceptions are always open
for debate. Nevertheless, Russian challenges to the sovereignty of the
four states can be supported by a variety of data.
Let us begin with the first point of Russia’s reluctance. Although
Russia as the successor of the SU has accepted the legal status of
sovereignty of the four countries, it did so only reluctantly and chal-
lenged their sovereignty by its practices throughout the 1990s. Thus,
in addition to the legal recognition of their sovereignty, the four states
seek practiced sovereignty. The experience of Russia granting inde-
pendence only reluctantly to the new independent states sustained
their distrust towards Moscow (cf. Molchanov & Molchanova 2010:
5; cf. Haran 2011: 1). The secession of several Socialist Republics
from the SU was understood by the political Russian elite as being
treason and not a right (Trenin 2011: 26). Particularly the Ukrainian
23 For Mikhail Molchanov (2009a: 344) this combination of ‘Westphalian’ sov-
ereignty perception and the understanding of increasing economic and social
interconnectedness constitutes a new type of IR in Eurasia.
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political elite led by Leonid Kravchuk received a great part of the
blame for the collapse of the SU (Klimin 2009: 96). Putin’s famous
exclamation that the dissolution of the SU was the biggest tragedy
of the last century (Scherrer 2008: 15; Trenin 2011: 27), underlines
Russia’s continuing hesitation to accept the new situation, to treat
PSS as independent countries, as equals in world politics.24 Russia
has not fully accepted the sovereignty of PSS (Pourchot 2008: 117)
and owing to Russia’s reluctance, GUAM members perceive their
sovereignty to still be in jeopardy.
One example for Russia’s reluctance to let the four states go forth
independently, was the coercion into CIS as the succeeding institution
of the SU. The inception of the CIS in December 1991 by the three
states Russia, Belarus and Ukraine can be regarded as the end of the
SU (Barner-Barry & Hody 1995: 269). However, Ukraine perceived
the CIS rather as a mechanism to coordinate the dissolution of the
USSR, while Russia perceived it as a successor institution (Halbach
1995: 3; Trenin 1998: 10; Aslund et al. 1999: 2). So it was that
Ukraine had to learn that crucial issues of disintegration are a bilateral
issue with Russia, making the CIS a mechanism of civilised divorce
obsolete. An ‘Agreement on friendship, cooperation and partnership’
between Russia and Ukraine could only be signed in 1997, and was
sidelined by a package of further agreements, e. g. on the division
of the Black Sea Fleet (Spillman et al. 1999: 327f) and settling the
crucial question of the Crimean peninsula (belonging to Ukraine only
since 1954) (cf. Pourchot 2008: 93; Felgenhauer 1999: 4).25 Yet,
many agreements remain unimplemented (Spillman et al. 1999: 329).
Only in 2003 did Putin and Kutchma sign a border limitation treaty,
24 It has to be noted that Putin did not dream of reviving the SU (Trenin 2011:
27).
25 For more about the circumstances of passing the Crimea to the Ukrainian
Socialist Republic cf. ‘Wie die Krim zur Ukraine kam: Historische Symbolik
und Wirtschaft.’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.03.2014, p.2. There have
been administrative justifications for assigning the Crimea to the Ukrainian
Socialist Republic, even though the judicial proceeding contradicted the Soviet
Constitution. For the new situation with the Crimea see ch. 5.3.2.1
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and the question of the demarcation of borders remained unsolved for
several sections, e. g. the Kerch Strait in the Sea of Azovsk (Nygren
2008: 56).26 Ukraine never signed the CIS-Charter (Kurtov 2008: 264;
Kuzio 2000: 84), neither did Moldova (Eyvazov 2008: 278; Aslund
et al. 1999: 9). The Agreement on the Creation of CIS received the
Ukrainian signature only after many ‘provisos and qualifications that
substantially changed its essence’ (Kurtov 2008: 264). Kuzio (2000:
84) asserts—from a theoretical point of view—that Ukraine is not a
member of the CIS.
It was Russian pressure that coerced states like Georgia to enter
the CIS and the CSTO (Nygren 2008: 120). Russia also used minority
conflicts to destabilise Socialist republics that were on the brink
of independence, making the consolidation of a new independent
statehood rather diﬃcult for the four states. Georgia first resisted
and later bargained for CIS membership. During 1992/1993 a civil war
erupted in Georgia and the country fell into a state of chaos (Barner-
Barry & Hody 1995: 241). Even the newly elected president Eduard
Shevardnadze could not restore peace, since he lacked the sources of
enforcement. Russia supported the separatist movement in Abkhazia
militarily until it traded its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity
for Georgia’s CIS membership (Rtskhiladze 2007: 94; Halbach 1995:
3).
In Azerbaijan, the Russian role is more opaque. In 1991, fighting
between Soviet troops, Azerbaijani and Armenian forces took place in
Nagorno Karabach (Sabanadze 2002: 8). It is diﬃcult to confirm the
diverging accounts on the forces that led to the emergence of warfare
between 1991-94, but Russia is said to have manipulated ethnic strife
(Raptis 1998: 6). Clearly, in the first months of Azerbaijan’s and
Armenia’s independence, the remainder of the Soviet army was the
only professional military force in the region. Azerbaijan joined the
CIS in 1993 as well (Halbach 1995: 3) and reached the withdrawal of
Russian troops in the same year (Human Rights Watch 1994: 176).
26 With the annexation of the Crimea to Russia on 18th March 2014, the question
of the Kerch Strait became obsolete because it is now surrounded by only
Russian territory.
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Already in 1990, Moldova declared that the republic’s laws stand
above the law of the union, including the right to start diplomatic
relations with other states (Casu 2012: 115f). Moldova from the
beginning was not interested in negotiating and signing a new union
treaty between the members of the SU, thus, giving to understand
that it had no interest in remaining a member of the SU (Casu 2012:
117). Moldova pledged for ‘the same considerations as that of the
three Baltic republics, on the grounds that all four have been annexed
at the same time by the USSR under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of
1939’ (Socor 1995a: 185). As other PSS, Moldova opposed Moscow’s
demand for a referendum on preserving the USSR (Socor 1995a: 196f);
Soviet military intervention was used to push for the referendum, but
failed to intimidate the electorate (ib.). After Moldova’s declaration of
independence on the 27th of August 1991, minorities in Gagausia and
Transnistria feared romanisation and even an integration of Moldova
into Romania (Müller 2012: 23), despite Romania’s acceptance of
Moldova’s independence the same day (Casu 2012: 117f). The 14th
Soviet army, stationed in Transnistria, supported the Transnistrian
secession movement by training and supplying the newly created
Transnistrian forces that overthrew authorities of the Moldovan gov-
ernment in the region (ICG 2003: 3). Yet, it remains unclear to what
extent Moscow fully controlled the 14th Army’s Tiraspol headquarters
and whether the latter ‘eﬀectively controlled all its sub-units’ (ICG
2003: 4). Russia waited until December the same year to accept
Moldova’s independence in exchange for Moldova’s entrance into the
CIS (Casu 2012: 117f).
Having elaborated on the reluctance of Russia to accept the in-
dependence of the four GUAM states, let us now turn to the second
argument that Russia did not practice the legally granted sover-
eignty in relation to the four new independent states. The disregard
of sovereignty is exemplified in three attributes of sovereignty: (a)
self-determination and non-interference as components of undivided
authority, (b) equality and (c) territorial integrity.
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Self-determination and non-interference (a) are derivatives of the
core principle of no other authority being above the state. On the
international level, self-determination implies for the young GUAM
states the freedom to decide on their allegiances, sign agreements
with any state and participate in any integration project they choose.
On the domestic level, self-determination is coupled with undivided
authority within state borders, allowing the four states to pursue
any political regime and economic system they perceive optimal
without being accountable to any higher institution or fearing external
interference. A state may be obliged to certain agreements or be bound
by dependencies on other states; yet, they are not subordinate to any
other government than their own.
Russia did not fully adhere to these principles in the years prior to
the GUAM initiative. On the one hand, Russia aimed at determining
the principle direction of foreign policy of the four states; this refers
to integration directions (Europe/Asia vs. Russia) and forming alle-
giances in the international community. Russian opposition to NATO
enlargement, its ambition to embrace all PSS into the CIS, the CSTO
or the Eurasian Economic Community are vivid examples. All PSS
strived for limiting Russian influence (Parakhonskiy 2008: 108, Jinguo
& Zhizhun 2008: 183, Klimin 2009: 274). The wish to get rid of the
periphery status was decisively influencing foreign policy formation
of PSS and the creation of regional cooperation agreements without
Russia (Pourchot 2008: 110). Projects of regional cooperation in
post-Soviet space without Russia can be understood as ‘demanding
a level of respect in bilateral relations’ (Pourchot 2008: 107). On
the other hand, Russia used local conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Moldova to coerce the three states to its policy objectives, e. g.
membership in the CIS or foreign policy preferences. Examples for
violations of non-interference follow below in greater detail when it
is about ignoring territorial integrity. Interference in domestic issues
before 1997 were primarily related to cultural issues of identity with
Russia trying to maintain the rights of Russian minorities within
GUAM member states.
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Another attribute of sovereignty that is relevant for the four states
is equality (b) between states on the international level. The four
newly formed states oppose the pattern of Russian dominance—or
patronage—in its Near Abroad.27 Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine wish to be on par with their former ruler, but Russia violates
the principle of equality by expecting to be the leader among post-
Soviet states (Aslund et al. 1999: 2; Piroshkov & Parakhonskiy 1999:
3ﬀ), denying them equality in regional cooperation formats.28 Even
before Putin’s presidency, all regional arrangements with Russian
participation were—intentionally or not—dominated by Russia. It
can be grasped as a feature of Russia’s general foreign policy approach
(Pourchot 2008: 110f).29 Yet, equality is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty. Consequently, participation in integration structures,
where Russia dominates, is per se a threat to the national sovereignties
of GUAM states (cf. Coppieters 1998: 200).
The CIS is a good example for the annoyance of most PSS with
Russian dominance (Aslund 2009: 1; Aslund et al. 1999: 28f; Pi-
roshkov & Parakhonskiy 1999: 3ﬀ; Pourchot 2008: 110f). Whereas
Ukraine, Belarus and other PSS saw the Commonwealth primarily
as an instrument for a ‘civilised divorce’ (cf. Nemyria 2005: 53; cf.
Jahn 2007: 37f;), Russia and also Kazakhstan began to view it as a
re-integration scheme (Robinson 2004: 182; Piroshkov & Parakhon-
skiy 1999: 3ﬀ). Right after the break-up of the SU, none of the
republics—except for Russia—would have been able to survive on its
27 The term Near abroad was coined during Yeltsin’s presidency and refers to the
Russian principal sphere of interest which embraces all former Soviet states
save the Baltic states, revealed in Russia’s military doctrine from 1993 (cf.
Zagorski 2005: 69; cf. Bremmer & Bailes 1998: 136; Halbach 1995: 3). Malfliet
et al. (2007: 3) underscore that Russia not only perceives the entire former
Soviet space as its sphere of interest, but it also acts like this.
28 The aversion of PSS to multilateralism may be related to the Russian wish of
maintaining the privilege of a weighty voice, the ability to veto decisions it
doesn’t approve of, as it is used to from its former status as a superpower (cf.
United Nations Security Council).
29 Even bilaterally, Russia’s foreign policy prompts disappointment over ‘neglect
of reciprocity and parity in economic and international aﬀairs’ (Haran 2011:
1).
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own (Japaridze 2008; Aslund et al.1999). Joining the CIS was not so
much a nostalgic step as it was a necessity for unraveling the economic
dependencies between PSS (Aslund et al. 1999: 2; Trenin 1998: 10;
cf. ch. 2.1.2 and 4.2.1). The new independent states also expected
Russian assistance with their domestic disintegration movements, but
soon understood that neither the CIS nor Russia were poised to do
so—on the contrary, Russian initiatives led to more destabilisation
and freezing of conflicts (Kuzio 2000: 91; Rtskhiladze 2007: 95). The
four states opposed—alone or together—many CIS-decisions (Aslund
et al. 1991: 7ﬀ), and all four maintain a cautious policy towards
the Commonwealth.30 Particularly after 1994, the reintegration of
the former Soviet republics became a corner stone of Russian foreign
policy (SVOP 1994: 7). Notwithstanding, the four states shied away
from a clear breakup. Only Georgia could finally decide to leave the
CIS after the Georgian-Russian war in 2008—having threatened to
do so a dozen times before.
The negligence of practiced sovereignty is particularly evident
when it comes to territorial integrity (c). Three issue areas constitute
a challenge to the territorial integrity of the four states: Russia’s
hesitation to withdraw its troops from GUAM territories, unresolved
territorial questions and Russian involvement in secessionist conflicts
within several GUAM countries. The first question of troop deploy-
ment had been solved for Azerbaijan in 1994 and for Ukraine in 1997.
Soviet troops engaged in Baku in January 1990 on the grounds of
‘anti-Armenian progroms’ due to escalations in Nagorno Karabakh.31
However, in contrast to Georgia or Moldova, all Russian (former
30 The CIS has never been fully embraced by its members. Almost all members
opted out of one or more of the CIS-agreements (Aslund et al. 1999: 3).
31 The incident was paralleled with Azerbaijan’s independence movement. The
role of the Soviet/Russian army is still debated among scholars. Whereas
Azerbaijan regards the Soviet/Russian intervention as an action to prevent
their independence from the SU, Russians argue they acted to protect the
Armenian minority in Baku (Fuller 1995a: 165). Götz & Halbach (1995: 18),
speak about a military intervention in Baku by Soviet troops just before the
opposition movement for an independent AZ gained power in some smaller
and bigger towns.
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Soviet) troops had been withdrawn from Azerbaijan by 1993. This
is assumed to be related to Azerbaijan becoming a member in the
CIS the same year and the fact that Azerbaijan’s navy is under the
command of the CIS (Human Rights Watch 1994: 176). In Ukraine
the deployment of Russian troops had been solved in 1997 with the
signature of the Agreement on friendship, cooperation and partnership,
the accompanying Agreement on BSF (1997) and the Agreement on
Economic Cooperation (1998). But Russian troops remain in Moldova
and Georgia. I will discuss both cases in detail in ch. 5.3.2.
The second issue area challenging the sovereignty of the four states
are unresolved territorial questions. There are still disputes about
the demarcation of borders between Russia and the four states. In
Georgia, the border of Chechnya, but also the Abkhazian and South
Ossetian territorial conflicts in general are debated (cf. Moroney &
Konoplyov 2002: 190). Apart from the question of autonomy, Georgia
and Russia disagree on the exact border line of both regions. Ukraine
signed a border limitation treaty with Russia in 2003 (Nygren 2008:
56). Yet, several demarcation issues remain unsolved, like the Kerch
Strait in the Sea of Azovsk or the island of Tuzla. After independence,
it took five years of negotiations until the 1997 accords decided over,
firstly, the division of the former Soviet BSF, and secondly, the
territorial status of the Crimea; lastly, the rent of Sevastopol’s port
by the Russian BSF (Felgenhauer 1999: 3; cf. Spillman et al. 1999:
330; Pourchot 2008: 93).32 It was crucial for Ukraine to maintain
its sovereignty over the Crimea, on the one hand, and to stay firm
against perceived Russian dominance, on the other (Felgenhauer
1999: 4). In Azerbaijan, only about 70% of the Russian-Azerbaijani
border have been agreed on after its independence (Nygren 2008: 102).
Though Moldova shares no border with Russia, Russian involvement
in Transnistria impedes a clear border settlement, leaving Moldova’s
territorial integrity in limbo since the 1990s.
32 Apart from the BSF, there are still small quantities of Russian military in
Ukraine. For example, Russia rents two Ukrainian early-warning radar stations
(Trenin 2007: 209).
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The third issue that challenged the territorial integrity of the
GUAM states is interference into domestic conflicts. At the beginning
of this chapter, it was outlined how Russia utilised domestic cleavages
to inhibit the departure of Moldova and Azerbaijan from the SU. But
also in the case of Georgia, it was shown that Russia employed the
conflicts to convince the Georgian government of the benefits of a
close association with Russia.
In chapter 5.2.2, was claimed that the four GUAM states are young
states and can be compared to post-colonial states, and therefore,
are more concerned about their sovereignty than other states. Yet,
this is also true for other PSS that are not members of GUAM.33
Two reasons can be brought forward to explain why exactly those
four PSS decided to form a regional grouping: Firstly, all four states
experienced at least short phases of independence before becoming
part of the SU. Secondly—and more importantly—, all four states
have an alternative integration option besides Russia.
In contrast to the Central Asian states, GUAM members can
refer to at least a short period of independent statehood (Halbach
1995: 5) and a national consciousness which can form a basis for new
statehood, even though the borders in the past cannot be compared to
the present oﬃcially recognised borders. The First World War (WW
I) oﬀered the four states an opportunity to claim independence. In
the past, Azerbaijan and Georgia had been conquered either from the
Southern direction by the Turks and Persians, or from the North by
Tsarist Russia. Azerbaijan experienced a short period of independence
between 1918 -1920, before the Bolsheviks took power (Nygren 2008:
110). Georgia also gained independence after WW I, lasting from
from 1918-1921 (Nygren 2008: 119). The red army conquered Georgia
in 1921 and formed one year later the Transcaucaus Republic em-
33 Uzbekistan had been a passive member of GUAM from 1999-2005, turning
GUAM into GUUAM. Its membership was part of its foreign policy towards
Russia in the first place and ended when Uzbek-Russian relations became less
tense (Goble 2008: 159; Schmidt 2003: 362). Moreover, Uzbekistan was not
comfortable with GUAM’s relationship to NATO and perceived a growing
competition with NIS economic projects (Tolstov 2008: 37).
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bracing also Azerbaijan and Armenia, until the three of them became
individual Soviet Republics in 1936 (Nygren 2008: 119). Moldova’s
and Ukraine’s independence was much shorter. In December 1917,
Moldova proclaimed the Moldovan Democratic Republic, but sold its
future to Romania in 1918 to avoid Russian Bolshevism (Müller 2010:
19). Ukraine became independent as a people’s republic in January
1918, but was already occupied three months later by Germany and
was divided into two parts in 1919. Until 1920, Ukraine experienced
civil war and occupation of various war participants. Being an inde-
pendent Socialist Soviet Republic for one year, the Eastern part of
Ukraine was integrated into the SU in 1922, whereas Western Ukraine
was divided among Poland, Chekhoslovakia and Romania (Kappeler
1994).
More important for the explanation of why exactly those four
states formed GUAM is the fact that the four states do have the
option of an alternative integration model (cf. Qoraboyev 2010: 224):
Membership—or at least allegiance—with the EU and NATO is pos-
sible or at least not entirely impracticable for the four states. GUAM
members are engaged in a dialogue with the EU. Heinz Timmer-
mann (2003: 19) discerns an integration rivalry between Brussels and
Moscow; all of them are part of the Eastern Partnership, the successor
of the European Neighbourhood Policy, with three of the four states
enrolled in negotiations for an association agreement with the EU.
Also, NATO-membership is a realistic option, though not immedi-
ately. Belarus and the Central Asian states have no Euro-Atlantic
option due to their political regime (Belarus) and/or due to their
geographic position (Central Asian states).34 Armenia’s exclusion is
related to its conflicting relationship with Azerbaijan and its role as a
close Russian ally, even though Armenia also enjoys a Euro-Atlantic
option. Membership in a new regional integration project may serve
as a preparation for future membership in the EU, as Ciuta (2008:
34 Azerbaijan may be as authoritarian as Belarus, but cleavages in domestic
politics are less pronounced, spur less Western interest and are accompanied
by its significance for European energy security.
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134) suggested for the case of the BSEC. However, using regional
integration as a learning tool for macro-regional integration causes an
‘institutional reflex’, restricting its own development. Such groupings
should ‘not be pushed too hard’, since they are not supposed to
turn into a serious alternative to macro-regional integration projects
(Ciuta 2008: 135). Choosing another integration path other than the
one proposed by Russia is in itself an assertion of sovereignty and a
foreign policy agenda independent from Russia conveys sovereignty.
Furthermore, the EU and NATO are regarded as sovereignty providers
for GUAM states (Strasbourg Declaration, 2007; Batumi Declaration,
2008). This may come across naturally, as they could be perceived
as the ‘adversaries’ of Russia. Although membership in both organ-
isations would curtail the sovereignty of the four states—NATO to
a lesser extent than the EU—GUAM participants seem to prefer
such a limitation of sovereignty compared to the constraints exercised
by Russia.35 GUAM lobbies for membership on the one hand, and
expresses eligibility by practicing ‘decent cooperative behaviour’ on
the other. In this way, it can be understood as an interim mechanism
for EU and NATO-membership.
To sum up, it can be concluded that GUAM members understand
their sovereignty to be contested by Russia. On the one hand, Russia
showed reluctance to let the four states depart from the SU into
full independence. On the other hand, Russia did not fully practice
sovereignty towards the four states, questioning their right for self-
determination, non-interferences, territorial integrity and equality on
the international level. Russia claims that the four GUAM states
remain in its sphere of interest. In addition, it has been outlined that
the four GUAM states dispose of a European and trans-Atlantic inte-
gration option and therefore diﬀer from other PSS which underscore
their sovereignty.
35 It might also be the case that the four states simply do not realise that
Euro-Atlantic integration entails the transfer of parts of their sovereignty.
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5.2.4 Sovereignty in GUAM Documents
After having presented the arguments, for why GUAM should be
grasped as a sovereignty strategy, this chapter substantiates the as-
sumption with GUAM documents. Sovereignty has been a cornerstone
in GUAM’s first oﬃcial documents and never lost momentum in the
following years. In the first joint statement, the Strasbourg Commu-
niqué (1997), the members reveal their wish for
‘. . . strengthening quadrilateral cooperation for the sake
of a stable and secure Europe guided by the principles of
respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability
of state frontiers, mutual respect, cooperation, democracy,
supremacy of law, and respect for human rights.’ (Stras-
bourg Communiqué, 1997)
This statement forms the basis for the friendly relationship between
the four states and oﬀers insight into their general understanding of
interstate relations. The subsequent Washington Declaration (1999)
is the first oﬃcial document that refers to GUAM as a cooperative
format. With references to key documents of international law, the
declaration reiterates principles of sovereignty. It supports the argu-
ment presented in chapter 5.2.2 that international agreements are
employed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, to strengthen
their sovereignty. Furthermore, it stresses the high appreciation of
sovereignty. The four GUAM states are characterised as sovereign sub-
jects of the international community, highlighting again the grounds
for cooperative relations between states:
‘Aﬃrming our adherence to the basic norms and prin-
ciples of international law, strengthened by the Charter
of the United Nations and corresponding documents of
the OSCE, particularly the respect of sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, independence of states and inviolability
of the internationally recognised borders. . . ’ (Washington
Declaration, 1999, Preamble)36
36 The Washington Declaration (1999) is only available in Russian on GUAM’s
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GUAM members regard themselves as sovereign and equal actors in
the international community. The four states devote themselves to the
principles named above, when taking action in the international arena
and, thus, delineate a code of conduct for their external relations with
the protection of sovereignty at its core.
‘Sharing the objectives for strengthening our indepen-
dent statehood and gaining stability, security and coopera-
tion in the OSCE-area, free from dividing lines of interest
spheres; [...] Emphasising the importance of consolidating
eﬀorts for strengthening the regimes of non-proliferation
of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and
also preventing the deployment of weaponry in conflict
zones’ (Washington Declaration, 1999, Preamble)
Apart from a code of conduct, the quotation above underscores the
ambition of the four states to pursue their own foreign policy agenda.
The Preamble indicates that they accept no higher authority above
them except international agreements that shape their actions on
the international level, stressing the sovereignty attributes of equality
and non-interference. It should also be understood as a remark on
Russia’s foreign policy in its Near Abroad. On the one hand, they
discard the role of being an interest zone of Russian foreign policy.
On the other hand, the Preamble indirectly addresses the situation
of Russian troop deployments and alleged Russian support of seces-
sionist forces within GUAM states. Later documents endorse this
assumption: The Batumi Declaration (2008) claims the freedom of
choice to follow a deeper European integration (pt. 9-10), which
clearly contradicts Russian interests that promote integration within
the post-Soviet space. The first GUAM document was issued on the
sidelines of an OSCE-meeting in Vienna in 1996/1997 where the ques-
tion of withdrawing previously Soviet and now Russian troops from
GUAM territory was discussed (Japaridze 2007: 2; Tolstov 2008: 35f,
Japaridze 2008: 75, Schmidt 2003: 361): This proves their ambition
oﬃcial website. This and following quotations have been translated by the
author.
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to set their own foreign policy agenda and, thus, distance themselves
from their former power centre Moscow.
Not only do the founding documents of GUAM show a strong
sovereignty reference: Almost all later documents follow the lead with
the first GUAM Charter declaring that GUAM cooperation is
‘Guided by the provisions of the United Nations Char-
ter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for [a] New
Europe and the Charter for European Security of the Or-
ganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’ (Yalta
Charter, 2001, Preamble)
This quotation reflects that the GUAM countries perceive themselves
as sovereign members of the international system. As such, they
form a regional grouping that shall stand in line with other respected
international organisations. This supports again the argument that
membership in international organisations or international agreements
demonstrate sovereignty.
The consolidation of sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity are focal points in GUAM’s Yalta Charter and in all other
GUAM documents expressing the conviction that regional cooperation
would strengthen their individual sovereignty:
‘. . . regional cooperation [...] may contribute to con-
solidation of sovereignty, independence and territorial in-
tegrity [...] peaceful settlement of conflicts and improve the
well-being of their peoples’ (Yalta Charter, 2001, Pream-
ble)
The Yalta Charter also names ‘interacting in the framework of inter-
national organizations’ as one of the objectives of GUAM cooperation,
which is a privilege of only oﬃcially recognised sovereign states—
underscoring again their sovereignty status by membership in IGOs.
The Strasbourg Communiqué names the international organisations
which should deal with regional and international security, indicating
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that the four GUAM countries perceive others as the dominating
security providers, instead of GUAM:
‘Leaders of the four nations were unanimous in as-
sessing threats and risks for the European, as well as for
the regional securities. They agreed that the process of
integration into Trans-Atlantic and European structures
could to a considerable extent reduce these threats and
risks. In this connection, they underlined the prospects of
the four nations cooperation within the framework of the
OSCE, other European and Atlantic structures, including
the recently established Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-
cil and the Partnership for Peace NATO Program. The
Presidents of the four states agreed that such cooperation,
as well as the development of a distinctive partnership,
like that envisaged in the Charter on a Distinctive Part-
nership between NATO and Ukraine, could become an
important element in strengthening stability, and serve
as the basis for a relationship and further development
of cooperation between NATO and other countries in the
region.’ (Strasbourg Communiqué, 1997)
The Preambles of the Yalta Charter and other key documents reiterate
GUAM’s code of conduct (cf. Kyiv Charter, 2006; Baku Declaration,
2007). Territorial integrity, independence, self-determination and
authority are central issues. Mutual relations shall be guided by:
‘. . . norms of international law, in particular, on the
respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity
and non-interference in domestic aﬀairs of the Member
States’ (Yalta Charter, 2001, pt. 2)
Interference in domestic aﬀairs is clearly rejected:
‘. . . the Parties shall develop mutually beneficial coop-
eration, guided by the principles of respect for sovereignty
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and territorial integrity of the states, inviolability of their
internationally-recognized borders and non-interference in
their internal aﬀairs and other universally recognized prin-
ciples and norms of international law.’ (Kyiv Charter,
2006, art. 2)
GUAM documents underscore the mutual acceptance of sover-
eignty and the wish to shield their own individual sovereignties. In
this sense, GUAM is of a symbolic character, reflecting the status of
sovereignty of its members, on the one hand, and proposing a code
of conduct that delineates how sovereignty should be practiced, on
the other. GUAM is also employed as an instrument to strengthen
sovereignty; this is exemplified in the secessionist conflicts on GUAM
territory. Secessionist conflicts within GUAM member states question
their territorial integrity and their undivided domestic authority and
are, hence, regarded as a threat to their respective sovereignty. Those
domestic conflicts are understood to be the culprits for slow advances
in democratisation and economic development within GUAM member
states.37 Hence, GUAM participants regard the strengthening of their
sovereignty as the key to achieve democracy and economic prosperity:
‘Emphasizing the fact that unresolved conflicts in some
of the GUUAM states undermine their sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and independence, complicate the full-scale
implementation of democratic reforms and the economic
development of the region, impact adversely on the Eu-
ropean integration process, and pose a challenge to the
international community’ (Chisinau Declaration, 2005,
Preamble)
Strengthening sovereignty is primarily directed at Russia. The ap-
proach varies between decreasing dependence on Russia, particularly
37 Scrutinising GUAM documents, it became evident that GUAM member states
tend to shift the responsibility for domestic failure to external actors, citing
either secessionist conflicts, international terrorism or organised crime as the
impediments not only for economic development but also for democratisation,
with Russia performing as the convenient scapegoat.
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economically, and limiting Russian influence in domestic conflicts,
including the withdrawal of Russian troops. One example for the
latter is GUAM’s ambition to raise international awareness and to
seek assistance for solving their domestic conflicts:
‘[GUAM members] underline the importance of in-
tensifying the concerted eﬀorts by GUUAM states and
the international community in resolving the Transnistria
problem and the conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia on
the basis of norms and principles of international law, by
reintegrating uncontrolled territories into the states, of
which they are a part, and ensuring that various ethnic
groups live together in peace within internationally recog-
nized borders of states.’ (Chisinau Declaration, 2005, pt.
4)
Other major documents join in:
‘[GUAM] Welcome[s] the eﬀorts of [the] international
community and stress[es] the importance of providing sup-
port to GUAM States in the development and implementa-
tion of a comprehensive and consistent strategy for conflict
settlement based on the above mentioned principles, in-
cluding short-term and long-term measures aimed at the
achievement and maintenance of lasting peace, security
and sustainable development.’ (Kyiv Declaration on Con-
flict Settlement, 2006, pt. 8)
‘Expressing deep concern with regard to the ongoing
crises and growing security challenges ensuing from inter-
national terrorism, aggressive separatism and extremism
and other related dangerous crimes, and in this connection
drawing attention of the international community to [the]
complexity, gravity and scale of these problems encountered
by the GUAM States’ (Baku Declaration, 2007)
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This statement by Secretary General Valeri Chechelashvili on Crimea
denounced Russian activities as a violation of international law (Che-
chelashvili 2014).
Apart from references in their joint documents, GUAM members
cooperate on the diplomatic level within the UN. In 2007, they sub-
mitted their first joint draft resolution ‘Protracted conflicts in the
GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security
and development’, pleading for international support:
‘1.Reaﬃrms its continued support for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova
and the inviolability of their internationally recognized bor-
ders; 2. Calls upon Member States and international
and regional organizations and arrangements to eﬀectively
contribute, within their competence, to the processes of
settlement of conflicts in the GUAM area’ 38
Moreover, the four states clearly choose neutrality, rejecting any in-
terference in their domestic aﬀairs and acknowledging that each state
has to take individual measures to strengthen its authority within
its borders. The deployment of troops or deliveries of weaponry to
the conflict zones is condemned. In 2006, the four countries issued a
declaration on conflict settlement: The preconditions for a peaceful
settlement are publicized again, stressing the role of GUAM partners
as non-participants. ‘. . . [The] respect for sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders of these
states’ (Kyiv Declaration on Conflict Settlement, 2006, pt. 1) are as
important as the consensus that the
‘. . . territory of a state may not be a subject of acquisi-
tion or military occupation, resulting from the threat or
use of force in breach of the relevant norms of interna-
tional law. No territorial acquisitions and the resulting
38 Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international
peace, security and development, 62nd Session of the General Assembly (http:
//bit.ly/1NzFtsI; last: 15.03.2014).
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self-declared entities may be recognized as legal under any
circumstances whatsoever’ (Kyiv Declaration on Conflict
Settlement, 2006, pt. 2)
It is endorsed with ‘the obligation of states of non-interference in
the aﬀairs of any other state and non-exertion of military, political,
economic or any other pressure thereupon.’ (The Kyiv Declaration on
Conflict Settlement, 2006, pt. 3). However, GUAM is not supposed to
take any military action within the conflict zones. Interferences that
already took place by the Russian government are also condemned
indirectly. Nevertheless, the four states support
‘. . . the importance of demilitarization of conflict zones
and establishment of security in these zones with the help
of multinational peacemaking forces deployed therein un-
der UN or OSCE auspices for providing conditions for
return of population and peaceful coexistence of ethnic
communities.’ (Kyiv Declaration on Conflict Settlement,
2006, pt. 6)
Concerning the solution of secessionist conflicts, GUAM is employed
as a rhetorical instrument only; that is, the grouping does not discern
itself as a substitute for ongoing conflict resolution processes:
‘[GUAM members] Pledge to support the peaceful initia-
tives and processes aiming at the resolution of the existing
conflicts. In this context they welcome the recent proposals,
the peace plan presented by the President of Georgia for
South Ossetia autonomy, the continuing of the ‘Prague
process’ of negotiations within the OSCE Minsk group, as
well as the appearing during the GUUAM Summit of the
proposals of the President of Ukraine and the President of
Romania concerning solving of the Transnistrian problem.’
(Chisinau Declaration, 2005, pt. 6)
Opposition to Russian interference has been mentioned above. One
example is the issue of withdrawing Russian troops from GUAM
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territories. The Chisinau Declaration endorses the agreements on the
withdrawal of Russian troops from GUAM territories which have been
reached alongside the OSCE negotiations. The withdrawal is regarded
as a central step to strengthen the sovereignty of each GUAM member
state:
‘[We] Stress the importance of the Istanbul OSCE Sum-
mit in 1999 and appeal to all the OSCE states to undertake
all the eﬀorts for the realization by Russia of the approved
commitments regarding the entire exclusion of the Russian
troops and munitions from the Republic of Moldova and
Georgia.’ (Chisinau Declaration, 2005, pt. 5)
Let us turn to the significance of security for GUAM. Sovereignty
and security are frequently applied terms in GUAM documents. Yet,
analysis shows that GUAM does not perceive itself as a traditional
security organisation. Security references in GUAM documents are
guided by a wider security concept, viewing GUAM as just another
contributor to the overall objective of peace and stability in the inter-
national community. Instead, GUAM activity shall ‘. . . ensure respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to assert democratic
values, the rule of law, to actively contribute to ensuring international
peace, security and stability’ (Batumi Declaration, 2008, pt. 1). This
is facilitated through
‘. . . the important role of GUAM in developing inter-
communal and inter-confessional dialogue and protect-
ing the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,
strengthening mutual understanding and creating favorable
conditions for cohesive development of global and regional
security.’ (Batumi Declaration, 2008, pt. 7)
In their reaction to Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014, the
Council of national Coordinators of GUAM emphasised their mission
‘that GUAM member states will continue to insist on the need to
respect states’ sovereignty, territorial integrity and internationally
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recognised borders as the fundamental principles for maintaining
international peace and security’ (30th Meeting of the CNC, 11.–
12.03.2014).
Even though security has been mentioned widely in the Wash-
ington Declaration, the declaration does not specify any measures to
obtain or strengthen security in the narrow sense. The very general
perspective on security is also reflected in later documents. Yet, the
intention to cooperate in ‘combating international terrorism, orga-
nized crime and drug traﬃcking’, does not turn GUAM automatically
into a security-driven organisation. For example, when detailing in-
structions for cooperation, there is nothing about security, but all
about economy, technology and science (Yalta Charter, 2001, pt. 3).
Nevertheless, GUAM is concerned about various threats to regional
as well as international peace and stability, particularly over inter-
national terrorism and violence, which they acknowledge to ‘pose a
threat not only to individuals or states, but to the entire international
community’, and demand cooperation in fighting terrorism (Washing-
ton Declaration, 1999, Preamble). The four states underscore their
readiness to participate in solving international security issues, such
as stopping the further spread of weapons of mass destruction or
fighting international terrorism. The Chisinau Declaration confirms:
‘. . . the need for further strengthening and enhance-
ment of cooperation of states to counteract international
terrorism and extremism and such related negative phe-
nomena as illicit drug traﬃcking, transnational organized
crime, human traﬃcking, illegal migration, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, illegal arms trade, money
laundering and corruption[. There is a mandate] to im-
plement the Declaration’s provisions on concerted eﬀorts
to provide stability and security in the region and the
Agreement on cooperation among the Governments of the
GUUAM member states in the areas of fighting terrorism,
organized crime and other dangerous crimes.’ (Chisinau
Declaration, 2005, pt.2)
5.2. EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF GUAM 219
GUAM expresses its readiness to contribute to international peace
and stability. Their enthusiasm is influenced by their domestic conflict
zones, which are recognised arenas for the illegal arms trade, organised
crime and terrorism. GUAM did take non-military measures in
that direction by forming the Virtual Centre for Law Enforcement,
meant to help pursue transnational crime. The project was strongly
supported by the United States, which paid particular attention to
GUAM projects that would contribute to combating international
crime and terrorism. The Agreement on Cooperation among the
Governments of GUUAM Participating States in the Field of Combat
Against Terrorism, Organized Crime and Other Dangerous Types of
Crimes (signed 2002, entry into force 25 August 2004) shows that the
focus is on increasing domestic security. The member states agreed
to consider mutual ‘requests for rendering assistance’ in an ample
field of activity such as illegal circulation of arm, narcotics, forged
documents, etc. (art. 1 and 2). Today, this field of cooperation
remains relevant—information exchange and networking structures
have been improved for fighting transnational crime. Cooperation in
this area is regarded as a contribution to international security and
stability (Preamble).
The security emphasis in the Washington Declaration (1999) may
be a reflection of its time with the raised awareness of terrorist threats,
but does not delineate a tangible security programme for GUAM.
The first point of the agreement illustrates that GUAM should be
understood as the intention of the four member states to help safe-
guard stability on a global level, for example, by sending troops
to UN-peace missions: ‘strengthening our multilateral cooperation
joint actions within the framework of international organisations and
fora’ (Washington Declaration, 1999, pt. 1). Again, participating
in international peace missions can be understood as an assertion
of sovereignty, since only sovereign states are assigned to peace mis-
sions under the UN-mandate. GUAM does not pursue an individual
security agenda and the Washington Declaration does not describe
circumstances in which violence may be considered as a means of
action; instead, it delineates security-related issue areas which might
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benefit from a cooperative approach. The council of the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership’ and the NATO partnership for peace programmes are
identified as appropriate channels for their security issues (Washington
Declaration, 1999, pt. 2). The role of a security provider is trans-
ferred to other established institutions like NATO and the EU. In the
Strasbourg Declaration GUAM members agreed ‘. . . that the process
of integration into Trans-Atlantic and European structures could to a
considerable extent reduce [...] threats and risks [to European and
regional security]’.
Even though domestic conflicts have been determined as threats to
the sovereignty of the four states, GUAM members regard peaceful dia-
logue as the appropriate way to solve their domestic conflicts, rejecting
any military action (cf. Washington Declaration, 1999). References
to the secessionist conflicts are not supposed to end in military action;
instead, the declaration hails the principles of non-interference, terri-
torial integrity, strengthening of state authority within their borders,
and, when they refrain from proliferation of weapons in conflict zones,
or praise peaceful conflict resolutions (cf. Washington Declaration,
1999, pt. 3). Although the Washington Declaration claims to ‘deep-
ening practical cooperation aiming at strengthening the peacekeeping
potential on the grounds of the respective legal basis’ (1999: pt. 4),
this point remains equivocal without any substantial suggestions. The
suggestion of ‘a joint contribution to sustaining peace and stability,
aﬃrm[ing] their intention to establish military and political coopera-
tion, including peacekeeping operations’ remained a ‘determination’
(Chisinau Declaration, 2005, pt. 3 ). GUAM is not a grouping based
on military cooperation:
‘Having expressed their concern with respect to the
long-standing conflicts in Europe, the heads of the four
states supported a prompt and peaceful settlement of the
unresolved problems. The President unanimously upheld
the need for combating aggressive nationalism, separatism,
and international terrorism.’ (Washington Declaration,
1999)
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To sum up, GUAM documents reflect the emphasis on sovereignty:
All four members regard GUAM as a demonstration of the funda-
mental attributes of their sovereignties and the GUAM documents
lay down a code of conduct for their external relations designed to
showcase how their new sovereignty should be practiced, directed
primarily at Russia. GUAM is also an instrument to strengthen the
sovereignty of its members by using joint UN drafts to raise interna-
tional awareness and support for conflict resolution, on the one hand,
and the withdrawal of Russian troops, on the other. Although GUAM
members are willing to contribute to international peace and stability,
GUAM should not be understood as a security-driven organisation.
5.2.5 Summary
This chapter on the emergence of GUAM is based on two arguments
that support the assumption of GUAM being a sovereignty strategy:
The first argument alludes back to previous conclusions on sovereignty,
claiming that young states and post-colonial states care much more
about their sovereignty than do established states; they use interna-
tional agreements and organisations to strengthen their sovereignty.
These previous conclusions can be applied to GUAM member states,
which are young states with unconsolidated statehood. Moreover,
they can be compared to post-colonial states that strive to distance
themselves from their former potentate, in this case Russia. Territorial
integrity as well as undivided domestic authority are core attributes
of their sovereignty concepts, coupled with derivates such as equality
and self-determination; various quotations from GUAM documents
have been used to support this point.
The second argument refers to research on sovereignty and the
idea that sovereignty—no matter what sovereignty concept states
employ—is always an issue if contested, and, as has been shown, the
four GUAM states do understand their sovereignty to be contested
by their former ruling power, Russia. According to numerous GUAM
documents and historical examples from 1991 to 1997, it is clear that
the four states put particular emphasis on their individual sovereignties
and understand that this is questioned by Russia.
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This section on the emergence of GUAM further substantiated
that GUAM should be regarded as a sovereignty strategy in the first
place and less as a security strategy. Only under the condition of a
broad security concept, might GUAM be termed a security-motivated
organisation with the survival of its members as independent states
as its prime interest—yet, there are no instruments to be found that
would follow such a strategy.
5.3 Explaining the State of GUAM
This chapter consists of three parts: The first sub-chapter (ch. 5.3.1)
repeats the common ground amongst scholars on sovereignty and
integration. It forms an important backdrop to prove the fourth
assumption of this dissertation which states that GUAM as a sov-
ereignty strategy is bound to fail. The second part (ch. 5.3.2) will
show that sovereignty is still an issue for GUAM states, primarily
because Russia still does not practice sovereignty towards the four
countries, but also because their domestic sovereignty is still not
consolidated. GUAM could neither strengthen the sovereignty of its
members nor decrease dependence on Russia. The third part (ch.
5.3.3) will demonstrate that GUAM as a sovereignty strategy is bound
to fail due to the unwillingness of GUAM participants to strengthen
their regional institution by a transfer of sovereignty, on the one hand,
and the deficient member constellation, on the other.
5.3.1 Sovereignty, Power and the Evolution of Integra-
tion
The aim of this chapter is to review existing assumptions on sov-
ereignty and integration that are relevant for examining the fourth
major assumption of this dissertation. I will firstly reveal, how re-
gionalism scholars see the nexus between sovereignty and integration.
Secondly, I will elaborate on the diﬀerent approaches to integration
among states, forming an important backdrop to explain how sover-
eignty turned into a stumbling block for GUAM. Lastly, this chapter
5.3. EXPLAINING THE STATE OF GUAM 223
recalls assumptions from the IR school of realism, underscoring the im-
portance of accumulated power to secure the sovereignty of a grouping.
First of all, the nexus between integration and sovereignty shall
be discussed. Since the beginning of studies on European integration,
sovereignty has been a core subject of analysis. Ernst B. Haas’ revised
definition of integration centres on explaining
‘. . . how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign,
how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with
their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of
sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving
conflict between themselves’ (Haas 1971: 6)
Regionalism scholars adhere to the concept of sovereignty as a bundle
or basket of rights and obligations. Sovereignty is circumscribed with
the control of certain competences or authorities—i. e. decision-
making competence, the creation and subjection to national legisla-
tion, or the ability of agenda setting within domestic society.39 The
willingness to transfer parts of those competences is paraphrased
with the willingness to shift parts of national sovereignty to an in-
tergovernmental or even supranational institution (Zimmerling 1991:
43; Mattli 1999: 41). Decision-making processes in distinctive issue
areas have to be opened up in order to include other participants
(Hoﬀmann 2007: 100; Lindberg 1971: 48). Sovereignty transfer is
deemed necessary to furnish the regional or global institution with
suﬃcient authority to fulfil its tasks. Highly authoritative institutions
can make decisions legally binding for domestic governments even
without those government’s consent (Cooper et al. 2008: 501). Even
economic integration at an advanced stage implies the relinquishment
of sovereignty over the national market in order to gain sovereignty
39 Ruth Zimmerling (1991: 43) prefers to apply the term of ‘decision-making
competence’, because, in her view, the transfer of sovereignty is a feature of
an already highly integrated region. Sovereignty would be an indicator too
strong and too fuzzy to measure levels of institutionalisation (loc.cit.: 47).
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over other markets and leave behind the sphere of simple cooperation
(Salazar 1986: 280).
Yet, sovereignty never ceases completely in integration projects.
Wouter Werner & Jaap de Wilde (2001: 299) maintain that as long as
a state as such exists, it has the possibility to take its own decisions.
An attachment to an integration project would be done voluntarily
and is in itself an expression of sovereignty. Within the joint institu-
tion, each participating state has authority, retains it and can, thus,
protect its sovereignty. Even if a state would enter into a federation
and cease to exist as an independent, sovereign entity, dis-integration
processes might take place. It seems a paradox that national sov-
ereignty and domestic institutions usually keep existing—with their
claim to undivided domestic authority—despite participation in inte-
gration projects (Zimmerling 1991: 49; 125). The bundle approach of
sovereignty seems to tackle this paradox.
On the one hand, scholars see the relinquishment of parts of
national sovereignty as a core feature of regional integration (cf.
Kühnhardt 2008: 261; cf. Haas 1958; cf. Hoﬀmann 2007; cf. Zimmer-
ling 1991), with ‘. . . das Ausmaß der zugestandenen Beschränkung
der Souveränität als Indikator für den erreichten Stand der Integra-
tion’ (Zimmerling 1991: 47).40 On the other hand, scholars deem
the relinquishment of sovereignty to a regional or global institution
necessary to advance with integration. Thus, the ability to hand
over control and legislation power—authority—to a joint institutional
entity reflects a state’s willingness to proceed with integration on a
higher, more institutionalised level (cf. Slocum-Bradley 2008: 241;
cf. Zimmerling 1991: 47). The more sovereignty is relinquished, the
higher the integration level (Zimmerling 1991: 47).
Scholars suggest that states cede parts of their sovereignty in
exchange for certain benefits. Such ‘sovereignty bargains’ suggest
40 The transfer of parts of a state’s sovereignty or authority can be regarded as the
distinguishing moment between regional integration and regional cooperation
(Kegel & Amal 2008: 226; Slocum-Bradley 2008: 241). Such a static view
would conceive of integration as a result.
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a trade-oﬀ between regional integration and the relinquishment of
parts of a state’s sovereignty (Litfin 1997; cf. also Sridharan 2008).
Costs in the form of diminished national policymaking autonomy and
power are contrasted with benefits of integration, namely increased
national prosperity (cf. Mattli 2000: 150). Apart from prosperity
eﬀects, sovereignty bargains may ‘increase the influence that any one
member has over others, thereby helping it to attain certain policy
objectives more directly’ (Mattli 2000: 150). As Walter Mattli (2000:
151) points out: ‘While sovereignty bargains reconfigure sovereignty,
they do not necessarily diminish it; reduced autonomy, for example,
may be the price to pay for enhanced control or legitimacy.’. Thus,
scholars should shed light on the cost-benefit-assessments that states
undertake before joining an economic union (ib.). The cost calculus
can also be employed for other settings. It can be assumed that the
more institutionalised an integration project is, the higher the costs
for withdrawing. Hence, states are carefully weighing the anticipated
costs and gains of transferring competences to a supranational struc-
ture. Yet, this assumption has not been studied thoroughly so far
(Scheingold 1981). Cooper et al. (2008: 502) explain the transfer of
sovereignty with credibility which participants expect from such a
move; vice versa, withdrawing from deep integration entails a consid-
erable loss of that credibility.
Let us now turn to the question of why some states seem to
be more willing to transfer parts of their sovereignty than others;
whereas some scholars argue with diverging concepts of sovereignty
among states (Werner & de Wilde 2001), others emphasise the nexus
between domestic and external sovereignty (Seidelmann 1998). The
first group claims that in many cases the expectations for integration
do not comply with the participant’s concept of sovereignty, and
this incongruence would lead to imperfect integration results and
would demand a change of perceptions of concepts like statehood,
sovereignty etc. (Kegel & Amal 2008: 226). Whereas Western states
tend to embrace the modern understanding of sovereignty, developing
countries usually stick to the Westphalian concept and, hence, would
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eschew to forfeit sovereignty (Werner & de Wilde 2001: passim).
Regional economic and political unions would violate the Westphalian
model of sovereignty, even though legal sovereignty still exists, ‘the
violation occurs when these unions establish authority structures
that supersede territorial boundaries and transgress autonomy by
conferring control to supranational actors’ (Mattli 2000: 149). If
developing states would adopt their understanding of sovereignty,
they might be more willing to participate in advanced integration
projects (Werner & de Wilde 2001).
The second group suggests that states which hesitate to shift
control and decision-making competences to a higher, intergovern-
mental or even supranational level, are habitually weak states with
non-consolidated domestic authority (Kühnhardt 2008: 272; Aslund
et al. 1999: 3; cf. Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 28), whose priority
is to consolidate domestic sovereignty. Especially strong states have
been the most willing to shift parts of sovereignty to international
institutions, such as in the case of the European Central Bank or
International Criminal Court (Cooper et al. 2008: 501). The more
insecure domestic regimes perceive themselves to be, the less intrusive
and eﬀective the regional institution will be (Acharya & Johnston
2007c: 262; Haas 1981: 244). Scholars also link the regime type
to a state’s disposition towards ceding sovereignty. Authoritarian
regimes are believed to have more problems with giving up sovereignty
than democratic regimes (Acharya & Johnston 2007c: 262; Kühn-
hardt 2008: 271; Zimmerling 1991: 123ﬀ).41 They habitually aim at
centralising governance, eliminating the necessity to share authority
(Hooghe et al. 2010: 68). However that does not imply that weak
or authoritarian states refrain from integration at all; they tend to
eschew power pooling with other governments and pursue partici-
pation in low institutionalised integration projects to manifest their
respective independence internationally, but with joint institutions
that guard their sovereignty (Allison 2003: 39; cf. Kühnhardt 2008:
271 and Aslund et al. 1999). As a result, regional agreements tend to
41 Some scholars also perceive a relation between presidential regimes and a
strong emphasis on national sovereignty (Bach 2005: 172).
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not be binding and lack institutional content. Their involvement in
regional integration projects may serve other purposes, for example, to
increase the ‘domestic power base of the leader’ (Acharya & Johnston
2007b: 28). Regime survival and regime legitimacy play an important
role, particularly in developing countries, and influence—or rather
abuse—regional institutions (Acharya & Johnston 2007c: 259).
One indicator of the willingness to cede parts of national sover-
eignty to regional institutions is the institutional design: For example,
a consensus-based decision-making process leaves every change up
to the participating states themselves and demands thorough negoti-
ations (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 25; cf. Cooper et al. 2008: 501).42
Let us change the theoretical setting from sovereignty to power as
one explanatory variable for the eﬀectiveness of a regional integration
project. Referring to power accumulation (ch. 5.2.1), a project fails
when the combined power of participants or the power that the re-
gional institution has gained, proves insuﬃcient to reach the objectives
of integration participants. Power shall also be applied from another
angle: It has been stated that violations of sovereignty have been an
instrument of power politics, where stronger states have used their
resources ‘to pressure or compel their weaker counterparts to accept
unwanted domestic institutional arrangements’ (Krasner 1999: 224).
Theorists of realism observe that states remained sovereign only when
they were powerful enough or their independence was accepted as
being relevant for the balance of power (Little 2005: 771). Hence, the
success of regional integration as a sovereignty strategy would be a
question of power constellations—the sum of power among integration
participants and their support from non-members.
To sum up, the objective of strengthening sovereignty is not easily
combined with an integration project. Relinquishment of parts of a
state’s sovereignty is necessary to form capable regional institutions
42 Acharya & Johnston (2007c: 262) suggest that for developing states domestic
weaknesses have a greater impact on institutional design than do external
threats.
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that will produce the desired results; it is also essential to proceed with
the integration project. States seem to accept the transfer of parts
of their sovereignty, because they expect certain benefits in return.
Thus, it is important to ask whether GUAM promises suﬃcient enough
benefits in exchange for the relinquishment of parts of their national
state’s sovereignties. Scholars propose either variations of sovereignty
concepts or regime-type as explanations for why some states are more
prone to cede sovereignty than others. States with authoritarian
regimes or unconsolidated domestic sovereignty usually create weak
regional institutions. Although conclusions on the nexus between
sovereignty and integration have been made primarily in analyses
of African or Asian projects, it can be suggested that they are also
applicable to the GUAM states. Lastly, the success of a sovereignty
strategy is not only a question of sovereignty transfer: It is also related
to suﬃcient power accumulation either within the project or from
allies of an integration project.
5.3.2 Continuing Challenges to Sovereignty
This chapter builds on the assumption that sovereignty becomes an
issue if it is contested (Werner & de Wilde 2001). This chapter further
demonstrates that the sovereignty situation has not improved during
GUAM’s existence and, therefore, is one reason why the grouping
keeps existing.
The four GUAM members perceive their sovereignty as contin-
uously questioned by Russia. With Russian foreign policy sticking
to traditional patterns of patronage and inequality towards its neigh-
bours, GUAM states have nourished their distrust towards Russia (cf.
Spillman et al. 1999: 327; cf. Devdariani 2005: 153). Sovereignty is
also threatened, to a lesser extent, by not fully consolidated domestic
sovereignty.
Challenges to sovereignty aﬀect various issue areas (political, eco-
nomic, cultural) and occur on various agency levels simultaneously:
the international as well as the domestic level of each GUAM state
(cf. Piroshkov & Parakhonskiy 1999: 3ﬀ; cf. Parakhonskiy 2008:
108). The first four sub-chapters address how Russia questions vari-
5.3. EXPLAINING THE STATE OF GUAM 229
ous attributes of sovereignty: territorial integrity, equality and self-
determination, domestic authority and economic sovereignty. The
last sub-chapter draws on contested domestic authority.
5.3.2.1 Challenging Territorial Integrity
Since territorial integrity and national unity in each GUAM state
is challenged by domestic conflicts, the territory-sovereignty nexus
becomes more pronounced (cf. Kakachia 2010: 1). Simultaneously,
the support for actors within the conflict areas also questions the
domestic authority of sovereign states. Consequently, regional cooper-
ation within the GUAM framework developed along lines of territorial
integrity first (Alieva 2011: 197; Norling & Nilsson 2008: 204; Schmidt
2003: 379, Skakov 2008: 143; Getmanchuk 2006: 1). GUAM states
regard Russian involvement as instrumentalisation of domestic con-
flicts to perpetuate their underdevelopment and, hence, to preserve
their weak power position and degree of dependence on Russia. The
presence of Russian troops on the territory of the new states and,
thus, the need to restore full sovereignty, was the propelling force
for the start of cooperation among the four states and is still not
solved completely (cf. Pourchot 2008: 107; cf. Japaridze 2007: 1; cf.
Tolstov 2008: 36). Russia’s reluctance to withdraw its troops can be
understood as a serious disregard of the GUAM states’ sovereignties.
On the one hand, Soviet/Russian troops and munition remained
in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine after their indepen-
dence. Their withdrawal was negotiated in various rounds, such as
through talks on the adaptation of the CFE treaty or in the OSCE
Istanbul summit (1999). The CFE treaty negotiations provided the
first setting for consultations within the GUAM format and today,
the issue remains prevalent in Moldova and Georgia (Klimin 2009:
274; cf. Gorincioi & Tcaci 2005: 238f; Devdariani 2005: 190ﬀ). The
remaining forces limit Moldova’s and Georgia’s authority over their
respective territory. On the other hand, the relationship to Russia is
also determined by Russian interference into domestic conflicts of the
four states. GUAM members believe that Russia overtly and covertly
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supports separatist movements within their states and therefore dis-
regards their territorial integrity and domestic authority (Kuzio 2000:
97; cf. Klimin 2009: 275; Rzchiladse 2007: 71; Nygren 2008: 223). In
the cases of Moldova and Georgia, secessionist conflicts and Russian
troop deployments are interrelated.
Looking at Moldova, bilateral relations to Russia are centred to a
great part on Transnistria (Nygren 2008: 222). Although Vladimir
Putin at the beginning of his incumbency seemed very willing to
solve the conflict, he would not accept a withdrawal of Russian troops
from Transnistria (Nygren 2008: 222). The fact that in Moldova as
well as in Georgia troops are engaged in so-called ‘peace missions’,
complicates the situation. Soviet troops supported Transnistria in
the 1990s to use it as a means for preventing Moldovan independence
(ICG 2003: 3). Boris Asarov (2005: 119), a Transnistrian-based
journalist and commentator speaks of ‘occupation’ of the Eastern part
of Moldova by Russian troops. In the 1999 Istanbul agreement, Russia
consented to withdraw both from Moldova and Georgia (Löwenhardt
2005: 17). Russian munition was to be withdrawn in 2001, but
Transnistria boycotted the respective trains (Nygren 2008: 92). Then,
in 2004, it was Russia which claimed that Russian troops should stay
as long as munition could not be transported back to Russia (Nygren
2008: 93). Putin later interpreted the agreement as being linked to
a solution of the Transnistrian conflict (Nygren 2008: 92f). As a
consequence, Russian troops remain to this day (Nygren 2008: 99).
Moldova is also worried about strong Russian military equipment
(Klimin 2009: 274). There are munition plants in Transnistria still
producing weaponry (Asarov 2005: 123f), and those weapons are
assumed to go to criminal gangs and separatists worldwide (Asarov
2005: 138). According to an OSCE report from 2002, 1,500 troops and
21,000 tons of munitions remain in Moldova (Diaconu 2008: 323). The
newspaper Neue Züricher Zeitung reported in 2012 that there were
1,400 troops of which only 400 were under a peacekeeping mandate.
The remaining 1,000 remained stationed in Transnistria to protect
Russian munition camps (Hermann 2012: 7).
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Figure 5.1: Moldova and the separatist region Transnistria (Source: author’s
design).
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Apart from the deployment of Russian military, Moscow also pro-
vides for other assistance to Transnistria: It supports the secessionist
government financially and grants the local population various advan-
tages like visa-free travel into Russia or organising network meetings
(secessionist summits) among separatist governments of various PSS
(Bielawski 2004: 6). Transnistria would not be able to survive with-
out Russian economic support (Hermann 2012: 7) nor would South
Ossetia (Lynch 2006: 45). Although the CIS agreed to establish
economic sanctions on the separatist regions, Russia ignores the de-
cision. Russia claims the role of a mediator for conflict resolution
in Transnistria, but lacks the approval of the Moldovan government
as a neutral negotiator. Yet, Russia’s acceptance of the last election
results in Transnistria in 2011, which brought to power the adversary
of the Russian-backed candidate, may open a way toward conflict
resolution.43
Moldova as well as Georgia are dissatisfied with the Russian peace-
keepers (CIS mandate) in their countries (Molchanov & Yevdokimov
2005: 194), who are perceived as biased; both countries aim at inter-
nationalising the peacekeepers in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (Kuzio 2000: 91) to reduce tensions and get closer to conflict
resolution. Particularly the Crimea annexation and the current Don-
bass situation in Ukraine has raised fears among Moldovans that the
conflict could spread to their country. The Russian military based in
Transnistria could easily be used used to copy the Crimean annexation.
Russian challenges to Georgia’s territorial integrity are comprised
of two dimensions: Firstly, Russian troops on Georgian territory via
the remaining Soviet military bases and secondly, Russian troops
43 Longtime Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov resisted Moscow’s suggestion to
decline participation in the 2011 elections. Only after the devastating results
of the first election round did Smirnov withdraw in favor of the other ‘Moscow
candidate’ Kaminski. However, it was the independent candidate Yevgeni
Shevchuk, who succeeded despite a smear campaign against him. Russia stated
that it is willing to work together with Shevchuk, since the elections had been
free and fair (Gamova 2011).
5.3. EXPLAINING THE STATE OF GUAM 233
within and support for the separatist regions Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. The situation in Georgia is exacerbated due to Georgia’s
diﬃculty in eﬀectively controlling its mountainous Northern borders as
well as due to armed citizens and criminal groups (Nygren 2008: 224).
Sovereignty concerns have been a driving force for the development
of regional cooperation separate from Russia (Alieva 2011: 197).
At the beginning of the 1990s, Soviet/Russian forces stayed in
Georgia to ‘avoid a security vacuum’ and to protect the Georgian
government (cf. ch. 5.2.2), which was rattled by domestic conflict and
civil war (Nygren 2008: 119). In the 1999 Istanbul Agreement Russia
agreed to withdraw its four remaining bases in Akhalkalaki, Vaziani,
Batumi and Gudauta (Abkhazia) (Löwenhardt 2005: 17; Nygren 2008:
120).44 Russia complied with the closure of the Vaziani base. The
Gudauta base was reported to have been cleared as well (Halbach
2007a: 2).45 The withdrawal of the remaining two bases has slowed
down due to increased tensions between Georgia and Russia (Nygren
2008: 223). In a new negotiated agreement in 2005 Russia consented
to withdraw from the Akhalkalaki base by the end of 2007 and from
the Batumi base by the end of 2008 (Halbach 2007a: 2; Lynch 2006:
46). Russia complied with the agreement ahead of time; since the
13th of November 2007 Georgia has been without Russian military
bases except for in the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia (Kakachia 2008: 3). Since then, the Georgian government has
aimed at changing the Russian peacekeepers for peacekeepers from
other countries.
The case of Abkhazia shares some commonalities with Transnis-
tria in Moldova. Russian/Soviet forces, which had already been in
Abkhazia before the conflict started in 1989, sided with the Abk-
44 Withdrawal was agreed to proceed in two phases: the first from Vaziani and
Gudauta till 2001 and later from Akhalkalaki and Batumi until the end of the
year 2008 (Nygren 2008: 131).
45 It cannot be confirmed whether Gudauta has actually been closed. In 2000
Russia renamed the military base and turned it into a training base for Russian
peacekeepers so Gudauta could not exactly be termed a Russian military base
(Nygren 2008:131).
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Figure 5.2: Georgia and its district Adjara and the two separatist regions South
Ossetia and Abkhazia (Source: author’s design).
hazian forces during the civil war in 1992-4 (Nygren 2008: 119). Yet,
it was the previous Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze, who
asked Russia for help in establishing a demilitarised zone between
Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia (Nygren 2008: 119; Indans 2007:
132). Russian troops are still stationed in Abkhazia and the region
can only survive due to Russian assistance.
In South Ossetia it was the first president of independent Georgia,
Sviad Gamsakhurdia, who inflamed a violent conflict by lifting the
autonomy status of South Ossetia (Popescu 2006: 2; Reisner 2005: 33).
Russia negotiated a ceasefire in 1992, but refrained from recognising
South Ossetia’s declaration of independence (Reisner 2005: 33). The
ceasefire resulted in a trilateral peacekeeping force (Russian, Georgian,
South Ossetian) under Russian leadership (Popescu 2006: 2, Reisner
2005: 33). Although the OSCE had already acted as an observer
(Popescu 2006: 2), Georgia failed to turn the peacekeeping mandate
into an oﬃcial OSCE mandate (Reisner 2005: 33). In 2004, Georgian
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president Saakashvili tried to apply his ‘Adzharia strategy’ to South
Ossetia and failed boldly (Reisner 2005: 33).46 Despite Russia’s
initial role as a mediator, Moscow soon began to manipulate the
situation and sewed distrust between the conflicting parties. Russia
supplied Abkhazia and South Ossetia with weapons, including heavy
equipment, expert assistance (training of forces) as well as financial
support (McDermott & Morozov 2008: 246; Rzchiladse 2007: 71;
Sabanadze 2002: 24; Reisner 2005: 33). The war between Russia
and Georgia over South Ossetia in 2008 intensified distrust between
the two states. Since then, diplomatic relations between both states
are conducted through Swiss representatives. Only a ceasefire could
be reached by french mediation (Kakachia 2010: 1) and a peace
deal is still missing. Russian troops remain in South Ossetia and its
surrounding buﬀer zone without any time schedule for their withdrawal
(Allison 2008: 1159). Moreover, the buﬀer zone is contested and has
been changed single-handedly by Russia (N.N. 2015: 4).
The Russian-Georgian war in 2008 demonstrated how fragile the
sovereignty of GUAM member states still is. Russia’s legal recogni-
tion of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s sovereignties resurrected fears
among many other PSS that embrace former Russian territory and
Russian minorities; they became afraid of more cases following this
precedent and were proved right with the Crimea case in 2014 and the
ongoing destabilization in the Ukrainian Donbass region (Aslund 2009:
1; Allison 2008: 1151).47 GUAM was paralysed by the events of 2008
46 The region Adzharia (bordering Turkey on the Black sea coast) tried to claim
autonomy under its long-lasting governor Aslan Abashidze in early 2004 using
the circumstances of the Rose revolution (ICG 2004: 6). Tensions between
Abashidze and Saakashvilli increased and both sides threatened to use force.
Saakashvilli won using a mixture of economic blockades, military threats, local
protest movements and coercion of Abashidze’s partisans (ICG 2004: 7f).
47 The Georgian-Russian war was a sharp cut in the so far good Azerbaijani-
Russian-relations (Valiyev 2011: 2). The Azerbaijani public and government
fully tolerated Georgia defending its territorial integrity (ib.). Azerbaijan
feared a similar Russian manoeuvre in Nagorno Karabakh (ib.). Ukraine
shared the same fear with Azerbaijan due to the unclear and unstable domestic
political situation in Ukraine and the huge share of ethnic Russians living
there (Moshes 2008: 1).
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and could not agree on an appropriate reaction to them. At a meeting
of representatives of the foreign ministries of the four states, they un-
derscored that conflict resolution should be based on international law
and respect for territorial integrity (http://bit.ly/1TKK6WT, last:
15.03.2014).48 The Russian-Georgian war is an example of GUAM’s
failure to improve the sovereignty status of its member states. GUAM
is in good company with prominent international organisations which
were not able to impede the Russian seizure and the secession of
South Ossetia that followed.
Due to the common Russian-Georgian border in Russia’s volatile
Caucasian region, disputes over the respect of Georgian sovereignty
have been common. Incidents around the Pankisi gorge during the
second Chechen war were perceived by Georgia as violations of its
territorial integrity. Russia, in return, claimed the right to control the
Russian-Georgian border adjoining Chechnya and to conduct ‘preven-
tive strikes against Chechen groups hiding in Georgia’ (Zagorski 2005:
70). At the same time, an OSCE border control mission was in place
and Americans had trained Georgian special forces to meet the new
tasks required to handle illegal border crossings by Chechen refugees
and combatants in a barely accessible mountainous area (Zagorski
2005: 70). Yet, Russia did bomb Georgian territory several times
in 2001. Today, consolidating its independence and safeguarding its
territorial integrity are the most important foreign policy objectives
of the Georgian government (Mayer 2007: 6).
Ukraine and Azerbaijan have been less aﬀected by the deploy-
ment of Russian troops. Before 2014, Ukraine had been regarded as
an irregularity among GUAM members when it came to territorial
integrity. Notwithstanding, Ukraine shares the security concerns of
48 On the 19th of August 2008, Secretary General Valeri Chechelashvili and the
acting Georgian Ambassador to Ukraine, M. Antadze, held a press conference
in Kyiv. They provided background information to illustrate the Georgian
position in the Russian-Georgian war. Chechelashvili remarked that Russia
had lost its credibility as a mediator for conflicts on the Georgian territory
(http://bit.ly/1NLBo35; last: 25.03.2014.).
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the Caucasus, because it is also exposed to ‘separatist trends’ and
is bordering unstable Transnistria (Tolipov 2008: 135). Ukrainian
independence and territorial integrity had be called ‘irreversible’ (Tim-
mermann 2003: 20); yet, the Crimea remained a hot spot due to the
mixture of its large part of Russian population, the presence of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet and the desire of the Crimean Tatars for more
autonomy within the region. Ethnic Russians in Donbas, Southern
Ukraine and the Crimea have been continuously utilised by Russia to
influence Ukrainian domestic politics. President Viktor Yanukovich
negotiated the Kharkov Deal (2010), trading the prolonged rent for
Sevastopol with discounts on Russian gas imports.49 For Volodymyr
Dubovyk (2010: 1) the deal was less about gas and more about the
fleet. The gas conditions would be a mere add-up to make the fleet
deal more attractive to Ukrainians and the international audience.50
Tyler Felgenhauer (1999: 4) claims that after Ukrainian independence
‘Ukraine and Russia could have gone to war over the fleet—not over
the actual strategic value of the ships in harbor, but over Ukraine’s
desire for complete independence from Russia and for Russia’s want
to maintain some control in the Soviet successor states’ (1999: 5).
The conflict potential of the BSF issue is diﬃcult to assess; in contrast
to the political elite, it has not been perceived as one of the top chal-
49 The deal confirmed the lease of the Black Sea military base to Russia for
another 25 years in exchange for a decrease in gas prices of 100 USD. It also
established a fixed price formula for Russian gas, giving Russia leverage over
Ukraine. The deal also included a debt regime (Haran 2011: 2). In April 2014,
Russia revoked the gas discount, arguing that the annexation of the Crimea
would nullify the Kharkov deal (Balser 2014: 17).
50 Dubovyk (2010: 1) argues that military concerns are not the principal motive
for Russia since a military base could also be operated from the Russian coast
at the Black Sea. It would be about geopolitics in the first place. Russia
would aim to stay in a volatile region and weaken Ukraine’s sovereignty (ib.).
Dubovyk, however, should bear in mind that the Russian coast of the Black
Sea is geographically inadequate for an alternative fleet port; therefore the
base on the Crimea is essential for Russia’s access to the Black Sea. Tyler
Felgenhauer concurs that, ‘Russia needed the remains of the BSF not for any
strategic purpose but as a symbolic instrument to help it reassert power on its
southern flank—vis a vis Turkey, the Caucasus, and future Caspian oil flows’
(1999: 4).
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lenges for Ukraine by the public (cf. Felgenhauer 1999: 24).51 Along
with the Euro-Maidan movement, the Crimean question re-emerged
and within less than a month, on the 16th of March 2014, Ukraine had
lost the Crimea to Russia (Ukraine-Analysen 2014b: 26).52 Neither
the Kyiv interim government nor the UN, OSCE, EU, NATO or any
other leading Western countries recognised the annexation to Russia.
Even though Russian law which binds the Russian government to
defend its citizens abroad is well known among diplomats and scholars
of Russian foreign policy, its quick application in the Crimean case
took politicians worldwide by surprise. The Russian move signifies
how fragile the sovereignty of GUAM members still is. Interestingly,
as in the case of Georgia in 2008, Russia tried to demonstrate that its
actions were strictly following international law. The assessment of
the Crimean annexation for international relations will have to remain
outside this dissertation.53 Nonetheless, the Crimean case supports
the sovereignty argument for GUAM members: In a snap, a GUAM
member—whose sovereignty was regarded as the most secured among
51 It remains unclear to which extent the presence of the Russian BSF on the
Crimea troubles Ukraine and Moldova though (cf. Klimin 2009: 274). From
1992-1997, up until the Friendship Agreement between Russia and Ukraine,
there was a joint Russian-Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea. Separation
of both fleets and Moscow’s renting of the Sevastopol port began only afterwards
(Neshitov 2014: 3).
52 The Budapest Memorandum (1994) between Russia, Ukraine, the US, France
and the United Kingdom has been mentioned frequently in relation to the
violations of Ukrainian territoriality in the Crimea in 2014. Yet, the memoran-
dum was weak since the beginning—firstly, because the relevant border issues
had not yet been solved when the document was signed, and secondly, since
the gas wars in 2004-5 had contradicted the ban on economic pressure.
53 Since Russia sees the Kyiv interim government as illegitimate and disagrees
with its approach of European integration, it can be suggested that Russia
feared that the Kharkov-deal might be questioned. Arguing from a geopolitical
perspective, the Russian government was not prepared to risk losing its BSF on
the Crimea. The fact that Sevastopol has been incorporated as an individual
subject along with the Crimea into the Russian Federation, indicates its
relevance. Furthermore, it can be assumed that Russia needed a precedent to
put its foot down in its ‘Near Abroad’ of which it has been excluded and fears
losing influence. The Crimea can be regarded as a pawn in the struggle for
power in international relations.
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Figure 5.3: Ukraine and the disputed peninsula of Crimea (Source: author’s
design).
all GUAM members—suﬀered a severe violation of its authority and
had to surrender part of its territory. As in the Georgian case, GUAM
did not react in any military or violent manner to the Crimea situa-
tion, which underscores its character as a non-security organisation.
The secretary general Valeri Chechelashvili clearly denounced Russian
actions as violating principles of international law (Chechelashvili
2014). He reiterated GUAM’s position on domestic conflict resolu-
tion, emphasising the respect of the inviolability of internationally
recognised borders and territorial integrity as well as non-interference.
Statements of the individual members vary between strong criticism
from Georgia and a more subdued comment from Azerbaijan. The
common denominator is the demand for respect of the territorial
integrity of all the states (.guam-organization.org).
The annexation of the Crimea was followed by a continuing threat
to Ukraine’s territorial integrity in the Donbass region in Eastern
Ukraine. Russia acknowledges its support for the so-called separatist
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movement that strives for independence and has also argued widely
for an annexation to the Russian Federation (Ukraine-Analysen 2014a:
32ﬀ). Today, the new Ukrainian government is fighting against a
mixture of citizens and mercenaries that rely on Russian financial and
military support. Analysts and diplomats alike are unsure about the
motives of Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. The immediate objectives
seem to be, on the one hand, to continue destabilization of Ukraine
either by pushing for an abundant federal status or by installing a
frozen conflict (Meister 2014b: 12; Wipperfürth 2014: 12). On the
other hand, the current Ukrainian government shall be weakened
and replaced by a pro-Russian government. Both objectives aim at
securing Russian influence on Ukrainian domestic and foreign politics.
On a larger scale, Russia intends to prevent a full Western turn by
Ukraine (Wipperfürth 2014: 26; Simon 2015: 2). Interestingly, both
Stefan Meister (2014b: 13) and Christian Wipperfürth (2014: 26)
maintain that an annexation of Donbass would be against Russian
interest, because it is simply too expensive. From an international
perspective, Russia seems to be interested in securing its current
international power status by maintaining its role as the hegemon in
post-Soviet space. From a domestic perspective, Russia intends to
counterbalance policy models in one of the PSS that would pose as
an alternative to Putin’s Russia. In order to maintain its domestic
power base Vladimir Putin is interested in discrediting all attempts of
‘Westernisation’. However, both explanations imply a status of limited
sovereignty for Ukraine and underscore why GUAM as a sovereignty
strategy keeps existing.
The case of Azerbaijan is again diﬀerent. On the one hand, agree-
ments with Russia in 2003 and 2004 deepened military cooperation
(Nygren 2008: 111f); Russia provides military equipment as well as
training facilities for Azerbaijani oﬃcers in Russia (Nygren 2008: 112)
and at present, Russia rents the Azerbaijani radar station in Gabala
(Nygren 2008: 111).54 On the other hand, the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict stirs discord between both states (Alieva 2011: 197f). Al-
54 Talks about the prolongation of the contract after 2012 are continuing.
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though Moscow presents itself as a neutral broker, Azerbaijan is
deeply worried by Russia becoming increasingly partisan with Ar-
menia, especially by providing Armenia with weaponry (Molchanov
& Yevdokimov 2005: 194; Sabanadze 2002: 20). The Armenian
occupation of Nagorno Karabakh and its surrounding territories are
perceived to have been possible only with Russian support (Raptis
1998: 5). Russia is being frequently accused of employing a strategy
of controlled instability in the South Caucasus (Freitag-Wirminghaus
2008: 54f.). There are reports that accuse Russia of eschewing conflict
settlement in a move to gain control over energy resources in the region
(ib.; Raptis 1998: 17). Various reports indicate that Russia follows a
double strategy, supporting either Azerbaijan or Armenia, depending
on its own interest at a time (Sabanadze 2002: 20; Lynch 2001: 17).
Azerbaijan regards regional cooperation within the GUAM format
as an instrument to restore the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan,
‘to consolidate post-Soviet independence’ (Alieva 2011: 205). The
restoration of territorial integrity even dominates over the exploitation
of oil and gas reserves on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy agenda (Mayer
2007: 1).
Despite various signed documents ‘Russia’s lacking respect for its
neighbors’ territorial integrity’ remains (Aslund 2009: 1). Russia’s
challenge to territorial integrity is a violation of external sovereignty.
GUAM has been frequently employed for diplomatic consultation and
coordination in international organisations to strengthen their status
as sovereign states, particularly on territorial issues (cf. Parakhonskiy
2008: 111, Pinzar 2008: 128). GUAM allows for a concerted approach
towards Russia, which is perceived as the main obstacle for regional
conflict resolution. This multilateral approach in diplomacy is believed
to increase the eﬃcacy of each country’s national foreign policy and
would also strengthen GUAM itself (Chechelashvili 2008: 12).
5.3.2.2 Challenging Equality and Self-Determination
Along with equality, Russian dominance also questions the right of
self-determination. Russia’s approach to treat the post-Soviet space
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Figure 5.4: Azerbaijan, Armenia and the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh
(Source: author’s design).
as its exclusive space of action (cf. Fischer 2014: 1) is an expression
of Russian patronage towards the four states. The GUAM states
demand the acceptance of their individual foreign policy agendas and
Russia continuously disregards their right to choose their own alle-
giances and their own integration model (Moshes 2010: 1; cf. Tolstov
2008: 34; cf. Malfliet et al. 2007: 3; Fischer 2014: 1). As part of
Russia’s zone of interest, they are exposed to Russia’s interference in
their domestic and foreign policies to such an extent that the former
Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov openly threatened Ukraine and
Georgia, should they become NATO members (Nygren 2008: 157).
Russia was also irritated by the increasing engagement of the US in
domestic Georgian aﬀairs (by invitation of the Georgian government)
and strictly demanded a prohibition of deployment of foreign forces on
Georgian territory (Nygren 2008: 123; Devdariani 2005: 183). Putin’s
speech at the Munich security conference in 2007 highlighted again
its demand for non-interference in Russia’s near abroad.55 Moscow’s
55 The original is not accessible anymore, but a summary can be found on
http://bit.ly/1K311kV; last: 24.04.2014.
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actions question the sovereignty of GUAM members, regarding them
as not capable of having their own foreign policy approach. Hence,
opting for non-Russian integration is one articulation of sovereignty.
All GUAM states share the problem of being an interest sphere of
both Russia and EU/US (Munteanu 2005: 263). However, the sover-
eignty of the four states has been challenged by Russia only. Russia
is not used to sovereign actions of PSS; if such actions occur, they are
associated with manipulation by external actors, strengthening the
Russian conviction that PSS are rather the puppets of others (either
of the US or EU) (Fischer 2014: 1; Pourchot 2008: 2). Thus, Russia
is mixing up ‘sovereign mindedness’ of PSS with being ‘pro-Western’
or ‘anti-Russian’ (Pourchot 2008: 2). Although PSS today are no
longer ‘pushover pawns’, Russia is still able to influence the policy
agenda of its close neighbours (Moroney & Konoplyov 2002: 180). To
the surprise of many analysts, it can even change the the facts on the
ground—although not entirely. Ukraine and Georgia today are not
able to govern their entire territory. In 2014, Russia demonstrated
on the Crimea that the self-determination of Ukraine ends where
Russian interests are concerned. Only a limited sovereignty for PSS
is tolerable; with this, Russia rejects the principle of equality among
states.
GUAM members follow an ambivalent bilateral policy towards
Russia. Ukraine, for example, is fully aware that it needs a consensus
with Russia for its Western integration; thus, good and stable rela-
tions with Russia are essential (Fischer 2008: 122). This is one reason
for President Yanukovich’s hesitation to ratify the EU Association
Agreement. Yet, it fears Russian dominance due to its strong depen-
dence (Molchanov & Molchanova 2010: 7; Coppieters 1998: 199; cf.
Piroshkov & Parakhonskiy 1999: 3ﬀ). Russian pressure, in form of
sudden trade barriers for Ukrainian products, signaled that Russia
preferes Ukrainian membership in its customs union instead of a
Ukrainian free trade agreement with the EU.56 Moldovans are divided
56 With the so called ‘chocolate war’ in 2013, Russia stopped all imports of
Ukrainian sweets (Ukraine-Analysen 2013b).
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whether to denounce Russia as an occupant or to cooperate cordially
(Munteanu 2005: 262) and Azerbaijan practices a multi-vector policy
similar to Ukraine’s (Valiyev 2011: 7), avoiding a critique of Russian
domestic policy in order to prevent any ‘colour revolutions’ at home or
abroad (Freitag-Wirminghaus 2008: 67). Yet, Russia’s ‘taking sides’
in Armenia deeply disturbs Baku (Valiyev 2011: 7). The divided
approach can also be perceived in Georgia, where, despite playing a
heavy anti-Russian rhetoric, Russian investment is welcome as are
Russian citizens (Papava 2009: 199; Rtskhiladze 2007: 96). Leaving
Georgia aside, most PSS were interested in and did pursue good
relations with Russia, despite simultaneous intentions to get closer to
the Euro-Atlantic community (Pourchot 2008: 111). This bifurcation
seems to be characteristic of all for the unhappy marriages between the
post-Soviet states and Russia—neither complete isolation nor equally
beneficial cooperation seems possible. Although Russian intervention
into Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 was a
great shock to all PSS, they fear less their complete annexation to
a Greater Russian Federation, than of becoming a puppet state—a
quasi-sovereignty (cf. Hawrylyshyn 2005: 119). This anxiety is fur-
thered by the Russian shift toward economic assertiveness, creating a
combined threat to political and economic sovereignty (Pourchot 2008:
2; Hawrylyshyn 2005: 119; cf. chapter 8.3.4). For Ruslan Grinberg
(2003: 345), Russia’s size is the main obstacle for any integration
project in post-Soviet space: Due to Russia’s immense proportions,
equality among partners is diﬃcult. Neither does Russia want to
subordinate to a majority of minor states, nor do PSS want to be
dominated by Russia (ib.).57 The fear of Russian ‘empire ambitions’
caused the defection of other PSS and ensued a greater emphasis on
sovereignty (Grinberg 2005: 6). This may shed some light on the
popularity of bilateralism among the PSS.
57 This problem was addressed by regionalism scholars with the demand for
cohesion of the political and economic system. It poses also a problem for
governance within Russia itself.
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5.3.2.3 Challenging Domestic Authority
Russia questions the sovereignty of GUAM members by interfering
into domestic aﬀairs. As such, Russia violates the core principle of
sovereignty: the absence of a higher authority above the state. Rus-
sia is taking advantage of weak domestic governance within GUAM
states. A vivid example of interfering into domestic aﬀairs is Rus-
sia’s taking sides in national elections. During presidential elections
in Ukraine in 2004, Russia overtly supported presidential candidate
Viktor Yanukovich, Leonid Kuchma’s designated successor (Zagorski
2005: 75; Trenin 2007: 200). Moscow denounced accusations of
election fraud, when Ukrainians took to the streets to protest the
2004 results (Trenin 2007: 201). In Georgia, Russia has been accused
of financing political groups opposing the Georgian government of
Mikhail Saakashvili (Nodia 2007: 17). In Moldova, the communist
party and their pro-Russian candidate Vladimir Voronin could count
on Moscow’s approval (Vrabie 2012: 370). The case of Azerbaijan
diﬀers; since neither Vladimir Putin nor Ilham Aliev are interested
in weakening their domestic power base by democratisation, both
endorse each other’s authoritarian governments (Nygren 2008: 113;
Pleines & Schröder 2005: 28). Russia supports Azerbaijan in elections,
and confirms them to have been carried out according to the law (cf.
Babajew 2007: 58f). Nevertheless, bilateral relations are far from
being harmonious. Azerbaijan was deeply disappointed by Russian
resistance to crucial infrastructure projects within its country, like the
BTC pipeline or the Baku-Supsa pipeline (Valiyev 2011: 1; Zagorski
2005: 70). Azerbaijan is also irritated by Russian resistance to clear
the Caspian Sea status, which impedes bringing Caspian gas into
Europe (Valiyev 2011: 1; Zagorski 2005: 70). Moreover, Baku still
remembers Boris Yeltsin’s pressure to join Russian-led regional insti-
tutions as well as the first Chechen war, which saw most Azeris on the
Chechen side (Valiyev 2011: 2).58 Finally, the Russian-Georgian war
58 During the second Chechen war, Azerbaijan supported Russia and in return,
Russian business men increased their activity in Azerbaijan (Valiyev 2011: 2).
Nevertheless, Baku shares with Tbilisi objections against Russia’s Caucasus
policy (Mayer 2007: 8).
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questioned Russia’s role as a neutral broker in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict (Valiyev 2011: 1).
Cultural debates have been a frequent issue in bilateral relations
between Russia and, for example, Moldova or Ukraine, which have
a considerable amount of ethnic Russians.59 In addition, Russia
frequently uses the protection of Russian citizens abroad to justify its
interference into other states (cf. Allison 2008: 1166; Fischer 2014: 2;
Halbach 1995: 3). But it is also concerned about the russkoyazychnye
(russian speakers) in general, which induces a special Russian interest
into its neighbours’ aﬀairs every time remainders of Russian culture
are aﬀected (Lam 2007: 4f). A serious threat to the sovereignty of
the GUAM states has been the deliberate dissemination of Russian
passports to residents outside Russian borders, increasing, thus, its
leverage over its neighbours. This has been reported primarily in
the Georgian exclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Littlefield
2009; Nygren 2008: 246; Rzchiladse 2007: 72; Devdariani 2005: 177),
but also in Transnistria (Allison 2008: 1167; Popescu 2006: 5).60 It
came to no one’s surprise that one of the explanations the Russian
government provided for its invasion in the South Ossetian region in
2008 was to protect its citizens abroad (Allison 2008: 1152; Mühlfried
2010: 8f). In addition, historical events are being reassessed and
often lead to new interpretations by the newly independent states,
criticising the role of Tsarist or Soviet Russia and causing anger and
opposition in Moscow (cf. Gallina 2006: 14; Bugajski et al. 2008: 21).
However, Kitty Lam (2007: 19) hesitates to view language debates as
a leverage of Russian foreign policy towards Moldova or Ukraine; she
maintains that Russian interference should be regarded as coming
from Russia’s search for its own identity. Vice versa, strengthening
59 Ukraine entails the largest Russian-speaking population outside Russian bor-
ders (Trenin 2007: 199). The Russian Orthodox Church ‘regard[s] Ukraine,
alongside with Russia itself and Belarus, as an inviolable part of its ‘canonical
territory’ ’ (Trenin 2007: 199).
60 Restrictive visa-regimes are an additional constraint. For example, in 2001
Russia introduced an obligatory visa for Georgian citizens, but excluded
Abkhazian people (Popescu 2006: 5).
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the Romanian-Moldovan language was part of Moldova’s nation and
identity building process (Büscher 1996: 77)—the government was
interested in ensuring the rights of Russian speakers to oﬀer Russia
no justification to intervene. Moldova’s language policy in the first
years of its independence have been approved by delegations from
the Council of Europe, the UN and the OSCE (Socor 1995b: 341).
Recent events in Ukraine weaken Lam’s argument though: After the
Kyiv interim government, which was installed after the insurrection
on the 22nd of February 2014, reduced the Russian language from an
oﬃcial to a regional language (Malygina 2014: 5), Russia spurred fears
among ethnic Russians in Ukraine that their cultural heritage, the
‘Russian way of life’ would be in danger (Malygina 2014: 4).61 The
language debate has been employed as a justification to occupy and
annex the Crimea and promote the separatist movement in Ukraine’s
Donbass region. On the Crimea, the discrimination against Ukrainian
passport holders right after the referendum aimed at cementing the
annexation and installing leverage for future debates on the status of
the Crimea.62
5.3.2.4 Challenging Economic Sovereignty
This chapter focuses on Russian challenges to the economic sover-
eignty of the four GUAM states. The first part of this sub-chapter
addresses the relationship of dependence between the four states and
Russia, with the energy sector as a special case. The second part
focuses on the shift in Russia’s foreign policy during Vladimir Putin’s
incumbency towards more assertiveness in relations with the four
GUAM members. It will be argued that this shift increased fears for
61 A real danger to Russian nationals in the form of a humanitarian crisis or a
genocide that would justify R2P measures under international law did not
exist at the time.
62 Disinformation campaigns—i. e. the dissemination of wrong or biased in-
formation through media channels—particularly TV—also question domestic
sovereignty. Russian media, which is widely consumed in GUAM countries,
has been frequently employed to spur discord (cf. Malygina 2014: 5; Heller
2014: 2). Yet, this dimension has to remain outside of this dissertation due to
its limited scope.
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sovereignty violations, firstly, by the growing use of economic leverage
for political objectives and, secondly, by Russia’s new integration
approach.
Let us begin with a look at the relationship of dependence between
Russia and the four GUAM states. Interdependent relationships,
particularly in the world economy, are nothing new. GUAM members
depend on Russia economically in various sectors and in varying
degrees (cf. Piroshkov & Parakhonskiy 1999: 3ﬀ; cf. Fischer 2008:
122; cf. Löwenhardt 2005: 19) and dependence aﬀects all three
economic factors—labour, capital and goods.
The smaller GUAM participants of Georgia, Moldova and Azer-
baijan benefit from labour migration to the Russian market and the
ensuing income from remittances (Valiyev 2011: 1; Devdariani 2005:
198; Zagorski 2005: 68). All four depend on trade with Russia, namely
imports (cf. Vinokurov et al. 2009: 119). Russian investment dom-
inates in the financial sector among all PSS, which are habitually
shunned by Western investors (cf. Prohnitchi 2005: 108; Pourchot
2008: 102; cf. Nygren 2008: 221). But dependence continues also
concerning the debts of the GUAM states to Russia (cf. Aslund et
al. 1999: 54). Most debts of PSS originated in the beginning of the
1990s and are related to energy imports from Russia (passim Hishow
2002).63 At the end of the year 2013, Putin granted Janukovich’s
government a new credit; when as an outcome of the Euro-Maidan
movement a new Ukrainian government had been installed, Russia
stopped the credit payment as well as the gas discounts that went
along with it. Russia also uses its position as the biggest lender to
Ukraine to block a new debt agreement that would allow the new
Ukrainian government to receive additional financial support from
the IMF. In addition, Russian investments in strategic sectors, such
as in pipelines, telecommunication, electricity or banking, increase
63 For example, Ukraine’s economic situation in general and the trade relationship
with Russia deteriorated due to a debt crisis. Barter trades were common in
the 1990s between the PSS and have been only slowly replaced by monetary
transactions (Astrov & Havlik 2007: 128ﬀ).
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the dependence of the GUAM countries on Russia (Dubovyk 2010: 2;
Nygren 2008: 151; Rtskhiladze 2007: 96). Particularly Ukraine’s huge
industrial sector is tightly interwoven with the Russian one, making
complete independence impossible. Some experts (Hishow 2002: 8)
even fear that the Ukrainian economy may become completely de-
pendent upon Russia, and that such economic dependency would
eﬀect political sovereignty as well. As Spillman et al. (1999: 331) has
noted, that ‘Ukraine catches cold, if Russia sneezes’. Nevertheless,
one has to bear in mind that Ukraine also cooperates with Russia in
the military-industrial sector, particularly in the production of mili-
tary equipment, construction of airplanes, and in space exploration,
underlining again the mutual dependency of the two, which is not
paralleled by other GUAM participants (Hawrylyshyn 2005: 119; cf.
Trenin 2007: 209).
The GUAM states are concerned for their sovereignty, because
economic dependence favours Russia, their former metropolitan cen-
tre. It is an asymmetric dependence and economic dependence on
Russia is strongest in the energy sector: Without securing energy
distribution, no national economy is able to survive; it is a prerequisite
for economic development (cf. Hallaert et al. 2011: 63) and, thus,
for national sovereignty (Pourchot 2008: 79; Abdelal 2002: 2; Hishow
2002: 7). Russia is the most important energy resource distributor
to the CIS states, an important transit country, but at the same
time also consuming the transit services of its neighbours (Grinberg
2005: 8f; Aslund et al. 1999: 55). Moscow allowed the usage of its
pipelines for other than Russian hydrocarbons only to a small extent,
maintaining the traditional relationship of dependence and enforcing
the development of various new pipeline projects in the region (Aslund
et al. 1999: 53). Although Georgeta Pourchot (2008: 79) speaks of
a mutually dependent relationship between Russia and other PSS
in transit, supply and demand of energy resources, this is only the
case for GUAM member Ukraine (cf. Pleines 2008b: 10; Götz 2007:
152). Even after the future completion of Nordstream, Bluestream
and the extension of the Jamal pipeline, Ukraine will remain the
major transit country for Russian gas deliveries to Europe (Götz
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2007: 159). In contrast to Russia, it also possesses various gas storage
facilities. Thus, analysts assumed that Ukraine won’t loose relevance
for Russia. Reversely, Ukraine will depend on Russian energy imports
as long as domestic energy consumption cannot be reduced to a sound
average and without alternative pipeline routes installed (Patronyk &
Zhovkva 2010). During the 1990s, Ukraine accumulated huge debts
for Russian gas supplies and used transit fees and illegal extraction
of Russian gas to alleviate the tense delivery situation (Pleines 2008b:
11).64 Today, the Ukrainian government subsidises domestic prices for
private consumers, thus, further growing the budget deficit (Pleines
2008b: 11). However, the situation changed after 2014, with the new
Ukrainian government, the annexation of the Crimea and the desta-
bilization in the Donbass region, both Ukraine and Russia changed
their dependence relationship fundamentally: Ukraine pushed for gas
imports from EU-countries via the Slovak pipeline. Russia instead,
pushes forward to install new transit routes that will make them
independent from Ukraine.65
Moldova is completely dependent on energy imports from Russia
(Munteanu 2005: 75; Nygren 2008: 241; Stent 2007: 10).66 Moldova
disposes of limited bargaining power, because it plays neither a signifi-
cant role as a transit country nor is its demand for Russian gas decisive
for Russian revenues (cf. Vinhas de Souza 2008: 77). Without taking
into account Transnistria, Moldova can produce only 30-35% of its
needed electricity (Prohnitchi 2005: 113).67 Moreover, Moldova has
payment problems as enterprises and consumers are lazy payers and
smuggling is common, making it more exposed to Russian pressure
64 In 2000, Gazprom initiated negotiations on an international gas consortium to
control gas pipelines via Ukrainian territory and stop gas stealing by Ukraine.
However, no agreement could be reached (Pleines 2008b: 10f).
65 The present transit agreement ends in 2019. Russia said it will not prolong
the agreement; instead, Russian gas will be transported to Europe via Turkish
Stream (Zeit.de 9.6.15).
66 Moldovan facilities are technically constructed for Russian gas (cf. Prohnitchi
2005: 111).
67 One of the greatest electricity plants (thermal power) is situated in Transnistria
(Munteanu 2005: 77).
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(Munteanu 2005: 77). The issue is even more complicated, because
most debts for energy are held by the Transnistrian government, where
Chisinau has no control over expenditures (Nygren 2008: 241).
During the first years of GUAM, Azerbaijan depended on Rus-
sian energy imports. Realising autonomous pipeline and exploration
projects, Azerbaijan could decouple from Russian transit routes (cf.
Nygren 2008: 241f.).68 Today, Azerbaijan is almost independent from
Russian imports (Mamedov 2006: 1) and even selling gas to Russia
(Papava & Tokmazishvili 2010: 110; cf. Nygren 2008: 241f; Hosp
2011). Due to Baku’s multivector foreign policy, Russia had also
been included in the so-called Contract of the Century, (Zagorski
2005: 66).69 In 2013, Azerbaijan decided that gas from its reserves
in Shah Deniz II will be delivered to Europe via the TANAP and
TAP-pipelines.70
68 The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline was built in 1999 (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 165). In
2007, it was already technically used up and oil delivery through the pipeline
was stopped until renovation and a new delivery agreement was concluded
(Tomberg 2007: 45). The Baku-Tbilissi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) opened in
2006 (Astrov & Havlik 2008: 165). Oil from Azerbaijan to Georgian ports at
the Black Sea has also been transported by rail (Kulick & Yakobashvili 2008:
25). The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (also named South Caucasus
pipeline) was commissioned in 2007 (Mangott & Westphal 2008: 162).
69 The contract of the century organised a consortium which has been granted
concessions for extracting hydrocarbons. The Consortium Azerbaijan Interna-
tional Operating Company (AIOC) is comprised of companies from the US,
Japan, Turkey, Norway and Azerbaijan under the leadership of the British
Petroleum Company. Sources vary on the shares each partner holds due
to regular changes (cf. Naval 2005: 208; Nanay 2009: 116; Hishow 2002:
19; Meister 2014a). According to several sources, Russia presently partici-
pates only with Lukoil in the gas project of Shah Deniz (Nanay 2009: 116;
http://on.bp.com/1NKWncS).
70 With this decision, Azerbaijan decided against the Nabucco-pipeline that has
been favoured by the European Commission. The pipeline route will cross
Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania and Italy. Shakh Deniz II is
planned to deliver 16 billion m3 per year. The pipeline will be managed by
the same Consortium that oversees the other gas field, with small changes in
the distribution of shares amongst shareholders (Meister 2014a).
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Georgia is heavily indebted to Russia for past energy deliveries
(Nygren 2008: 241). Major energy producing stations in Georgia
are owned today by Russian companies (Chomachidze 2011; Nygren
2008: 244; Reisner & Kvatchadze 2005: 27). RAO ES, Russia’s state
electric company, bought 75% of the Georgian electricity distribution
company in 2003 (Nygren 2008: 150; Reisner & Kvatchadze 2005: 27).
This includes the management of several power plants, Khrami-1 and
2 and Mtkvari, and 50% of the trans-energy nuclear power plant (Ny-
gren 2008: 151). Until 2006, Russia was Georgia’s main gas supplier
(95%) and delivered also 53% of its electricity (Vinhas de Souza 2008:
76; Halbach 2007a: 2; cf. Reisner & Kvatchadze 2005: 27; cf. Mayer
2007: 6). Bilateral tensions in winter 2006/7 induced a price increase
for Russian gas from 110 USD to 235 USD (Vinhas de Souza 2008:
76). To avoid increasing dependence on Russia, Georgia turned to
Azerbaijan for its gas deliveries even though its neighbour demanded
more or less the same high gas price (ib.).
Suﬃce it to note that GUAM states did benefit from low energy
prices from Russia during the 1990s. Nevertheless, they perceived
the asymmetric relationship of dependency to their former ruling
power as aﬀecting their sovereignty. Only Azerbaijan could reduce its
dependence on Russia by developing its hydrocarbon export sector
and add export routes bypassing Russia. Georgia also succeeded
in reducing its dependency on Russia by substituting a number of
Russian import products, particularly hydrocarbons; however, both
developments are not a result of GUAM policy.
Let us now turn to the second part of this chapter and the argument
that a shift in Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 21st
century (cf. Trenin 2007: 195) increased existing fears for losing
sovereignty among GUAM participants. It can be suggested that
it is one explanation for the longevity of GUAM, fostering also its
institutionalisation process into a regional organisation.
The shift towards more assertiveness culminates in a stronger em-
phasis on Russian interests (cf. Löwenhardt 2005: 23f; Fischer 2005:
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11f) and the ambition to regain Russia’s great power status (Trenin
2007: 195). Russian economic policy towards the PSS in general
and GUAM countries in particular has always been characterised by
dominance and a state-led approach of economic cooperation (Grin-
berg 2005: 14).71 The shift is characterised by an increasing practice
of applying economic leverages for political objectives, on the one
hand, and the pursuit of a unilateral economic integration model,
on the other. In a first step, I will discuss the evidence of a shift
in Russia’s foreign policy. Next, I will present three examples for
the employment of economic leverage for political objectives: cutting
subsidies (a), trade wars (b), and gas disputes (c). Lastly, I elaborate
on the new integration model that Russia pursues in post-Soviet space.
There is consent among scholars that a shift in Russian foreign
policy towards its post-Soviet neighbours took place with the first
presidency of Vladimir Putin, even though scholars are divided about
the nature of this shift. Since Vladimir Putin became president,
growing Russian assertiveness in foreign policy has been frequently
scrutinised (Löwenhardt 2005; Fischer 2005: 11; Wenger 2009: 227;
Tsygankov 2006: 678). Enhancing economic prosperity has become
the driver of Russian foreign policy (Nygren 2008: 238; cf. Trenin
2007: 197). Yet, Putin’s incumbency alone is no suﬃcient explanation
for this turn in foreign policy. There is a broad consensus that the
fast increasing revenues from sales of Russian hydrocarbons prepared
the basis for such a shift towards more self-confidence and greater
assertiveness (Löwenhardt 2005: 23; Indans 2007: 132; Trenin 2007:
196f., cf. Sherr 2006: 162). Although Dmitri Trenin (2011: 81) assents
to the view that Russia changed its approach towards its neighbours
from ‘hard control’ towards ‘soft domination’, he refutes the notion of
dominance in Russia’s relations with its neighbours and terms Russian
foreign policy as an ‘ambition to play a leading role in economic and
cultural fields’ (2011: 142). Notwithstanding, at least in the economic
71 Within the CIS, for example, Russia was interested in binding other PSS into
CIS agreements, while avoiding compliance with the agreements itself (cf. CIS
free trade agreement from 1994; Aslund 2009: 2).
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area he admits, ‘Russia still treats the new states as less than equals’
(2011: 172). Andrei P. Tsygankov defends Russian assertiveness as
being ‘post-imperial and largely defensive’ (2006: 684). For Georgeta
Pourchot (2008: 110f) there is no doubt that Russian actions reflect
its claim for leadership and show a propensity for inequality in its
relations with other PSS.
Although every Russian government has used the asymmetric de-
pendence of the PSS as leverage (Prohnitchi 2005: 112), the Russian
approach has been modified in the last years; the critical point is
that Russia seems to aim at increasing or at least maintaining this
asymmetric dependence of GUAM states, avoiding win-win situations
for its GUAM partners.72 This shift towards more assertiveness in-
creased sovereignty concerns among the four GUAM member states.
Russia’s bargaining power, which is frequently applied for political
objectives, challenges not only the economic but also the political
sovereignty of GUAM states. Some analysts accuse Russia of utilising
economic dependency as retaliation for political disobedience (Sokov
2006: 3f). Others instead underline the justified economic motives
for Russia’s policy (Trenin 2011: 37).73 Anders Aslund (2003: 1)
asserts that Russia’s disrespect for others’ sovereignty is reflected
in the way it is putting through its own economic policies without
caring for the interests and sovereignty of its neighbours. Russia
practices ‘de-sovereignisation’ (Popescu & Wilson 2009: 58) in its
Eastern neighbourhood by utilising economic crisis or applying eco-
nomic instruments to take over strategic assets like pipelines.
The increased employment of economic leverage for political ob-
jectives can be illustrated with three examples: cutting subsidies (a),
72 The shift in Russian foreign policy is not limited to Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine—gas prices, for example, increased for Armenia or
Belarus as well (Trenin 2007: 204). Yet, Russia’s pressure seemed to be more
intense on the GUAM members than it was on Central Asian states and may
shed light on the question of why exactly those four states decided to form
GUAM.
73 The shift of Russia’s foreign policy was characterised by a greater importance
of tangible benefits. Russia turned towards numbers (cf. Trenin 2007: 198).
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trade wars (b), and gas disputes (c). During the 1990s, the PSS
enjoyed reduced prices for various Russian products. Cutting those
subsidies (a), namely for energy products, was a serious blow for
GUAM countries. Hitherto, threats to their political sovereignty had
at least been coupled with economic privileges. As a hegemon, Russia
protected the four states from the realities of sovereign economies
in a globalised world by oﬀering preferential prices and conditions.
However, in the 2000s, Russia rechecked its balance and estimated
that it is getting little in return for those subsidies. Hence, the four
states either had to submit fully to Russia’s political agenda or stop
at least costing the Russian government money. Thus, Russia started
charging market prices for its export products.74 If the PSS were
directing their focus to the West, than it is the West that should
pay for the PSS’ failing economies (Putin cited in Makarychev 2008:
16). Cutting subsidies has been particularly eminent in the gas sector.
For example, a debt agreement was reached between Ukraine and
Gazprom in 2004, which also put an end to the gas-for-transit-swap
deals (Pleines 2008b: 11); Gazprom seems to strive for ending the
barter deals to receive cash instead. Although Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine have no legal claim to privileged treatment by
Russia, they perceived the turn to realpolitik as a serious aﬀront.75
Another example of economic leverage in Russia’s foreign policy are
trade wars (b), which are particularly common with GUAM members.
In 2005/06, Moldova’s major export products—alcoholic beverages—
were
banned from its biggest export market, Russia, on health grounds
(cf. Chivriga 2008: 3; cf. Nygren 2008: 98ﬀ). The trade retaliation
74 Naturally, it is debated what should be termed a ‘market price’. Particularly
the current gas price for Ukraine can be considered to be above market prices
for gas.
75 Pretensions in post-Soviet space are two-sided and explain to some extent
the failure of regionalism in post-Soviet space. There is ‘Russia’s demand for
primacy’ on the one hand, and the demand, on the other hand, by the PSS
that Russia, as the richest country, must pay for everything (Aslund et al.
1999: 178f).
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should be understood as a reaction to Molodva’s not signing the
Kozak memorandum proposed by Russia to solve the Transnistrian
conflict (Vrabie 2012: 368). Today, the Moldovan government has
still not succeed in regaining the necessary certificates to re-enter the
Russian market. In 2006, Russia issued a prohibition of Georgian
wine and mineral water (Smirnov 2007a: 138; Halbach 2007a: 2f),
which constitute Georgia’s main export products. The tense relation-
ship between Vladimir Putin and the Georgian President Mikhail
Saakashvili set in motion an intensive tit-for-tat-game: the extraction
of Russian spies from Georgia, the subsequent complete shut down
of Russian-Georgian air, road, rail and mail connexion (2006), the
deportation of Georgians from Russia (2006), among other things.
(Halbach 2007a: 2). In contrast to Moldova, Georgia was more suc-
cessful in accessing alternative markets with its alcoholic beverages
(cf. Reisner & Kvatchadze 2005: 27). Saakashwili’s successor as
Georgian president, Bidzina Ivanishvili (2012-13), reduced tensions
between his country and Russia and was thanked with the permission
to reapply for the wine and mineral water certificates necessary to
enter the Russian market. Ukraine experienced various disruptions
of its cross-border trade with Russia by sudden tariﬀ trade barriers.
In 2013, Russia halted customs procedures at the joint border for
Ukrainian sweets (Ukraine-Analysen 2013a: p. 14). The move has
been associated with the resistance of the Ukrainian government to
join Russia’s customs union while simultaneously pursuing the ratifi-
cation of an EU Association Agreement.
Gas disputes (c) are a further indicator for the growing usage
of economic leverages in Russian foreign policy. Ukraine suﬀered
from halted gas deliveries in 2005/06 and in 2008/09 (Malyhina 2009:
41f). The gas war aimed at weakening the new Ukrainian govern-
ment, which has been elected against Russian preferences. Since 2010,
Ukrainian diplomats continue to renegotiate better gas conditions
for the gas contract from 2009 (Haran 2011: 2; Dubovyk 2010: 1).
This time, Russia aims at coercing Kyiv into participating as a full
member in its upgraded customs union, making the ratification of
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the Association Agreement with the EU diﬃcult (Charap & Darden
2013). In fall 2013, the Russian government, together with Gazprom,
oﬀered to Yanukovich’s government a discount on the Russian gas
price that was combined with a credit of 15 billion USD. This aid
package was aimed at supporting the Ukrainian economy which was
facing default, and was oﬀered by Russia after Ukraine had stopped
the ratification of the EU Association Agreement. In February 2014,
when Yanukovich’s government was ousted, Russia halted the next
installment of its credit. This was followed by an annulment of the
gas discount in April 2014. Russia did not only revoke the latest gas
discount, but also the gas discount agreed upon in the Kharkov-Deal
(2010) in exchange for the lease of the Sevastopol navy base, arguing
that with the annexation of the Crimea the whole deal would lose its
validity (Balser 2014: 17). Russia claims the reimbursement of the
entire gas discount granted between 2010-2014 (ib.).76, weakening the
interim government in Kyiv considerably. During Vladimir Putin’s
first term, gas exports to Moldova were halted every winter due to
outstanding debts (Nygren 2008: 96). However, gas disputes with
Russia have been less common for Moldova, which went through its
ultimate ‘gas-war’ with Russia in 2006 (Nygren 2008: 98ﬀ). In the
Georgian case, Russia was already using gas interruption as a foreign
policy instrument in winter 2000/01 (Devdariani 2005: 177). This was
repeated in 2004 and followed by a price-hike in 2006, leading finally
to the signing of a contract with Azerbaijan securing the import of
gas (Vinhas de Souza 2008: 76).
The second dimension of Russia’s shift towards more assertiveness
is the pursuit of a diﬀerent integration model. The new Russian
approach has been termed as ‘economisation’ (Fischer 2005: 14).
Celeste Wallander (2007: 118f) speaks of ‘transimperialism’, which she
conceives of as ‘a form of geopolitics through commercial relationships
and transnational patron-client relationships’. Having understood that
76 Russia argues that the discount has been granted for the future leasing of
Sevastopol. Since that is not happening, the already granted discount should
be paid back to Gazprom (Balser 2014: 17).
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a rebirth of the SU is impossible and that the CIS has failed to attract
the former socialist republics to an equivalent successor model, Russia
opted for an economic emphasis towards its post-Soviet neighbours (cf.
Trenin 2007: 198).77 However, this ‘belt of Good Neighbourhoods’
(Nikitin 2008: 27) along the Russian borders was going to be built
upon economic asymmetry—another form of coercion—and not on
balanced, harmonious relations. Russia’s understanding of integration
is unilateral, as it seeks to strengthen the asymmetric relationship
of dependence (cf. Aslund 2003: 1). Integration in this sense is not
based on increasing interdependence, it is about increasing asymmetric
dependence on Russia. Yet, this unilateral integration should not
be mixed up with re-integration in the sense of re-uniting all former
Soviet states with Russia, as Dmitri Trenin (2011: 142) remarked,
‘seeking advantages is not the same thing as seeking annexation’. The
new approach advocates reintegration of the post-Soviet space in
economic terms, by connecting and integrating economic sectors of
the PSS into Russia (Devdariani 2005: 197). This ‘liberal empire’
(Chubais 2003: 1) builds on Russian ownership of strategic assets
in PSS (Papava 2009: 204)—an integration model which proposes a
clear bottom-up component of Russian investors gaining gradually
more influence in the GUAM economies (Rtskhiladze 2007: 96).
Russian enterprises are encouraged to seek investment primarily in
post-Soviet markets.78 The concept would leave the decision about
the future of the post-Soviet space to Russia’s big enterprises, and far
reaching regional market liberalisation would pave the way for such
an idea (Grinberg 2003: 342). The Russian government and federal
agencies already follow this practice when applying economic leverage
to acquire strategic assets in its neighbouring states. The ‘asset for
77 Notwithstanding, Ivana Klympush (1999: 254) remarks that the Russian
political elite still plays with the idea of reuniting post-Soviet space, particularly
the Slavic states.
78 A leaked document from the Russian foreign ministry illustrates Russia’s
attempt to integrate Ukraine’s capabilities in economy and science, something
easily done by ‘making significant investments into some of the key sectors of
Ukrainian economy and using its position as the nearly sole energy supplier to
Ukraine’ (Hawrylyshyn 2005: 119; Haran 2011: 1).
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debt deals’ have already been mentioned; dependence is maintained or
even strengthened by swapping debts of the GUAM states to Russia
into shares of strategic assets (cf. Aslund et al. 1999: 54). By
such means, Gazprom controls today large parts of the Moldovan,
Ukrainian and Georgian pipeline systems (Aslund et al. 1999: 54;
Pleines 2008b: 11; Vinhas de Souza 2008: 77).79 Another example of
strategic Russian acquisitions is in the banking sector: The Russian
Foreign Trade Bank (VTB), for instance, is the main lender to the
Ukrainian government (Haran 2011: 2) and also possesses 51% of the
United Georgia Bank (Devdariani 2005: 198; Reisner & Kvatchadze
2005: 27). John Löwenhardt (2005: 20) estimates that about 40-
50% of Ukrainian industry is owned by Russian investors. Viktor
Yanukovich increasingly shows resistance to Russian dominance and
contests Russian business proposals with demands for more Ukrainian
benefits (Haran 2011: 3). In 2010, Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs
clashed in various privatisation cases (ib.).
In Moldova, particularly in Transnistria, Russia owns many en-
terprises, particularly in the wine industry (Löwenhardt 2005: 20).
Putin has also negotiated deals with RAO ES, Gazprom and the
Moldovan government: Low priced gas deliveries in exchange for
Russian participation in the ownership of Moldovan assets (shares
in gas companies, hydropower station and electricity company) (Ny-
gren 2008: 96). Moldova’s gas sector is controlled by Moldovgaz,
51% of which Gazprom obtained in turn for debt reliefs (Vinhas de
Souza 2008: 77). In 2005, Gazprom oﬀered Georgia to swap its part
of the Russian-Armenian pipeline in exchange for some debt relief.
Whereas Nygren (2008: 151) states, the deal was realised, Papava
(2009: 204) and Rtskhiladze (2007: 96) claim, it had been prevented
79 In the late 1990s, Ukraine and Russia agreed to charge 50% of Russian gas
supplies against the transit fee for Russian gas and oil to Europe. In addition,
lease of military bases, including the Black Sea Fleet port on the Crimea, was
financed with a reduction of Ukrainian debts (Pleines 2008a: 10). Ukraine long
avoided an asset swap for its outstanding debts (Pleines 2008b: 10f). With the
2005/6 gas crisis, a new deal was reached decoupling gas prices from transit
fees and increasing gas prices for Ukraine (Pleines 2008b: 11; cf. Vinhas de
Souza 2008: 78).
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thanks to American intervention. Rtskhiladze (2007: 98) concludes
that Saakashvili’s government was not aware of the economic side
of sovereignty. Coupled with the ambition to increase or at least
maintain the dependence of the four states on Russia, the Russian
government opposed attempts to reduce dependence. For example,
the Russian government reacted fiercely to infrastructure projects
that could decrease energy dependence (Valiyev 2011: 1).80
One might object that the promotion of the customs union is
demonstrating the opposite trend in Russian integration policy. Yet,
the customs union should be conceived as a pure economic integra-
tion project deprived of the usual political decorum, focusing on
real economic benefits for its participants: Starting with low politics
instead of high ones. From the various integration projects which
mushroomed in the post-Soviet area, Vladimir Putin chose the one
with the most economic potential and including the most faithful,
trustworthy and willing states. Yet, this state-led economic integra-
tion is a perfect supplement for Russia’s integration from below and
can easily embrace political issues as well. Russia’s endeavour to press
Ukraine for participation can be discerned as the traditional patro-
nising pattern and the intent to determine the integration direction
of its neighbourhood as well as integration projects themselves. It
should be considered that Russia’s approach towards the four GUAM
members took place amid stable preferences among the four states
for Western integration projects (cf. Trenin 2007: 196).
80 Russia and Iran strived to prevent an alternative transport route of Azerbaijani
oil and gas through the Caucasus (Papava et al. 2011: 165; Valiyev 2011: 1).
Georgia claims that during Georgian-Russian war in 2008, Russia was trying
to bomb the Caucasian pipelines (Papava et al. 2011: 165). Moreover, the
project of a new pipeline along the bottom of the Caspian Sea to deliver gas
from Turkmenistan/Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan and further to Europe depends
on the consent of all littoral states of the Caspian Sea (Smirnov 2007b: 78).
As Russia and Iran would have no advantage from that pipeline, negotiations
remain without decision (Preyger 2008: 65; Nygren 2008: 222).
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5.3.2.5 Unconsolidated Domestic Sovereignty
The four GUAM states are burdened with the dual task of strength-
ening their new sovereignty externally and domestically. Referring
to the assumption in ch. 5.1 that external sovereignty is linked to
domestic sovereignty, unconsolidated domestic sovereignty within the
GUAM states can contribute to explain why sovereignty is still of
particular importance. It has to be borne in mind that GUAM’s
agenda did not address the strengthening of domestic sovereignty. On
the one hand, unconsolidated sovereignty explains why sovereignty is
still an issue; on the other hand, unconsolidated domestic sovereignty
also aﬀects the sovereignty strategy adversely. I will explain that
connexion below. Domestic conflicts and cleavages as well as weak do-
mestic authority can be delineated as major causes for unconsolidated
domestic sovereignty. With this chapter, the focus is shifted from
regime type to the strength of domestic sovereignty as an explanation
for the eﬀectiveness of a sovereignty strategy.
Looking at domestic conflicts and cleavages as a source for un-
consolidated domestic sovereignty, much has already been said in
ch. 5.3.2.1. All four GUAM members are characterised by domestic
cleavages and/or secessionist movements, weakening their domes-
tic authority, making the situation even more critical, since Russia
frequently takes advantage of those domestic tensions.
Although Transnistria’s independence has not been internationally
recognised, the status quo of Transnistria causes various problems of
authority to the Moldovan government in Kishinau. It cannot control
its border with Ukraine which is particularly relevant for participation
in integration regimes such as GUAM’s free trade area or the free
trade area envisaged in the EU’s Association Agreement. At present,
Moldova has to rely on the assistance of the Ukrainian customs service
(Nygren 2008: 100). Moreover, the Moldovan government has no con-
trol over key economic complexes, which are primarily situated in the
disputed zone (Munteanu 2005: 73). From a political-administrative
perspective, the Moldovan government in Kishinau has no legal or
executive power over Transnistria. In addition, Moldova is aﬀected
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by a cleavage between ‘Romanophiles’ and ‘Rusophiles’ (Müller 2012:
23). Many Moldovans fear annexation by Romania, suspecting even
the EU of reducing Moldova to a ‘region’ under Romanian rule. For
instance, the Gagausian minority, whose autonomy status is consid-
ered to be solved, decided in a referendum in 2014 that they would
declare their independence, should the Moldovan government one
day agree to a unification with Romania (N.N. 2014). They also
object to a closer relation with the EU such as signing the Association
Agreement due in September 2014 (ib.).
Even before its independence in 1991, Georgia was troubled with
secessionist tendencies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian-
Georgian war in August 2008 led to the recognition of the two zones as
independent states by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru.81 In
addition, the ‘Rose Revolution’ has been utilised by the autonomous
region Adzharia to claim independence and had been retained only by
the threat of force (ICG 2004: 6ﬀ). Today, Georgia has no eﬀective
control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but continues to struggle
with refugees from both regions.
Azerbaijan is aﬀected by a territorial conflict with Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabach. The history of conflict reaches back until 1918,
but it was the collapse of the SU in 1991 that fired violent disputes.
Despite a negotiated ceasefire in 1994, skirmishes occur frequently
(ICG 2007: 1). The Azerbaijani government is also burdened by
the unsolved situation of refugees from the enclave (Astrov & Havlik
2008:133; ICG 2007).
Ukraine has not exhibited open domestic conflicts like the other
three GUAM members for a long time. There is a cleavage between
Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers that regularly tests national
unity (Bugajski et al. 2008: 2f). The bifurcation is rooted in history,
when Western Ukraine was annexed either to Poland or the Habsburg
Monarchy, and the Eastern part was part of Tsarist Russia (Kappeler
1994). The divide is also reflected in Ukraine’s political party struc-
ture, with the ‘Party of the Regions’ representing Eastern Ukraine
81 Vanuatu (2013) and Tuvalu (2014) retracted their recognition of South Ossetia
after negotiations with Georgia.
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and smaller opposition parties such as ‘Batkivchina’ (Fatherland) or
‘Svoboda’ (Freedom), representing Western Ukraine.82 In 2013/14,
the Euro-Maidan movement exemplified the divide in Ukraine. As a
repercussion, the latent conflict on the Crimea revived. In the past,
Tatars irritated the Ukrainian government with demands for more
autonomy, or Russian natives suggested the annexation of the Crimea
to the Russian Federation, all questioning domestic sovereignty (Buga-
jski et al. 2008: 3; 21). The events of the Euro-Maidan movement
and the subsequent change of power in Kyiv, encouraged the Crimean
Russian population to seek annexation by Russia. In the course of
events, the hitherto unconsolidated domestic sovereignty has not only
been curtailed by the loss of the crimean territory, but is further
destabilised by the ongoing attempts of the interim government to
gain complete authority over the entire country and its institutions
(Ukraine-Analysen 2014b: 26ﬀ).
Weak domestic authority is the second cause for unconsolidated
domestic sovereignty. Indicators for weak domestic authority are,
firstly, the contested succession of governments, secondly, diﬃculties
to create political consensus, and thirdly, the existence of parallel
power structures. Domestic turmoil, particularly after elections, can
also be used as a leverage by external actors. The danger of spreading
regime instability to their home was brought forward by Russia to
explain its interference into the domestic aﬀairs of the PSS (Stent 2007:
11). Contested successions of governments are tightly interwoven with
diﬃculties to form consensus in domestic politics. A stumbling stone
for all Moldovan governments has been their relationship to Russia,
Romania and later, the European Union. Moldova is less defined by
specific political programmes, but more by the geopolitical direction of
political parties (Vrabie 2012: 367). In 2001, Vladimir Voronin from
the Communist Party led the government and relations to Russia
improved shortly (loc.cit. 368). Voronin pursued a pro-Russian
82 Parties are undergoing constant change. Previous popular parties have been
the Western ‘Our Ukraine/People’s Self Defence’, the Western/Central ‘Bloc
Timoshenko’, or the ‘Lytvyn Bloc’.
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course, aimed at introducing Russian as the second oﬃcial language
and even pondered joining the Russian-Belorussian Union (Vrabie
2012: 370). But with Moldovan rejection of the Kozak Memorandum
in 2003, relations deteriorated and Moldova was getting closer to the
EU, resulting in a Russian embargo on Moldovan alcoholic beverages
(Vrabie 2012: 367). Moldovan governments are still characterised
by thin majorities and frequent changes due to a divided political
landscape, but also due to scandals over corruption and cronyism.
After the presidential and parliamentary crisis years of 2009-2011 the
government can be termed as stable.
In Ukraine, all elections have been criticised as being fraudulent
and a culture of paid demonstrators has been established. After serv-
ing two terms as a president, Leonid Kuchma planned to install Victor
Yanukovich as his successor in 2004. However, the electorate doubted
the election results that favoured Yanukovich and took to the streets
(Bugajski et al. 2008: 3). The inability of the successful opposition
to find a common denominator apart from getting rid of the existing
government reflects a deeply divided society. After parliamentary
elections in 2006, a state of cohabitation began and introduced a
period of tit-for-tat and fights for personal influence on the back of
the Ukrainian people (Bugajski et al. 2008: 14f). The ambition of
president Yanukovich (elected in 2010) to bring his predecessor and
archrival Yulia Timoshenko behind bars shows that Ukrainian domes-
tic politics are still far away from following the rule of law (Charap
& Dardan 2013: 1). When President Victor Yanukovich indefinitely
postponed the ratification of the already signed association agreement
with the EU in autumn 2013, pro-European demonstrators took to
the streets. The Euro-Maidan movement is not only a reflection of
the national divide over which governance model would be right for
Ukraine, but also about the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy.
The protest movement was spurred by a general dissatisfaction with
the ruling elite in the country. Yanukovch’s autocratic regime did
not prove to be as stable as assumed and he was ousted in February
2014. Since then, the interim Kyivien government strives to install
authority over the Ukrainian territory and its institutions. National
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elections for president and very likely also parliament are planned for
the 25th of May 2014 and may consolidate the domestic sovereignty
of Ukraine.
In Georgia, after violent clashes in the years 1992-93, Eduard
Shevardnadze brought several years of stability. But his unwillingness
to break-up with old traditions of clientelism culminated in a violent
political change in 2003/4 with the ‘Rose Revolution’ (Jawad 2006:
2). Yet, his successor Mikhail Saakashvili also lost esteem and has
been widely criticised and opposed in the last years (Halbach 2007b;
Kldiashvili 2012). Nevertheless, he allowed for the first peaceful and
fair change of government in 2012, when Bidzina Ivanishvili was
elected prime minister and one year later the opposition candidate
Georgi Margvelashvili became president (Kldiashvili 2012; Beard
2013). Ivanishvili’s resignation just one year after his election—though,
announced right from the start—and the legacy of an idealistic but
inexperienced and divided government again signals instability in
Georgian domestic politics (Beard 2013).
Azerbaijan is a special case among the four GUAM members.
Even though it can be characterised as the most autocratic regime
of the four states, it is today by far the most stable one. Regime
instability was limited to the first years after independence. The last
communist representative Ayas Mutalibov was forced to leave his
oﬃce in 1992 (Barner-Barry & Hody 1995: 240f). He was followed
by the elected president Abulfaz Elcibey. Just one year later in 1993,
Haidar Aliev gained the top of the power vertical with a coup (ib.).
After enduring various attempts to oust him from power, he could
consolidate his power. Since then domestic authority has remained
strong. In a monarchic manner, disguised as elections, Aliev left the
presidency to his son Ilham Aliev, who managed to maintain his power
by strict control over the few oppositional forces (Babajew 2007: 62f;
Heinrich 2010: 11ﬀ). Thus, societal consensus has been realised by
the use of force.
The third indicator, parallel power structures, is a product of the
turbulent first years of independence when everything was possible
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and regulation was scarce. Power is concentrated in the hands of the
so-called ‘oligarchs’ in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In Azerbaijan,
power is concentrated entirely in the hands of the Aliev clan. Never-
theless, governmental structures keep existing and are utilised and
misused by the oligarchs, either overtly or candidly. Parallel power
structures are enforced by corruption, which has been shown in ch.
4.3.2.3 on state capacity and shall not be repeated here.
Summarising chapter 5.3.2, it has been shown that challenges
to the sovereignty of the four GUAM states continue—particularly
violations of territorial integrity persist. Georgia and Azerbaijan could
at least reduce their energy dependence on Russia. Yet, as has been
exhibited in ch. 3.4, GUAM cannot be accounted for advances in that
area. Thus, unsolved challenges to external and domestic sovereignty
can be delineated as causes for the continuing relevance of sovereignty
and, thus, provide an explanation for the longevity of GUAM.
5.3.3 Constraints on Sovereignty
The previous chapter revealed that sovereignty concerns are still an
issue for GUAM members, with the continuing challenges by Russia
discerned as the main reason for keeping the sovereignty strategy high
on GUAM’s agenda. Unconsolidated domestic sovereignty is another,
though, less relevant factor. This chapter focuses on the question
of why GUAM could not reduce challenges to the sovereignty of its
members. The last assumption of this dissertation, which states that
GUAM’s sovereignty strategy is bound to fail, is presented below in
two parts: Firstly, regional integration and strengthening of national
sovereignty are antithetical objectives. Secondly, strengthening sover-
eignty depends on adequate partners.
Let us begin with the first point of integration and sovereignty
as contradictory objectives. Chapter 5.3.1 discussed previous as-
sumptions on sovereignty and integration. It has been argued that
advancing regional integration is coupled with the transfer of parts
of sovereignty to the macro-regional level. Strategies of guarding
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sovereignty compete with strategies of integration. Strong sovereignty
concerns are regarded as an obstacle for integration projects, because
states avoid the pooling of sovereignty necessary to fulfill integration
objectives (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 28). ‘Pooling and delegation
of sovereignty is the most obvious way of creating credible commit-
ments’ (Laursen 2010b: 267). Hence, an integration project between
states with a high regard for their sovereignty should not be expected
to produce the same results as projects composed of states which are
more willing to transfer considerable authority to a regional body (cf.
Kegel & Amal 2008: 226).
A minimal degree of authority transfer is necessary to ensure
GUAM’s eﬀectiveness. GUAM is confronted with the dilemma that
it strives to strengthen the sovereignty of its members by a strategy
which in itself demands the decrease of national sovereignties.
Aslund et al. (1999: 3) could hardly identify a willingness of the
new independent states to ‘delegate authority to multistate arrange-
ments’. This can also be observed for the GUAM case. The primacy
of guarding sovereignty nationally and limiting the authority of the
regional body can be traced in GUAM’s institutional design. The
decision-making process indicates a strong notion for national sover-
eignty (cf. ch. 3.3). All decisions follow the principle of unanimity—if
one state opts out, a project fails. Consensus decision-making guaran-
tees control over decisions maintaining one’s sovereignty (Acharya &
Johnston 2007c: 253). The GUAM Secretariat is limited to coordina-
tion with little influence on agenda setting. Furthermore, implemen-
tation of GUAM decisions is a national issue and not accompanied
by regional monitoring or sanction mechanisms. Hence, each national
government can proceed according to its own time, cost and interest
calculation, resulting in the frequent postponement of implementation
measures, for example, the reform of customs services. Even more
than ten years after the agreement on a free trade area, only Georgia
shows considerable progress in the facilitation of customs procedures
and, thus, the reduction of non-tariﬀ trade barriers. The financial
equipment of GUAM is also an indicator of the limited authority of
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the regional organisation. All projects are financed nationally. Most
working contracts of GUAM personnel are with their national gov-
ernments and follow a rotating principle. The budget and personnel
of the Secretariat limit the institution to mere representation. As
a result, GUAM exhibits limited transfer of decision-making and
enforcement competences from the national to the macro-regional
level. GUAM is scarcely equipped with authority.
Various reasons why GUAM members hesitate to shift parts of
their sovereignty to a regional institution have been suggested. First
and foremost, GUAM states still perceive their sovereignty questioned
by their former ruling power Russia (ch. 5.3.2.1 – 5.3.2.4). Second
up is that GUAM states still have little experience with independent
statehood and their domestic sovereignty is still not fully consolidated
(ch. 5.2.2 and 5.3.2.5). This underscores the nexus between the do-
mestic and the external dimension of sovereignty. Thirdly, all GUAM
states are hybrid regimes at best with presidential regimes. Only
Georgia and Moldova took advances in the last years to strengthen the
role of the national parliament. This aspect has been neglected in this
chapter. Lastly, several scholars assume that particularly developing
states employ a Westphalian sovereignty concept that contradicts the
modern understanding of sovereignty and makes them ill-prepared for
regional integration (Acharya & Johnston 2007b: 14; Werner & de
Wilde 2001). Although this assumption has not been scrutinised in
detail, various references have been made to it in chapter 5. GUAM
states indeed emphasise core categories of Westphalian sovereignty:
territorial integrity and the absence of any power above the state.
However, they are aware of restrictions on their sovereignty by interna-
tional agreements and exposure to world economic activities. Hence,
a traditional sovereignty concept is not apparent and the argument
deficient. A thorough analysis would be needed to determine the
exact sovereignty concept of each GUAM member and assess its eﬀect
on regional integration.
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GUAM deals with a dual problem. On the one hand, GUAM
participants guard their sovereignty nationally and are not willing
to transfer parts of their authority to the regional body. This is
a constraint on any integration project, regardless of its specific
objectives. The primacy of national sovereignty means a regional
development at low speed, advancing only according to the smallest
common denominator. Lacking suﬃcient sovereignty to be eﬀective,
the whole sovereignty strategy is put into question. This in turn will
very probably restrict the eﬀectiveness of GUAM. Thus, as long as
GUAM states secure their sovereignty nationally, it can be assumed
that GUAM as an organisation will not increase its authority. On
the other hand, the emphasis on national sovereignty also aﬀects the
institutional advancement of GUAM adversely, explaining its low
institutionalisation level. To sum up, GUAM perfectly reflects the
sovereignty appreciation of its participants. GUAM can be regarded
exactly as developed as its member states allow it to be.
This raises the question of whether forming a regional integra-
tion project is the optimal approach to strengthen the sovereignty
of integration participants. Looking at one specific instrument of
GUAM –raising international awareness and support for its challenges
on territorial integrity—a regional integration project is dispensable.
Forming diplomatic initiatives is policy coordination in the first place
and does not demand an integration project on the level of a regional
organisation. Less institutionalised modes of cooperation would suﬃce.
Furthermore, using the symbolic potential of international agreements
between states to exhibit their recognition as sovereign states in the
international system, it has to be asked whether there is a diﬀer-
ence between the symbolic eﬀect by entering existing international
organisations, on the one hand, and by forming new ones, on the
other. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are members of
various international organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE or the
European Council. They participate in partnership programmes with
the EU and NATO and, except for Azerbaijan, they are all members
of the WTO. It can be suggested that the creation of GUAM brings
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little added value in comparison to membership in established and
renowned international organisations. Moreover, the symbolic eﬀect
of creating a regional organisation wears oﬀ as soon as the deed is
done. The grouping would need results to maintain its symbolic power.
Referring to the trade-oﬀ argument for sovereignty relinquishment, it
can be concluded that GUAM members are unwilling to shift more
sovereignty to the regional level, because they do not expect a satisfy-
ing eﬀect in return. This would signify they do not have much faith
in their own project.
This brings us directly to the second line of argument in this sub-
chapter: The issue of adequate partners for strengthening sovereignty
shall be discussed. As has been discussed in ch. 5.1, violations of
state sovereignty are no new phenomenon; particularly weak states
or states of less importance to other states suﬀered from deliberate
violations. Examining the state of GUAM from a realist stance brings
the power variable back in. The PSS tend to perceive and assess
international politics through the glasses of realism. They think
in realist categories, ‘consequently, their openness to multilateral
cooperation, not to speak of deeper integration with other states,
remains rather limited’ (Fischer 2008: 145). A perception of zero-sum
games is common (cf. Molchanov & Molchanova 2010; cf. Spillman et
al. 1999: 329; Löwenhardt 2005: 25; Adomeit et al. 2001: 12; SVOP
1998: 2) with governments and societies traditionally worshiping
power (cf. Kornyeyeva 2009: 29ﬀ). Moreover, Russia—the prior
concern of the four states—is also deeply rooted in realist thinking
(Fischer 2014: 1; Zagorski 2005: 69; Hamilton 2008: 326; Mayer 2007:
18).
With this backdrop, strengthening sovereignty would suggest that
weaker states integrate with stronger states. Even though Ukraine can
be regarded as one of the most powerful PSS, GUAM members cannot
accumulate suﬃcient power to compete with Russia’s power status.
Since GUAM’s inception, they could not improve their bargaining
position towards Russia. Even if GUAM would include a military
component—turning into a defense community—it would still be too
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weak to defend its sovereignty against Russian challenges to their
sovereignty. Furthermore, referring to the assumptions in ch. 5.1
that states whose sovereignty is relevant for other powerful actors
suﬀer less from sovereignty violations, GUAM states remain in the
backyard. Neither GUAM as a regional organisation nor the individual
member states can rely on a lobby which would defend their interests
against violations of their sovereignty. None of the four GUAM
states are members of NATO. In 2014, NATO underlined that it will
not interfere militarily in Ukraine, even though Russian interference
seemed obvious. GUAM abandoned its attempts to attract a ring
of friends after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.83 The Georgian-
Russian war in August 2008 and the annexation of the Crimea in
2014 illustrated the consequences: Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine
could only condemn the Russian violation of Georgian and Ukrainian
borders, since GUAM is no military alliance. A full NATO and/or EU
membership might have prevented the aggression; thus, the four states
continue their path of close cooperation with both organisations.
83 GUAM actively invited observers to its summits, e. g. at the 2006 Kyiv
Summit the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland, Vice-President of Bulgaria,
and high-level representatives from Romania, Kazakhstan, the USA and of
the OSCE, BSEC (Kyiv Summit Communiqué, 2006). At the Baku summit
in 2007 representatives from Poland, Lithuania, Russia, Bulgaria, Japan,
Latvia, the U.S., Estonia, Austria, China, Korea, Kazakhstan, Germany,
Turkmenistan, Turkey, Slovakia, Portugal, Greece, Italy and the EU, OSCE,
NATO, UNESCO, the Council of Europe, UNO have been present (Gamowa
et al. 2007: 2). Particularly with its Eastern European neighbours GUAM
tried to intensify cooperation, for example in the ‘Energy-summit’ in 2007 in
Krakow, Poland,where the plan for a ‘common Balto-Black Sea-Caspian energy
transit space’ was formulated together with Poland, Lithuania and Kazakhstan
Grand rounds of participants gathered mainly when energy issues had to be
discussed (Simonjan 2008: 1). Crucial in GUAM’s attempt to attract allies
has been the US-GUAM framework agreement, signed in 2002. The headline
of an informal meeting in Madrid 2007 ran ‘Forum: Group of GUAM friends
in EU’.
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5.3.4 Summary
The objective of this section on the state of GUAM was twofold: to
explain the longevity of GUAM, and then, to explain the deficiencies
of such a sovereignty strategy. Both aspects shall substantiate that
GUAM as a sovereignty strategy is going to fail. It has been argued
that the four states still understand their sovereignty to be at risk.
Externally, their sovereignty is continuously challenged by Russia.
Domestically, they suﬀer from weak authority. Both weaknesses are
responsible for the persistence of GUAM as a sovereignty strategy.
In a second step, this section referred to conclusions from European
integration studies linking the advancement of integration to a relin-
quishment of parts of a state’s sovereignty. The institutional design
of GUAM demonstrates that the member states guard their national
sovereignty and, as a consequence, the weak regional authority brings
about poor results. Moreover, it fosters institutional gridlock, in-
hibiting a further institutionalisation process. Employing power as
an explanatory variable form the realist school of IR, it has been
argued that power accumulation would be the appropriate approach
for a successful sovereignty strategy. Yet, GUAM has not succeed
in incorporating powerful states or attracting relevant supporters to
ensure the respect of its sovereignty.
5.4 Conclusion
Chapter 5 scrutinised the nexus between GUAM and sovereignty in
order to substantiate two of the leading assumptions of this disserta-
tion. In a first step, this chapter examined the emergence of GUAM
and demonstrated that GUAM has to be understood as a sovereignty
strategy. In the second part, this chapter drew on the state of GUAM,
revealing why its sovereignty strategy is designed to fail.
Sovereignty has been conceived of as a bundle of rights, powers and
obligations tied to the status of authority within specific territorial
borders. Parts of sovereignty are ceded when states participate in inte-
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gration projects, submit to international agreements or participate in
global economic activities. Sovereignty violations can also occur from
other state actors with or without the mandate of an international
organisation. Despite restricted sovereignty, the sovereign state as a
phenomenon still characterises the international system.
Addressing the assumption of a sovereignty strategy, the argu-
ment presented in chapter 5 was twofold: In the first place, GUAM
members emphasise their sovereignty. They are young states who lack
considerable experience as sovereign states and frequently suﬀer from
unconsolidated domestic sovereignty. Hence, they value sovereignty
more than established states. GUAM states have also been com-
pared to post-colonial states who who have also disintegrated from
the former SU. They strive to distance themselves from their former
potentate, Russia, so assurance of their sovereignties is primarily di-
rected at Russia. GUAM members emphasise some core attributes of
sovereignty: territorial integrity and unchallenged domestic authority,
but also derivates like the equality of states in the international system
or the right to self-determination.
The second reason why safeguarding sovereignty plays such a vital
role for GUAM members is that they understand their sovereignty to
be questioned by an external actor—Russia. Russia’s reluctance to
grant them departure from the SU and the dominance it has since
practiced in mutual relations, particularly in the CIS, buttress this
assumption. The GUAM states are less concerned about limitations
to their sovereignty by international agreements or their participation
in the world economy, than they are about deliberate challenges to
their sovereignty by another state actor. Despite legal recognition,
the four states strive for practiced sovereignty from Russia.
Forming a regional organisation like GUAM should be regarded as
a demonstration of sovereignty, on the one hand, since only sovereign
states can enter into international agreements and form international
organisations. GUAM should be seen as a blueprint for regional coop-
eration in post-Soviet space. Thus, it endorses equality between states,
self-determination, non-interference in domestic aﬀairs and contrasts
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with the Russian concept of dominance in post-Soviet space. On the
other hand, GUAM has been employed to improve the sovereignty
status of its members, mainly by raising international awareness for
violations of their sovereignty. The assumption that GUAM functions
as a sovereignty strategy has been substantiated with references from
a variety of GUAM documents. The chapter also showed that GUAM
should not be equated with security-motivated organisations like the
UN or NATO. Neither is GUAM designed to ensure peace between its
members, nor as a defense alliance against an external attack. Only a
wide security concept would justify terming GUAM a security strategy.
The second part of this chapter focused on the state of GUAM.
It has been shown that sovereignty maintains a prominent stance
on GUAM’s agenda. Reasons are twofold, first, sovereignty is still
perceived to be questioned by the external actor Russia. Challenges
to their territorial integrity, equality and self-determination, domestic
authority and economic sovereignty continue. Second, though, to a
lesser degree, the domestic sovereignty of GUAM states cannot be
regarded as fully consolidated even with several years of independence.
It can be suggested that as long as the sovereignty of the four states
remains challenged externally or/and domestically, GUAM will con-
tinue to exist despite poor performance. Since the four states perceive
their sovereignty to be primarily questioned by Russia, the latter is
an agent of change.
Analysis of the state of GUAM has also concluded that GUAM’s
sovereignty strategy is designed to fail, because the concept of integra-
tion is opposed to the objective of strengthening the sovereignty of its
participants. In accordance with conclusions from integration studies,
strong appreciation of national sovereignty restrains the transfer of
suﬃcient parts of domestic sovereignty (authority) to the regional
institution, causing a weak regional institution that produces few
results. A high appreciation of sovereignty also inhibits the advancing
of the integration process; thus, GUAM as an integration project will
remain lowly institutionalised with little authority. GUAM serves
sovereignty first, and integration second.
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A further reason that limits the eﬀectiveness of GUAM’s sover-
eignty strategy comes from the IR theories. Sovereignty violations
by other actors of the international system are believed to aﬀect
particularly weak states or states whose sovereignty is of no specific
concern to others. GUAM could neither accumulate suﬃcient power
among its members nor attract adequate allies to enforce the sovereign
statehood of its members against Russian challenges to their sover-
eignty. Instead, GUAM should have incorporated powerful states to
form a counterweight towards Russia, or aﬃliated with the relevant
international actors. The latter has been a strategy of GUAM, but
has failed to produce continuous support. Alternatively, the four
states should have followed a unilateral approach. To some degree
they followed this idea by individually pursuing membership in NATO
and the EU.
The sovereignty variable also sheds light on the specifics of the
GUAM case; even though the elevated sovereignty concern constitutes
a characteristic that is also frequent amongst the other PSS, the four
GUAM states diﬀer due to the additional integration option at their
disposal.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Research Assumptions
Research on regional integration projects has always been driven by
the principal question of how regional integration projects contribute
to peace, welfare and even democracy in the international system
(Oneal et al. 2003; Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield & Pevehouse 2006).
The increasing number of regional projects constitutes a defining
characteristic of our global order (Baccini & Dür 2011; cf. Fawcett &
Hurrell 1995b; Glania & Matthes 2005; Mansfield & Milner 1999). The
majority of regional projects are still state-driven, particularly among
the PSS (Börzel 2012b). Power calculus and welfare maximising
are regarded as the main drivers of integration processes. The level
of economic development and democratisation among integration
participants have been employed as key variables to form conclusions
about diverging integration formats and outcomes (Shaw et al. 2011;
Sbragia & Söderbaum 2010). Yet, these approaches have limited
explanatory power for the emergence and longevity of GUAM.
GUAM has been widely neglected by Western scholars; major
research focused only on the first years of GUAM’s existence, be-
fore GUAM had transformed into a regional organisation (Schmidt
2003; Kuzio 2000; Moroney & Konoplyov 2002). The grouping has
been approached either from a realist stance—understanding it as
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a security organisation against Russia—or from an institutionalist
perspective—considering it a failed project (Tolstov 2008, Tsantoulis
2009; Parakhonskiy 2008). GUAM has been frequently characterised
as a vehicle of American foreign policy, reducing its member states to
mere pawns on the great geopolitical chessboard (Getmanchuk 2007:
2; also Eyvazov 2008: 285; cf. Pourchot 2008). This dissertation
sheds light on a case of PSR without Russian membership combining
development and sovereignty as key variables.
Four assumptions were investigated and presented in this disser-
tation: Firstly, that GUAM functions as a development strategy (1),
where I refer to explanations from liberal institutionalism and Inter-
national Political Economy (IPE) with welfare as the actor-related
variable. Welfare in the narrow sense has been equated with economic
prosperity. The second assumption claims that GUAM’s develop-
ment strategy is bound to fail due to the deficient composition of
the participants (2); mutual trust, state capacity and demand were
conceptualised as the independent variables. The third assumption of
this dissertation is that GUAM functions as a sovereignty strategy
(3). While the development concept is a common approach to re-
gional integration, the nexus between sovereignty and the emergence
of regional integration projects has been too often overlooked. This
study argues that GUAM is more about sovereignty than security.
The first and third assumption link the emergence of GUAM to the
dissolution of the SU and assert distinct preconditions, which influence
the format but also the outcome of GUAM. The fourth assumption ar-
gues that GUAM’s sovereignty strategy is also bound for non-success,
because the format of GUAM is inadequately equipped to address
the sovereignty concerns of its members (4). This argument refers to
sovereignty and power as explanatory variables.
6.2 Research Results
Chapter 3 described GUAM’s development and analysed its insti-
tutional form. GUAM started as a coordination mechanism and
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became a regional organisation within ten years. GUAM’s first joint
document deals with the consequences of the dissolution of the SU
and reflects on the linkage between political objectives such as the
withdrawal of Russian troops from their territory and economic in-
terests, particularly securing energy transport. Advancing economic
integration, building networks for law enforcement or tourism have
been added to the agenda. GUAM has been particularly active dur-
ing the incumbency of Ukrainian president Victor Yushtshenko and
Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili. The Russian-Georgian war
in 2008, the parallel international financial crisis and the cooled oﬀ
colour revolutions led to a downsizing of activities, which are presently
conducted in the shadow of public attention. Nevertheless, despite
regional crises, GUAM continues to work.
Today, GUAM can be characterised as a regional organisation with
a comprehensive organisational structure. Yet, GUAM’s Secretariat
is equipped with limited authority and financial means, functioning as
an information hub, coordinating the cooperation process. GUAM’s
advanced institutional structure contradicts the principle of ‘form
following function’ and imitates established international governmen-
tal organisations. Implementation deficits and a genuine state-led
approach are further characteristics of GUAM.
The first part of the analysis (ch. 4) centred on development with
the first assumption arguing that GUAM functions as a development
strategy (1). The economic cooperation built around GUAM’s free
trade agreement allows us to see GUAM as an economic integration
project. Development is a widespread objective of regional integration
(Belassa & Stoutsjesdijk 1981: 285; cf. Halperin 2007: 221), which is
as well observable in the case of GUAM. In the narrow sense, devel-
opment can be equated with economic growth, while in a wider sense
development is circumscribed within raising the overall welfare level,
including social standards such as health and education. In contrast
to regional integration between developing states, GUAM members
transcend the traditional development objective of modernisation by
employing a comprehensive development concept that enables them to
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advance their transformations into market economies and democratic
states, on the one hand, and their disintegration from the Soviet eco-
nomic and political union, on the other. One has to bear in mind that
the dissolution process of the Soviet Union (SU) has caused a high
degree of interdependence, combined with low economic, political as
well as ideational capacities. These factors proved to have ambiguous
eﬀects on integration.
GUAM followed the traditional approach of trade expansion to
create immediate growth eﬀects. Secondary eﬀects of trade expansion
are also relevant, e. g. reducing dependencies towards dominant
trading partners, utilising economies of scale and scope and attract-
ing foreign direct investment (FDI). All four countries are primarily
dependent upon Russian and EU-imports. GUAM’s free trade agree-
ment is aimed at reducing dependency on the Russian market, easing
trade conditions and securing exports. Economies of scale and scope
are particularly relevant for the small states of Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Moldova, whose market size cannot satisfy domestic demand
with competitive prices and quality goods. Additional FDI can help
GUAM members comply with the tremendous transformation tasks.
Trade facilitation, especially by improving transport infrastructure,
can also ease the access to scarce resources and constitutes one of the
pillars of GUAM’s economic cooperation. Namely, the transport of
hydrocarbons and energy figure high on the agenda. Particularly the
transport of hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan and the Caspian region
to Europe is expected to propel economic growth, both by reducing
dependence on Russian energy deliveries (diversification) and creating
revenues from transit via GUAM territory.
The second assumption argues that GUAM’s development strategy
is bound to fail (2). Mutual trust, state capacity and demand are
examined as conditional variables, substantiating the assumption that
GUAM members are unready for the chosen integration format and
their partner constellation is flawed.
Due to their common past as parts of the Russian Tsarist Empire
and the SU, all four members share similar beliefs and practices and
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can refer to a common business and political culture, which is but-
tressed by personal cross-border networks. Russian—one of GUAM’s
two oﬃcial languages—functions as the lingua franca and exemplifies
the commonalities amongst GUAM members. There is strong reason
to believe that these commonalities facilitate mutual trust and have
had a positive eﬀect on the emergence of GUAM. Mutual trust is
also regarded as one explanation for why cooperation was initially
sought with other post-Soviet states (PSS) and does not include other
neighbours like Turkey. However, mutual trust seems to have an am-
biguous eﬀect on the continuation of GUAM. There does not seem to
be suﬃcient trust between member states to allow for a considerable
transfer of financial means and authority to the regional body. This
can be explained, on the one hand, with the vanishing of the described
commonalities among the younger generations, which are gradually
replacing the old elite. On the other hand, Soviet legacy also entails
practices and values that tend to curb mutual trust, such as a lack
of transparency in decision-making or the preponderance of personal
loyalties instead of the rule of law.
Deficient state capacity—the institutional and financial capabili-
ties of the member states, which are necessary for implementing and
enforcing integration measures, to distribute benefits and to manage
the negative eﬀects of integration—is another obstacle for GUAM’s
eﬀectiveness. Analysis has demonstrated that all four participants
lack viable political and economic institutions—including expertise—
which would enable them to implement integration policies and cope
with any repercussions. In addition, GUAM members are short of
suﬃcient financial means to comply with their integration policies.
The weak state capacity of GUAM members is a result of the collapse
of the SU. Clearly, the wider the integration agenda and the higher
the institutionalisation level are, the more state capacity is needed to
benefit from integration. That makes GUAM states ill-prepared for
their chosen integration project and oﬀers an explanation for the low
implementation level of GUAM initiatives.
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In this context, the relevance of the leadership and the cohesion
argument were tested. The leadership rationale reinforces the state
capacity argument: Neither Ukraine as the largest participant and
market actor nor Azerbaijan as the most prosperous member could
establish themselves as a leader which may have been able to compen-
sate the deficiencies of other members. This supports the argument
of a leader being requisite for functioning regionalism. By contrast,
the GUAM case reveals the limits of the cohesion argument: Being
incomplete market economies and non-consolidated political regimes
with multiple unfinished or half-heartedly conducted reforms, GUAM
states primarily share weaknesses. Although cohesion of the political
and economic system is supposed to have a positive eﬀect on regional
integration, a cohesion of deficiencies turns into a clear disadvantage
for regional integration, which underscores the unfavourable composi-
tion of member states within GUAM.
Demand is the third conditional variable that was studied to
support the assumption that the development strategy is bound to
fail. Bottom-up demand for trade integration has been examined
along with trade flows and trade structure. The analysis shows that
GUAM participants exhibit considerable homogeneity of their export
and import products. Although regional trade did increase within the
GUAM area, the level has remained relatively low, despite intense
bilateral trade relations between direct GUAM neighbours—Moldova-
Ukraine and Azerbaijan-Georgia. Major trade flows are directed
outside the GUAM area. Relevant trading partners are the trading
blocs of the EU and the CIS, and amongst individual states, Russia,
Romania and Turkey.
All in all, the decision of who should be a member of GUAM
does not reflect actual demand for trade facilitation among member
states. Moreover, this study underlines that regional economic inte-
gration is no panacea for GUAM countries per se. Constraints on
economic growth among the four states are country specific. Unilat-
eral measures such as reforming the tax system and law enforcement
structures would contribute considerably to economic growth. To
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sum up, limited demand for economic cooperation among the current
member states aﬀects GUAM integration adversely.
GUAM’s development strategy can be understood as a convincing
but insuﬃcient explanation for the emergence and longevity of GUAM.
It does not enlarge our knowledge on why exactly those four states
initiated an economic integration project. Other PSS were exposed
to the same challenges and other partner constellations would have
promised greater benefits. Moreover, it oﬀers no explanation for why
the four GUAM members created such an advanced organisation,
when a free trade agreement would have suﬃced. Thus, the second
part of this dissertation (ch. 5) employs the sovereignty dimension as a
complementing explanans for the inception of GUAM, its persistence
and its current state.
The third assumption of this dissertation argues that GUAM
functions as a sovereignty strategy (3). Sovereignty is understood
as a status of authority that is linked to a bundle of rights, powers
and obligations (Krasner 1999). Although the idea of full sovereignty
is restricted by international agreements and the global dimension
of economic activity (Heller & Sofaer 2001; cf. Fawcett 2005: 35;
Cunliﬀe 2007: 53), states remain sovereign units of the international
system and are far from becoming obsolete (Little 2005; Krasner
1999). Sovereignty violations by other actors have never ceased and
mark the bifurcation between legal and practiced sovereignty.
There is strong reason to believe that GUAM was created to
address sovereignty concerns of its member states. Three reasons ex-
plicate why the four states pay excessive attention to their sovereignty:
First of all, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova are young
states that tend to emphasise their sovereignty more than established
states do. They gained independence in 1991 and before that had not
existed as independent states within their present borders even though
they had experienced short independences between the first World
War and their annexation to the SU. In addition to their lack of ex-
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perience with independent statehood they suﬀer from unconsolidated
domestic sovereignty, increasing the relevance of sovereignty.
Second of all, departing from the SU is comparable to the process
of decolonisation. The four states inherited a strong relationship
of dependence with their former power centre, Russia. Being eco-
nomically dependent on the former ruling power was perceived as
detrimental to their new sovereignty—even in times of globalisation.
They strive to distance themselves from their former ruling power.
In contrast to other decolonisation processes in, for example, Africa
or South America, the former metropole remains in close proximity,
increasing the desire to constantly reassure the new independence.
With GUAM the four states not only discard their periphery status,
they also challenge Russia’s role as a leader in post-Soviet regionalism.
Thirdly, regardless of the sovereignty concept that states employ,
sovereignty is always an issue if contested. GUAM members think
their sovereignty is questioned by Russia; thus, the GUAM states
have rejected deep integration with Russia despite promising benefits
(assuming that the expected benefits would not suﬃciently compensate
for the decrease in their sovereignty). These three factors explain why
GUAM members estimate sovereignty higher than do other states.
Participating in interstate agreements and institutions serves as
an instrument to demonstrate sovereignty in the international system.
Starting and maintaining a regional organisation with a broad field
of activity like GUAM is seen as an even stronger expression of
sovereignty. GUAM strengthens the sovereignty of its participants
primarily on a symbolic level. In its Charters, GUAM delineates
a blueprint for mutual relations in post-Soviet space, advocating
principles like equality, non-interference and win-win situations that
contrasts Russian-led regionalism. Practicing this code of conduct
within GUAM is as well a demonstration of sovereignty. GUAM
activities such as raising international awareness for violations of their
sovereignty in the UN or the OSCE are also intended to strengthen
their sovereignty. However, activities such as raising international
awareness through concerted diplomatic actions, do not need the
format of a regional organisation.
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The sovereignty strategy clarifies why exactly those four states
decided to form GUAM, even though, from an economic vantage point,
the composition is fairly deficient. All four GUAM states share similar
sovereignty concerns. In addition, the four states diﬀer from other
PSS due to their geopolitical position—they dispose of an alternative
to Russian-led integration.
The fourth assumption of this dissertation asserts that GUAM’s
sovereignty strategy is bound to fail (4). In the course of analysis, it
has been shown that practiced sovereignty has improved only to a
limited degree. GUAM’s contribution to strengthen the sovereignty of
its members has been scarce. Issues of territorial integrity remain un-
solved and, in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, have even deteriorated.
While Ukraine could more or less consolidate its territoriality prior to
2013, events in 2014 have revealed how fragile Ukrainian sovereignty
still is. Russian troops remain in disputed areas on Moldovan and
Georgian territory and the successful withdrawal of Russian troops
from Azerbaijan and Ukraine in the 1990s is not related to GUAM’s
policy. Looking at economic sovereignty, there are moderate advances
in Georgia and Azerbaijan, namely concerning energy. Georgia could
decouple its economy considerably from Russian dominance—however,
it did so by unilateral eﬀorts. GUAM members still perceive their
sovereignty questioned by Russia and analysis has illustrated the dif-
ferent levels on which sovereignty continues to be challenged. To start,
Russia questions the principles of equality and self-determination by
practicing dominance in the post-Soviet regionalism (PSR) and limit-
ing the choice of allegiances and integration projects. Russia moreover
challenges the domestic authority of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova
and Ukraine by interfering in their domestic aﬀairs, particularly when
the four states assert their otherness from Russia. Thirdly, Russia
calls into question the territorial integrity of the four independent
states by a) avoiding the withdrawal of its troops from GUAM territo-
ries, b) manipulating secessionist movements in the four states and c)
direct intervention. Lastly, Russia challenges the economic sovereignty
of the GUAM participants by maintaining and even increasing the
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asymmetric dependence on Russia. Hence, the longevity of GUAM
can be explained with the continuing relevance of sovereignty: As
long as the sovereignty issue remains unresolved, GUAM will continue.
The sovereignty and power variables are employed to demonstrate
that GUAM’s sovereignty strategy is bound to fail. Defining sover-
eignty as authority, analysis showed that GUAM as an organisation is
equipped with limited authority. GUAM members shy away from pro-
viding GUAM with suﬃcient authority, preferring policy coordination
over policy harmonisation. Exogenous and endogenous challenges
to the sovereignty of GUAM members explain why they hesitate to
transfer parts of their authority to the regional body. With external
sovereignty being threatened, domestic sovereignty far from being con-
solidated and a generally strong appreciation of national sovereignty
due to young statehood, GUAM members hesitate to transfer more
authority to a regional entity. The GUAM case pointedly exhibits the
nexus between domestic and external sovereignty. However, GUAM’s
limited authority produces poor results. Furthermore, a strong appre-
ciation of national sovereignty inhibits the further institutionalisation
process for GUAM. Both objectives—integration and strengthening
sovereignty—are irreconcilable, particularly in higher institutionalised
projects such as GUAM. Consequently, integration stops where the
ceding of sovereignty begins. To sum up, GUAM in its present form
as a regional organisation, is an inadequate instrument to enhance
practiced sovereignty, since this would demand the relinquishment of
parts of national sovereignties.
The limited authority of GUAM retains the eﬀectiveness of both
its sovereignty and development strategy. Development and sover-
eignty are interwoven in another aspect: Development is seen as the
key to reducing strong dependence on Russia, in other words, de-
velopment shall strengthen the sovereignty of the individual GUAM
states. While Russia strives to increase—or at least maintain—the
dependency status of GUAM states, the latter aim at reducing or
even nullifying their asymmetric dependency. However, GUAM’s
development strategy should not be reduced to a mere tool of its
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sovereignty strategy. The comprehensive development objective is
equally relevant. But it was the sovereignty motive that determined
the choice of participants and the institutional format, which have
proven to be second-best for a successful development strategy. As
such, GUAM diﬀers from other multi-dimensional projects, because
the economic and political dimensions have been present from the
start.
The second explanation for the failure of GUAM’s sovereignty
strategy builds on power as the explanatory variable. Despite the
significance of international law, IR scholars consent that violations
of sovereignty are no new phenomenon. All in all, the sovereignty of a
state depends on its power status or its relevance for a powerful state.
Costs for defending a state’s sovereignty are weighed against the costs
of inactivity. Power can be multiplied by alliances or partnerships with
other powerful states in the international system. With Russia as the
yardstick, GUAM does not embrace suﬃcient enough powerful states
to prevent violations of their individual sovereignties. The given choice
of member states is inadequate to compete with Russia. Furthermore,
GUAM has not succeeded in attracting powerful supporters which
would act on their behalf to prevent violations of their sovereignty.
Russian intervention into Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of
Crimea in 2014 illustrate GUAM’s weak power status.
GUAM should not be equated with a security organisation. Firstly,
GUAM contradicts traditional security projects, because it is not
directed at increasing the security among its members. Secondly,
GUAM is not a defense alliance against Russia—it demonstrates
neither the ambition nor the means to implement security through
military means. Instead, GUAM members regard the EU and NATO
as security providers and strive for greater integration into the two
organisations.
Having summarised the results of analysis, several conclusions
should be drawn on GUAM and PSR: Firstly, this dissertation con-
firms that GUAM cannot be termed as either an economic or a
security project; it is of multidimensional character with a double
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strategy (development and sovereignty) at its core. Secondly, analysis
has shown that GUAM states do share common interests. Therefore,
the supposition that GUAM is just a puppet of American foreign
policy should be rejected. Thirdly, this study characterises GUAM as
a special case of PSR.
The sovereignty strategy distinguishes GUAM from other integra-
tion projects in post-Soviet space, which have primarily been driven by
the power calculations of Russia. Thus, it contradicts the rationale of
hegemony as an explanation for the emergence of regional integration.
Moreover, adhering to the principle of equality, self-determination,
non-intervention and territorial integrity, GUAM represents a mile-
stone for multilateral cooperation in post-Soviet space. It is opposed
to old patterns of Russian dominance within PSR. As an epiphe-
nomenon, GUAM strengthens mutual cooperative relations between
member states by facilitating the formation of expectations of each
other’s behaviour. This is a considerable positive eﬀect, because the
four states did not maintain previous mutual relations as independent
states. However, this comes at the cost of exacerbating relations to
outsiders such as Russia. Furthermore, the significance of GUAM
as a role model for relations among PSS is diminished by GUAM’s
inability to produce tangible results. Thus, GUAM’s contribution to
stability in the region remains ambiguous.
There is another argument for GUAM as a special case of PSR:
GUAM sets a precedent with the mid-term strategy of its members to
integrate into other macro-regional structures like the EU and NATO.
Hence, GUAM has an expiry date. This restrictedness draws the
finish line on the institutionalisation process and the willingness to
make GUAM work.
What can be concluded for regionalism studies in general? The
findings of this dissertation highlight the advantages of a functional
approach to regional integration, especially when economic integration
is concerned. State-led initiatives tend to overlook actual demand
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and stakeholder interests and usually lack support from domestic
constituencies. These deficits contribute to implementation diﬃcul-
ties. Moreover, states should abstain from the temptation to create
one catch-all institution for integration; instead, they should favor a
step-by-step approach in line with true demand. A demand-oriented
approach is even more relevant for states with weak state capacity,
who should begin with issue-related, low institutionalised integration
formats. Indeed, economic regional integration is no panacea and
states with weak state capacity are advised to pursue unilateral mea-
sures to spur economic growth. There is reason to believe that trade
facilitation is not always the optimal instrument to achieve devel-
opment. Developing economies should employ multilateral formats
after unilateral approaches, because they are in need of functioning
political and economic institutions in order to implement integration
measures and allocate costs and benefits of integration fairly among
aﬀected domestic actors. Moreover, developing economies usually fail
to provide the necessary means to finance an integration project.
Looking at conditions for regional integration, this study under-
scores the importance of state capacity. It can be assumed that func-
tioning domestic institutions (political and economic) and financial
capabilities are more relevant than being democratic or economically
developed. The state capacity variable suggests that states with weak
state capacity should abstain from regional integration, especially
from deep integration.
This study also emphasises the significance of sovereignty as an
explanatory variable. Although sovereignty has been considered in
previous European integration studies, its impact for non-European
projects should gain more relevance; even if full sovereignty is an
illusion, sovereignty still matters. On the one hand, a strong apprecia-
tion of sovereignty amongst member states impedes the advancement
towards deeper regional integration since they shy away from establish-
ing an authoritative institution above the nation-state. On the other
hand, weak regional institutions tend to produce poor results. GUAM
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shows a paradox of sovereignty: Regional integration is employed to
strengthen sovereignty. Yet, such regional integration projects are
destined to fail. A better approach would be to consolidate domestic
sovereignty and to pursue integration into existing strong organisa-
tions or seek strong partners on an individual basis. Furthermore, this
study shows that a combined approach which associates development
objectives with a sovereignty strategy will fail on both accounts. Both
objectives demand diﬀerent types of cooperation formats and their
combination causes deficits in eﬃciency.
Considering the saliency of the power variable to explain regional
integration, this dissertation presents a case that adds a new per-
spective from the traditional hegemon rationale. While the creation
of international or regional institutions has been regarded by vari-
ous scholars as a hegemon’s strategy for maintaining or increasing
its power status, the GUAM case shows us that smaller states may
also form regional institutions. However, the GUAM case also illus-
trated the negative impact of an absent leader among members of an
integration project.
6.3 Recommendations
Through the course of analysis, GUAM was termed ‘destined to fail’.
GUAM failed in certain areas, but should not be regarded as a com-
plete failure. GUAM’s code of conduct and GUAM as an example of
cooperation between PSS that is not directed by Russia is indeed an
added value. Moreover, with GUAM, certainly there has been estab-
lished a communication channel for solving conflictive issues among
the four states in a peaceful manner. While GUAM’s sovereignty
strategy can be described as flawed from the start and indeed as a
failure, the development strategy may still succeed in certain areas,
given that GUAM members improve their state capacities.
Two main aspects should be considered for enhancing development
among the four states: One, regional integration may not be the
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most appropriate approach for the four states at the given time
and place to enhance their welfare levels. Unilateral measures can
contribute considerably to trade facilitation and economic growth
in all four states and can be assumed to create greater immediate
benefits than the GUAM model can. They should constitute the
first steps towards development, e. g. by continuing to reform tax
and customs procedures and trade related institutions. Some of the
aspired economic growth eﬀects would need a higher integration level
than the free trade area that GUAM members have agreed upon,
whereas other economic growth eﬀects could also be achieved without
strongly institutionalised regional integration.
Next, unilateral measures should be followed by selective coopera-
tion between the four states on specific issues instead of the present
broad and advanced GUAM format. For example, an energy alliance
promises benefits, both in a bilateral (Georgia - Azerbaijan, Georgia
- Ukraine, Moldova - Ukraine) and a quadrilateral format, whereas
transport projects indicate greater potential on a bilateral scale (Azer-
baijan - Georgia, Moldova - Ukraine). Additionally, economic integra-
tion projects should not be guided by GUAM membership, but by
actual demand. On a regional level other partner combinations would
be more appropriate, for example Georgia - Azerbaijan - Turkey, Geor-
gia - Azerbaijan - Armenia or Moldova - Ukraine - (Russia) as well
as partnerships with the entire European Union or single European
states like Romania. Alternatively, each of the four states could pur-
sue macro-regional solutions within the EU-28 or the CIS/Customs
Union-format. In the long-term perspective, a GUAM customs union
would be comparatively too small to compete with other regional
trading blocs in the neighbourhood. International trade integration
represents the third alternative to GUAM integration.
Recommendations for GUAM’s sovereignty strategy are much
harder to draw. Employing a realist stance, the four member states
should have sought integration or alliances with partners who are
capable of and willing to deter any attempts to violate their sovereign-
ties. Should Russia be prepared to take military steps to maintain its
sphere of interest, so should the partners of the four GUAM states
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if their sovereignty shall be eﬀectively guaranteed. However, great
powers are not inclined to go to war for the sake of smaller states.
As a symbolic demonstration of sovereignty, membership in other
established organisations such as the UN or the OSCE would be
suﬃcient. Looking at GUAM as an instrument to strengthen sover-
eignty, a diplomatic initiative would have suﬃced. More important
are strategies to address domestic factors of weak sovereignty. Since
unconsolidated domestic authority is a challenge to the sovereignty of
a state, which can be utilised by external actors, GUAM states have
to take unilateral actions to strengthen their domestic governance and
economies—including especially a reduction of economic dependence
on Russia. They should also push domestic conflict resolution with
unilateral initiatives and promote existing formats such as the Minsk
group. Russia also is an actor of change; as long as Russia challenges
the sovereignty of the four states, GUAM will continue to exist. The
EU should continue to support the four GUAM states on an individ-
ual basis to improve their state capacities and spur their economic
development; a direct cooperation with GUAM is not recommended
due to GUAM’s unreadiness addressing the pending issues.
Concluding, GUAM in its present state should continue to con-
centrate on low politics such as facilitating exchange and harmonising
technical standards. It should further strengthen its network function
by providing information and best practice. In a second step, GUAM
should promote economic integration, provided that the participants
have improved their state capacities.
6.4 Outlook
Conditional variables oﬀer a huge field for further research, partic-
ularly the domestic dimension promises interesting results. Close
examination of domestic actors and stakeholders within GUAM mem-
ber states could shed light on cleavages in interest formation towards
integration. This could also help to determine exact stumbling blocs
in implementing regional integration policies. In addition, the link-
age between the evolution of integration projects such as GUAM
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and domestic policy cycles in the member states could shed light on
accelerating and retaining factors for the advancement of regional
integration. This could oﬀer explanations for why GUAM’s most
prosperous phase coincided with the first years of Saakashvili’s and
Yushtshenko’s incumbency in the ‘post-revolutionary’ years.
The impact of the so-called Soviet legacy is a further conditional
variable that should be examined more closely. Soviet legacy may en-
tail negative eﬀects on mutual trust or cooperative behaviour. Study-
ing concepts of multilateral cooperation and integration could illus-
trate whether GUAM states follow other patterns than do states
without a Soviet, communist or colonial past. It could oﬀer insights
on the question of why bilateralism is the most common and success-
ful cooperation format in post-Soviet space or why the PSS prefer
state-led and strongly bureaucratised integration formats. By further
analysing trust between states, it could be asked whether the PSS do
trust each other more or less than other states, how much they trust
their former ruler Russia and whether there is suﬃcient mutual trust
for deeper integration formats. Analysis of the concept of sovereignty
could also be useful, since diverging sovereignty concepts are supposed
to explain the diﬀerent integration behaviours of states.
Taking a closer look at the domestic linkage and the issue of
identity construction may help to answer the question of why some
states initiate integration projects for which they are ill-prepared to
succeed with.
This dissertation indicates that the cohesion rationale should be
reconsidered: Cohesion is not entirely a conducive variable for regional
integration. Being equally poorly developed economies or sharing the
same type of deficient governance will provide little positive outcome
for regional integration projects. Cohesion loses its positive impact if
all participants display the same level of economic and/or political
underdevelopment.
Although the leadership rationale has been supported in this dis-
sertation, it can be suggested that the sum of means that can be
allocated amongst all participants is more relevant to advance the
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integration project than the existence of one single financier (given
that there are indeed shared interests). There is reason to believe that
regional projects embracing primarily poor participants are bound to
fail, no matter whether there is a leader among them or not. Hence,
research should examine whether integration projects between weak
states will fail per se. This brings us to the role of external promot-
ers of regional integration: It should be asked whether an external
promoter could compensate for weak state capacity amongst mem-
ber states or be an adequate substitute for an absent leader within
a regional grouping. The case of GUAM showed the ambiguity of
external commitment. Suﬃce it to note, advanced states must decide
how much they are willing to contribute to the development of other
countries. Opening their markets for developing economies would
already be a significant contribution.
Turning from conditional variables to explanations for the emer-
gence of regional projects, it should be studied to which extent regional
integration, particularly amongst post-colonial or newly formed states,
has been employed for national identity construction. It could be sug-
gested that GUAM states employ regional integration as part of their
nation building process, reassuring their place as independent states
in the international community and being on par with Russia—their
former metropolitan state.
Post-Soviet space is unique for being home to competing inte-
gration projects driven by the EU and Russia. The impact of such
competition on regional integration has not been estimated so far
and there is also the phenomenon of overlapping memberships. It
will have to be seen how (sub)regional projects like GUAM which are
squashed between (macro)regional integration projects will develop.
Overlapping regionalism may turn into the sine qua non.
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Leaving Russia's Backyard
Dana Schulze
The Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development–GUAM 
extends from the Black Sea region to the Caspian Sea and is situated 
between the European and the Russian integration project. The post-
Soviet region has been scarcely studied by Western scholars of regional-
ism. Previous research concentrated primarily on the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). GUAM has not been initiated by Russia 
and its members are keen on getting involved in Western integration 
projects.
In this book, the author explores the emergence and state of GUAM 
and constructs the wish to enhance development and to strengthen 
sovereignty as the two major integration motives of its member states 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Added to this, the analy-
sis delivers explanations for the shortcomings of GUAM.
This book revisits regional integration as an instrument to prosperity 
and independence for young and less developed states and provides 
many insights into the politics and economy of GUAM members.
